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not commit the expert irrevocably, right or wrong, to the client's interests.

The usual argument advanced for the "retainer" side is that the relations between expert and client are sacred, and that the expert in such relation has received privileged information.

There should be no necessity for giving any privileged information to the expert. In the case of the handwriting examiner two sets of writings are brought to him—the standard and the questioned and his opinion is asked as to the identity or nonidentity existing between the two. It is not necessary to give him the history of the case, and to pour into his ear "privileged" information.

verse opinions, but if they allowed themselves to be retained, they would be effectually silenced. Then the defendant, or forger, could produce some witnesses, who would pass as experts, and with this positive testimony win his case. Several recent prominent murder cases could be used as illustrations of this point.

A brother expert has told me of a case, where millions of dollars hung on the authenticity of a document, upon which he was called to give a professional opinion. The opinion was adverse, and apparently stunned the clients an attorneys, notwithstanding the fact that they must have known that the instrument was a forgery. The attorneys finally offered the expert $50,000 to change his mind, and to testify that the writing was genuine. He not only spurned the offered bribe, but informed the attorneys that if they pushed the matter further and attempted to defraud the rightful heirs, that he would make the whole matter public. Here was a carefully planned conspiracy, involving forgery, to secure possession of millions of dollars worth of property, and had the expert thought it proper to allow himself to be retained, of course he would have to remain a silent witness to the wrecking of a vast estate.

What privileged information can there be in written documents which are intended to be used in court soon? The only privilege that the expert could abuse, would be to inform the opponents of the existence or contents of some of these documents prior to the trial. And of course any expert who would do this would soon lose standing with attorneys for both sides; and no decent attorney would desire or accept information obtained in that way. But the mere examination of the handwriting in the standards on one side of the case, can surely convey to the expert no privileged information, should he be called later to the other side. It can only be Lawyers and laymen too, frequently accuse experts the mere existence of certain documents, or the con- of always agreeing with those who approach them tents of such documents, that would be considered first; and then when experts do not agree with privileged information. It would require a stretch the side first approaching them, and they (the exof imagination to believe that a batch of cancelled perts) render service for the opposing side, there is checks could seriously be considered as privileged a cry of "privileged information" raised against information, but if so, then the expert should and being consulted by both sides of the same controwould be silent about them. versy. It would seem that experts are "damned if they do; and damned if they don't."

Let us look at the matter from the expert's point of view. It would be improper for him to accept any fee except for actual work performed and to take a fee to purchase his silence would certainly lay him open to charge of being bought and prove the charge at the same time.

Suppose a case involving a large sum of money and an expert fee running into the thousands is brought to the office of an expert. He receives a small sum for the preliminary examination and makes a report contrary to the expectations or contentions of his client. The expert has no moral right to take any further fee, because he cannot perform any further service. for that side of the case. By this adverse decision, the expert has cut himself out of a large fee. But should the opposite side desire to engage his services, why should he be kept out of a large fee for work which he can scientiously perform for them?

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Looking at the subject from the point of view of public policy furnishes the strongest argument against experts being retained. Any defendant in a criminal case, or the person putting forward a forged document in a civil suit, could, for a few thousands of dollars "retain" (were this practice permissible) every professional handwriting expert in the country. The experts might have given ad

It is very seldom that an expert is engaged by one side, after giving an adverse decision to the other side. In my own practice I find that once out of every four or five times I render an adverse decision, yet in only four out of over one hundred of the cases, where adverse decisions were given, have I testified for the opposing side. It is not the number of such cases that makes them important, but rather the under-lying ethical principle involved.

I do not know that it is the best unravelling of the expert question in our courts, but as I view it, an improvement on the present practice would be to have official experts, and allow both sides of the controversy with exhibits, to be submitted to them. When decision was reached, the experts could still be examined and cross-examined in open court, if thought necessary. This may not be a perfect solution of the expert witness problem, but I am convinced it is an improvement over the present method. I hope the bench and bar will take this matter up, and aid the experts in living up to a code of ethics that is at once moral, sensible and practical; and I also hope that the plan of having official experts will receive consideration from the same source.

