sioners of the State of Oregon to the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company recommending, amongst other things, to reduce its rates on wheat to twenty cents per hundred pounds in car-load lots from certain points east in that State to Portland has been introduced in evidence by petitioners, and is relied on by them as sustaining their views of this case. Among the points thus named are Centreville, Blue Mountain, and Pendleton. A recommendation of that honorable Board as evidenee opon any matter to which it relates receives, as it deserves to receive, at our hands a very high and respectful consideration, but we do not know the evidence upon which that recommendation was made, and if we did we would still be constrained to be governed by the evidence that is before us in this proceeding, which involves interstate commerce, and is within a peculiar jurisdiction, which is devolved upon us by the statute.

Shortly after these petitions were filed the defendant, as it had a right to do under the statute, reduced its rate on wheat from Walla Walla to Portland from $6 per ton to $5 per ton, or twenty-five cents per hundredweight.

Since the first of April, 1887, the defendant has reduced its rates as follows:

Dry goods, boots and shoes......

Sugar, in less than car-loads..

Coffee........

Bacon, in less than car-loads....

Bacon, in car-loads.......

Nails, in car-loads and less than car-loads.....

Hardware..........

Agricultural implements, in less than car-loads..

Lime, in car-loads.......

Soap........

Starch, less than car-loads......

Starch, in car-loads.....

Barbed wire........

Coal oil, less than car-loads...

Dried fruit.........

Cts. per 100 lbs.

33

15

15

37

15

15

12

33

33

15

43

58

15

33

43

These are large and general reductions on a fine line of freights, and they are fairly entitled to be taken into consideration in a proceeding of this nature. Rates are, and should be, to a considerable extent, so related to each other in the

manner in which they are laid for the revenue of a railroad that the instances are very frequent in which a change of tho freight upon one important article of commerce involves a consideration of the relative rates on other articles. This case is one of that description. A reduction of rates, such as is claimed by petitioners, to fifteen cents per hundred pounds, or three dollars per ton, on wheat shipments from Walla Walla to Portland is one that would be entirely too great under the circumstances by which the defendant is surrounded at this time.

The order, therefore, is that on and after the 15th day of December, 1887, the defendant must cease to charge more than twenty-three and a half cents per hundred pounds, or four dollars and seventy cents per ton, on wheat transported by it over its railroad lines from Walla Walla, in Washington Territory, to Portland, in the State of Oregon, during the present grain season.

The order is also made in this form as to the present grain season upon the statement in the answer of the defendant that further reductions on wheat rates are intended to be made by defendant as soon as this can be done and upon the general course of dealing of defendant, as shown in the proofs, that the rate for the next season on wheat will doubtless be further modified.

WILLIAM H. COUNCILL v. THE WESTERN AND ATLANTIC RAILROAD COMPANY.

Tried July 23.-Decided December 3, 1887.

The Commission will not go into the question of money damages when the claim presented is in its nature an action of trespass, for the reason that defendant is constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury in such a case. The Commission is not authorized to award the counsel and attorney's fees, which may be given by a court under the 8th Section of the Act. Colored people may properly be assigned separate cars on equal terms. Such a separation of the races does not create undue prejudice or unjust preference.

Complainant, a colored man, paid the same fare as other first-class passengers, and it was only fair dealing and common honesty that he should

have the security and convenience of travel for which his money had been taken.

Colored people who buy first-class tickets, must be furnished with accommodations equally safe and comfortable with other first-class passengers. The Commission finds that the car furnished complainant was only second-class in comforts for travel, and that he was thereby subjected to undue prejudice and unreasonable disadvantage, in violation of the Act to regulate commerce.

John R. Brandon and Oscar R. Hundley, for complainant. Julius L. Brown, for defendant.

REPORT AND OPINION OF THE COMMISSION.

