full knowledge of the fraudulent character of Henry Craps' title. They allege that the deed from the sheriff to Mitchell in 1850 is void, and passed no title, because, if a sale was really ever decreed by the court of ordinary, that court was without jurisdiction to order a sale, both because Craps was not an heir of John H. Eiffert, and because no notice, by advertisement or otherwise, was served on the complainants. As the reason why complainants have been prevented from sooner asserting their rights, they allege that about 1856 the complainant John Henry Eiffert returned to South Carolina, and inquired of Mitchell about their father's land, and was informed by him that it had been sold for debt by the sheriff of Lexington district; that the fraud has only quite recently come to their knowledge, having been fraudulently concealed from them; and that, since they have learned of the fraud, one of the complainants has visited South Carolina, and seen the old people who might have knowledge of the matters, and has examined the records in the clerk's office. The bill prays that the deed from the sheriff to Mitchell may be set aside, and declared void; that the title be declared vested in the complainants; that an account of rents be taken, and a writ of possession granted.

The defendants answered, denying the alleged frauds, and claiming to be innocent purchasers for value. They pleaded the statute of limitations, and the laches of the complainants in asserting their claim of title, and that the complainants have an adequate remedy at law.

The bill coming on to be heard, the court (Judge Simonton) held that it appeared from the allegations of the bill that the complainants had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, and dismissed the bill. The court, as appears from its opinion, proceeded upon the ground that as it was alleged that the court of ordinary was without jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and its order of sale was unauthorized by law, and none of the heirs of Eiffert were parties to the proceeding, or bound by the order, and therefore, as alleged, that the title to the land had never been divested out of them, the case was, in fact, an attempt to enforce a merely legal title by a bill in chancery, instead of by action or ejectment. The court cited Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 277, as controlling authority that such a bill must be dismissed.

In the case of Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271, cited in his opinion by the learned judge of the court below, the children of a testator filed a bill in equity to recover possession of lands of their father, which had been sold by his executrix during their minority by virtue of an order of court empowering her to make the sale. The complainants relied upon the invalidity of that order, and the consequence nullity of the sale. The Supreme Court held that the remedy at law, by ejectment, was plain, adequate, and complete, and that the bill in equity was rightly dismissed. It was held, also, in Phelps v. Harris, 101 U. S. 375, that, if a deed is invalid upon its face, it is to be repelled by an action at law, and not in equity.

But the complainants in the present case allege, and assign as error in the decree dismissing their bill, that there is also a matter extrinsic the deed itself, or the proceedings in the court of ordinary, viz. the fraud of representing to the court that Craps was an heir and distributee of their father, which gives a court of equity jurisdiction to set aside the deed procured through the fraud. The defendants have set up as a defense the complainants' laches, and the staleness of their claim. If, therefore, it be conceded that their allegations of fraud do make a proper case of equity jurisdiction, it is necessary to examine the bill to see how the complainants account for the long delay from 1851 to 1890, a period of 39 years, and what it is they aver has prevented them from earlier asserting their claim of title. According to the statement of the bill, the youngest of the complainants must have arrived at 21 years of age in 1866. The bill states that the complainant John Henry Eiffert came to South Carolina, in 1856, to inquire about this land, and was told by Mitchell that it had been sold by the

the sheriff for debt. He appears to have made no inquiry, as, to what had become of the proceeds, how it had been sold, or who was in possession. The deed from the sheriff to Mitchell was then on record, the first line of which begins with the recital:

"Whereas, Henry Craps, one of the heirs and distributees of John H. Eiffert, deceased, filed a petition in the court of ordinary," etc.

All that is alleged in the bill could have been learned in 1856, by the examination of one recorded deed, and by asking who was in possession of the property. The averment of the bill is that:

"Some time last fall, your orators were put upon the track of these frauds, and since that time one of them, at much expense, has visited different places in South Carolina, saw the old people who might have knowledge of the matter, examined the records of the clerk's office, and, by all diligence, have sought to acquire the information contained in this bill. They submit that no laches or imputation of negligence in asserting their claim can be charged against them, as the whole transaction was fraudulently concealed from them."