NEW YORK.

WILLIAM J. KINSLEY.

A GRAVE QUESTION; A LIVE ISSUE WITH paper
A DEAD MAN.

upon which it is written, that title by inheritance, under the statutes of descent and distribution, is not a perfect title, carrying all A suit was recently instituted at Jackson, Miss., the right of the decedent. I never knew a pleadby a bright young lawyer against the contractors ing before this one predicated of the conception for the erection of the new that property, even rights of action, descended State capitol, demanding damages in his client's favor for at the death of the owner with a string to it, by personal injuries received which it might be jerked back. Such is not the

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the building. In his zeal to magnify his law, your honor; a dead man's property, including client's sufferings, and in the hope of increas- his causes of action, is at once by operation of law ing his recovery, the attorney charged in the invested in his heirs or his administrator. Their declaration that "the plaintiff suffered death a thou- title is as complete and perfect as was the decedent's sand times." An older member of the bar, who in his lifetime, and there is no way known to the some time since learned to be more moderate in the law of divesting them of that title, even should the use of language, was employed to defend. A gen- dead man, by a miracle, be restored to life. I call eral demurrer was filed to the declaration, assigning your honor's attention, however, to the fact that as cause therefor that, "Under the facts stated the this declaration nowhere charges that the plaintiff plaintiff cannot recover." When the hearing of the ever came to life after suffering death, and I think demurrer was about to be reached the young attorwe must regard him as absolutely dead. But, if ney caused a dozen or more law books, including by any sort of implication, it can be claimed by my the reports of nearly as many States, to be brought young friend that his declaration can reasonably be to the court-house and arranged on the desk before construed as showing that his client is yet alive, him; the young man evidently thinking that the law I shall not invoke the rule that pleadings are to be of master and servant, contributory negligence, safe taken strongest against the pleader, because I am appliances, safe places to work at, etc., was involved. satisfied to rest this issue upon the contention that Finally the case was called and the young man read even a resurrection of a dead man will not divest his declaration with much emphasis to the court, the title of his heirs or personal representatives — and took his seat, to hear from his adversary. The which was invested in them by his death, a perfect defendants attorney then stated the demurrer and title passed, no string to it — and reinvest it in the proceeded in argument, in the most solemn tone and new man. serious manner, without a smile, as follows, as near as his remarks can be remembered:

"If the court please, the question presented by the demurrer is a grave one, upon which I feel confident there is but little, if any, direct authority. Your honor will perceive that this declaration distinctly avers that the plaintiff 'suffered death a thousand times.' Of course the words 'a thousand times' can add nothing to the strength of the pleading, and we are justified in treating the declaration as simply charging that the plaintiff died, or, to use its own language, 'suffered death' once, and once only, as a result of the injuries received because of the averred negligence of the defendants. dead man maintain a suit? A serious question. We have here a live issue which my clients have been compelled to join with a dead man.

Can a

"My first conception of appropriate procedure in this case, if the court please, was to suggest the death of the plaintiff, supporting the suggestion by the record, and to ask that the suit be abated, but reflection led me to conclude that course appropriate only where death occurred after the beginning of the suit; here, however, the plaintiff suffered death before the institution of the action, and the grave question presented, as it seems, can be raised only by demurrer.

"Now, your honor, I have never found in the law books any warrant for the claim of my young friend; he must necessarily make it. for otherwise his declaration is not worth the

Lazarus thereafter

"Your honor, I was greatly surprised that my bright young friend could have produced so many authorities as he has on the table before him, on this question. The cases which he will read you surely must be distinguishable from this one. There is but one instance in all history, not to speak of Him who was more than human, before this case out of which the exact question before the court could have arisen, and that is the case of Lazarus. We are told in the Holy Scriptures that Lazarus died, was dead for four days and that his body stunk. By the performance of a miracle, was raised from the tomb, brought back to life, resurrected; but we have no record that he ever instituted, much less maintained, an ejectment for the lands which he owned before death, or replevin, detinue, trover or other action for the recovery of any personal property which passed from him to others when he died. I have often thought, your honor, when reading the gospel account of the resurrection of Lazarus, of his extreme poverty, so far as concerns worldly goods, as he came from the tomb. He did not even own the grave clothes which were upon his body, for it has often been decided that grave clothes should, in indictments for stealing them, be averred to be the property of the executor.

