1

viding that when either party to a marriage, for want of age, shall be incapable of assenting thereto, and there shall have been no subsequent voluntary cohab itation, the marriage shall be void from such time as shall be fixed by the judgment of a court of competent authority declaring the nullity thereof, the marriage of a 15 year old boy without the consent of his parents is voidable only, and not void.-STATE V. CONE, Wis., 57 N. W. Rep. 50.

66. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Homestead. -While the consent of the wife to a contract creating a lien on the homestead for material furnished in the erection of a house thereon should precede the purchase of the material, yet a material man who has furnished material both before and after such consent is entitled to a lien at least for such material as he furnished afterwards. -WALKER V. HOUSE, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 82.

67. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Statement of Claim. Where materials are furnished by a subcontractor to the head of a firm having the contract for the erection of a building, and in his statement for a lien such subcontractor names only the individual member with whom he dealt as the contractor, and where there is nothing to indicate that the owner was misled or injured by the failure of the subcontractor to correctly state the firm name of the contractors, such subcontractor's lien will not be declared invalid because of such error. FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF HUTCHINSON V. SANTY, Kan., 34 Pac. Rep. 974.

68, MINING LEASES-Construction.-A provision in a mining lease that if the specified royalties produce less than $1,000 for any year the lessees shall nevertheless pay that sum, and that if they fail to do so because of inability to find sufficient ores the lessor may terminate the lease, requires payment of at least $1,000 per year, whether sufficient ores can be found or not, so long as the lease is not terminated.-LEHIGH ZINC & IRON CO. V. BAMFORD, U. S. S. C., 14 S. C. Rep. 219.

69. MORTGAGES-Payment by Cotenant-Contribution. -Where a cotenant and comortgagor has conveyed his interest in the land expressly subject to the mortgage, and the other cotenant has been obliged, in protecting his interest, to pay and takejan assignment of the note and mortgage, the latter's payment does not extinguish the mortgage, but he may foreclose it on the other's interest.-LANG V. CALDWELL, Mont., 84 Pac. Rep. 957.

70. MORTGAGE BY HUSBAND AND WIFE-Judgment.Where a husband and wife executeja note and mortgage jointly, but it does not appear that the wife executed the instruments on account of her separate property, or to charge the same, personal judgment cannot be rendered against her, on foreclosure, for any deficiency after sale of the premises.-GAYNOR V. BLEWETT, Wis., 57 N. W. Rep. 44.

71. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Authority of Mayor.The mere fact that a county is about to inclose land claimed by a city, and that the city attorney had failed to present his case to the court so as to obtain injunctive relief, does not give rise to an emergency authorizing the mayor to employ counsel without calling a meeting of the council, in which is vested all control over the city property. CITY OF OWENSBORO WEIR, Ky., 24S. W. Rep. 115. 72. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Constitutional Law.The word "elections," in section 1, art. 7, of the con. stitution, is not used in its general or comprehensive sense, but in its restricted political sense, meaning public elections for the choice of public officers. A statute requiring the question of the annexation of a town or city to be submitted to the determination of qualified electors of the municipality as have in the year next preceding paid a property tax therein, is not unconstitutional. MAYOR, ETC., OF TOWN of VALVERDE V. SHATTUCK, Colo., 34 Pac. Rep. 947.

73. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Public Improvements. -Under 1 Gen. St. § 2415, requiring municipal corpora tions contracting with any person "to do any work of

