IMPEACHMENT.
See Witnesses, 7-9.
IMPROVEMENTS.
See Homestead, 3.
INDEBTEDNESS.
See Municipal Corporations, 9.
1. INDICTMENT-APPLYING VERDICT TO COUNTS IN.-If there are several counts in an indictment, on the bringing in by the jury of a general verdict the court may apply the verdict to any one of the several counts of the indictment, and order judgment and sentence accordingly. (Southern v. State, 702.)
2. INDICTMENT-APPLYING VERDICT TO COUNTS IN.—If the jury returns a general verdict of guilty upon an indictment containing different counts for distinct offenses, and the court, without objection, after interrogating the jury and with its consent, changes the verdict so as to make it apply to one of the counts in the indictment upon which the evidence justifies a conviction, the defendant is not prejudiced by the action of the court, nor entitled to a reversal of the judgment on the ground of such action. (Southern v. State, 702.)
3. INDICTMENT-COUNTS FOR DISTINCT OFFENSES-APPLYING VERDICT TO.-If the jury returns a general verdict of guilty upon an indictment containing counts for distinct offenses, the proper practice is to retire the jury, and require it to indicate by the verdict the count upon which the defendant is found guilty. (Southern v. State, 702.)
4. INDICTMENT-COUNTS IN FOR DISTINCT OFFENSES.If an indictment contains two or more counts for two or more distinct offenses, a general verdict of guilty operates as a conviction upon all, but the defendant is, upon request, entitled to have separate findings, or at least to have the jury in some way pass upon each count by itself. (Southern v. State, 702.)
See Crime Against Nature; Forgery, 3; Slander, 7.
INDORSEMENT.
See Negotiable Instruments, 3-7.
1. AN INJUNCTION GRANTED WITHOUT NOTICE, except in case of emergency shown in the complaint, is by the statute of Washington void, but the courts may grant a restraining order to be operative to keep things in statu quo until notice can be given and the application for injunction properly presented. (Larsen v. Winder, 864.)
2. JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.-THE POWER TO GRANT AN INJUNCTION, though vested in the clerk of a court, is judicial, and therefore cannot be exercised by a deputy. (Payton v. McQuown, 437.)
3. PRACTICE.-AN INJUNCTION CANNOT BE GRANTED BY A DEPUTY CLERK of a circuit court in Kentucky, though the statute gives authority to grant injunctions to any circuit judge or to the clerk of the court or a county judge, if the judge of the court be absent from the county. (Payton v. McQuown, 437.)
4. STATE, INJUNCTION AGAINST OFFICERS OF.-Officers or
agents of the state in charge of its insane asylum may be enjoined
from interfering with the flow of a natural stream, and from throw-
ing offal therein, whereby its waters become unfit for any purpose,
and the air is rendered noxious and offensive. (Herr v. Central Ken-
tucky Lunatic Asylum, 414.)
5. TAXES, RELIEF AGAINST IN EQUITY.—Though the man-
ner of levying a tax is so irregular as to render it void, still, unless
the tax is excessive or unequal or unjust, so as to affect its substan-
tial justice, equity will not interfere to declare it invalid or to en-
join its enforcement. (Hayes v. Douglas County, 925.)
6. ASSESSMENTS.-WHILE MERE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
do not invalidate an assessment, it must appear to be a fair attempt
at compliance with the statute, and an assessment made in entire
disregard of the statute is presumed to be unequal, and to justify
the interference of a court of equity to prevent its enforcement.
(Hayes v. Douglas County, 925.)
7. EQUITY.—AN ASSESSMENT MAY BE JOINED THOUGH
THERE IS NO OFFER to pay such part as may be rightfully due
from the complainant, where such assessment is shown to be un-
equal and to be imposed upon a part only of the property rightfully
subject thereto. (Hayes v. Douglas County, 925.)
8. PROBATE SALES-INJUNCTION AGAINST JUDGMENT.—
In a suit to set aside a regular and authorized probate sale of land
and to enjoin the purchaser from enforcing a judgment obtained by
bim in an action of unlawful detainer against the complainants in
possession, an injunction should not be granted in the absence of an
allegation of the purchaser's insolvency. (Cobb v. Garner, 136.)
9. JUDGMENT, RELIEF FROM NEGLIGENCE AS A BAR TO.
An injunction will not be issued against a common-law judgment on
the ground that the complainant had requested an attorney to prepare
an answer for him, and, relying upon the attorney's promise to do
so, had gone to another county under the supposition that the answer
would be filed, and the cause continued to another term. (Payton v.
McQuown, 437.)
10. THE NEGLIGENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AT LAW is treated
as the negligence of his client, and, therefore, does not constitute a
ground for enjoining a judgment alleged to be due to it. (Payton v.
McQuown, 437.)
See Contempt, 1; Officers, 3.
1. INNKEEPERS-LIABILITY FOR THEFT BY CLERK.—If a
regular boarder who has lived in a hotel for several months deposits
money in the hotel safe, the proprietor, who has used ordinary care
and diligence in the selection and employment of his hotel clerk, is
not liable for the theft of such money by the latter. (Taylor v.
