The following cases seem to lay down the principle that acts of ownership over part of the land may give one the title over the whole. Davis v. Henderson, 29 Q. B. 344; Wigle v. Shennick, 12 C. P. 325.

In Davis v. Henderson, per Morrison, J., "Payment of taxes on the whole is an important fact in such a case." Heyland v. Scott, 19 C. P. 165.

The principle laid down in the two last preceding cases, as to the exercise of acts of ownership over wild land sufficient to establish possession under the Statute of Limitations, recognized, and acted upon; and held, that the evidence set out in the report of this case was sufficient to shew a title by possession to the south half of the lot, though twenty-five acres only had been actually occupied. Mulholland v. Conklin, 22 C. P. 372; see also McKinnon v. McDonald, 13 Chy. 152; but see contra, McMaster v. Morrison, 14 Chy. 138.

A man cannot be constructively dispossessed of a portion of his land; and if by a mistake in boundaries a portion of an adjacent lot is inclosed for twenty years, the title acquired by the Statute only embraces that portion actually in possession; that such encroachment will not be extended by any application or constructive possession beyond the limits fenced in, nor give the right to insist on the course of that fence as establishing the course of the line of division between the lots, further than the fence has been maintained for twenty years. Doe d. Hill v. Gander, 1 Q. B. 3; Wideman v. Bruel, 7 C. P. 134; Doe d. Becket v. Nightingale, 5 Q. B. 518; Ferrier v. Moodie, 12 Q. B. 379.

Twenty years' mutual acquiescence in a boundary line, although differing from that set out in the original survey, is binding upon the owners of adjoining lots, especially if upon this assumed boundary each owner has his full complement of land. Bell v. Howard, 6 C. P. 292.

Disputed or mistaken boundaries: Doe d. Stewart v. Radick, Tay. 494; Doe d. Howard v. McDonnell, Dra.

374; Doe d. Morgan v. Simpson, T. T. 1 & 2 Vic.; Dennison v. Chew, 5 O. S. 161; Doe d. Dunlop v. Servos, 5 Q. B. 284; Doe d. Taylor v. Sexton, 8 Q. B. 264; Martin v. Wild, 19 Q. B. 631. The fact that both plaintiff and defendant in the above case were under a common error as to the true boundary, will not prevent the Statute from running against the true line. McNish et al. v. Munro,

25 C. P. 290.

As to exchange of land, see Findley v. Pedan, 26 C. P. 483; Taylor v. Croft, 30 Q. B. 573; Cole v. Brunt, 35 Q. B. 103; Elliot v. Bulmer, 27 C. P. 217; Bernard v. Gibson, 21 Chy. 195.

Possession is considered continuous, though there may be a break: McLaren et al. v. Morphy, 19 Q. B. 609; Lewis v. Kelly, 17 C. P. 250; Kipp v. Incorporated Synod of Diocese of Toronto, 33 Q. B. 220; McLeod v. Austin et al., 37 Q. B. 443.

In ejectment, defendant claimed under a deed from one C. The land had been granted to A., a married woman, and C. proved that in 1825 he got a deed, since lost, from her and her husband, on which was endorsed a certificate of A.'s examination and acknowledgment by two magistrates, both dead, before whom he took her for that purpose. He bought out the interest of one K., who was in possession under an agreement to purchase from A. and her husband, and he paid the balance due to them by K., from whom he received possession. A. and her husband having died within the last five years, their heirs brought ejectment. Hela, that the plaintiffs were not barred by the Statute, for that C. under the circumstances entered as a purchaser from A. and her husband; that their deed to him being void, he held as tenant at will, and the Statute did not begin to run for a year, since which forty years had not elapsed. Amey et al. v. Card et al., 25 Q. B. 501.

The burden of proof is thrown upon the defendant in ejectment to shew that the Statute is inapplicable. Doe d. McKay v. Purdy et al., 6 O. S. 144.

The effect of the exception in favour of the grantee of the Crown who has never gone into possession is, that while ignorant of the fact of his land being in the possession of some other, he is not to be regarded as disseised, and consequently may devise. Doe d. McGilles v. McGillivray, 9 Q. B. 9.

It protects the grantee even if unconscious of his title, and believed he had disposed of his land. 9 Q. B. 276.

Holding a bond for a deed does not make the person entitled to the land. Johnson et al. v. McKenna, 10 Q. B. 520; Cushin v. McDonald, 26 Q. B. 605.

Under the Quieting of Titles Act, a petitioner claiming title by length of possession against the patentee of the Crown, must shew that the patentee or his heir had knowledge of such possession, or he must shew a forty years' possession.

