courts have addressed themselves to a determination plated by the founders. Indeed, the founders' inten of the governing object. The decisions, in spite of the modern tendency which views an establishment with disfavor, have wrought but slight change in the old rule (1). tion was judicially determined in Attorney-General v. Pearson and others. This case was the natural consequence of the earlier rule. English law, contrary to the Roman system, adheres to a view which The earliest case in which this question (the re- extends the scope of objects to what may have been ligious views of trustees, etc.) was squarely pre- contemplated originally and does not open its doors sented for adjudication arose in England early in to that condition where things are changed by exithe nineteenth century. In the case of Attorney-gencies of time and progress. In other words, the General v. Pearson (2), it appeared that in 1701 a founders' (5) intention was strictly construed. meeting-house had been founded by certain Protestant Dissenters, for the worship and service of God. By the grant, the parties to the deed were named trustees to effectuate the trust, with a power of election in the majority of the survivors to fill vacancies, etc. Originally these Dissenters held Trinitarian doctrines; at the time the case was litigated, the greater part had become Unitarians (3). Such did not contemplate the religious alterations of succeeding ages. It was held that no doctrines ought to be taught in this meeting-house which are opposed to the opinions of the founders. To ascertain these opinions, regard must be had of the state of the law when the meeting-house was founded. The court will intend that the founders did not contemplate that doctrines, illegal at the time, were to be taught. Again, in Attorney-General v. Shore (6), it has been said: Lord Chancellor Eldon decided that where there is a charity for the education of persons in accordance with particular religious opinions and tenets, or where there is a charity, the objects of which 6* * * If persons maintaining one particular must be persons who are followers of a particular class of opinions are to be intrusted with the manfaith, it must be governed by trustees whose relig-agement and entire control of funds which are to ious opinions conform to these objects. be applied for the benefit of persons maintaining other opinions * * (then) the vice-chancellor was correct in removing the trustees." In re Ilminster Free School (7) presents many Besides, where a trust is created for religious worship and this cannot be determined from the settlement itself, the usage of the congregation must be taken in fixing the nature of the worship. However, if it was the founder's intention, although this points of interest. There had been a conveyance may not have been expressed, that a particular doc- to trustees in 1549 of lands in the parish of Ilminstrine should be preached, it is not in the power ofter. These trustees had to appoint a schoolmaster to trustees or congregation to change what may be viewed as the designed objects of the institution. In other words, where land or money is given for the purpose of maintaining "the worship of God," without more, such a trust will be executed in favor of the Established Church. Where dissenting doc trines are to be maintained, such being the express declaration, so long as these are not illegal (4), the trust will be executed according to intention. If the intention appears alinude, as was the case here, the manifest design of the founder will be executed. From these expressions of judicial opinion, it was plain that the trust would be maintained as contem (1) Here it may be well to direct the reader's attention to the Statute of Charitable Uses, Stat. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (1601). This provided that where land, money or other property had been given for various charitable purposes, e. g., the relief of aged persons, the maintenance of schools, the repair of churches or of bridges, etc., the Court of Chancery should control the administration of the same. (2) 3 Mer., 353 (1817). (3) The case specifically brought up the question of the succession or removal of trustees. In the present paper, only the broad principles of the decision are adverted to. (4) Unitarian doctrine was looked upon as blasphemous and subversive of the Christian religion in those times. The Toleration Act of 1689 (Stat. 1 Wm. & Mary, c. 18) recognized Dissenters whose doctrines were in accord with Christianity. The founders were Trinitarians, hence this trust was legal. instruct children "in all godly learning and knowledge." If such schoolmaster was negligent in the performance of his duties or guilty of a heinous crime, he was to be discharged. Besides, the trustees had to devote a part of the rents to the repair of the school-house, bridges, etc., another to the schoolmaster's salary. Furthermore, when the number of trustees was reduced to four, the survivors should elect as many other honest persons of the said parish of Ilminster" to the number of twenty. The question presented was, whether persons dissenting from the doctrines of the Church of England were eligible as trustees? It was decided that, since education in conformity with established doctrines was the primary object of the charity (8) and the other provisions in the settlement subsidiary, Dissenters could not act as trustees. In this