The only concealment averred is that Mitchell stated in 1856 that the land had been sold for debt. The only allegation which contradicts the statement said to have been made by Mitchell is the recital in the sheriff's deed, and that deed was just as open to inspection in a public record in 1856 as it was 34 years afterwards, in 1890. After so great a lapse of time, after the original purchaser has been dead 12 years, the land, by a decree for the partition of the estate devised by his will, has been sold at public sale, and and resold several times, it is too late to rely upon a fraud 40 years old, which could have been discovered as soon as it was perpetrated, by the inspection of a deed recorded where the record title

to the land was to be looked for. In denying relief in the case of Norris v. Haggin, 136 U. S. 392, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 942, the Supreme Court said:

"It is a part of this general doctrine that to avoid the lapse of timé, or statute of limitations, the fraud must have been one which was concealed from the plaintiff by the defendant, or which was of such a character as necessarily implied concealment. Neither of these principles can apply to the defendants in this case. The acts which constituted the fraud, as alleged in the bill, were open and public acts. The note and mortgage were recorded in the proper public office of the proper county. The possession of defendants was obtained by judicial proceedings, which were open to everybody's examination, and which were properly well known in the entire community."

The salutary rule of courts of equity for discouraging antiquated demands requires that the bill shall set forth why the complainant has remained so long ignorant of his rights, and if his averments show that he could have learned his rights at any time, if he had chosen to inquire, or to examine a public record, his bill is to be dismissed. Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 95; Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 185; Brown v. County of Buena Vista, 95 U. S. 157; Naddo v. Bardou, 2 C. C. A. 335, 511Fed. Rep. 493. In Stearns v. Page, 7 How. 829, it was said by the Supreme Court:

"And especially must there be distinct averments as to the time when the fraud, mistake, concealment or misrepresentation was discovered, and what the discovery is, so that the court may clearly see whether, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, the discovery might not have been before made."

See, also, Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418, and Pearsall v. Smith, 149 U. S. 231, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833.

Considering how easily all the facts alleged in the bill could have been discovered at any time since March, 1851, when the sheriff's deed was recorded, it cannot be said that ordinary diligence has been exercised; and considering that Henry Craps resided on the property for 27 years, until his death, in 1878, and the changes and the sales of the property since that date, it is clear that the time for the complainants, to have attacked the sheriff's deed was certainly not later than during the 27 years which Henry Craps lived after he took possession, and that they have stated no fact sufficient to relieve them of the imputation of laches.

Our conclusion is that the Circuit Court was right in dismissing the bill without prejudice to an action at law, and the decree is affirmed, with costs.

NOTE.-Courts of equity are always solicitous of the rights of all parties and lend an assisting hand when a case deserving it is made out by the party asking relief. There are certain well defined rules, however,

by which these courts of justice are governed in granting relief. One cardinal requisite is, that the party seeking a favor at the hands of equity must show himself deserving and worthy. He must be diligent, and especially must he be so when by reason of his supineness and lethargy valuable property rights have been made and acquired by parties supposing themselves entitled to the property they claim. Questions under this doctrine arise, perhaps, more often in cases involving title to or interests in lands, than in any other. And these courts are especially loth to lend their aid to a party to recover property where it has been bought and a right asserted by another; large and exceedingly valuable improvements made, and the value greatly enhanced by reason of such. Especially when the real owner could have averted this great expenditure by promptly asserting his rights and putting the adverse claimant on notice that there was an adverse claim that would be asserted against him. Often cases in the west where towns spring up in a year or a ltttle more are brought to recover from the occupants after varying lengths of time, and it is unquestionable that equity will the more reluctantly grant relief in such cases as these, when at all, that in such as bear upon their face the impress of the utmost good faith and diligence.