any character which, if performed for an individual, a right of lien would exist under the law, or make any improvement for" such municipality, to take a bond conditioned for the payment of laborers, mechanics, and material-men, a city contracting with a person to grade a street is not required to take a bond, as it is only required to do so where the work to be done is such that, if done for an individual, a lien would attach in favor of laborers and others, and no lien would attach, under Gen. St. § 1663, for labor performed on a street for an individual.-CLOUGH V. CITY OF SPOKANE, Wash., 34 Pac. Rep. 934. 74. NEGLIGENCE Expert Evidence. In an action against a raliroad company for loss of services of plaintiff's minor son, it appeared that deceased went under an engine to tighten a boiler plug which was leaking, and was so scalded that he died. Defendant's foreman testified that he informed deceasd of the dangerous character of the work: Held, that evidence of an expert engineer that the conduct of deceased was careless was inadmissible. LOUISVILLS, E. & ST. L. CONSOLIDATED R. Co. v. BERRY, Ind,, 35 N. E. Rep. 565. 75. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Assignment.-An investment company which, as agent, makes a loan on bonds and mortgages payable to its investors, and guarantied by it, does not, by taking up said bonds at maturity, become an innocent holder for value, who may disregard the terms of the original oral agree ment for the loan.-ELWELL V. TATUM, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 71.

76. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Fraud- Burden of Proof.-Where an answer to a complaint in an action upon a promissory note, brought by an indorsee, sets up fraud in the inception of the note, and such fraud is established by evidence on the trial, the burden of proof shifts, and the plaintiff is bound to prove that he took the same for value, and without notice of the fraud.-BANK OF MONTREAL V. RICHTER, Minn., 57 N. W. Rep. 61.

77. OFFICE AND OFFICERS-Removal.-Const. art. 12, § 8, making it the duty of the governor, when the legis. lature is not in session, to examine into the condition of any public office, and the acts of any public officer, and to remove from office, for gross neglect of duty and malfeasance, any officer of the State, specifying particularly the attorney general, State treasurer, and others, and to appoint his successor, does not apply to subordinate officers, like the warden of the house of correction, so as to restrict to the governor the power to remove him, and prevent the legislature from vesting such power in the board of control, as by Act No. 118 of 1893.-FULLER V. ELLIS, Mich., 57 N. W. Rep. 33.

78. PARTNERSHIP-Firm Debts.-Where a township trustee uses the funds of the township to pay the debts of a firm of which he is a member, the obligation to re pay the township may be considered in equity a debt due the township by the firm, instead of the individual debt of the trustee.-ELLIOTT V. PONTIUS, Ind., 35 N. E. Rep. 562.

79. PLEADING-Counterclaim-Unliquidated Damages. -Commissions due an agent under a contract provid ing for a compensation of 25 per cent. on sales of the principal's merchandise effected by him are not unliquidated damages, and may be pleaded by him as a counterclaim to an action on notes executed by him to the principal.-D. JUNE & Co. v. BRUBAKER, Tex., 24 8. W.Rep. 79.

80. PLEADING-Demurrer-Misjoinder.-A question of misjoinder of plaintiffs, or whether a complaint states a cause of action in favor of one or more of several plaintiffs against defendants, cannot be raised by de murrer, under Rev. St. § 2649.-KUCERA V. KUCERA, Wis., 57 N. W. Rep. 47.

81. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Scope of Agency. An agency to borrow money for the purpose of clearing off liens from defendant's property does not compre hend an agency to confer with the holder or claimant of one of the liens, and make to him declarations

touching the agency, the payment of the debt, the agent's hopes or arrangements as to borrowing money, or the purpose for which it was wanted, no application for any loan being made to such holder or claimant.AKERS V. KIRK, Ga., 18 S. E. Rep. 366.

8. PUBLIC LAND-Homestead-State.-Where a party commutes his homestead entry into a cash entry, and the final receipt for the price is issued to him by the receiver, and the certificate is signed by the register, such receipt and certificate may entitle him prima facie to a patent, but do not conclude the land department from investigating the truth of the facts on which they were issued, and the bona fides of the homestead claim, and from canceling the same if found untrue and insufficient.-HOLMES V. STATE, Ala., 14 South. Rep. 51.

83. PUBLIC LANDS - Swamp Lands. - By Act Cong. Sept. 28, 1850, § 1, granting to certain States the swamp lands within their boundaries, and providing that such lands "shall be, and the same are hereby, granted" to such States, a grant in præsenti was effected, whereby the title to such lands passed at once to the State in which they lay.-SHERMAN V. A. P. Cook Co., Mich., 57 N. W. Rep. 23.

