Sup. Ct. Rep. 593; Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121, 163. The question here is not the power of the State of Ohio to lay a charge on interstate commerce, or to prevent a foreign corporation from engaging in interstate commerce within its confines, but simply the right of the State to determine upon what conditions its laws as to the consolidation of corporations may be availed of. DECEIT SALE OF BONDS-FALSE REPRESENTATIONS OF VALUE.-In Handy v. Waldron, it was decided by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, that a false and fraudulent warranty of bonds may become actionable, although it relates to values where the buyer has no knowledge or no present facility for learning the real value; that a false statement that corporate stock has paid a certain rate of dividend, is a positive statement of a material fact, on which a buyer may rely. The rule of caveat emptor does not apply. Although several false representations in a sale are averred in one count, only one cause of action is alleged. Tillinghast, J., says: In support of the demurrer, defendant's counsel contend that, as between a vendor and a vendee, representations as to the value of the thing sold, although false, and fraudulently made, with intent to deceive the vendee, are not actionable; that such representations are held to be expressions of opinion, merely,"dealers talk,"-upon which the vendee is not entitled to rely. There can be no doubt as to the correctness of the proposition that mere expressions of belief or opinion on the part of a vendor as to the value of articles sold by him, even though false and fraudulent, cannot be made the basis of an action for deceit. This principle is ordinarily expressed in the old maxim, "Simplex commendatio non obligat." It is based upon the universal practice of the seller to recommend the article or thing offered for sale, and to employ more or less extravagant language in connection therewith. As said by Benjamin on Sales (volume 1, § 508): "The buyer is always anxious to buy as cheaply as he can and is sufficiently prone to find imaginary fault in order to get a good bargain; and the vendor is equally at liberty to praise his merchandise, in order to enhance its value, if he abstain from a fraudulent representation of facts, provided the buyer have an opportunity of inspection, and no means are used for hiding the defects." And the common experience of mankind is that an ordinarily prudent buyer will not rely upon such statements to his hurt. The law therefore recog nizes the fact that men will naturally overstate the value and qualities of the article which they have to sell, and that a buyer has no right to rely thereon. Kimball v. Bangs, 144 Mass. 323, 11 N. E. Rep. 113. Indeed, the decisions have gone so far, under this principle, as to hold that, as said by Holmes, J., in Deming v. Darling, 148 Mass. 504, 20 N. E. Rep. 107: "The law does not exact good faith from a seller, in those vague commendations of his wares which manifestly are open to differences of opinion, which do not imply untrue assertions concerning matters of direct observation (Teague v. Irwin, 127 Mass. 217), and as to which it has always been understood, the world over, that such statements are to be distrusted." But while the law thus countenances a certain degree of misrepresentation, sometimes termed "privileged fraud," in commercial transactions, yet it holds the seller responsible if he falsely represents a particular fact (other than the price he paid, or an offer to him) affecting the value, quality, or condition of the property in question. Grinnell, Deceit, § 28, and cases cited. If there is an ex ress warranty as to quality or value, the thing sold not being open to the inspection of the buyer, or if any trick or device is employed by the seller to prevent such inspection, and the buyer relies upon the warranty or false representations of the seller, and is injured thereby, the the latter may be held liable. But, in the absence of either fraud or warranty, the general rule is that the vendor is not liable for any allegations as to the quality or value of the thing sold. See Bicknall v. Waterman, 5 R. I. 43; Gordon v. Parmelee, 2 Allen, 214; Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 217; Cooper v. Lovering, 106 Mass. 77; Bishop v. Small, 63 Me. 12; Brown v. Leach, 107 Mass. 67; 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 809, and cases cited in notes 7 and 8. See, also, Story, Sales (2d Ed.) §§ 360, 361; Nash v. Trust Co., 159 Mass. 437, 34 N. E. Rep. 625; Chandelor v. Lopus, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 294, and note on pages 320, 321. The law applicable to a warranty of value is well stated by Campbell, J., in Picard v. McCormack, 11 Mich. 73. He says: "It is undoubtedly true that value is usually a mere matter of