"It is a long step from Lazarus to Banks Bracy, Jr., this plaintiff, but we have to make it for an exact parallel to the grave and solemn question now before this court.

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There is another view of this case, and it is, perhaps, the correct one. If this action be taken as a suit for the wrongful death of the plaintiff, it cannot be maintained. Nothing was better settled at common law than that no action would lie for the death of a person. Lord Campbell's act and our statute, modeled after it, does not give the right to sue to the dead man, but to his next of kin or his personal representative. There is not a word in any of the statutes which can be reasonably construed as providing for the resurrection of the decedent.

"Before saying more, however, I will hear from my bright young friend and see what authority he presents for his most unusual contention."

The plaintiff's attorney did not join very heartily in the amusement of the other listeners; he seemed amazed that the question discussed was involved, but modestly admitted that his authorities were not applicable and graciously yielded to the suggestion of the court that the declaration had better be

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The people of Minnesota do not believe for a moment that the State of New Jersey can erect an organization to defy the law in the State of Minne* Neither the statutes of the State of New Jersey nor of any other State can saddle this corporation upon a sovereign people.

sota.

* *

For the purpose of exhibiting some of the peculiar inducements offered incorporators by these rival contestants for foreign patronage, we select the State of New Jersey, though it should be distinctly understood that in so doing, no disparagement of the claims of other States is intended.

Here is a partial list of the attractions offered:
I. Perpetual duration.

2.

None of the corporators need be residents of the State.

3. But one resident director is required.

4. The right to purchase and hold stock of other corporations.

5. This may be best stated in the language of one of the writers referred to:

The laws of New Jersey involve no publicity; the only report required to be filed with the secretary of state being the list of officers and directors, filed within thirty days after the annual stockholders' meeting. The corporation must keep a record of the stockholders in New Jersey, which is open to inspection by the stockholders, but is not public property. The books of account and general records of the company are not required to be kept in New Jersey; may be free from inspection even by the Stockholders. Under New Jersey's law it is not necessary to file or publish any statement of loans or liabilities, nor to disclose the private affairs of the corporation.

6, Powers. Quoting again from the pamphlet symposium:

New Jersey certainly grants broad powers. In one of the most recent charters the power is given, among other things, to make any kind of contract, to carry on any business and do all things therein set forth to the same extent as natural persons might or could do in any part of the world, as agents, contractors, trustees or otherwise.

A reference to the General Incorporation Act of Equally suggestive is the following paragraph the State shows that after conferring power upon from a pamphlet recently published for gratuitous any three or more persons to become a corporation distribution by the Broun-Green Co., of New York, "for any lawful purpose or purposes whatever," under the title “Where to Incorporate," a sympo- the statute excepts certain specified lines of business, sium by members of the eastern bar, setting forth among them, railroad, telegraph and telephone comthe special advantages presented by four States, re- panies and follows the enumeration with this respectively, as breeding ground for corporations or-markable if not unique proviso: ganized for the actual purpose of carrying on It shall, however, be lawful to form a company

business in some other State:

By the rules of inter-state comity, a corporation organized under the laws of a particular State, may transact business beyond the borders of that State; it is even legal for citizens of one State to incorporate a company in another State for the purpose of carrying on their entire corporate business in the State where they live. This may be practically stated to be the recognized doctrine of the country and is universally recognized as the tendency of modern corporation law.

*Read before the Illinois State Bar Association at Chicago, July 17, 1902.

hereunder for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating railroad, telephone and telegraph lines outside of this State.

In other words, by this proviso, the State of New Jersey undertakes the truly benevolent task of creating corporations to construct and operate the public utilities of her sister States. Accordingly we find the charters of the Carnegie Company, the United States Steel Corporation, the Federal Steel Company and others providing for the construction and operations of railways, but only outside of New Jersey.

