Barras v. Bidwell. of Louisiana, and, therefore, cannot maintain this action in this state. This exception cannot stand for several reasons. First, it is pleaded, as the record shows, after a judgment by default, which is forbidden by art. 333, Code of Practice. Second, even if there had been no default, it comes too late, for it should have been pleaded in limine litis: Art. 333, Code of Practice. Third, it is waived by the filing of defenses on the merits: Wingate v. Wheat, 6 La. Au., 241. Fourth, it is embodied in the answer, which is expressly forbidden by art. 333, Code of Practice: Pecquet v. Pecquet, 17 La. An., 232. Fifth, it is not verified as required by rule 6 of this court. The exception is, therefore, overruled. The second exception is lis pendens. This is open to the same objections as the exception just considered. It is also conceded not to be well founded in fact. It is, therefore, dismissed. II. The action of the plaintiff is based on the record of a judgment recovered in a cause between the same parties in the superior court of the city of New York, on Feb. 2, 1876. One of the defenses to the action is, that the judgment was obtained by fraud and improper practices on the part of the plaintiff; that defendant had a good and valid defense against the claim on which the judgment was rendered, which had been made known to his attorney, and proof thereof put in his possession, with instructions to make said defense, and the plaintiff fraudulently and corruptly induced defendant's attorney to withhold said defense and absent himself from the trial of the cause, and withhold the evidence in his possession, and permit the plaintiff to obtain said judgment against the defendant. The plaintiff moves to strike out this answer. The question is thus presented, whether fraud practiced in the recovery of a judgment can be pleaded in an action on the judgment. Article 4, sec. 1, of the constitution of the United States, declares that "full faith and credit shall be given in each Barras v. Bidwell. state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." Pursuant to this constitutional provision, congress has prescribed how the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of the states and territories, shall be authenticated, and has declared that "the said records and judicial proceedings so authenticated shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are taken:" Rev. Stat., sec. 605. From this statement of the law, it is clear that the plea that judgment was obtained by fraud, cannot hold unless it would be good in the courts of the state where the judgment was rendered. See Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat., 234; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall., 290; Maxwell v. Stewart, 22 Wall., 77; Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; Iockaday v. Skeggs, 18 La. An., 682; McLaren v. Kehler, 23 La. An., 80. In the state of New York, in whose courts the judgment sued on was rendered, it is held that "the judgment or decree of a court possessing competent jurisdiction is, as a general rule, final not only as to the subject matter thereby actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might litigate in the cause, and which they might have had decided:" Embury v. Connor, 3 N. Y., 522; Le Guen v. Gouverneur, 1 Johns. Cas., 436; Etheridge v. Osborn, 12 Wend., 399; Gardner v. Buckbee, 3 Cowen, 120; Burt v. Sternburgh, 4 Cow., 559; Wood v. Jackson, 8 Wend., 1; Wright v. Butler, 6 Wend., 284; Lawrence v. Iunt, 10 Wend., 80. As we are required to give the same force and effect to their judgment as would be given it by courts of the state of New York, and as the defense here set up could not be made against the judgment in those courts, it cannot be made here. III. The defendant, assuming the character of plaintiff in reconvention, sets up a claim to damages for the violation, by the plaintiff, of the same contract upon which the plaintiff's Barras v. Bidwell. suit in the superior court of New York city was founded. The claim in reconvention alleges that the defendant contracted with the plaintiff, in consideration of certaim sums of money, for the exclusive right to exhibit, within certain specified territory, a spectacular drama called the Black Crook, of which the plaintiff's intestate was the owner, and that the plaintiff, in violation of his said contract, both exhibited said drama himself and caused others to exhibit it within the territory for which the defendant had the exclusive right under said contract whereby the defendant sustained damages in the sum of ten thousand dollars, for which sum he asks judgment against the plaintiff. To this claim in reconvention the plaintiff has filed three exceptions. First, that the same cause of action was set up by way of counter-claim, in a suit between the same parties, in the superior court of the city of New York, and decided by the final judgment rendered in said cause on the 23d of December, 