MORRISON, Commissioner:

The complaint of Wm. H. Councill against the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company states that he is a minister of the Gospel of the African Methodist Church, a school teacher, a citizen of the United States, a resident of Huntsville, in the State of Alabama, where he is principal of the State Colored Normal and Industrial School; and that said railroad company is a common carrier of passengers and property from Chattanooga, in the State of Tennessee, to Atlanta, in the State of Georgia; that, having occasion to visit some of the States east of Alabama in the interest of said school, he had, on April 7, 1887, proceeded as far as Chattanooga, where he purchased of said railroad company a first-class ticket over its road from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and shortly before the train started, entered a car and seated himself without direction from any one as to the car he should take or seat he should occupy. Soon after he went aboard and the train had started, and before his ticket had been asked for, he was told by a man to go into another car. The person making this request did not announce his official character, and the same being unknown to complainant the request was not heeded. And complainant avers that, whether or not such person was an officer, agent, or employee of said company, he had no right or authority to require complainant to change his seat.

The complainant was soon again told to go into another car, this time by a brakeman or person in railroad garb, to

whom complainant answered that when the conductor came for his ticket he, complainant, would go into another car if the conductor so directed. Soon after the second direction to go into another car, the brakeman or employee by whom it was given, returned with two. other persons, one carrying a railroad lantern, who again told complainant to go into another car, to which he responded as before, that he would go if told to do so by the conductor. The person holding the lantern, without provocation, struck the complainant with it several blows, cut and bruised his face, and the three together forcibly ejected him from the car and compelled him to go into and occupy another car, in which he rode until the train reached Dalton, Georgia, at which place, in consequence of the injuries and bruises inflicted on him, he left the train. His ticket over the road to Atlanta had been surrendered. These injuries and wrongs were done to complainant in the presence of the passengers seated in the car which he was compelled to vacate, and none of said passengers were told to change their seats nor were they otherwise molested; that the conductor witnessed the violence and had information that it was intended and made no effort to prevent it, and when requested by complainant to protect him and see that his rights as a passenger on said train was respected, his reasonable request was answered by the conductor with harsh and abusive language.

That defendant did, on April 7th, 1887, in respect of the matter stated by complainant, subject him to unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage in violation of the Act to regulate commerce, and especially of the third section of said Act; that, being a colored man, he was in consequence thereof not allowed a seat in said car, while white passengers who had purchased tickets at the same price paid by complainant were allowed to ride in said car, and that, because of his color, he was unreasonably discriminated against and subjected to unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage; that by reason of the public manner of the assault, ejectment from the car, bruises received, pain endured, mental anxiety, and humiliation, delay in making his journey, and the unjust discrimination against him he had been damaged in the sum of $25,000,

342

· INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORTS.

which he asks may be awarded to him, together with $1,500 for the reasonable pay of counsel he has been compelled to employ.

The answer of the defendant railroad company admits, or does not contest, the occupation, citizenship, and residence of the complainant as stated in his complaint. It admits that defendant is a common carrier of passengers, that complainant is a colored man and purchased a ticket over its road as stated by him, and does not contest his statement that he on April 7th, 1887, entered the car and seated himself without direction from any one as to the car he might take or the seat he might occupy. Defendant admits that complainant was twice told by employees, its agents, or, as it claims, was politely requested, once by the conductor and once by the brakeman, to go into another car, and that complainant was removed from the car to another by violence, but, as it alleges, not by its agents. It admits that the violence was used in the presence of the passengers in the ladies' car, and that no demand was made upon any other of the passengers to vacate their seats, but it alleges that no others were there in violation of the rules. It admits that complainant left the train at Dalton, Ga., as it avers, for no other reason than that he chose to do so.

It admits "its obligation to furnish to all passengers who pay the same fare equal or like accommodations, and that it has no right to discriminate between classes on account of color, sex, or otherwise, by offering one better accommodations and another inferior accommodations for the same. money.

Further answering, the defendant railroad company avers that it has the right to promote good government of its trains and the convenience and comfort of passengers by classifying and requiring those of one color or sex to ride in one car and those of another in a different car, and to avoid confusion and trouble which might result from "crowding persons of the two races together in the same car," it had established a permanent rule or regulation of the company. By this rule a car was and is set apart, called the ladies' car, which no one but a lady, or a gentleman accompanied by a lady, or a