opinion, and that a purchaser must expect that a vendor will seek to enhance his wares, and must disregard his statement of their value. But while this is generally the case, yet we are aware of no rule which determines arbitrarily that any class of fraudulent misrepresentations can be exempted from the consequences attached to others. Where a purchaser, without negligence, has been induced, by the arts of a cheating seller, to rely upon material statements which are knowingly false, and is thereby damnified, it can make no difference in what respect he has been deceived, if the deceit was material, and was relied on. It is only because statements of value can rarely be supposed to have induced a purchaser without negligence, that the authorities have laid down the principle that they cannot usually avoid a bargain. But value may frequently be made by the parties themselves, the principal element in a contract; and there are many cases where articles possess a standard commercial value, in which it is a chief criterion of quality among those who are not experts. . . . We think it cannot be laid down, as a matter of law, that value is never a material fact." See, also, McClellan v. Scott, 24 Wis. 81; Griffin v. Farrier, 32 Minn. 474, 21 N. W. Rep. 553; Cruess v. Fessler, 39 Cal. 336; Chrysler v. Canaday, 90 N. Y. 272; Eaton v. Winnie, 20 Mich. 165, 166. In the case at bar the plaintiff alleges in the first two counts of his declaration, that the defendant warranted the bonds in question to be of the values therein named, respectively, when in fact they were not of that value, as the defendant well knew; in short, that the defendant made a false warranty as to the value of said bonds, and the plaintiff relied thereon, to his hurt. We think that when a vendor goes to the extent of warranting the value of the article sold, the vendee ordinarily has the right to rely thereon, without making further investigation, and, if the warranty proves false, to hold the vendor liable; for to warrant the value of an article is not a mere expression of opinion, but of fact. It is an express undertaking that the article is of the value placed upon it. "A warranty is a statement of fact as to an article sold, coupled with an agreement to make the statement good." And we see no good reason for not holding the vendor liable on his warranty as to the value, as well as on his warranty as to the quality of the article sold, and more particularly where the plaintiff, as in this case, was wholly ignorant of the premises and believed and relied on the promises and representations of the defendant as to the value of the bonds. Had the de fendant, by words or acts, deceived the plaintiff as to the quality or value of goods sold, which were open to his observation and inspection, so that, by ordinary diligence, he could have ascertained their value, no action could be maintained. But such was not the case here. The defendant knew the value of the bonds, but the plaintiff did not, and so far as appears, had no ready means of ascertaining the same. He trusted to the honesty of the defendant as to the value of the bonds, and was by him deceived and cheated. To uphold such a transaction would be to connive at dishonesty and fraud, and bring the administration of law into just contempt. CONDITIONAL SALE-VALIDITY.-The Supreme Court of Utah in Hirsch v. Steele, hold that a conditional sale of merchandise, to be resold by the vendee, is valid as against his attaching creditors. Smith, J., says: The only question presented by the record is whether the conditional sale of merchandise under the above contract for resale by the vendee is valid. The doctrine that conditional sales of specific chattels, sold to be held and used by the vendee, are valid, has been long established in England, and, in the absence of statutes to the contrary, generally prevails in all the States of the Union, except Illinois, Kentucky, Virginia, and perhaps one or two others. It is fully settled in Utah. See Russell v. Harkness, 7 Pac. Rep. 865; Shoshonetz v. Campbell, 24 Pac. Rep. 672. And in the case of Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663, 7 Sup. Ct. 51, the Supreme Court of the United States has given the great weight of its authority to this doctrine. We do not understand that appellant questions this rule, as applied to specific chattels sold for use by the vendee, but claims that a distinction should be made where, as in this case, goods are sold to a vendee for resale by him. As was said by the Supreme Court of New Mexico in the case of Redewill v. Gillen, 12 Pac. Rep. 877: "This position appeals strongly to our sense of justice, and we should hold with him, and thus uproot, in this jurisdiction, what we consider a penicious system of secret titles, concealed in the pockets of the owner, and calculated to entrap the unwary, were we