A petitioner, under the Act for Quieting Titles, claiming by length of possession, must prove possession for the requisite length of time by clear and positive evidence, which should be of more than one independent witness. Re Caverhill, 8 L. J., N. S. 50, Chy.

Quere: If B., in undisturbed possession for twenty years, voluntarily restores possession to C., can B. turn C. out again by reverting to his title under the Act? Doe d. Ausman v. Minthorne, 3 Q. B. 423.

Semble: That a plaintiff in ejectment, relying in the opening of his case upon a prima facie title by possession,. and being met by proof on the part of the defendant of a prior possession, cannot repel such proof by attempting to shew the possession of the defendant that of a tenant to him (the plaintiff) as landlord. He should go into his case fully in the first instance. Robinson, C. J., diss. Doe d. Osborne v. McDougal, 6 Q. B. 135.

The practice at the present time would have admitted the evidence.

A defence under the Statute against a clear title is not one to be favoured, especially in cases between relations; and where the jury have leaned against such defence in support of the case, and there has been no misdirection, the defendant must shew very strong grounds to entitle him to a new trial on the evidence. Hemmingway v. Hemmingway, 11 Q. B. 237.

As to forty years in case of disability. Petre et al. v. Mailloux, 8 C. P. 334; Myers et al. v. Greely, 9 C. P. 297.

A rector is not barred by adverse possession of the glebe land for twenty years, unless he has been incumbent during the whole of that time. Hill v. McKinnon, 16 Q. B. 216; Plowden, 375; Runcorn v. Doe d. Cooper, 5 B. & C. 696, 698; Barker v. Richardson, 4 B. & Ald. 579.

Where an action of ejectment brought under the old practice had been stayed owing to an order for security for

costs, and the devise had expired nine years since, the Court refused an amendment by enlarging the term, which would have deprived the defendant of a title acquired under the Statute of Limitations. Doe d. Day v. Bennett et al., 21 Q. B. 405; vide also Malloch v. Derinan et al., 22 Q. B. 54.

Where a party, by deed, has granted a piece of land to another, though he may retain possession of part of the land granted, and though the grantee may suppose his grant does not cover such part, yet if the deed does actually cover the land, the grantee is entitled to it if he asserts his right within twenty years of the date of the grant. Styles v. Taylor, 14 C. P. 93.

Possession of land of wife does not give husband absolute right to the land; any grant made by him will only pass an estate for his own life, if his wife should so long live. Nolan v. Fox, 15 C. P. 565; McGregor et al. v. La. Push, 30 Q. B. 299.

With regard to the effect of registration, a good case is that of Hamilton et al. v. Lightbody, 21 C. P. 126.

A deed of the land in question from the testator under whom the plaintiff claimed to one P. was produced by defendant unregistered, and under which the grantee had never taken possession, the testator having retained possession till his death, and his widow and devisee for life having continued in possession under the will which she registered; in all a period of twenty-seven years. Held, that the title of the plaintiffs, who claimed under the deceased in remainder under the will, was not defeated by the deed to P., for whatever estate was conferred, by it was lost by the twentyseven years' adverse possession. Hamilton et al. v. Lightbody, 21 C. P. 126; Boys v. Wood et al., 39 Q. B. 495; McIntyre v. Canada Co., 18 Chy. 367; Connor v. McPherson, 18 Chy. 607; Greenstreet v. Paris, 21 Chy. 229; Nash v. Glover, 24 Chy. 219.

An action at law for the assignment of dower is barred by this section. Marshall v. Smith, 5 Giff. 37.

A plaintiff, admitted to be in possession, and seeking to displace the title under which the defendants claim on the ground that it was barred by the Statute, need not shew what that title was and how it was barred; but a general allegation, so as to bring the case within that section, is sufficient. Jones v. Jones, 16 M. & W. 699.