84. RAILROAD COMPANIES Accident at Crossing Trespassers. As against a bare licensee, a railroad company may run its trains in the usual way without special precautions, if the circumstances do not of themselves give warning of his probable presence, and he is not seen until it is too late.-CHENERY V. FITCHBURG B. Co., Mass., 35 N. E. Rep. 554.

85. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Contributory Negligence. -Upon the facts plaintiff held guilty of contributory negligence. — WEST JERSEY R. Co. v. EWAN, N. J., 27 Atl. Rep. 1064.

86. RAILROAD COMPANY-Injury to Employee.-A track repairer going on the right of way with the foreman and other members of the gang, after work hours, to take a train for the next working place, is not a trespasser.-SWADLEY V. MISSOURI PAC. RY. Co., Mo., 24 S. W. Rep. 140.

87. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Negligence.-In an action against a railroad company for personal injuries, the jury found that defendant's agent had placed a box car on a side track, so that plaintiff might load goods therein, and that while she was in the car a train was backed in upon the track to take the car out, and struck the same, causing the injuries; that the agent knew the car was not ready, and failed to notify those in charge of the train; that no signals were given; and that no brakeman was on the rear of the train, from which, had he been there, he could have seen that the car was not ready: Held, to show negligence on the part of defendant. - TOLEDO, ST. L. & K. C. R. Co. v. HAUCK, Ind., 35 N. E. Rep. 573.

$8. RAILROAD COMPANY Street Railways. The rule requiring one exercising his lawful rights, in a place where the exercise of lawful rights by others may put him in peril, to use such precaution and care for his safety as a reasonably prudent man would use under the circumstances, is the measure of duty for one who crosses a public highway on foot. He must use his powers of observation to discover approaching vehicles, and his judgment how and when to cross without collision, but his observation need not extend beyond the distance within which vehicles moving at lawful speed would endanger him.-NEWARK PASSENGER RY. Co. v. BLOCK, N. J., 27 Atl. Rep. 1067.

89. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railways Collision. -Plaintiff, driving in his wagon, in a broad street, with his nigh wheels in defendant's street car track, was met and run into by a car: Held, that the court properly charged that the car driver had a right to assume that plaintiff would turn out in time, but that, if plaintiff failed so to do, and the car driver saw it, he must do what he could to stop his car, and warn plaint iff off.-GLAZEBROOK V. WEST END ST. RY. Co., Mass., 35 N. E. Rep. 553.

90. RAILROAD DITCHES- Overflow.-In an action

against a railroad company for damages to plaintiff's property from an overflow of surface water from ditches and drains on defendant's road,,there being evidence that they were in good condition; that a storm during the night caused a cave in, filling one of them up; and that it was the heaviest fall of rain ever known by persons who had lived in the vicinity for many years, the rain all falling within five hours,-the question of whether the damage was caused by the act of God was properly left to the jury.-SENTMAN V. BALTIMORE & O. R. Co., Md., 27 Atl. Rep. 1074.

91. REPLEVIN-Evidence.-In an action of claim and delivery against a constable who had levied an execu tion on property, evidence is admissible to show that it appeared that an absolute bill of sale given by plaintiff to the execution debtor was actually a mortgage given to secure a debt, and it is immaterial that the of ficer did not know the true relation of such execution debtor to the property.-VOORHIES V. HENNESSY, Wash., 34 Pac. Rep. 931.

32. RES JUDICATA-Breach of Contract.-Where an ac tion by the assignee of a nonnegotiable contract was tried on issues, raised by defendant, of fraud by the assignor in its procurement, a judgment for the assignee was a bar to a subsequent action by defendant against the assignor on the same contract, and the privity of contract between the assignor and assignee rendered unnecessary the identity of the parties to the two ac tions.-GODDING V. COLORADO SPRINGS LIVESTOCK CO., Colo., 34 Pac. Rep. 942.

93. SALE-Misrepresentations.-In an action on a note given for the price of certain cattle, when defendant pleads misrepresentations of plaintiff as to number and class, and that on discovering the shortage he offered to rescind, and plaintiff induced him to go on with the contract, promising to make good said shortage, which he has failed to do, proof of these facts, and of the amount of said shortage, is competent in reduction of damages.-LEWIS V. TAYLOR, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 92.