not impelled by an overwhelming weight of authority to the contrary." The States of New York and Indiana alone make the distinction insisted upon by appellant. See Ludden v. Hazen, 31 Barb. 650, and Bonesteel v. Flack, 41 Barb. 440. And for the rule in Indiana see Manufacturing Co. v. Carman, 9 N. E. Rep. 707. Kansas occupies a doubtful position on the question. In support of appellant's contention may be cited Poorman v. Witman, 31 Pac. Rep. 370. But the case of Standard Implement Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 33 Pac. Rep. 360, is by the same court, and on the other side of the question. But the following cases of the same character as the one at bar are directly in point, and against the appellant, to-wit: Lewis v. McCabe, 49 Conn. 141 (which was a conditional sale of liquors to a retail merchant). Brewery Co. v. Merritt, 82 Mich. 198, 46 N. W. Rep. 379 (a case of the same kind); Armington v. Houston, 38 Vt. 448 (a case where provisions were sold to be consumed by the family of the vendee); Rogers v. Whitehouse, 71 Me. 222 (a case of groceries sold conditionally to a retail merchant for resale); Burbank v. Crooker, 7 Gray, 158 (a case exactly like the last). Without further citation, we will say that the authorities, up to a very recent date, are all collated in Bennett's Notes to Benjamin on Sales (pages 271-277 of the first American edition), and it only requires a very slight examination to see how overwhelmingly the weight of authority is against the appellant. However much we may desire to see this rule abolished in this territory, we believe that it is the duty of the legislature, and not of the courts, to abolish it. Judicial legislation is to be avoided, although the enforcement of the law, as we find it, may work a hardship in individual cases. EVIDENCE LIKE EFFECTS FROM SAME CAUSE. Frequently at the time of the injury in question, or before or after the happening of the same, others, by reason of the same defect, have either been injured or affected by it. This gives rise to the question whether the effect upon others of the defect in controversy is admissible in evidence. Upon this our courts have succeeded in widely disagreeing. This disagreement gives rise to two lines of decisions, the one holding such testimony admissible either in proof of the dangerous character of the cause or in proof of knowledge of its existence. By the other such testimony is not only held inadmissible for any purpose whatever, but absolutely incompetent as raising collateral issues. A review of the cases upon this subject, with sufficient to indicate the nature of each, how decided and the reasons therefor, together with conditions governing admission of such testimony, may be of practical use to the practitioner. For convenience of reference, not that different principles are involved, classification of these cases may be of serv ice. 1. Injuries Caused by Fright of Horses.In this class of cases, sufficiently large to warrant separate mention, it is competent to show that other horses were frightened by sound of a locomotive whistle;1 by noise of steam escaping from a locomotive, as tending to show that it was likely to frighten horses;2 by steam escaping from a mill;3 by a pile of lumber, as tending to show whether it was such an object as was liable to produce 1 Hill v. The Portland, etc. R. Co., 55 Me. 438. 2 Gordon v. The Boston, etc. R. Co., 58 N. H. 396. 8 Crocker v. McGregor, 76 Me. 282. fright; by a hole in a bridge, constituting part of the highway, as tending to show its continued existence, dangerous character and tendency to frighten horses ;5 by a mill wheel, as tending to show it was such an object as would naturally frighten horses; by a flag, similar to the one in question, suspended over the same street in a similar manner; by a pile of stones, at the side of the road, as tending to show that it presented an unusual and strange appearance; but, on the contrary, it is held inadmissible for defendant to show that numerous horses had been driven past a mortar-box, lying near the track, withwould open the door to numerous side issues. out becoming frightened.9 2. Injuries Caused by Defective Sidewalks. -For the purpose of proving defective condition of the sidewalk, at the time of the injuries in question, it is competent to show that others had slipped and fallen upon it, as tending to show that, tested by actual use, it was in an unsafe and improper condition;10 or had fallen over a water-gate projecting a water-gate projecting from it; or had tumbled down upon it;12 or that similar accidents had occurred at the same place, as tending to establish its condition and knowledge of the same by defendant; or that others had fallen into a cellarway constructed in it;14 or that others had slipped upon it, as tending to establish a physical fact; and, as tending to show that the sidewalk was not dangerous, it is competent to show that others passed over it without injury.16 But, in opposition to the foregoing, it is held incompetent to show that others had slipped and fallen upon it;17 neither, in proof that the sidewalk was not defective, is it competent to be shown that others passed over it in safety.18 13 4 Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401. 