ply because they indicate the general character of all, and enable the Commission to announce certain conclusions to which it has arrived respecting its jurisdictions and powers.

It is obvious, from the tenor of such applications as these, which reach us by every mail, that the impression is generally prevalent that this Commission has power to construe, interpret, and apply the law, by preliminary judgment. We are continually appealed to for decisions in advance as to whether common carriers, said to be willing to adopt certain methods of dealing with respect to Interstate Commerce, can do so without subjecting themselves to the penalties denounced by the statute for violation of its provisions.

A careful reading of the "Act to regulate commerce," under which this Commission is organized, will show to the petitioners and others who have made similar applications that no jurisdiction has been given us to answer these questions like those under consideration. An expression of our opinion upon these subjects at this time, being neither a duty imposed nor a power conferred by the statute, would carry with it no judicial efficacy or sanction; in fact, would be no more useful to the public or the carriers than the opinion of other men upon the same points.

Two sections of the law confer power upon the Commission to entertain and decide applications and petitions.

Section 4 empowers us, upon application by a common carrier, to authorize such common carrier in special cases to charge less for longer than for shorter distances over the same line, and also to prescribe the extent of relief from the operation of the former part of the same section which a designated common carrier may from time to time enjoy. A number of petitions have been filed under this section, the consideration of which is at the present time engaging the attention of the Commission, and nothing said in this opinion is to be treated as in any manner bearing thereon. It is obvious that applications like those of the Railway Conductors and the Traders' and Travelers' Union have no relation whatever to the duties imposed upon us by section 4. And this is the only section of the law which the Commission has power to relieve against or relax.

Section 13 authorizes complaints to the Commission, and confers jurisdiction to entertain the same. It provides that any person, etc., "complaining of anything done or omitted to be done by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act in contravention of the provisions thereof, may apply to said Commission by petition, which shall briefly state the facts." Notice and opportunity for answer having been given, unless satisfaction is made, an investigation is required. Upon such an investigation the Commission will necessarily entertain the consideration of the question whether the conduct complained of is or is not in contravention of the provisions of the law, and if it so adjudge, it is authorized to issue a notice enjoining the carrier from further violation of the law, and to award reparation for the injury done, or both. But neither the Railway Conductors nor Traders' and Travelers' Union complain that any common carrier has violated the law. On the contrary, they both aver that the railroad companies do not now violate the law, and do not wish to do so. The Conductors say that they fear they will not receive free passes as heretofore, and the Traders' and Travelers' Union say that they fear commercial travelers will not be allowed free transportation for 150 pounds of extra baggage, as was allowed last year. They present no complaint of anything done or omitted in contravention of the provisions of the law. If a railroad company should issue a pass to a conductor and his family to attend the approaching convention, or should transport 300 pounds of baggage free for a commercial traveler under the registry and indemnity system, and some person, feeling aggrieved, should make complaint of unjust discrimination, it would then be proper for the Commission to entertain the question of whether such conduct was or was not in violation of the law, and if so, whether it was or was not within the exceptions stated in section 22. Complaints may also be presented if the charges made by the carriers are not considered reasonable and just. But until questions of this kind come before us in

the

way clearly indicated by the statute, it would be worse than useless for us to express opinions or give advice.

We should not only lay ourselves justly open to the charge

of assuming unwarranted authority, but should also run great risk of involving all concerned in what the courts might afterwards hold to be breaches of the law, by hasty and illconsidered conclusions, based upon ex parte statements and arguments. Although it might be desirable, or at least convenient in respect to any piece of new legislation, to have a tribunal established to which inquirers might apply for instruction and advice respecting the meaning of the law and its application to suggested "circumstances and conditions," a moment's reflection will show that no such tribunal could be properly erected. Congress has not taken the management of the railroads out of the hands of the railroad companies. It has simply established certain general principles under which interstate commerce must be conducted.