94. SALE-Rescission.-A vendor of land need not, before bringing suit for a rescission of the sale and the cancellation of the deed for fraud, tender to defendant the consideration received by him; but it is suffi cient if he offer in his petition to restore to defendant what he received, as the rights of the parties can be fully adjusted by the decree.-GARZA V. SCOTT, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 89.

95. SHERIFFS Wrongful Seizure Justification.Where a sheriff has seized goods in possession of a mortgagee, and attempts to justify by producing the judgment and execution under which he acted, and by showing that the mortgage was in fraud of creditors of the mortgagor, the mortgagee may show that the judgment, which purports to have been confessed before a justice of the peace, is void, the mortgagor having never been served with process, nor confessed judg. ment, but merely having in his own store admitted to the justice and the creditor's agent that the claim was a just one.-TOWNSLY MYRICK DRY GOODS Co. v. FUL. LER, Ark., 24 S. W. Rep. 109.

96. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Contract.-In an action by T and husband against the heirs of F to enforce performance of a contract whereby F agreed to adopt Tas her daughter, and leave her all her property at her death, in consideration that T would serve her as her daughter during her life, and take care of her "in her old days," the evidence showed only casual refer ences by F to T as her adopted daughter, and expres sions to others than T of an intention to leave her property to the latter; that T served F only about 8 years, for only one of which she received no compensation; and that, for 16 years before her death, Fre ceived no services from T, though during a portion of such time she sorely needed the care of some one: Held, that the contract was not established, nor performance by T shown.-TEATS V. FLANDERS, Mo., 24 S. W. Rep. 126.

97. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Contract.-Where a con. tract for the sale of land required payment of the purchase price, before entry and the erection of improvements thereon by the vendee but the vendee nevertheless entered and constructed improvements thereon, with the knowledge of the vendor, and thereafter con. tinued to occupy and use the same without objection: Held, that the court was justified in finding, under the circumstances of the case, that such entry was with the consent and acquiescence of the vendor, and that the condition of the contract in respect to payment before entry was waived, and also that such vendee was in possession under the contract.-MINNEAPOLIS, ST. P. & S. S. M. RY. V. CHISHOLM, Minn., 57 N. W. Rep. 63.

98. STATUTES - Construction.-A requirement in an act relating to a turnpike road that the "width" of the macadam shall not be less than 8 inches, nor more than 15 inches, will be construed as a requirement that the "depth" of the macadam shall be as specified, as a literal interpretation would lead to an absurdity.-BIRD V. BOARD OF COM'RS OF KENTON COUNTY, Ky., 24 S. W. Rep. 118.

99. STATUTES-Pending Actions.-Chapter 109, of the Laws of 1893, concerning the sale and redemption of real estate, does not have the effect to change or nullify any of the terms of a judgment duly rendered before the passage of that act, directing the sale of lands, or any interest therein, for the purpose stated in said judgment.-GREENWOOD V. BUTLER, Kan., 34 Pac. Rep.

967.

100. SUNDAY CONTRACT.-The owner of goods in a store agreed on Sunday to let plaintiff have the goods to apply on a debt due for money loaned, and permitted him to come to the store on Monday, and remove the goods: Held, that the mere delivery on Monday was not sufficient to show the elements of a contract without relying on the Sunday transaction, which was illegal.-ASPELL V. HOSBEIN, Mich., 57 N. W. Rep. 27.

101. TAXATION-Powers of County Court.-Section 8, art. 10, of the constitution, prohibits the contraction of any indebtedness by a county court which cannot be paid out of the funds on hand or the levy for the current fiscal year, without complying with the other requirements of this section.-DAVIS V. WAYNE COUNTY COURT, W. Va., 18 S. E. Rep. 373.

