detailed account of the progress and close of the negotiation, and informing him of the means taken to communicate to General Wayne, and the different agents of the government in the western country, the failure of the treaty, and the course they had pursued to conciliate the Six Nations, who were openly and decidedly in favor of the United States, and who exerted all their influence in the grand council, to induce them to make peace.

CHAPTER VII.

Condition of the Western Army in 1793.-Encampment at Hobson's Choice. -Discipline of the army.-Order of march.-Fortifications at Greenville. -Indians attack Fort Recovery.-Repulsed with very heavy loss.-Proofs of British influence over the Indians.-Lieutenant Lowery attacked.-Defeated.-Killed.

ALL prospects of peace being now at an end, the attention of the War Department was directed to the completion of the army; which was to consist of five thousand one hundred and twenty, rank and file, and to the arrangements necessary to sustain it. In answer to a call, for a statement of the number of non-commissioned officers and privates, then in service, General Knox reported, that exclusive of the small detachments at West Point, and in the South, which were not considered as belonging to the Western army, there were, on paper, three thousand five hundred and ninety-four-showing a deficiency of fifteen hundred and twenty-six.

That report was accompanied by a statement from General Wayne, made in October, from which it appeared that the entire force for the expedition, independent of those reported sick, and in garrison, and including ten hundred and twenty-nine mounted volunteers, to be raised by General Scott, but not yet in camp, amounted to three thousand six hundred and twenty-nine. There was, of course, at that time, a deficiency, of fourteen hundred and ninety-one. In addition to this, the influenza was prevailing with great severity, in all parts of the country, by which a large propor

tion of the men in camp, were returned on the sick list, as unfit for duty. At the same time General Wilkinson was lying dangerously ill, at Fort Jefferson, with the same disease.

General Wayne, having been authorised by the War Department, to resort to any lawful expedient to bring forward the mounted volunteers from Kentucky, after a pressing correspondence on that subject with Governor Shelby and General Scott, and after the season was far advanced, proceeded to order a draft from the militia of that State, as a dernier resort; remarking at the same time, that he had but little hope of its success. It was his opinion, that the safety of the out-posts and the settlements required him to advance at the earliest moment possible, to guard them against the host of savages, who were congregated at the Rapids, and were then at liberty to commence hostilities.

The communications from the Commissioners, in the early part of their intercourse with the Indians, had created a general expectation that peace would be the result of their labors; and, as a consequence of that impression, the efforts to complete the military establishment, were entirely suspended; so that when the time for action came, neither the recruits to fill the regular regiments, nor the volunteers called for by the President, from Kentucky, were ready to join the army. In addition to this, the sickness which had prevailed during the summer, reduced the effective force in camp to two thousand six hundred, officers included. Such, however, was the exposed condition of the frontiers, that the General, after deliberately weighing the consequences, wrote to the Secretary of War, that something must be done, immediately, to save them from the impending fury of the savages, and that he would therefore advance with the force he then had, in order to gain a strong position in front of Fort Jefferson, so as to keep the enemy in check, by exciting apprehensions for the safety of their women and children, and wait there, until a favorable

opportunity might present itself, to strike a blow with effect.

It was his opinion, that the apparent tranquillity on the frontier, and elsewhere, was temporary, and indicated that the enemy were collecting in force, to oppose the legion on its march, and attack it in some position, unfavorable for the action of cavalry; yet he expressed entire confidence in his ability to sustain himself, and keep the enemy in check, if nothing more, till his troops should be collected; which he hoped would be in time, to give the haughty savage a blow, that would compel him to sue for peace, before the next opening of the leaves.

If he should be disappointed in the arrival of his forces, as he expected to be, he assured the Secretary, that he would not commit the legion, so as to endanger its safety, or put at hazard the honor and reputation of the government; and that, unless more powerfully supported than he then was, he would content himself with taking a strong position, in advance of Fort Jefferson; where he might protect the frontiers, secure the out-posts, and improve the discipline of his army, during the winter. It was a matter of regret, that at so interesting a period, when so much was at stake, the army had not been completed, according to the original plan of the government. But it will be remembered, that during the tedious negotiation with the Indians, which continued between three and four months, the American officers and agents were strictly prohibited from making any movement of a military character.

When that prohibitory order was received, in the spring of 1793, General Wayne was at Legionville, with a portion of his troops, where he continued in a state of inactivity, during the season. When the order was revoked, after the failure of the negotiation, about the 1st of September, he repaired to Fort Washington, and encamped with his troops on the bank of the Ohio, between the village of Cincinnati and Mill creek. To that encampment, he gave

the name of "Hobson's Choice," it being the only place in that vicinity, suited for the object intended. During the time they remained in that encampment, waiting for reinforcements, they were constantly and laboriously engaged in military exercises and movements, particularly those which had been adopted, as best suited to the nature of the service, in which they were employed.

The country through which they had to march, was a dense wilderness, containing ravines, thickets, morasses, water courses, etc.; at any of which, the whole force of the Indians might be made to operate, at once, on the legion, without warning. The General foresaw this; and that the obstructions to be encountered, and the character of the enemy with whom he had to contend, made it hazardous to pursue the customary modes of marching through cultivated, civilized, countries.

The subject had therefore occupied his mind, when first he received his appointment; and before he left Philadelphia, he conversed on it freely with the President, who had more experience in the mode of Indian warfare, and understood it better, than any other officer living. With the information derived from that high source, General Wayne formed a plan for conducting his marches, and constructing his encampments, in the Indian country, well calculated to guard against surprise, and enable him, in case of a sudden attack, to form his line of battle without confusion, and in the shortest time possible.

In addition to the videttes, usual in military movements, a strong guard preceded the army, which followed in parallel lines, at such distances, and so arranged, that the line might be quickly formed, by a single manœuvre. General Harrison, in his subsequent successful campaigns, in the Indian country, adopted the same plan, with great success, having seen its operation in the army of General Wayne.

In accordance with the determination before expressed,