That even this partial list of the advantages pre

sented by the State of New Jersey offers most of a State having no interest whatever in the coralluring inducements to promoters of what have been poration, except to preserve it. aptly called “tramp" corporations will hardly be denied. Their material value is largely attested by the fact that so many corporations are willing to pay not only the initial fee, but also the annual taxes imposed by the State, for the mere privilege of corporate existence under its charter.

That this list also contains the germs of almost every element which has tended to excite popular apprehension and distrust concerning the rapid growth of corporate control in the business of the country must be evident to any one familiar with the subject.

In order that no element of convenience may be lacking, sundry local Corporation Trust Companies have been formed, which undertake not only to procure any desired charter, but to provide within the State convenient rooms which shall answer the designation of "principal place of business" of the corporation, where the annual elections may be held and where such of the books may be kept as the law requires to be kept in the State; also to furnish the statutory resident director.

Perhaps the most amazing thing about all this is that there is so much truth in the statement above quoted to the effect that the legality of the organization of corporations in one State by citizens of another, for the purpose of carrying on the entire corporate business in their own State, is the recognized doctrine of the country; universally recognized as the tendency of modern corporation law. That the statement is wholly or largely true as a juridicial fact can hardly be conceded. That it has a substantial foundation in a quite general public tolerance must be admitted.

Any adequate attempt to explain the reason for this remarkable condition would unduly extend the scope of this paper. It is sufficient for the present purpose to say that any doctrine which affirms or any legislation which assumes the right of a State to breed corporations whose purpose is to operate solely in another State- usually that in which their actual progenitors reside is a wide departure from the fundamental principles of corporate existence and a presumptious imposition upon interstate comity.

No wonder that the people of some of the States are beginning to awaken both to the danger which lurks in these encroachments upon their legislative and commercial rights and to this gross infringement of their sovereign dignity.

The organization of such concerns as the Northern Securities Company to acquire and hold the stock of business corporations, if not indicative of a purpose to erect one more obstacle in the path of judicial investigation, at all events makes such a result tolerably or intolerably certain. If no adverse legislation intervenes, it is by no means impossible that we may be treated to the edifying spectacle of a corporation organized by citizens of Minnesota, under the laws of Delaware, to operate a railroad in North Dakota, the stock of which shall be owned and its business controlled by another corporation organized for the purpose by citizens of New York under the laws of New Jersey. Indeed, the process may be indefinitely extended.

Long ago, in the case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle (13 Peters, 519), the Supreme Court of the United States laid down certain principles which have ever since been generally recognized and applied, with their natural and necessary development, by the courts of this country. Some of these may be here stated:

"A corporation being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty which created it. It must dwell in the place of its creation and cannot migrate to another sovereignty. The recognition of its existence even by other States and the enforcement of its contracts made therein, depend purely upon the comity of those States; a comity which is never extended when the existence of the corporation or the exercise of its powers are prejudicial to their interests or repugnant to their policy. Having no absolute right of recognition in other States, but depending for such recognition and the enforcement of its contracts upon their assent, it follows as a matter of course that such assent may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States may think proper to impose" (Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, citing Bank of Augusta v. Earle).

Answering the contention that in respect of its contracts, entered into outside of the State of its creation, the members of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals carrying on business under their corporate name and therefore in that capacity entitled to the privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution to citizens in the several States, Chief Justice Taney, in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, among other reasons for denying the soundness of the proposition, said:

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The people of Minnesota will not, nor ought they to submit to it. Nor will the people of many other 'Besides, it would deprive the State of all control States of the west and northwest. If there were no over the extent of corporate franchises proper to be other reason it would be intolerable that for the granted by the State; and corporations would be redress of any evils involving the internal manage- chartered in one to carry on their operations in ment or corporate existence of such organizations another. It is impossible upon any sound principle of for the investigation of their corporate books to give such a construction to the article in and accounts, citizens of the States where the busi- question."

ness is carried on should be driven to the courts It was accordingly held that whenever a corpo

ration makes a contract, its is the contract of the legal entity-the artificial being created by the charter, and not the contract of the individual members, and that the only rights it can claim are the rights which are given to it in that character, and not the rights which belong to its members as citizens of a State.