102. TAX SALE - Redemption.-A person seeking to redeem land sold for taxes should make a legal tender of the proper amount of actual, lawful money; but that will be excused if the purchaser place his refusal, not upon the non tender of actual money, or because the amount is not the proper amount, but on the distinct ground that the party offering to redeem has no authority or right to do so.-POLING V. PARSONS, W. Va., 18 S. E. Rep. 379.

103. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-Damages.-There may be a recovery against a telegraph company for mental anguish and suffering, caused by its failure to deliver a message.-WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. CLINE, Ind., 35 N. E. Rep. 564.

101. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-Limiting Liability.-A telegraph operator who rejects a message written on a piece of brown paper, as unintelligible, and who then writes it on a regular telegraphic blank, at the dictation and request of the sender, is, in so doing, the sender's agent; and the latter is bound by a stipulation in the printed blank relieving the company from liability for mistakes or delays which may occur on con... · necting lines.-GULF, C. & S. F. RY. Co. v. GEER, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 86.

105. TOWNSHIP BOUNDARIES.-The laws of the United States require that all township lines shall be straight lines connecting the township corners, and all section and quarter section corners established by the government surveyor in surveying the exterior lines of townships should be so placed as to coincide with such township lines.-HANSON V. TOWNSHIP OF RED ROCK IN MINNEHAHA COUNTY, S. Dak., 57 N. W. Rep. 11.

Common Source of

106. TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE Title-Deed-Delivery.-In trespass to try title, though the deed under which defendant claims is void for un certainty in description, it is nevertheless admissible in plaintiff's favor to show common source of title.CULMORE V. GENOVE, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 83.

107. TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE- Deeds.-A deed purporting to have been executed by an administrator at a sale under order of court is not admissible in trespass to try title. to show title in plaintiff, unless the order under which the sale was made is produced.-RILEY V. POOL, Tex., 24 S. W. Rep. 85.

Warehouseman.-In

108. TROVER AND CONVERSION an action against warehousemen for the conversion of household furniture, plaintiff cannot recover for injury thereto by moths, caused by careless keeping, in the absence of anything in the complaint to indicate that damages are claimed for want of care.-SANFORD V. PECK, Conn., 27 Atl. Rep. 1057.

109. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Deficiency in Quantity, -In a conveyance of land not sold by the acre, but by the tract or entire body, the qualifying words "more or 'less" will cover any deficiency which does not justify a suspicion of willful deception, or mistake equiva lent thereto. This is true whether there was willful deception in fact or not. By accepting such a conveyance the vendee waives not only any mistake, but any deception, as to quantity, unless (keeping in view the object of the purchase and all the attendant circumstances) some willful deception or gross mistake would, after ascertaining the true quantity, be suggested to the mind by a mere comparison of that quantity with the quantity named in the descriptive words.-ESTES V. ODOM, Ga., 18 S. E. Rep. 355.

110. VILLAGES-Incorporation.-If powers and privi leges are conferred upon the inhabitants of a certain district or territorial area, and if they cannot be enjoyed or exercised, and the purposes intended cannot be attained without acting in a corporate capacity, an incorporation to this extent is created by implication, and the intent of the legislature can be shown con. structively as well as expressly.-STATE V. VALEN, N. J., 27 Atl. Rep. 1070.

111. WAREHOUSEMAN-Loss of Goods.-A warehouseman, having a large quantity of plaintiffs' goods in storage, removed from the warehouse at the expiration of his lease, and the new lessee was substituted as custodian of the goods, with plaintiffs' consent. Subsequently, plaintiff's discovered that some of the goods were missing, and they sued the original warehouseman on the warehouse receipts: Held that, if the goods were missing at the time of the transfer to the new lessee, defendant was liable; otherwise, not. HOEVELLER V. MEYERS, Peun., 27 Atl. Rep. 1081. 112. WILL Powers.-Testator bequeathed certain land to his son for life, "with the right and privilege of disposing of the same by will or devise to his children, if any he should have; and, in case he should die without leaving any children, I give and devise the same to the children of my daughter:" Held, that the power was imperative, and, as equity considers that done which ought to have been done, the children of the son were entitled to the land on his death intestate.-SMITH V. FLOYD, N. Y., 35 N. E. Rep. 606.