A petitioner claiming title by length of possession must prove possession for the requisite length of time by clear and positive evidence, which should be of more than one independent witness. In such a case, a notice prepared and signed by the referee should be served upon the person having the paper title, if he can be found; but if not, evidence should be put in both of search for him and his representative; and if such search prove fruitless, possession should be shewn long enough against him, even though he had no notice of such possession.

A mortgage more than twenty years old appeared upon the Registrar's Abstract. A discharge of this did not appear to have been registered; none was produced, nor was any proof given of the mortgage ever having been discharged. It was stated on affidavit that nothing was known of the mortgagees, and that no demand had ever been made for the mortgage debt, though nothing had been paid, and that no acknowledgment had been given within twenty years or more. Held, that evidence should be adduced of search for the mortgagees or their representatives. That a single

ex parte affidavit that no payment or demand has taken place would not bar claims of mortgagees who could be

⚫ served with notice. But if they could not be found, notice might be dispensed with after a great length of time and satisfaction presumed (a).

Under the present Statute, he would have only to shew a twenty years' possession. See also Turley v. Williamson, 15 C. P. 538; Doe d. Fitzgerald v. Finn; Doe d. Fitzgerald et al. v. Clench, 1 Q. B. 70; Stewart v. Murphy, 16 Q. B. 224; Mulholland v. Conklin, 22 C. P. 381; Stewart v. Murphy, 16 Q. B. 224; Hill v. McKinnon, 16 Q. B. 216; Armstrong v. Stewart, 25 C. P. 198; also Young v. Elliot, 23 Q. B. 420.

(5). Where any person is in possession or in receipt of the profits of any land, or in receipt of any rent by virtue of a lease in writing, by which a rent amounting to the yearly sum of four dollars or upwards is reserved, and the rent reserved by such lease has been received by some person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to such land or rent in reversion immediately expectant on the determination of such lease, and no payment in respect of the rent reserved by such lease has afterwards been made to the person rightfully entitled thereto, the right of the person entitled to such land or rent, subject to such lease, or of the person through whom he claims to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action after the determination of such lease, shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time at which the rent reserved by such lease was first so received by the person wrongfully claiming as aforesaid, and no such right shall be deemed to have first accrued upon the determination of such lease to the person rightfully entitled. C. S. U. C. cap. 88, s. 10.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Where a landlord places a tenant in possession of lot one, and the tenant knowingly encroaches on lot two, held that the tenant's occupation does not enure to create for the landlord a title to lot two. Doe d. Smith v. Deans, 3 Q. B. 411.

(a) 8 U. C. L. J. 50; Re Caverhill, Mowat, V.C., in which he says "possession of part does not give title by prescription to the whole lot.', Hunter v. Farr et al. 23 U. C. Q. B. 324; Dundas v. Johnson et al. 24 U. C. Q. B. 550; Young v. Elliott, 25 U. C. Q. B. 334.

Non-payment of rent does not cause the Statute to run till after the determination of the lease. Liney v. Rose, 17 C. P. 186, following Doe d. Davy v. Oxenham, 7 M. & W.

131.

In the 3rd sub-section to this section we have followed the English Act, and have inserted the words "other than a will." The case of James v. Salter, 2 Bing. N. C. 505, where the plaintiff as an annuitant under a will was declared by the Court not to be barred even after twenty years, and the same case on review in 3 Bing. N. C. 544, where this decision was reversed, is worthy of being noticed. Vide Doe d. Jacobs v. Philips, 10 Q. B. 130; Ganard v. Tuck, 8 C. B. 231; Drummond v. Saut, L. R. 6 Q. B. 763.

(6). Where any person is in possession or in receipt of the profits of any land, or in receipt of any rent as tenant from year to year or other period, without any lease in writing, the right of the person entitled subject thereto, or of the person through whom he claims, to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action to recover such land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued at the determination of the first of such years or other periods, or at the last time when any rent payable in respect of such tenancy was received (whichever last happened). C. S. U. C. cap. 88, s. 9.

This section fixes the time when the right of action accrues either at the end of the first year or other periods of tenancy, or the last time when there was payment of rent. This section is taken from 4 Will. IV. cap. 1, s. 20.

It was held in McClenaghan v. Barker, 1 Q. B. 26, as follows: "A letting at an annual rent constitutes a yearly tenancy, which continues at the same rent for the second year as the first, if the tenant remain in possession of the premises; and the landlord may distrain for the first year's rent at the end of the second year; and the Real Property Act 4 Will. IV. cap. 1, s. 20 (the section now under consideration) does not determine the tenancy at the end of the first year so as to make it necessary to distrain within six months afterwards."