holding, the lords justices reversed the learned master of the rolls, Sir John Romilly (9). (5) 7 Sim., 290 (1835). (7) 4 Jurist, new ser., 676 (1858). (8) On ecclesiastical charities, cf. Shore v. Wilson (9 Cl. & F., 355 [1842]); Attorney-General v. Murdoch (7 Hare, 445); Attorney-General v. Bunce (L. R., 6 Eq., 563). Where the primary object was not necessarily religious, but educational or eleemosynary, AttorneyGeneral v. Calvert (23 Beav., 248, 257). (9) S. c. (44 Jurist, new ser., 444). The Lords Justices' decision was affirmed in the House of Lords (Baker v. Lee, 8 H. L. C., 495 [1860]). Where a charity was founded as an institution est doubt has been expressed in some quarters as for the support of poor persons of both sexes, with- to the power of the Legislature to control the libout regard to religious beliefs, a recent decision of erty or freedom of contracting. the Court of Chancery provided that all religious restrictions, whereby the master of the hospital was to be a member of the Church of England, should be stricken from the deed (10). Thus, the Central Law Journal of St. Louis, in its last number, says: "The other suggestion for the purchase of the mines by the State, we believe to be the only practicable solution of those unforThese cases evidence a tendency, it is submitted, towards greater latitude in the administration of tunate conditions which periodically break out in charitable and religious trusts. Where the trust is what are known as strikes. The cupidty and seldistinctly of a charitable nature, the grantor's inten-fishness of the mine operators is aggravated by the tion will be disregarded, whenever this course must be followed. The courts, however, have not been so willing to change religious trusts; here, it is believed, their action is conducive to much greater freedom of conscience and the outward exercise of religious tenets. American tribunals (11) have gone a step further. Religious trusts are upheld only when they are declared to be such by apt or express terms; in all other cases the discretion of the court is addressed fact of their illegal combination, giving them an unfair advantage over their employes in the price of labor, and over the public in the price of the necessary commodity which they control. In such case the condemnation of the coal mines by the State, to be managed for the benefit of the public, is clearly a public use justifying its exercise under the power of eminent domain.” But the Journal, in the same article, says: "The when religious or charitable trusts are the res gestae fix the minimum amount of wages to be paid to suggestion that the Legislature has the power to of the litigation (12). New York city. ALBERT M. FRIEDENBERG. POWER OF STATE LEGISLATURES TO FIX coal miners, we gravely doubt. If that does not violate the citizen's liberty of contract we cannot perceive how such right can ever be violated. The right of individuals to contract cannot be limited THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF WAGES TO by arbitrary legislation which rests on no reason COAL MINERS. BY JUDGE R. M. BENJAMIN. on which it can be defended." Now it is the purpose of this communication to show from the decisions of the highest court in the land — the final interpreter of constitutional provisions - the Supreme Court of the United States that the right of individuals, and especially of corporations, to contract can be limited by legislation, which rests on, and can be defended by, good reasons, and that, accordingly, many enactments of State Legislatures and of Congress similar to the one proposed for requiring the mining corporations to be reasonable in making their contracts with the mine workers have been sustained and held not to be in conflict with any constitutional provisions relating to contracts. In a recent interview in relation to the controversy between the corporations in the coal combine and the mine workers of the anthracite region of Pennsylvania, it was asserted by the undersigned that the Legislature of that State has the power to classify the mines with reference to the depth and thickness of the coal veins and fix schedules of reasonable minimum prices per ton for mining coal, and a suitable penalty against any operator who may make contracts with miners for less than such prices. While it is generally admitted that the State, in order to secure the steady operation The constitutional provisions that are always of the mines and a sufficient supply of coal for cited, whenever it is claimed that a particular act the public, has the power to take the mines them- of the Legislature infringes upon the liberty or selves, or a portion of them, upon due compensa- | freedom of contract, are the fifth or the fourteenth tion, under the power of eminent domain, an hon (10) Attorney-General v. St. John's Hospital, Bath (L. R., 2 Ch. D., 554 [1876]). (11) In Robertson v. Bullions (11 N. Y., 243 [1854]) it was held that a religious trust is not limited in its use to persons of the grantors' faith, unless such is expressly stated. (12) Where the trustees, managers of the affairs of a church corporation, are expressly required to be members of the particular denomination, one who withdraws from this church to join another, whose constitution prohibits any connections on the part of members with other denominations, is deemed to have abandoned his office as trustee (Ross v. Crockett, 14 La. Ann., 823). amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The fifth is a limitation upon the power of Congress and is also embodied in every State Constitution. These provisions are as follows: 5. