Chief Justice Robinson, in delivering the judgment of the Court, said: "With respect to the argument founded on the Real Property Act, 4 Will. IV. cap. 1, s. 20, I am of opinion that that clause must always be taken in connection with the 16th clause (4th sec. of this Ont. Act), and that it can have no effect on the rights of parties until twenty years have elapsed, when its operation applies and not before."

This section requires an instrument in writing which may operate as a lease, and a party holding property for twenty years without such a lease, or payment of any rent, acquires a title. Doe d. Lansdell v. Gower, 16 Jur. 100; 21 L. J. Q. B. 57; 17 Q. B. 589.

With regard to admissions of payment of rent, see Doe d. Earl Spencer v. Becket, 4 Q. B. 601.

Where the circumstances are disputed. The circumstances connected with the annual payments are very important, for if the person paying makes the payment expressly or impliedly on account of something else than rent of land, of which he is tenant, that would not be a payment of rent within this section. Attorney-Gen. v. Stephens, 6 De G. M. & G. 146.

In Baines v. Lumley, 16 W. R. 674, the time commenced not to run from the death of lessor, but from the last payment of rent.

In our own courts, in Liney v. Rose, 17 C. P. 186, it was held that where in the case of a lease for twenty years, the lessor permits the lessee to continue during the term without payment of rent, the Statute does not begin to run against the lessor and those claiming under him until the determination of the lease. Vide also Davy v. Oxenham, 7 M. & W. 131; Doe d. Johnson v. Liversedge, 11 M. & W. 517.

A lease for life for a nominal rent, not under seal, although it could not pass a freehold interest, would operate as a lease

from year to year. Doe d. Lawson v. Coutts, 5 O. S. 499. Plaintiff claimed under a deed from J., the patentee, dated 12th April, 1853, and proved that on the 4th of April, 1854, he served defendant with a notice to give up possession on the 30th September then next, in failure whereof, "I shall require you to pay me rent of £1 per month for the same, for every month wherein you may continue in possession of the same, until I recover possession of the same by legal proceedings or otherwise." Defendant, at the time of the deed to the plaintiff and for some time previous, had been living on the lot under a verbal agreement with J. that he should have it for several years, and had made improvements. Held, that the plaintiff must recover; that the notice was not an acknowledgment of yearly tenancy, so as to entitle defendant to six months' notice; and that the agreement with J. could have no effect. Cleland v. Kelly, 13 Q. B. 442. See also as to yearly tenancy the following cases: Doe v. Coutts, 5 O. S. U. C. 499; Doe v. Morse, 1 B. & Ad. 365; Beney v. Lindley, 3 M. & G. 512. "Such leases of land as must be in writing, and are not made by deed, void as leases, leave the effect in all other respects as it was before the Statute was passed." The Statute here alluded to is Con. Stats. cap. 90, s. 4, or Rev. Stats. p. 948, cap. 98, s. 4. Held, in White v. Nelson, 10 C. P. 158, defendant obtained only a yearly tenancy by means of the correspondence, and was therefore entitled to a six months' notice to quit at least. Caverhill v. Orris, 12 C. P. 392; Sheldon v. Sheldon, 22 Q. B. 621; Houghton v. Thompson, 25 Q. B. 557.

In Johnson v. McLelland, held, that the receipt of rent by the wife from a tenant of her estate, after the expiration of a term, creates a tenancy from year to year. Davis v. McKinnon, 31 Q. B. 564; Birchall v. Reid, 35 Q. B. Manning v. Dever et al., 35 Q. B. 294; Gibboney v. Gibboney, 36 Q. B. 236; McPherson v. Norris, 13 Q. B. 472..

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The qualities that distinguish an estate from year to year from proper terms of years, and from estates at will, are

these: it is now raised by construction of law alone, instead of an estate at will, in every instance where a possession is taken with the consent of the legal owner, and where an annual rent has been paid, but without having been any conveyance or agreement conveying a legal interest; and that, whether it arises by express agreement or by implication of law, it may, unless surrendered or determined by a regular notice to quit, subsist for an indefinite period if the estate of the lessor will allow of it, and for the whole term of his estate, where it is of a limited duration, unaffected by the death either of the lessor or lessee, or by a conveyance of their estate by either of them. Birch v. Wright, 1 T. R. 380. The courts lean rather to construing estates as estates from year to year, and requiring a six months' notice to determine, rather than as estates at will. 3 Burr. R. Roe v. Lees, 2 Bl. R. 1171; Doe v. Weller, 7 T. R. 478; 1609; Pope v. Garland, 4 G. & Coll. 399; Doe v. Watts, 7 T. R. 83; Doe v. Morse, 1 B. & Ad. 365. Particularly is this the case if the rent reserved is certain, or capable of being ascertained with certainty. Daniel v. Gracie, 6 Q. B. 145.