Downey, 472.)
2. INNKEEPERS-LIABILITY.-Boarding-house keepers are lia-
ble as bailees for mutual benefit for the preservation of goods
brought upon their premises by boarders. The nature of the liabil-
ity is not changed by a deposit of money in the boarding-house safe,
though the degree of care may be increased over that required when
the boarder retains its custody. Still the boarding-house keeper owes
the depositor only the duty of ordinary care, and is liable only for
gross negligence. (Taylor v. Downey, 472.)
INNUENDO.
See Slander, 8-10.
See Building and Loan Associations, 8-10; Corporations, 13; Insur-
ance, 23, 28, 29.
1. INSTRUCTIONS-FORM AND ACCURACY.-A court is not
bound to give an instruction unless it is correct as written, and may
refuse to give it, if it is not expressed in proper terms. (Chicago etc.
R. R. Co. v. Champion, 357.)
IN PART-BAD IN PART.-The
fact that part of an instruction is correct does not cure that part
sitions, one of which is erroneous, there is no error in refusing to give
which is defective, and, if an instruction contains two distinct propo-
the entire instruction as asked. (Chicago etc. R. R. v. Champion,
357.)
3. JURY TRIAL-NEGLIGENCE, INSTRUCTIONS, WHEN DO
NOT REQUIRE A REVERSAL.-If the court can see from the
whole record that even under correct instructions a different verdict
could not have been rightfully rendered, or that the exceptant could
not have been prejudiced by the erroneous instruction, it will not,
for such error, reverse the judgment. (Richmond Ry. etc. Co. v.
Garthright, 839.)
COMPROMISE.-An instruction
that any proposed compromise of a claim for injury should not be
considered as an acknowledgment of any liability on the part of de-
fendant, should be given, especially if there is evidence that he
visited plaintiff in regard to a compromise. (Pelton v. Schmidt, 462.)
5. INSTRUCTIONS - CONTRACTS.-There is no error in in-
structing a jury that they may adopt that construction of a contract
which the parties themselves have placed upon it. (Merchants' etc.
Bank v. Fraze, 341.)
6. INSTRUCTIONS IN FELONY CASES.-Upon a trial in felony
cases, the court must give in its charge to the jury the law applicable
to the case, whether requested to do so or not. What law is ap-
plicable to the case is determined by the charge contained in the in-
dictment and the evidence adduced at the trial. (Miers v. State, 705.)
7. INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL LAW REASONABLE
DOUBT.-A charge to the jury, in a criminal case, that, “if they be-
lieve the evidence, they must find the defendant guilty," is erroneous,
and justifies a reversal of judgment, because it does not require be-
lief of the evidence to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt. (Shields
v. State, 17.)
8. JURY TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS, REVERSAL FOR RE-
FUSAL OF.-If a court has permitted evidence to be given before a
jury during a trial for murder of threats made by the decedent
against the defendant, and of the defendant's reputation for peace
and quietude, but refuses to instruct the jury respecting the consid-
eration which may be given to such evidence, such refusal cannot
be treated as harmless error, on the ground that from the convic-
tion it appears that the jury did not believe it. The appellate court
cannot conjecture what the jury would have done if furnished with
proper instructions for its guidance. (State v. Cushing, 883.)
1. INSURANCE, WHAT IS A CONTRACT OF.-A contract to
Indemnify a person from loss arising from the insolvency of his
customers is a contract of insurance, and a corporation authorized
to make it is an insurance corporation. (Shakman v. United States
etc. Co., 920.)
2. INSURANCE, APPLICATION, ABSENCE OF.-If an insurer issues a policy without an application or any representation in regard to the title to the property upon which the insurance is effected, he cannot complain, after a loss, that the interest of the assured was not correctly stated or that an existing encumbrance was not disclosed. (Morotock Ins. Co. v. Rodefer, 846.)
3. INSURANCE, SILENCE RESPECTING PROPOSAL TO CHANGE TERMS OF.—If, after contract of insurance is effected, a memorandum is sent to the assured in effect modifying such terms, he is not deemed to have accepted or acquiesced in this modification, because of his silence respecting it, where it is not shown that the insurer was influenced in his conduct by the silence of the assured. (Shakman v. United States etc. Co., 920.)
4. INSURANCE, FIRE.—A WAIVER OF A FORFEITURE, by a fire insurance company, caused by any act of the company, after a loss, and with full knowledge of all the facts, need not be based upon any new agreement, or an estoppel. (Home Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 521.)
5. INSURANCE, FIRE-EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DECLARE FORFEITURE-WAIVER OF BREACH OF WARRANTY.-A fire insurance company, after a loss, waives all defenses based upon a breach of warranty, and a resulting forfeiture, if, with a knowledge of the facts amounting to such breach, it fails to declare a forfeiture, but continues to recognize its liability by demanding successive amended proofs of loss, and making repeated peremptory calls for arbitration, under a stipulation which applies only to the measure of damages; and notice, by the company's secretary, in returning the first proof of loss for correction, that the company "neither admits nor denies liability nor waives any of its rights under said policy," does not affect such waiver of defenses. (Home etc. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 521.)