Courts of chancery, likewise, are reluctant to enforce a claim where the party applying for relief has slept on his rights for a great length of time; and especially is this the case when material evidence has been lost by the mutations of time, and the facts dimmed in the memory of the witnesses and obscured by the intervention of many years. The courts in denying relief in these cases proceed upon the theory that it would be as great, if not greater injury, to attempt to resurrect old demands after the destruction of evidence and great changes in values and perhaps bring disaster and ruin upon hundreds whose rights have intervened, than to allow such claims; and prefer to let the dead past bury its dead and refuses to lift the mantle of repose with which time has for so long a time covered by gone transactions. See, as instructive cases on this question, Gibson v. Herriott, 17 S. W. Rep. 589. In such cases the courts presume a grant from the long lapse of time for the respose of titles and the peace and security of society. Martin v. Skipwith, 6 S. W. Rep. 514; Fletcher v. Fuller, 7 S. C. Rep. 667; Snyder v. Snover, 27 Atl. Rep. 1013. Lapse of time is itself a bar to a suit for recovery in equity where the party has been long negligent in asserting his rights and been under no disability. This doctrine is treated with much learning and many authorities bearing thereon are cited in the case of U. S. v. Beebe, 17 Fed. Rep. 36. And this case was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court on appeal. See same case 127 U. S. 388. A strong case on this doctrine is that of Felix v. Patrick, 12 S. C. Rep. 862. In that case it was held that a delay of 28 years would bar a right of recovery, even in the face of the fact that the land may have been acquired, originally, by fraud, the cestui que trust suing therefor, not having shown reasonable diligence in unearthing the same. This, too, was an action to enforce an implied trust; to impress certain lands with that character. But the court properly held that the party aggrieved should have sooner asserted her rights, and that the implied trust would be barred by laches and the statute of limitations. Indeed this is the uniform doctrine of all the courts. See Boone v. Childs, 10 Pet. 177; Wood Lim. Sec. 215; Angell Lim. Sec. 178; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 John. Ch.-; Ewing v. Shannahan, 20 S.

W. Rep. 1065; Curtiss v. Daniel, 23 Ark. 363; Bland v. Fleeman, 23 S. W. Rep. 4, and many other cases that might be named.

Nor is the doctrine that laches will bar a trust confined to those trusts which must arise by operation of the law or the status of the parties, that is, constructive or implied trusts, but it is carried in some instances with manifest propriety to cases of actual technical, direct trusts. These latter of course, are such as are created by the instrument imposing the trust relation itself. Such as are created by deeds of trusts, powers of attorneys, etc. But in such a case the possession of the trustee being consistent with his relation, it requires much stronger facts to make a case that will be barred by the laches of the cestui que trust than in cases of constructive trusts. The books all seem to agree that these direct trusts can, under certain circumstances, and in certain cases, be barred as other trusts or rights. In such cases, however, it is necessary that the trustee assert his claim to title in a way that cannot be misunderstood. It must be done in an open, notorious and hostile manner. Moreover, such adverse assertion of ownership must be brought home to the knowledge of the cestui que trust, and he must be laboring under no disability, and capable of suing, before he can be charged with laches in prosecuting his rights in the trust property. Bland v. Fleeman, supra; Lemoine v. Dunklin Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 487; Naddo v. Rardon, Id. 493; Hammond v. Hopkins, 418; Gibson v. Harriott, supra. There must be such a plain and open assertion of an adverse right brought to the knowledge of the cestui que trust as will require a person of ordinary prudence to act as upon an asserted adverse title. Authorities, supra.

But it is not necessary that the parties whose rights are affected have actual notice of the hostile holding to charge him with laches. In the language of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Rugan v. Sabin, 53 Fed. Rep. 415,-"Nor can a vendor industriously close his eyes, stop his ears or refuse to believe the evidence of his senses when notice of fraudulent practices are placed before him and thus escape from the application of this principle of law. Notice of facts and circumstances which would put a man of ordinary intelligence upon inquiry is, in the eye of the law, equivalent to knowledge of all the facts a reasonable diligent inquiry would disclose." This well states the law in respect of notice such as a party must pursue with diligence before he can come into equity and at the same time escape the imputation of notice and consequent laches. To the same effect are the well considered cases of Norris v. Hagan, 28 Fed. Rep. 275, which was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court; Teal v. Slaven, 40 Fed. Rep. 774; Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 139.