Where a tenant at the end of a term of years held over, and the landlord received rent from him, it was held that the landlord might by a half year's notice require him to quit at the end of the first year after the term of years had expired. Doe d. Clarke v. Smaridge, 7 Q. B. 957.

Although a tenancy from year to year is ordinarily implied from the mere receipt of rent (Bishop v. Howard, 2 B. & C. 100), it is competent to either the payer or receiver to prove the circumstances under which the payments as for rent were so made, and by such circumstances to repel the legal implication which would result from the payment of rent unexplained. Doe d. Lord v. Crayo, 6 C. B. 90.

A demise, "not for one year certain but from year to year,” operates as a demise for two years, and consequently the tenant cannot be ejected after a notice to quit at the expiration of the first year. Denn v. Cartwright, 4 East. 31.

A lease for one year, and so on from year to year, until the tenancy hereby created shall be determined as hereafter mentioned, with a provision that it should be lawful for either of the parties to determine the tenancy by three months' notice, creates a tenancy for two years certain, and cannot be terminated by a three months' notice to quit at the end of the first year. Doe d. Chadborn v. Green, 1 Perry & Dan. 454; 9 Ad. & Ell. 658; Buckworth v. Simpson, 1 Cr. M. & R. 834; 5 Tyr. 344.

A tenancy from year to year will not arise by implication where it will work a forfeiture. Fenney v. Child, 2 M. & S. 255. The mere fact of occupation, coupled with payment of rent during such occupation, in an under-tenant who is permitted to hold over by the reversioner after the determination of the original lease, does not raise the presumption of a demise for years unless there is some evidence to shew an agreement for a demise for a term. Simkin v. Ashurst, 4 Tyr. 781.

Notice to quit must have at least a half year's notice in a tenancy from year to year, computing from the time when the tenancy commenced. Right v. Darby, 1 T. R. 159.

Land was let for one year, and so on from year to year, until the tenancy should be determined as after mentioned, with a subsequent proviso that three months should be sufficient notice to be given from either party, and another subsequent proviso that it should be lawful for either party to determine the tenancy by giving three months' notice. It was held that the tenancy was not determinable by three months' notice, expiring before the end of the second year. Doe d. Chadborn v. Green, 9 Ad. & Ell. 658; Birch v. Wright, 1 T. R. 178, Doe d. Jenkins v. Cartwright, 2 Camp. 572; Thompson v. Maberley, 4 East. 29.

(7.) Where any person is in possession or in receipt of the profits of any land, or in receipt of any rent, as tenant at will, the right of the person entitled subject thereto, or of the person through whom he

claims, to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action to recover such land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued either at the determination of such tenancy, or at the expiration of one year next after the commencement of such tenancy, at which time such tenancy shall be deemed to have determined. C. S. U. C. cap. 88, s. 7.

This sub-section is the same as 3 & 4 Will. IV. cap. 27, s. 7, except that the proviso in the Imperial Act is inserted in sub-section 8.

A tenant at will is he who enters and enjoys the land by the express or implied consent of the owner, without there being any obligation, either on the part of the lessor or lessee, to continue it for any certain or determinate term. Butler's note to Coke Lit. 270 b.; Leake's Law of Property, 206.

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At common law feoffment, or the conveyance of a freehold estate, was effected by livery of seisin, that is, by an actual delivery of possession, and by 29 Car. II. cap. 3, s. 1, estates made or created by livery and seisin only, or by parol, and not put in writing and signed by the parties so made or creating the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized, shall have the force and effect of estates at will only."

The plaintiff, by indenture dated 6th April, 1854, did "lease, let and to farm let," the land in question, to defendant, upon the terms that he should pay all rates, levies and assessments upon the said property, &c., and not transfer without the lessor's consent; and the plaintiff did thereby rent unto the defendant (the premises) at the rate of sixpence per acre per annum, payable half-yearly in advance. There was no livery of seisin, nor any time mentioned, but the defendant entered into possession. Held, that an estate at will only passed. Wilmot v. Larabee, 7 C. P. 407.

"There can be no estate created for life, if there be no livery, nor anything that would be equivalent to it, as if the conveyance could take effect under the Statute of Uses,