6. INSURANCE, EQUITY, WHEN WILL SET ASIDE A COMPROMISE.-One who has been induced to accept in full satisfaction of a loss under a policy of insurance one-half of the amount due through fraud and imposition upon him and willful misrepresentation made by the agents of the insurer, he being, as they knew, ignorant of his legal rights under the contract, may maintain an equitable ac tion to rescind such contract of satisfaction. (Titus v. Rochester etc. Ins. Co., 426.)
7. INSURANCE — ARBITRATION-SUCCESSIVE REMEDIES. If one clause in a fire insurance policy provides that, in case of loss, an estimate shall be made by the insured and the company, and another clause provides that in case they differ the subject shall be referred to appraisers selected as therein provided, the remedies are successive, and neither party can insist upon the second who has not shown himself willing and ready to enter upon the first. (Mozer v. Sun Ins. Office, 690.)
8. INSURANCE, FIRE-WAIVER OF ARBITRATION.-The denial, by an insurance company, of its liability under a fire policy issued by it, upon the ground of a forfeiture, by reason of a breach of warranty, is a waiver of its right to insist upon arbitration as a means for ascertaining the amount of the plaintiff's damage, although such means are provided for in the policy. (Home etc. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 521.)
9. INSURANCE, ENCUMBRANCE UPON PROPERTY.—Though a policy of insurance provides that if an encumbrance shall be placed on the property without notice to, or consent by, the insurer, the policy shall become void, no recovery can be had if the condition is violated, though such violation does not increase the risk, and though a statute of the state requires every insurer before issuing a policy to examine the building or structure insured and the insurable value
thereof, and that in the absence of any change increasing the risk
without the consent of the insurer and also of intentional fraud, in
case of total loss, the whole amount mentioned in the policy shall be
recovered. (Webster v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 658.)
10. INSURANCE-LIENS INVALIDATING.-A provision in an
insurance policy avoiding it for false representations or warranties
by the insured in reference to liens and encumbrances on the insured
property includes liens created by operation of law as well as those
created by contract. (Capital City Ins. Co. v. Autrey, 121.)
11. INSURANCE - LIENS VITIATING MISREPRESENTA-
TIONS.-A judgment lien duly recorded against property before mak
ing application for, or the issuance of a policy of insurance thereon,
constitutes a breach of warranty on the part of the assured that
there are no liens or encumbrances on the property and that his
ownership is absolute, unqualified, and undivided, aud is such a mis-
representation as vitiates the policy containing a condition that it
shall be void if the exact interest of the insured is not truly stated
therein. (Capital City Ins. Co. v. Autrey, 121.)
12. INSURANCE-INTEREST OF INSURED-MISREPRESEN-
TATIONS.—If a policy of insurance provides that it shall be void
unless the exact interest of the insured is truly stated, a statement
by him that he is the absolute, unqualified, and undivided owner
of the property insured vitiates the policy, when there are others
interested in such property to the extent that they are to perform
certain services in relation thereto, and participate in the proceeds
of the sale thereof. (Capital City Ins. Co. v. Autrey, 121.)
INSURANCE-CONDITION AGAINST CHATTEL MORT-
GAGE.-Whether certain machinery included in a mortgage of real
estate is personal property, so that its mortgage constitutes a breach
of the condition in the policy against personal property being or be-
coming encumbered by a chattel mortgage, is a question respecting
which the insurer must assume the burden of proof, where the
character of such machinery is such that it may be a part of the
realty. (Morotock Ins. Co. v. Rodefer, 846.)
14. INSURANCE-MORTGAGE-CHANGE OF INTEREST.-A
CONDITION in a policy of insurance against "any change in the
interest, title, or possession of the subject of the insurance, whether
by legal process or judgment, or voluntary act of the insured, or
otherwise," is not violated by the existence of a mortgage on the
property insured at the time the policy was issued. This condition
refers to subsequent changes in the interest, title, or possession of
the property. (Morotock Ins. Co. v. Rodefer, 846.)
15. INSURANCE-MORTGAGE.-A CONDITION in a policy of
insurance that it shall be void if the interest of the assured is not the
unconditional and sole ownership, is not violated by an encumbrance
existing on the property when the insurance was effected. (Morotock
Ins. Co. v. Rodefer, 846.)
16. INSURANCE, CHANGE INCREASING RISK, CONSTRUC-
TION OF STATUTE.-A statute requiring every insurer before is-
suing a policy to examine the building or structure to be insured, and
to fix the insurable value thereof, and that recovery may be had
notwithstanding any subsequent change not affecting the risk, ap-
plies only to the condition of the building or structure, and does not
impair the effect of the condition in the policy against the making of
any subsequent encumbrance on the property without notice to, and
consent by, the insurer. (Webster v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 658.)
17. INSURANCE CONDITIONS - DUTY TO FURNISH CER-
TIFICATE OF LOSS.-If a policy of insurance provides that the in-
sured must furnish a certificate of a magistrate or notary as to his
loss if required to do so by the insurer, the insured is under no obll-
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