And it is generally, if not always sufficient that a deed or decree or other evidence of a hostile assertion of title be placed of record when the person to be affected with such notice is capable of suing and laboring under no disability to charge him with the necessary notice. Cases, supra. Martin v. Skipwith, supra. To the same effect see Percy v. Cockrill, 53 Fed. Rep. 872 and authorities there cited; King v. Carmichael, 35 N. E. Rep. 509. In short, the whole doctrine of all the courts, gathered from all the authorities, seems to be, that to avoid the imputation of laches, the party must come into equity without fault on his part. He must have used all diligence to assert his rights in time. He must have done so at the first reasonable opportunity; especially where

values have changed, perhaps a hundred or a thousand fold. Where a great many years have elapsed and some or many of the material witnesses are dead, and values are greatly changed, or perhaps where they have not, the court will clothe the transactions of the past with the mantle of repose and refuse to dig up old and antiquated demands that should have been earlier asserted and perhaps thereby do a greater injustice than to be passive.

That in all cases of constructive trusts the plea of laches, when well taken, is a bar to a recovery by the cestui que trust. That even in cases of direct and technical trust laches is a good defense to an action to enforce such a trust after the cestue que trust has been supine for many years, values have greatly changed, and the trustee has asserted an adverse title in such a way as could not be mistaken by one of or. dinary prudence, when he puts the cestui que trust at arms length, as it were, or, where the trustee, being capable of suing, could, by the means of reasonable diligence and following up any information that would put a prudent person upon inquiry learn of the facts of such adverse assertion of right.

Nashville, Ark.

W. C. RODGERS.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Lawyers' Reports Annotated, Book XXI. All Current Cases of General Value and Importance Decided in the United States, State and Territorial Courts with Full Annotation, by Burdett A. Rich, Editor, and Henry P. Farnham, Assistant Editor. Aided by the Publisher's Editorial Staff and, Particularly in Selection, by the Reporters and Judges of each Court. (Cited 21 L. R. A.) Rochester, N. Y. The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Company, 1893.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

The court had assigned an attorney to defend the prisoner for larceny, but when the case was called the prisoner surprised everybody by announcing that he would defend himself.

"What's the matter with the attorney?" asked the court.

"Nothing, your honor," replied the prisoner. "Then why do you wish to defend yourself?" "Because, your honor," responded the prisoner confidently, "the case is likely to go against me, and if it does I want to be in a position to enter a plea of self-defense."

The following are grounds for which divorces have been granted by the Italian courts:

For calling his wife's sister a thief.
For beating his wife's pet dog.
For constantly chewing tobacco.

For cutting his wife's curls without her consent.
For refusing to take his wife out for a walk.

For refusing to sew on her husband's trousers buttons.

For forcing his wife to sit up until after midnight. For the wife staying in bed until noon.

For refusing to let her husband go too near the kitchen fire on a cold day.

For dragging her husband out of bed by the beard. For the wife strolling around town and shopping instead of attending to her domestic duties.

WEEKLY DIGEST

Of ALL the Current Opinions of ALL the State and Territorial Courts of Last Resort, and of the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts of the United States, except those that are Published in Full or Commented upon in our Notes of Recent Decisions.

ALABAMA..

ARKANSAS

.71, 79, 91, 140, 151, 193 ....14, 27, 74, 180 CALIFORNIA........2, 30, 31, 38, 103, 106, 130, 137, 139, 141, 165 COLORADO..................... .24, 41, 54, 59, 168 IDAHO....... .......36

INDIANA, 12, 48, 49, 51, 56, 62, 128, 142, 143, 153, 182, 184, 192, 199, 200

..122, 178 .4, 6, 9, 33, 69, 98, 123, 154, 198, 204 ..146, 177

........

..61, 68, 150 .29, 80, 144, 213 185, 187, 188, 197 ..34, 47, 109, 115, 118, 163, 195, 208 .1, 3, 26, 67, 70, 92, 93, 107, 108, 132, 155

IOWA....