113. WITNESS-Transactions with Decedent.-Testator left a life interest in his estate to his executrix, with remainder to his executor. The executor and execu trix sued to recover money deposited by testator, but claimed by the administrator of an intestate, and the executrix released to the executor all her interest in the deposit: Held, that the executrix, though no longer a party in interest, was incompetent, under Code Civil Proc. § 829, to testify to conversations with intestate concerning the deposit, since the executor had acquired through her an interest in the deposit, both personally and as executor.-O'BRIEN V. WEILER, N. Y., 35 N. E. Rep. 587.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., FEBRUARY 23, 1894.

We are pained to announce the death of Mrs. Myra Bradwell, editor of the Chicago Legal News and the first woman lawyer to apply for admission to the bar of Illinois. In 1869, she passed the required examination but was refused admission. She sought the aid of the courts to secure her right to practice and her application was passed upon by the Supreme Court of Illinois and the Supreme Court of the United States, but in both instances unfavorably. A few years later the legislature passed an act permitting women to gain admission to the bar but Mrs. Bradwell had become interested in the work of editing the Legal News, which she established in 1868, and she did not renew her demand. Of her conduct of that publication it is sufficient to say that it has been such as to place it in the front rank of legal periodicals. She was recognized as a woman of rare talent, of great strength of character and a leader in the movement to give women equal rights before the law and equal opportunities to enter all appropriate fields of useful activity.

A novel phase of life insurance is developed by the recent North Carolina case of Trinity College v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 18 S. E. Rep. 176, viz: churches as beneficiaries of insurance policies on the lives of young men who are members of their congregations. To insure their young men is said to be regarded by many religious and charitable institutions as a profitable investment. The young man is encouraged to take out a policy for the benefit of the organization, either paying the premiums himself in place of contributing to the treasury, or leaving the organization to pay for them. In the case referred to it was held by Judge Burwell that where a church pays the premiums the policy is void as a wagering contract, for where no ties of blood or marriage exist, one can have an insurable interest in the life of another only when he is a creditor of or surety for such other. Another phase of the question is presented where the young man Vol. 38-No. 8.

takes out a policy for the benefit of the church, and pays the premiums himself. This it would seem ought also to be void for the same reason as in the other case. If the man takes out a policy for the benefit of a person who has an insurable interest, e. g., for his own benefit, and the policy is then assigned to the church, is the assignment valid? This is a question upon which the courts differ, some holding the policy void in the hands of one not having an insurable interest, whether the policy was obtained by direct contract with the insurer or by assignment from one who had an insurable interest (Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775; Franklin Co. v. Sefton, 53 Ind. 380; Mich. Mut. Benef. Asso. v. Rolfe, 76 Mich. 146). Other courts hold that the assignment of a contract of insurance is like the assignment of any other contract, and the contract being valid in the hands of the assignor is also valid in the hands of the assignee (St. John v. Am. Mut. Co., 13 N. Y. 31; Olmstead v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593; Mutual Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24; Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. St. 6).

What may fairly be considered as "external means" within the meaning of an accident insurance policy is often a nice and difficult point as is illustrated by the recent English case of Hamlyn v. Crown Accidental Insurance Company, 1 Q. B. 750. The policy insured the plaintiff against "any bodily injury caused by violent, accidental, external, and visible means," but there were many exceptions such as intoxication, fits, steeplechasing or otherwise wantonly or negligently exposing himself to any unnecessary danger or arising from natural disease or weakness or exhaustion consequent upon disease. One day the plaintiff was standing in his shop

when a lady customer and child entered. The child dropped a marble, and the plaintiff stooped to pick it up, when he wrenched his knee, and could not get it straight again. He was disabled for nine weeks, though he had never previously suffered from weak knee. The injury was described by the doctors as a dislocation of the internal cartilage of the knee joint. The plaintiff claimed compensation, and the question thereupon came to be whether the injury was caused by external means. All the learning on the subject was brought to bear. The result was, that the