It has enacted in section 1 that all charges for interstate transportation shall be reasonable and just; has prohibited in section 2 all manner of unjust discriminations; has forbidden in section 3 all undue and unreasonable preferences; has required in the same section reasonable and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic; and has prohibited in section 5 the pooling of freights. That, in substance, is the interstate commerce law. There is nothing novel in these provisions. They simply bring back the business of the common carriers to the well-settled principles of the common law. Yet no one can deny that there was urgent need of their statutory formulation. Alleged difficulties in putting them in operation only disclose examples of the extent to which they have been violated in the past.

These sections of the act are expressed in plain words. A construction must be given to them in the first instance by the carriers and their patrons. When a course of conduct has been adopted of which complaint is made that it violates the law, the decision of the question will rest with the courts or with the Commission, as the complaining party may elect. This is the orderly method in which all legislation is administered and applied, and the statute in question presents no exception.

One more suggestion may properly be added. It appears from the numerous petitions that have been laid before us for

preliminary advice, many of them obviously upon the suggestion, if not by the procurement, of the carriers themselves, that common comment on the law by the carriers and those who have heretofore enjoyed special favors at their hands, describes the system of penalties which the law provides as extreme, and the risks imposed upon unintentional and unwitting violators of its provisions as enormous. Such com

ment seems to us neither fair nor just. It is true that section S provides that for violation of the law, and for failure to do an act which the law requires, the offending common carrier shall be liable to the injured party for the actual damages sustained, together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, and collected with the costs in the case. It is also true that section 10 imposes a fine of "not to exceed $5,000" upon common carriers and their officers, agents, and servants who wilfully do or cause to be done, or willingly suffer or permit to be done, any prohibited act, etc., upon conviction in a district court of the United States. The civil remedy described in section 8 adds an attorney's fee to the existing common law right of an injured party to recover the full amount of his damages, a condition of affairs. which cannot greatly alarm corporations disposed to fair dealing; while the criminal remedy given in section 10 obviously pertains to intentional violations of the law, and the fine is in these cases to be graduated by the court according to the enormity of the offense.

Good faith, exhibited in an honest effort to carry out the requirements of the law will involve reasonable and fairminded officials in no danger of damages or fines. The elasticity of the statute in their favor is noticeable. The unjust discrimination of section 2 must be "in a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions." The preference or or advantage of section 3 must be "undue or unreasonable." Throughout the act, as it now stands, in confessedly experimental form, there is exhibited an obvious and a generous pupose to allow to the corporations ample scope in the conduct of their business as common carriers for the people, and fair consideration of every reasonable claim,

while insisting upon just, impartial, open, and consistent rates of charge to which every citizen shall be subject alike whose situation is the same. Surely the people could not ask for less.

The language and the tenor of the act wholly fail to justify railroad managers, if any such there be, who refuse to accept responsibilities, decline to offer rates, neglect to announce conditions of traffic, embarrass the customary interchange of business, and impose stagnation upon trade while they "stick in the bark" of the phrases and expressions of the law, inventing doubts and imagining dangers. It is still more unjustifiable for railroad companies to make use of the general clauses of the law ignoring its modifying and enlarging words and formulas in order to impose additional burdens upon localities, trades, professions, manufacturers, consumers, classes of travelers or employes, straining and repressing every construction in favor of the corporate treasury, and quoting the new law as their authority for all manner of petty exactions. The powers of the Commission are entirely adequate to cope with such conduct, the existence of which is not affirmed, although it has been somewhat publicly suggested. The same statute which enacts that charges for like service shall be uniform to all, also provides that charges in every case, and for every kind and class of service, shall be reasonable and just.

As the law is practically applied it is seen to contain many elements of advantage to the economical and profitable. management of the business of the carriers, which they have not been slow to apprehend and take the benefit of. The Commission ventures to express the hope that with this explanation respecting the mutual functions of the carriers. and the Commission in carrying the law into effect according to its true intent and meaning, there will be no lack of good faith and active co-operation in continuing the normal activity of every kind of reputable industry and traffic throughout the land under favorable, fair, and reasonable terms, conceding frankly to the people all the rights, benefits, advantages, and equal privileges which the "Act to Regulate Commerce was intended to secure.