KANSAS.

KENTUCKY..........

LOUISIANA..

MASSACHUSETTS.

MICHIGAN..17, 32, 135, 138, 145, 156, 170, 172,

MINNESOTA...

MISSISSIPPI........

MISSOURI.

NEBRASKA.......

179

.126

TEXAS, 13, 15, 21, 22, 39, 40, 50, 52, 55, 57, 63, 66, 72, 73, 76, 94, 99, 101, 104, 120, 133, 159, 167, 169, 183, 186, 202, 209, 210 UNITED STATES C. C........

.86, 89, 97 ...119, 149 ..16, 23, 81, 87, 88, 205 .7, 8, 37, 58, 65, 100, 112, 136 WEST VIRGINIA.........20, 111, 117, 124, 127, 131, 148, 152, 212 WISCONSIN. ..96, 114, 129, 164

UNITED STATES C. C. OF APP.................
UNITED STATES 8. C.....
WASHINGTON..

1. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.-Plaintiff agreed to accept a certain sum in satisfaction of his claim against defendant, and gave a receipt for such sum, as actually paid, on defendant's promise to remit, but no money was actually paid or remitted: Held, that there was no accord and satisfaction, and plaintiff could recover on the original claim.-YAZOO & M. V. R. Co. v. FULTON, Miss., 14 South. Rep. 271.

2. ACTIONS-Transitory Actions-Contract.-A cause of action for breach of an executory contract during the life and after the death of the promisor is transi tory, and the action may be maintained against the administrator of the promisor without reference to where the contract was made, or to the fact that it was to be performed in a foreign country.-MCCANN v. PENNIE, Cal., 35 Pac. Rep. 158.

3. ADMINISTRATION-Claims.-Where a debt was incurred by an executor under a will charging the es

tate with the payment of testator's debts, and some of the secured debts due testator were transferred to the creditor, the latter is entitled to the priorities belong. ing to the original creditors, and the balance of the debt is of like rank with debts of a similar character due by testator at his death.-PAYNE V. DUNDEE LAND & MORTG. INVESTMENT Co., Miss., 14 South. Rep. 269.

4. ADMINISTRATION-Executor as Residuary Legatee. -Where an executor, who is a residuary legatee, executes a bond to pay all the debts and legacies of the testator, he and the sureties become absolutely liable, to the extent of the penalty of the bond, for all debts and legacies, regardless of the amount or value of the assets of the estate; and, where a specific legacy is not paid when due, the legatee may, without obtaining an order of allowance by the Probate Court, and upon demand and refusal of payment, maintain an action for the recovery of such legacy against the obligors of the bond.-KREAMER V. KREAMER, Kan., 35 Pac. Rep. 214.

6. ADVERSE POSSESSION-Estoppel.-Where an owner executes and places upon record a warranty deed purporting to convey the complete title of land occupied by himself and family, his subsequent possession will generally be considered as in subserviency to the record title.-SELLERS V. CROSSAN, Kan., 35 Pac. Rep. 205.

7. APPEAL-Service of Notice.-A notice of appeal may be served by mail under Code Proc. § 1441, which authorizes the Supreme Court to make rules governing the manner of serving notices of appeal, and under rule 26, made in accordance therewith.-HORR V. ABERDEEN PACKING CO., Wash., 35 Pac. Rep. 125.

a

8. APPEALLABLE ORDERS.-An order removing guardian required him to pay over a certain amount as funds in his hands belonging to the estate of his wards, and that he personally pay the costs of the suit: Held, that the guardian had such an interest in the subjectmatter as entitled him to appeal.-IN RE HILL'S ESTATE, Wash., 35 Pac. Rep. 181.

9. APPEAL FROM JUSTICE'S COURT. The successor of a justice of the peace has the power, under the direction of the District Court, to supply omissions in a transcript of his predecessor, and for that purpose may file with the clerk of the District Court a new and completed transcript from the official records in his possession.-ST. LOUIS & S. F. RY. Co. v. HURST, Kan., 35 Pac. Rep. 211.