Court of Appeal, held that the injury did not come within the exceptions of the policy. The court said the injury was accidental, becarse the plaintiff did not mean to wrench his knee. Then it was fairly described as something violent. So far, there was not much difficulty, but the difficulty was to say that it was by external means. If the injury had been caused by reason of something internal it would not be within the policy. The court held that as it was clearly not internal it must be external, and, hence, would suit the words. Lindley, L. J., said that the act of reaching after the marble, and the wrench which accompanied the act were fairly classed as external means. So the company were held to be liable.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

which his insurance was to be kept up to a specified amount by renewals or new policies, it was the custom of the agent to charge the premiums as policies were issued or renewed. and have periodical settlements with the insured when the premiums would be paid, a credit for a premium so charged to the next period of settlement may be implied.

PUBLIC OFFICERS ASSIGNMENT OF UNEARNED SALARIES-PUBLIC POLICY-CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY.-Two courts have recently held that the assignment of the unearned salary or fees of a public officer is void as against public policy. This ruling was made by the Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Williamson, 23 S. W. Rep. 1854, and by the Supreme Court of Texas in State Nat. Bank v. Fink, 24 S. W. Rep. 256. In England the authorities seem to be unanimous in holding such assignment void as being contrary to public policy. Flarty v. Odlum, 3 Term. R. 681; Barwick v. Reade, 1 H. Bl. 627; Arbuckle v. Cowtan, 3 Bos. & P. 328; Wells v. Foster, 8 Mees. & W. 149; Hill v. Paul, 8 Clark & F. 307; Palmer v. Bate, 2 Brod. & B. 673; Liverpool v. Wright, 28 L. J. Ch. 871; Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 1 Swanst. 79; Stone v. Lidderdale, 2 Anstr. 533; Lidderdale v. Montrose, 4 Term. R. 248. The American text writers and courts nearly all follow the rule laid down in the English cases. Story, Eq. Jur. § 1040a; Mechem, Pub. Off. § 874; Greenh. Pub. Pol. p. 351; Bliss v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442; Bangs v. Dunn, 66 Cal. 74, 4 Pac. Rep. 963; Schloss v. Hewiett, 81 Ala. 266, 1 South. Rep. 263; King v. Hawkins (Ariz.), 16 Pac. Rep. 434; Bank v. Wilson, 122 N. Y. 488, 25 N. E. Rep. 855; Field v. Chipley, 79 Ky. 260; Schwenk v. Wyckoff, 46 N. J. Eq. 560, 20 Atl. Rep. 259; Webb v. McCauley, 4 Bush, In People v. Dayton, 50 How. Pr. 143, it is held that the assignment of unearned fees does not fall within the rule sustained by the courts as to salaries. But in the case of Bank v. Wilson this case was disapproved by the Court of Appeals of that State. It was there held that the same reasons applied against assigning unearned fees as to a salary, and that such assignment was void. The validity of an assignment of unearned fees was the subject under consideration in Schloss v. Hewlett, 81 Ala. 266, 1 South. Rep.

INSURANCE-PAROL CONTRACT-DELIVERY OF POLICY-AUTHORITY OF AGENT.-In Newark Machine Co. v. Kenton Ins. Co., it was held by the Supreme Court of Ohio that a valid contract of insurance may be made by parol, when not forbidden by statute, or a provision of the company's charter which has been brought to the knowledge of the other contracting party; and, as in other cases of parol contract, the assent of the parties to the terms of the agreement may be shown by their acts and the attending circumstances, as well as by the words they have employed. When nothing is said in the negotiations about special rates of insurance, or special conditions of the policy, it will be presumed that those which were usual and customary were intended. In determining whether there has been a delivery of a policy, effect will be given to the intention of the parties; and when the terms of an executed policy have been unconditionally accepted by the insured, and it has thereafter been treated as in force by the parties, its delivery will be regarded as complete, though it remain in the hands. of the insurer's agent. An agent authorized to make contracts of fire insurance and issue policies may waive payment in cash of the premiums, and give time for their payment, unless there are restrictions upon his authority of which the insured has notice, and such waiver may be expressed or implied. Where, under an arrangement with the insured by

10.