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 14. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws." It is immaterial in this discussion whether the power of contracting is an incident of the right of liberty or an incident of the right of property, since in either view it is protected by the same constitutional provisions against Federal and State action. But it is well to keep in mind certain important distinctions between a citizen or natural person and a corporation or artificial person. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court of the United States that while a corporation is a person it is not a citizen within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Unlike the citizen, a corporation has no natural or original rights or powers. A corporation is an artificial person created by the law and endowed with only such capacity or powers as may be conferred upon it by the act of incorporation. No lawyer has ever contended that the State in granting a special privilege or immunity to a corporation has not a right to prescribe the conditions upon which such privilege or immunity shall be enjoyed. And whenever any such privilege or immunity, capacity or power is abused by the corporation, the Legislature, in order to prevent such abuse in future transactions, can modify and restrict the privilege or capacity, under that clause of the Constitution of Pennsylvania (also in the Constitutions of several of the States), which provides that "no law making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities shall be passed." And even without this clause of the Constitution the State has always had the right to enact from time to time reasonable laws for preventing in the future an abuse of any privilege or franchise conferred upon a corporation of its own creation. In Waters-Pierce Company v. Texas (177 U. S., p. 43), the Supreme Court says: "A corporation is the creature of the law and none of its powers are original. They are precisely what the incorporating act has made them and can only be exerted in the manner which that act authorizes. In other words, the State prescribes the purposes of a corporation and the means of executing those purposes. Purposes and means are within the State's control." Although no such condition is expressed in the company's charter it is necessarily implied in every grant of corporate existence. Equally implied, in our judgment, is the condition that the corporation shall be subject to such reasonable regulations, in respect to the general conduct of its affairs, as the Legislature may, from time to time, prescribe, which do not materially interfere with or obstruct the substantial enjoyment of the privileges the State has granted, and serve only to secure ends for which the corporation was created." There are some other principles to be considered in connection with the fifth and fourteenth amendments which are just as applicable to the citizen as to a corporation. The unrestrained, wrongful exercise of natural liberty is not a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States. Governments are instituted among civilized men for the prevention of wrongs. Civilized governments will not allow license to go unrestrained and do grievous and far-reaching wrongs under the name of natural liberty. “We must distinguish the natural liberty, which has no limits but the strength of the individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will for the common good." In the language of the court in Orient Insurance Company v. Daggs (172 U. S., 557, 566), “It would be idle and trite to say that no right is absolute. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas is of universal and pervading obligation. It is a condition upon which all property is held. Its application to particular conditions must necessarily be within the reasonable discretion of the legislative powers. When such discretion is exercised in a given case by means appropriate and which are reasonable, not oppressive or discriminatory, it is not subject to constitutional objection." Or as Mr. Chief Justice Fuller says: "The right to contract is not absolute, but may be subjected to the restraints demanded by the safety and welfare of the State' (St. Louis, Iron Mountain, etc., Railway v. Paul, 173 U. S., 404, 409). The weakness of the objections based upon the fifth and fourteenth amendments lies in the assumptions (1) that there is no distinction between In Chicago Life Insurance Company v. Needles prohibition and regulation, and (2) that a law pre(113 U. S., 579, 580), the court says: The right venting any and all parties who may engage in of the plaintiff in error to exist as a corporation, operating coal mines from contracting with miners and its authority in that capacity to conduct the for unreasonably low wages would not be a general particular business for which it was created, were law. granted, subject to the condition that the privileges and franchises conferred upon it should not be abused, or so employed as to defeat the ends for which it was established, and that when so abused or misemployed they might be withdrawn or reclaimed by the State in such way and by such means of procedure as were consistent with law. 66 Take