10. APPEAL FROM JUSTICE'S COURT.-If, in an appeal from justice court, the sufficiency of the sureties in the undertaking is excepted to as provided in section 6133, Comp. Laws, and they or other sureties do not justify as required in said section, the appeal, on mo. tion of respondent in Circuit Court, should be dismissed.-BARBER V. JOHNSON, S. Dak., 57 N. W. Rep. 225. 11. ARBITRATION AND AWARD.-Where one voluntarily submits to arbitration all matters in dispute between himself and another, and the amount of the award is paid by his sureties without exception or appeal, the award will not afterwards be set aside for technical irregularities. WOELFEL V. HAMMER, Penn., 28 Atl. Rep. 147.

12. ARBITRATION AND AWARD- Collateral Attack. Where an award under a common law arbitration is made without notice to the parties, the award is a nullity unless notice was waived, and it may be colla

terally attacked.-SHIVELY V. KNOBLOCK, Ind., 35 N. E. kep. 1028.

13. ATTACHMENT - Affidavit.

Where an attachment has been merged in a judgment, a claimant of the attached property cannot, in a trial of the right of prop. erty, question the sufficiency of the affidavit on which the attachment issued; and, if he could, it would have to be by special plea, in the nature of abatement, before pleading to the merits.-Roos v. LEWYN, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 538.

14. ATTACHMENT - Lien. - Mansf. Dig. § 324, which gives the right to attach defendant's property as security for the "satisfaction of such judgment as may be obtained," is intended only to prevent alienations and incumbrances subsequent to the levy, and not to cut off, destroy, or affect the prior rights, equities, or in. cumbrances of third persons. - TENNANT V. WATSON, Ark., 24 S. W. Rep. 495.

15. ATTACHMENT OF WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE. Where, in an action against a wife and her husband on notes made by the wife in Iowa while in business there, plaintiff attached certain land of the wife in Texas, it was not necessary that plaintiff should prove the title to the property to be in the wife.-MERRIELLES V. STATE BANK OF KEOKUK, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 564.

16. ATTORNEYS-Powers.-It is within the scope of an attorney's authority to agree that, if a foreclosure sale is effected pending an appeal from the foreclosure decree, the proceeds shall be held in court, subject to be disposed of pursuant to the decision and mandate of the Appellate Court.-HALLIDAY V. STUART, U. S. S. C., 14 S. C. Rep. 302.

17. BAIL-Recognizance. The principal in recogni. zance pleaded guilty, and was fined, upon another charge, in the same court in which his presence was required by the recognizance, and was taken by a deputy sheriff, to the clerk's office, where the fine was paid; the whole time taken not exceeding five minutes: Held, that the detention did not release the sureties on the recognizance.-PEOPLE V. ROBB, Mich., 57 N. W. Rep. 257.

18. BANKING-Collections.-Plaintiff deposited a draft with the bank of H for collection, which forwarded it for collection to defendant bank, and defendant collected it after the bank of H failed. The arrangement between the banks was that each should daily remit to the other every collection as inade, but this was not strictly complied with by the bank of H, and the final drafts sent by it to defendant in payment of balance were dishonored: Held, that defendant was liable to plaintiff for the collection, defendant not being a purchaser of the draft, but merely a subagent for its collection.-STEVENSON V. FIDELITY BANK OF DURHAM, N. Car., 18 S. E. Rep. 695.

19. BANKS AND BANKING — Authority of Cashier. - A bank is bound by the act of its cashier in drawing checks in its name, though with the intent of embezzling the proceeds, and payment of the checks by the drawee is binding on the bank.-PHILLIPS V. MERCANTILE NAT. BANK OF CITY OF NEW YORK, N. Y., 35 N. E. Rep. 982.

20. BOND OF DEPUTY SHERIFF.-In an action of debt by a sheriff against his deputy upon his bond, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties as deputy sheriff, and to account for and pay over, as required by law, all money which may come into his hands by virtue of said office, the right of action does not accrue to said sheriff at the time of the default of such deputy, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run against said action until said sheriff has paid the debt occasioned by said default, or some part thereof.-ADKINS V. FRY, W. Va., 18 8. E. Rep. 737.