Shelford says, p. 146: "The word 'rent' in the second section of the Act (4th section of Ontario Act), does not include rents reserved on leases for years, but is confined to rents reserved as an inheritance distinct from the land, and for which, before the Statute, the party entitled might have had an assize, such as ancient rent service, fee farm rents and the like." Grant v. Ellis, 9 M. & W. 113. Mere nonreceipt therefore of rent under a lease for more than twenty years does not deprive the lessor of his right to rent under the lease. A lessee of premises for one hundred and twentyfive years from the 25th of March, 1782, by a lease dated the 21st July, 1787, and which contained clauses of distress and re-entry, demised the same to a lessee for one hundred and twenty years from the 25th March last past. Twentytwo years of rent accrued due to the representatives of the lessor in the last mentioned lease. It was held that although the original lessee had no reversion expectant on the determination of the lease of the 21st July, 1787, yet that the rent reserved by the lease was a conventional equivalent for the right of occupation, and that therefore the right of the representatives of the original lessee to the rent during the residue of the term was not barred by this section. Re Turner, 11 Ir. Ch. Rep. N. S. 304. "It is now clearly established that so long as the relation of landlord and tenant under a lease in writing subsists as a legal relation, the landlord's right to rent is not barred by non-payment for however long a time" (per Lord Cranworth, Archbold v. Scully, 9 R. L. C. 360).

As to the use of the word "rent" in the Statute, see further on.

5. In the construction of this Act, the right to make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued at such time as hereinafter is mentioned.

(1). Where the person claiming such land or rent, or some person through whom he claims, has, in respect of the estate or interest claimed, been in possession or in the receipt of the profits of such land, or in receipt of such rent, and has, while entitled thereto, been dispossessed, or has discontinued such possession or receipt, then such right shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time of such dispossession or discontinuance of possession, or at the last time at which any such profits or rent were and was so received. C. S. U. C. cap. 88, s. 2.

"Has been dispossessed, or has discontinued such possession or receipt."

"Dispossession " means the actual ouster or expulsion of a person having a right to the possession. (a)

"Discontinuance" means the quitting possession of what a person has a right to possess, followed by actual possession on the part of another. (b)

Discontinuance or dispossession. The Statute is disjunctive. In the case of Doe d. Taylor v. Proudfoot, 9 Q. B., 503, which was an action for a small piece of land of two acres, happening to be a surplus in the lot, the circumstances were as follows: Taylor owned the lot of 200 acres, sold the rear 50 acres to Tisdale, and afterwards sold the balance of the land or 150 acres (the three-quarters of the lot) to Kemp, and left possession, supposing he had sold all the land. Between Kemp and Tisdale there appeared in running the lines to be a small piece of two acres. Taylor brings action for this. Verdict for plaintiff, but new trial granted.

Chief Justice Robinson there says: "It seems to me that neither Tisdale nor Kemp nor their vendors have in the

(a) Brown's Stat. Limitations, 445.

(b) Cannon v. Rivington, 12 C. B. 1; Austin v. Llewellyn, 9 Ex. 276; Smith v. Lloyd, 9 Ex. 562; McDonnell v. McKinty, 10 Ir. L. R. 574; Brown's Stat. Limitations, 446.

interval taken possession of the small piece of land in contest; but that does not affect the question, and no one has possessed it for twenty years. But dispossession and discontinuance of possession are not both required by the Statute, and there is no doubt that it may happen in cases under the Statute that one may by discontinuance have lost his right, when at the same time no other person can be said to have acquired a right to the property by possession against him. That may lead to consequences perhaps not foreseen by the legislature; but it is a consequence noticed by English commentators on the Statute, not however as a circumstance which can prevent the operation of the Statute as a bar in a clear case of discontinuance of possession."

Absence from the Province is not a discontinuance of possession, within sec. 17 of 4 Wm. IV. cap. 1, Doe d. Cuthbertson v. McGillis, 2 C. P. 124; see also Doe d. Shepherd v. Bayley, 10 Q. B. 310; Butler et al. v. Donaldson, 12 Q. B. 255; Ketchum v. Ingleton, 14 Q. B. 99; Ingalls et ux. v. Arnold et al., 14 Q. B. 296; Pringle v. Allan et al., 18 Q. B. 575; Lloyd v. Henderson, 25 C. P. 253.

Although the Statute provides in the same sentence both for case of land in which a party is dispossessed and for that of rent which he has ceased to receive, the Statute must be read reddendo singula singulis, i. e., fixing the actual moment of dispossession, or discontinuance of possession at the point from which the (ten) years are to run in the case of land, of which a person has at some moment of time ceased to be in the actual possession; and the last annual payment of rent as the point from which the (ten) years are to run in the case of a person ceasing to receive rent (a).

"Possession." What is the meaning of possession as defined by the cases reported in the Courts of Ontario?

(a) Owen v. De Beauvoir, 16 M. & W. 564; New Reports Stats. 37, 2nd edition.