notice that the words "deprived" and 'deprive" are used in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law," "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Regulation by Congress or the State is not deprivation: The proposed legislation would not take away from either the mine operator or the mine worker the power to make contracts whether this power is to be consdered an incident of the right of liberty or an incident of the right of property. Such legislation would simply regulate the exercise of this power of contracting so as to prevent extortion when the power is exercised between the mine operator and the mine worker and the subject-matter is labor in mining coal. It would not destroy or take away the power of contracting with any one, but would simply cut off from it the vicious growth, the exercise of extortion, leaving the power of contracting in the full enjoyment of all its proper functions. Indeed, government would be of no account if it could not regulate the enjoyment of life, liberty and property so as to prevent such evils as in their hurtful excesses or malignant growths endanger the peace and good order of society, the safety and welfare of the people. Mining corporations as well as railroad corporations, insurance companies, building and loan associations, etc., require a separate body of laws for the control of their operations. And there is not one of these classes of corporations that is not restricted in some directions as to the power of contracting. A railroad corporation, for instance, cannot buy farm land for farming purposes. Nor can any corporation of either of the other classes above mentioned. It is not necessary to dwell longer on the clause of the fourteenth amendment providing for "the protection of the laws," in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank (170 U. S., 283), the court says: "The State may distinguish, select and classify objects of legislation and necessarily the power must have a wide range of discretion." language Barbier v. Connolly (113 U. S., 27)." Again in Atchison, Topeka, etc., Railroad v. Matthews (174 U. S., 96, 103), the court says: "The There remains to be considered the last clause equal protection of the law which is guaranteed by of the fourteenth amendment, which provides that the fourteenth amendment does not forbid classino State shall deny to any person the equal pro-fication. That has been asserted in the strongest tection of the laws.". In Hawthorne v. People (109 Ill., p. 311), the court says: "A law is general, not because it embraces all of the governed, but that it may, from its terms, when many are embraced in its provisions, and all others may be when they occupy the position of those who are embraced." In view of this clear and sound definition of "general law" there is no doubt as to the constitutionality of a multitude of laws that are general in their scope, but partial in their operation, for the simple reason that while all persons may, all persons do not, place themselves within the range of their operation. We may not now belong to the class of money-loaners, but we may some day join that class of contractors, and then we shall be within the range of the operation of the interest law regulating the power of contracting, and if we take usury it will be useless for us to claim that the law forbidding usury is not a general law. We may not be land-sellers or landbuyers, but if we sell or buy land we are subject to the statute of frauds and cannot enforce the contract unless it is made in writing as required by the statute in such cases, and yet the law is general. We may not be the owners of land, but if we become such and make contracts for building houses thereon, we do so subject to all the restrictions and burdens of the mechanic's lien law imposed by the Legislature for the protection of contractors, material-men, sub-contractors and workmen, and no one claims that these laws are not general and constitutional. 66 In Minneapolis Railway Company v. Beckwith (129 U. S., 26), a law of Iowa making a class of railroad corporations for special legislation was sustained. And in Missouri Railway Company v. Mackey (127 U. S., 205, 209), the court says: 'When legislation applies to particular bodies or associations, imposing upon them additional liabilities it is not open to the objection that it denies to them the equal protection of the laws, if all persons brought under its influence are treated alike under the same conditions." The proposed legislation would not attempt to regulate contracts made prior to its enactment. In the case last cited, on page 208, the court says that "it cannot be successfully contended that the State may not prescribe the liabilities under which corporations created by its laws shall conduct their business in the future, where no limitation is placed upon its power in this respect by their charters. Legislaton to this effect is found in the statute books of every State." But while corporations have no original rights or capacities and are subject to legislative control, it is suggested that the proposed legislation would violate the miners - the citizens' liberty or freedom of contract. What is the natural person's original liberty or freedom to contract? It is nothing more than the liberty of freedom to contract with natural persons. And when, in addition to this liberty or freedom of the citizen, he acquires the capacity or power