21. CARRIERS- Limiting Liability.— A common car. rier has the right by special contract to limit its liability to injuries received on its own line.-TEXAS & P. RY. Co. v. SMITH, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 565.

22. CARRIERS-Live Stock-Damages.-The measure of damages for cattle killed or rendered worthless by

the negligence of a carrier while transporting them is the value at the place of delivery, and, as to those sustaining less injuries, the measure is the difference be. tween their value as delivered and what it would have been had they been transported with proper care.TEXAS & P. RY. Co. v. KLEEPER, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 567. 23. CARRIERS-Passenger - Negligence. A flight of steps decended from a railroad station about 15 feet to an unimproved street, passing under the tracks, with uneven surface, being a natural ravine, down which ran a large stream, making the ground marshy. It was the universal custom for persons going across the railroad to cross over the tracks: Held, that there was no absolute obligation upon a passenger alighting from a train on a dark night, the street being unlighted, to use it in crossing the railroad to reach his home.-CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. Co. v. LOWELL, U. s. S. C., 14 8. C. Rep. 281.

24. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS- Assault. — Plaintiff, on entering defendant's train, was struck and jostled by three men, and, missing his pocketbook, he shouted for help, saying that he was being robbed, and accused the men of robbing him. The pocketbook was found on the floor, and restored to him, but the dispute was renewed, and plaintiff, though calling loudly for help, was set upon, and severely injured. No one came to his assistance: Held, that though defendant employed a proper number of train and depot men to protect passengers in ordinary contingencies, it was liable if any of these could have heard plaintiff's cries, and failed to respond thereto.-WRIGHT V. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. Co., Colo., 35 Pac. Rep. 196.

25. CHATTEL MORTGAGES - Execution.-A mortgage of personal property is valid, as between the parties thereto, and as to subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers having actual notice of such mortgage, though it may not be attested by any subscribing witness.- WALTER A. WOOD MOWING & REAPING MACH. Co. v. LEE, S. Dak., 57 N. W. Rep. 238.

26. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Payment.-A debt secured by a deed of trust is not satisfied by the creditor's breach of his agreement with the debtor to take certain notes in satisfaction thereof.-Low v. COLEMAN, Miss., 14 South. Rep. 267.

27. CHATTEL MORTGAGE OR ASSIGNMENT.-A chattel mortgage executed by an insolvent on her entire stock of goods is not converted into a general assignment for the benefit of creditors by the fact that the mortgagor is unable to continue business, that the debt is made payable on demand, and that the mortgagee is authorized to take immediate possession. -MARQUESE V. FELSENTHAL, Ark., 24 S. W. Rep. 493.

28. COAL LEASES.- Defendant, having sunk a shaft into coal on plaintiff's land, took a 10-year lease to mine under plaintiff's whole tract at a certain royalty per bushel, to mine as a minimum 10,000 bushels each year, and, if less, to pay the royalty on 10,000 bushels. The seam became unworkable in 8 years: Held, that defendant must pay the minimum royalty for the rest of the term.-TIMLIN V. BROWN, Penn., 28 Atl. Rep

236.

29. CONFLICT OF LAWS-Carrier's Liability.-A con . tract made in Boston with plaintiff's daughter, entitling plaintiff to a passage from Queenstown by defendant's British steamship line, provided that if plaintiff chose not to embark the money should be refunded. On plaintiff's giving notice to defendant in Cork that she wished to embark at a certain time, this contract was exchanged for another, assigning plaintiff to a particular ship, and providing for her board on the voyage: Held, that the old contract was canceled on good consideration, and the new one determined the rights of the parties.-O'REGAN V. CUNARD STEAM SHIP CO., Mass., 35 N. E. Rep. 1070.

30. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Amending Charter of City, -Const. art. 11, § 8, which provides that the charter of a city "may be amended at intervals of not less than two years by proposals therefor, submitted by the leg