Again, speaking of the rule of inter-state comity, and of the presumption, in the absence of adverse legislation or judicial decision, of the existence in a State of a comity permitting the transaction of business therein by foreign corporations, Justice Taney says:

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And when (as without doubt must occasionally happen) the interest or policy of any State requires it to restrict the rule, it has but to declare its will and the legal presumption is at an end."

The particular development of the idea of breeding "tramp" corporations, which consists in providing a general system of rapid incubation, open to all who may choose to avail themselves of its advantages, is of comparatively recent growth; the idea itself is not new.

February 16, 1866, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act entitled "An act to incorporate the New York and California Vineyard Company." At that time, the legislatures of Pennsylvania were not at all particular to provide their statutes with titles indicating their real objects, and this particular statute, albeit a special charter, afforded no hint whatever of the actual purposes of the organization, which a perusal of the act shows to have been the acquisition, operation and disposal of mining property, with the usual incidental powers, but with this singular limitation, viz.: that all of these powers were to be exercised "in any State of the United States or the territories thereof except in the State of Pennsylvania."

A second section provided that it should "be lawful for the company to establish the necessary offices for the business of the company wherever their business is located and to have their principal office in the United States in such place as they may deem expedient, at which place it shall be lawful to hold all meetings for the transaction of the business of the company."

indicate some advantages in the Pennsylvania plan over that of New Jersey.

About this time the people of a county in the State of Kansas voted to subscribe for $200,000 of the stock of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company, to be paid in bonds of the county, and shortly afterward that company entered into a contract with the Land Grant Railway and Trust Company whereby the latter agreed to build certain sections of the road in consideration of the assignment to it by the former of sundry securities, including its interest in the aforesaid bonds which as yet were unissued.

The commissioners of the Kansas county having refused on demand to make the subscription to the stock or to issue the bonds which the people had voted, suit was brought to compel them to do so, whereupon the commissioners answered that the alleged Land Grant Railway and Trust Company

was no corporation and had no existence as such in the State of Kansas.

In the course of an opinion affirming the soundness of this defense, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:

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'No rule of comity will allow one State to spawn corporations and send them forth into other States to be nurtured and do business there when said first mentioned State will not allow them to do * * * From business within its own boundaries. the only territory in the world over which the State of Pennsylvania has any jurisdiction or control, and in which it could authorize a corporation to have an office or to do business, it excluded this corporation, and the attempt on the part of the State of Pennsylvania to authorize this corporation to have an office or to do business anywhere except in the State of Pennsylvania is ultra vires, illegal and void. The truth is that while this supposed corporation was originally organized for the whole United States, except the State of Pennsylvania, and afterwards by its amended charter for the whole world, except Pennsylvania, it had no legal or valid existence anywhere on the face of the earth. At the very creation of this supposed corporation its creator spurned it from the land of its birth as illegitimate and unworthy of a home among its

By a supplement to the original act of incorpo-kindred and sent it forth a wanderer on foreign ration, passed February 16, 1870, this New York and California Vineyard Company was granted power "to borrow money in any State, territory or country, except the State of Pennsylvania," and to secure the same by bond, etc.

With an evident recognition of the incongruity between the legislative title of this act and the declared objects of the company, and possibly with a prophetic sense that the stockholders might not care to be limited to either, the power was conferred upon them of changing the name of the corporation at their discretion, which was promptly done by the adoption of the name of "The Land Grant, Railway & Trust Company." All of which would seem to

soil. Is the State of Kansas bound by any kind of courtesy or comity or friendship or kindness to Pennsylvania to treat this corporation better than its creator had done?" (Land Grant Railway & Trust Company v. Coffey Co., 6 Kansas, 245).

It would seem, therefore, that the grapes raised by the New York and California Vineyard Company of Pennsylvania did not find a market in the State of Kansas.

This case presents what is perhaps the most conspicuously flagrant instance on record of trespass upon the doctrine of inter-state comity and shows how one court dealt with such a bare-faced imposition. To talk of the obligations of comity in such

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