1876, and, second, that said reconvention is the same set up in the answer of the same defendant to a suit by this plaintiff, in a case No. 8053 in this court, which reconvention was excepted to by this plaintiff on the same grounds above specified, and said exceptions were sustained and the said answers in reconvention dismissed by this court; and, third, that said reconvention is not pleaded with sufficient. particularity and detail. In support of the first and second exceptions, the records. of the cause in the superior court of the city of New York and of this court are produced. The only difference between the counter-claim, set up in the suit in the New York superior court, and the reconvention set up in this case is, that the former avers that the plaintiff wholly neglected to protect and secure to the defendant the exercise of the sole right to exhibit said drama within the territory named in the contract, but on the contrary, permitted it to be performed in said territory by others, and the latter charges that both the plaintiff and his intestate themselves exhibited said drama and caused others to exhibit it within the same territory. Flanders v. Thompson. Now, whether these two causes of action, to wit, the counter-claim set up in New York and the reconvention set up in this suit, are precisely the same, it is not necessary to determine. The claim in reconvention may be somewhat broader than the counter-claim, but it might and should have been litigated and decided in the issue raised upon the counterclaim in the superior court of New York city. The defendant is, therefore, concluded by the judgment upon the counter-claim in that case: Embury v. Connor, 3 N. Y., supra; Voorhees v. The Bank of the United States, 10 Peters, 449; 2 Smith's Leading Cases, title estoppel, 455, note; Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 346: The claim in reconvention set up in the suit in this court, No. 8053, and dismissed, is substantially the same as the one just passed on, and what has been said applies to it. It was also substantially disposed of by the judgment of the superior court of the city of New York. The reconvention under consideration appears to have been pleaded in too vague and general a manner: McMasters v. Palmer, 4 La. An., 381; Wilcox v. IIis Creditors, 11 Rob., 347; Jonau v. Ferrand, 2 Rob., 216. We think all the exceptions to the claim in reconvention, as pleaded, are well taken, and the reconvention must be dismissed. BENJAMIN F. FLANDERS, Assignee, v. EDWARD THOMPSON, ET AL. 1. A judgment creditor is not a bona fide purchaser who as such is protected against a resulting trust. 2. Where B, holding trust funds, invested them in real estate and took the title in his own name, and was afterwards compelled, by order of court, to convey the property so acquired to the party entitled to the money: Held, that a creditor of B, who had recovered and recorded judgments against him long before the latter took title to the property, could not, under the jurisprudence of Louisiana, acquire a lien Flanders v. Thompson. thereon superior to the equities of the party with whose money the property had been paid for, and to whom it had been conveyed by order of this court. PETITION OF REVIEW. Mr. W. W. Howe, for petitioner. Mr. Sam'l B. Blanc, for defendants. WOODS, Circuit Judge. The question presented by this case is whether, under the jurisprudence of Louisiana, a trustee holding trust funds, and against whom there stand recorded judicial mortgages, can pay off such mortgages by investing the trust funds in real estate in his own name, and thus subjecting it to the lien of the judicial mortgages so recorded. The facts were these. In the year 1869 the defendant, Edward Thompson, recovered in the fourth district court for the parish of Orleans, two judgments against one H. S. Bell, amounting in the aggregate to $672, and in the same year had them placed on record in the mortgage office of said parish. Afterwards, in 1874, Bell was appointed assignee in bankruptcy of one J. W. Champlin. Certain assets of the bankrupt estate having come to the possession of Bell, in July, 1875, he invested them in two lots in the city of New Orleans, and took the deed therefor in his own name. These facts having been brought to the notice of the bankrupt court, Bell was in November, 1876, removed as assignee and Benj. F. Flanders appointed in his stead, and Bell was ordered to convey the said lots purchased with the means of the bankrupt estate to Flanders the new assignee, which he did. Thompson, by virtue of his judgments against Bell, recorded in 1869, now claims that he has a lien for the amount thereof on the property purchased by Bell and by him conveyed to Flanders, and that his judgments ought to be first paid out of the proceeds of their sale. Under the general system of equity jurisprudence, a claim so unconscionable and so bare of equity would not be listened to. The purchase by Bell, with the money of the bankrupt |