5 Smith v. Township of Sherwood, 62 Mich. 159. 6 House v. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 631. 7 Champlin v. Penn Yan, 34 Hun, 33. 8 Eggleston v. Columbia Turnpike Road, 18 Hun, 146. 9 Bloor v. Town of Delafield, 69 Wis. 273. 10 Quinlan v. City of Utica, 11 Hun, 217. 12 Avery v. City of Syracuse, 29 Hun, 537; District of Columbia v. Arms, 107 U. S. 519. 13 City of Topeka v. Sherwood, 39 Kas. 690. 14 City of Augusta v. Hafers, 61 Ga. 48. 5 City of Aurora v. Brown, 12 Bradwell, 122. 16 Calkins v. City of Hartford, 33 Conn. 57. 17 Hubbard v. City of Concord, 35 N. H. 52 18 Bauer v. City of Indianapolis, 99 Ind 56: Temperance Hall Ass'n of Trenton v. Giles, 33 N. J. L. 260. 3. Injuries Caused by Defective Roadways. -For the purpose of proving defective condition of the roadway, at time of the injuries in question, it is competent to show the effect of the road upon other carriages, as tending to show by actual experiment, its fitness or unfitness for public travel;19 that others, by reason of the absence of barriers, had fallen into a canal, as tending to show notice by defendant;20 how other teams were affected in passing over a log, as tending to show condition of the road by actual experiment;21 that other accidents occurred, as tending to show bad nature of the roads or want of familiarity with them;22 that other teams had run into a post, as tending directly to show its dangerous character and negligence of defendant;28 that others had fallen into the water by reason of a swing bridge, constituting part of the highway, being out of place;24 that a too high railway switch, located in the street, caused accidents to others.25 But, in opposition to the foregoing, it is held incompetent to show that another person drove against the post;26 or fell over the embankment in attempting to avoid a hole in the highway;27 or that others were upset by a defect in the road;28 or that accidents happened to others in crossing the horse railroad track by reason of the too high rails;29 or that another horse had its foot caught between the plank and rail in crossing the railroad track;50 or that others were upset by embankments or breaks made across the road; and admissibility of proof of other accidents, held, questionable;82 and, as tending to show that the road was not dangerous, it is not competent to show that others passed over it without injury;3 and, on the sufficiency of the width of the highway, it is inadmissible to show that ve 26 Collins v. Inhabitants of Dorchester, 6 Cush. 349. 27 Blair v. Inhabitants of Pelham, 118 Mass. 420. 28 Hubbard v. And., etc. R. Co., 39 Me. 506. 29 Jacques v. Bridgport, etc. R Co., 41 Conn. 61. 30 Hudson v. C. & N. W. R Co. 59 Iowa, 581. 31 Sherman v. Kortright, 52 Barb. 267., 32 Bailey v Town of Trumbull, 31 Conn. 581. 23 Schoonmaker v. Inbabitants of Wilbraham, 110 Mass. 134; Kidder v. Inbabitants of Dunstable, 11 Gray, 342; Branch v. Libbey, 78 Me. 321. hicles passed other vehicles thereon without collision.84 4. Injuries Resulting from Various Causes. -For the purpose of proving defective con dition, it is competent to show injury to another by the same turn-table, as tending to show knowledge by defendant of its condition;35 or that, by reason of the back track, other engines had left the track, as tending to show its condition;36or that, by reason of the same low joint, other cars had run off the track; or that smoke was emitted from the mill chimney, as tending to show its habits;38 or that the chimney had at other times emitted smoke, sparks and flame, as tending to show improper construction;39 or an attempt on the same night to fire another building by the same means, as tending to show incendiary origin;40 but that other meadows were injured by overflow is incompetent, unless similar to those in question;41 and, as tending to prove that the alleged dangerous cause was not dangerous, it is competent to show frequent daily use for years of the approach to the grain elevator without occurrence of similar accidents;42 or that other boats, similarily constructed, had run for years without any similar accident.43 But, in opposition to the foregoing, it is held incompetent to prove that others had fallen into the same turn-table; or, as tending to show that a hall and passage, leading to an elevator-way, was not sufficiently lighted, that others had met with similar accidents; .45 that others had fallen in a passage-way, when in like darkened condition;46 or that others had walked off the boat into the river, by reason of insufficient light, and absence of chain across its bow;47 and, on application for an injunction to prevent mining operations, on the ground of threatened injury to plaintiff's land, evidence that other or 34 Aldrich v. Inhabitants of Pelham, 1 Gray, 510. 