to make contracts with a corporation, he, as well as the corporation with against any operator who may make contracts with miners for less than reasonable prices, will be held to be constitutional, and not an unreasonable restraint of the now arbitrary power of these combined mining corporations in making contracts with the individual miner, often ignorant, and always helpless, in his struggle with them against extortion and for a reasonable price for his labor. whom he may contract, is subject to the legisla- | prescribing what shall be taken in the courts as tive restrictions accompanying the capacity or prima facie reasonable minimum prices per ton power of the corporation. The capacity or power for mining coal and fixing a suitable penalty of a citizen to sell land to a corporation is no greater than that of a corporation to buy land. The natural person may be able to hold his own in making contracts with natural persons, but when the State, organized for the protection of human beings, creates artificial, unhuman beings, and gives them the capacity to grow into such monster corporations as now master the anthracite region, it becomes the duty of the State to put into the hands of the citizen some legal weapon that will aid and protect him in his struggle for a reasonable living wage with these creatures of the State itself. The proposed legislation for establishing reasonable minimum prices per ton for mining coal in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania is similar to the legislation of Illinois establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for transportation on the railroads in that State. It is also confidently believed that any doubt as to the constitutionality of such legislation (especially in its application to corporations in Pennsylvania) will be removed upon the consideration or careful re-examination of the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the following cases involving the validity of legislation in restraint of the power, liberty or freedom of making contracts: 66 In the case of Munn v. Illinois (94 U. S. 113) The powers of the legislature over railroad cor- the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed porations was fully discussed in the convention the doctrine announced by Lord Chief Justice which framed the Constitution that was adopted Hale more than two hundred years ago, that when by the people of Illinois in 1870 (Debates of Con- private property is affected with a public interstitutional Convention, Ill., vol. 2, p. 1,641), and est" it is subject to governmental control so as the following mandatory provision was incorpo- to prevent imposition and extortion. In that case rated in that Constitution: The general assembly it was held that the warehouse business in the city shall, from time to time, pass laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight on the different railroads in this State." of Chicago, carried on by Munn & Scott, a mere partnership, was a business "affected with a public interest," and that the limitation by legislative enactments of the rate of charge for warehouse ser In accordance with that mandate, in 1873, a vices was constitutional. "railroad and warehouse commission" was cre- The court says: "Under these powers (inherent ated, with authority to make schedules of reason- in every sovereignty) the government regulates the able maximum rates of charges which are to be conduct of its citizens, one toward another, and taken in all courts of the State as prima facie evi- the manner in which each shall use his own propdence that the rates therein prescribed are reason- erty, when such regulation becomes necessary for able. The schedules are subject to revision from the public good. In their exercise it has been time to time as often as circumstances may require, customary in England from time immemorial, and and penalties are prescribed for charging more in this country from its first colonization to reguthan a reasonable rate. The character of the legislate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, lation is such that in a proceeding for a penalty a millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so railroad corporation may escape conviction if it is doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for able to show on a trial before a jury that its services rendered, accommodations furnished and charges, although above those prescribed in the articles sold. To this day statutes are to be found schedule, are only reasonable. Such, in brief, is in many of the States upon some or all of these the character of the legislation in Illinois to pre- subjects, and we think it has never yet been sucvent extortion by railroad corporations in their cessfully contended that such legislation came rates charged, or contracts made, for the transpor- within any of the constitutional prohibitions tation of passengers and freights. It is confidently against interference with private property " believed that similar legislation in Pennsylvania (Page 125). providing for a classification of the mines, with reference to the depth and thickness of the coal veins and any other "differential" that may be deemed important, and providing for schedules In Embrey v. Jemison (131 U. S. 336) it was held that a contract for the purchase of "future delivery" cotton, neither the purchase or delivery of actual cotton being contemplated by the parties, |