35 The G. C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Evansich, 63 Tex. 54. 36 Morse v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 30 Minn. 465; Clapp v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 36 Minn. 6. 37 Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. Ashcroft, 48 Ala. 15. 38 Hoyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181. 39 Gagg v. Vetter, 41 Ind. 228. 40 Faucett v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 377. 41 Standish v. Washburn, 21 Pick. 237. 42 Field v. Davis, 27 Kas. 400. 43 Dougan v. Champlain Transportation Co., 56 N. Y. 1. 44 Early v. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 66 Mich. 349. Parker v. Portland Publishing Co., 69 Me. 173. 46 Martinez v. Planel, 36 Cal. 578. 47 Davis v. The Oregon, etc. R. Co., 8 Oregon, 172. lands, under similar circumstances, were injured is incompetent.48 4. Principles Governing the Admission of this Testimony.-The grounds for the admission of this character of testimony are often omitted in the above notation of cases, and this for the reason that the decisions themselves fail to state the same. But, evidently, in these cases, in approval of the reasons in many other cases expressly stated, such testimony is deemed competent as tending to prove the dangerous character of the cause or knowledge of its existence. The time to which such testimony has been directed appears to in nowise have entered as a factor into the question of its admissibility; and that testimony as to the effects of the alleged dangerous cause both prior and subsequent to the happening of the injury in question is to the same extent competent as though directed to the actual time of the injuries in question, may be safely asserted. To render such testimony competent, however, it should appear that the conditions, at the time to which it refers, were the same, or similar, as at time of the injury in question.49 Upon this point the Supreme Court of Minnesota evidently sets forth the correct rule in the following language, "that it must appear, or at least the evidence must reasonably tend to show, that the instrument or agency whose condition is in issue was in substantially the same condition at such times as it was when the accident complained of occurred."50 The grounds for rejection of this character of testimony are wholly omitted in the above notation of cases, for the reason that many of the decisions themselves fail to state the same, but the only assigned reason for its rejection is that it raises collateral issues, 51 but on the 48 Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534. 49 Crocker v. McGregor, 76 Me. 282; City of Topeka, v. Sherwood, 39 Kas. 690; District of Columbia v. Arms, 107 U. S. 519; Quinlan v. City of Utica, 11 Hun, 217; City of Aurora v. Brown, 12 Bradwell, 122; Calkins v. City of Hartford, 33 Conn. 57; City of Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169; Standish v. Washburn, 21 Pick. 237; Morse v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 30 Minn. 472; Clapp v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 36 Minn. 6; Bloor v. Town of Delafield, 69 Wts. 273. 50 Morse v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 30 Minn. 472. 51 Collins v. Inhabitants of Dorchester, 6 Cush. 394; Blair v. Inhabitants of Pelham, 118 Mass. 420; Aldrich v. Inhabitants of Pelham, 1 Gray, 510; Bauer v. City of Indianapolis, 99 Ind. 56; Temperance Hall Ass'n of Trenton v. Giles, 33 N. J. L. 260; Hubbard v. And., etc. R. Co., 39 Me. 506; Jacques v. Bridgport, etc. R. Co., 41 Conn. 61; Parker v. Portland Publishing Co., 69 Me. 173; Martinez v. Planel, 36 Cal. 578; It other hand, it is expressly held that such testimony does not raise collateral issues.52 Upon this point the Supreme Court of Kansas, following in substance the language of Quinlan v. City of Utica,53 says: "In a limited sense every item of evidence material to the main issue presents a new issue in this respect, at least; it invites, by way of reply, a contradiction or an explanation. In no other way did the evidence make a new issue. was important to show that the sidewalk was unsafe and dangerous, and upon that question the defendant was required to be prepared."' Under the decisions herein referred to, weight of authority evidently favors admission of this class of testimony. In further support of the same, and often so cited in the decisions herein, may also be included a large class of cases resulting from fires caused by locomotive engines;55 but as this class of cases has to considerable extent already been discussed in the pages of this journal,56 and as the considerations incident thereto lead to too great length, the same are here omitted. In conclusion it may be proper to add, as may have already been observed, that decisions of the same court are not all in harmony with each other, and that the courts of Maine, New Hampshire, Michigan, Connecticut, New York, Indiana, and Massachusetts have decided both for and against the admission of this class of testimony. E. F. HILTON. Topeka, Kansas. Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534; Sherman v. Kortright, 52 Barb. 267; Hubbard v. City of Concord, 35 N. H. 52; Bloor v. Town of Delafield, 69 Wis. 273. 52 City of Topeka v. Sherwood, 39 Kas. 690; Walker v. Westfield, 39 Vt. 246; Calkins v. City of Hartford, 33 Conn. 57; Morse v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 30 Minn. 465; Quinlan v. City of Utica, 11 Hun, 219. 53 11 Hun, 219. 54 City of Topeka v. Sherwood, 39 Kas. 690. 55 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Sec. 675; Pierce on Railroads, 439, 440; Thompson on Negligence, 158 et seq.; Rice on Evidence, 509; Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, Vol. 8, p. 9, note. 56 Vol. 2, p. 642, note. NOTE.-See also following cases, on fright of horses, Poilett v. Simmers, 106 Pa. St. 95; Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Wynant, 114 Ind. 525; on defective roadways, Phelps v. Winona, etc. R. Co., 37 Minn. 485; Merrill v. Inhabitants of Bradford, 110 Mass. 505; and various causes, City of Ft. Wayne v. Coombs, 107 Ind. 75; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Wright, 115 Ind. 378; Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 52 Hun, 111; Hodges v. Bearse, 129 Ill. 87. USURY-NOTES-INNOCENT PURCHASER. WARD V. SUGG. Supreme Court of North Carolina, December 19, 1893. A note given wholly for usurious interest is void, even in the hands of an innocent purchaser, under Code, § 3836, declaring the taking or charging of usurious interest, when knowingly done, to be a forfeiture of the entire interest. Burwell, J., dissenting. CLARK, J.: The jury found that the $400 note in suit was wholly given for a usurious charge for the use of money, and that the present holder acquired it before muturity, for value and without notice. The question whether it is valid in his hands is not an open one in this State. Such note is held to be void, into whatever hands it may pass. Ruffin v. Armstrong, 9 N. C. 411; Collier v. Nevill, 14 N. C. 30. Such was also the law in England until the law was in some respects modified by the act of 58 Geo. III., and is the law in New York and other States, except where modified by statute. Rand. Com. Paper, § 525; 3 Pars. Cont. (5th Ed.) 117; Powell v. Waters, 8 Cow. 669; Wilkie v. Roosevelt, 3 Johns. Cas. 206; Solomons v. Jones, 5 Amer. Dec. 538; Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 495, cited by Smith, C. J., in Rountree v. Brinson, 98 N. C. 107, 3 S. E. Rep. 747; Callanan v. Shaw, 24 Iowa, 441. When the statute makes a note void, it is void into whosesoever hands it may come, but, when the statute merely declares it illegal, the note is good in the hands of an innocent holder. Glenn v. Bank, 70 N. C. 191, 206. Hence, it was argued strenuously that the authorities above cited were good under our former statute, which made the contract void, but that the present statute merely makes the contract illegal. It does not so seem to us. The former statute (Rev. Code, ch. 114; Rev. St. ch. 117) denounced the contract as void as to the whole debt,-principal and interest. The present statute (Code, § 3836) makes it void, not as to principal, but as to the interest only. It provides that "the taking, receiving, reserving or charging a rate of interest greater than is allowed * * shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest * * * which has been agreed to be paid," with a further provision that, if such interest has been paid, double the amount can be recovered back by the debtor. The only difference between the two acts is that formerly the whole note was forfeited and of no avail, and now only the stipulation as to the interest is ipso facto deemed forfeited and void. But the point has already been adjudicated by this court. In two cases this court, and by most eminent judges, has expressly held that the words "deemed a forfeiture," in the act of 1876-77 (now Code, § 3836), make void the agreement as to interest. If any attention is to be paid to the doctrine of stare decisis, the precedents in our own court do not leave this open to debate. In Bank v. Lineberger, 83 N. C. 454 (on page 458), Ashe J., quotes this section in full, and says: "The purpose and effect of this statute were not only to make void all agreements for usurious interest, but to give a ** |