Part III, said, with reference to the death of Justice Andrews: "In rapid succession has death summoned the justices of this court. During my brief term I have bidden a last farewell to five of my colleagues. It is scarcely a week since we have stood by the bier of Judge Beach, and now a like great loss has befallen us. Justice George P. Andrews has gone to his eternal home. Men of distinction come and go, and are soon forgotten, but it cannot be that the remembrance of the virtues, the merits, the excellences which characterized his judicial career will be so fleeting, so momentary. It cannot be that only for the day will be acclaim, 'Well done, thou good and faithful servant.' "Judge Andrews had a noble conception of the high office which he so ably filled. Its chief attraction to him was the opportunity it afforded to do good, to purify, to elevate. 66 * * * 'As a tribute of respect to the memory of Judge Andrews this court will adjourn at 1 o'clock to-day, so that all who desire to attend the funeral services may do so. The clerk of the court will make note in the record of these proceedings, and transmit to the bereaved family the expression of our deepest sympathy in their great affliction." Former Governor of Connecticut, Thomas M. Waller, gives the following sensible views on the subject of advertising, from a professional man's standpoint: 66 "The professional etiquette that prevents the soliciting of law business by discreet and proper advertising," declares the former governor, works a hardship, especially in cities, upon young lawyers and gives an unfair advantage to old ones who have become known. Why should not a young lawyer, struggling to gain practice, have the right to advertise his profession, and a specialty, if he has one, without any more loss of character than merchant princes, like ex-Postmaster-General Wanamaker, suffer from advertising their wares? "If lawyers' services were honorary only, as in theory if not in fact they anciently were, there would be an artificial reason for the strained etiquette I speak of; but as fees are now legally recognized, and can be sued for, and even contingent fees are legal and not champertous, why should not legal buisiness be sought for in the same way that any other business is? I should not hesitate to advise a young lawyer in a city to advertise 'clients wanted' in the daily papers, naming his references, until he got all he needed to give him a good start.” In a recent decision in the case of De Frees Critten and others against the Chemical National Bank of New York the Court of Appeals has stated some interesting principles regarding the duties and liabilities of banks and depositors in relation to forged checks. Summed up briefly the decision, which is in favor of the plaintiffs, holds that: A bank which pays a raised check, that was altered so skilfully by the drawer's clerk, who presented it, as to avoid detection on reasonable inspection, must sustain the loss, unless the depositor has, by leaving blanks in the check or by some other affirmative act of negligence, facilitated the fraud. But a depositor, on the periodical writing up of his account and return to him of the pass-book and vouchers, is bound to make reasonable examination and verification of them and to notify the bank if forgeries have occurred, so that it may guard against recurrence. If he neglects to make such verification, or intrusts it to his clerk, who, from being connected with the forgeries, fails to disclose the discrepancies, the bank, in the absence of neglect on its part, is not chargeable with subsequent payments made to the clerk on a series of such forgeries. When, however, the bank, while the forgeries were going on, pays a forged check to the clerk under such circumstances as to practically disclose its dishonest character, and gives no notice of the transaction to the drawer, its negligence in paying the check and, by its silence, permitting the forgeries to be repeated, is an answer to its charge of negligence against the drawer for failing to verify his vouchers. English Botes. Lord Grimthorpe recently attained the age of eighty-six years. He is senior king's counsel and senior bencher of Lincoln's-inn. The South African Law Journal says of Sir James Rose-Innes, who has been appointed chief justice of the Transvaal, "The legal profession in the Cape Colony will regret Sir James' departure for the Transvaal. If he has to change the bar for the bench they would prefer that the change should take place in, and for the benefit of, the Cape. In parliament as well as at the bar the Cape can ill-afford to lose him. As chief justice of the Transvaal he will be most welcome to the inhabitants of that new colony, and to none more so than to the legal profession there. His name and fame are towers of strength, and guarantee that he will worthily and impartially occupy and discharge the functions of that high office with dignity and honor, with credit to himself and with great benefit to his adopted country." The accuracy of the following story is vouched for by a correspondent of M. A. P., says the Law Times: "Mr. Geoghegan was returning to his home one evening, having had, he assured me, a most arduous day's work at the old Middlesex sessions. He was defending a pickpocket charged with stealing a valuable gold watch. However, Mr. Geoghegan, by keen cross-examination and an eloquent appeal to the jury, raised a doubt, the benefit of which the prisoner was given. His client, on meeting him outside, was profuse in his thanks, 35), in which the Supreme Court of Kansas held and, as he said good-bye, quietly slipped the watch into his counsel's hand. The feelings of Mr. Geoghegan may be imagined, for he told me that he had conscientiously believed the man to be innocent." Lady Russell, of Killowen, has just witnessed the completion of the memorial placed upon her husband's grave in the Epsom cemetery, says the Daily Chronicle. The cross now set in its place is reproduced from drawings Lady Russell had made after an ancient pattern still to be seen in the cemetery of the ruined Abbey of Clonmacnoise, on the banks of the Shannon. The slab of marble which covers the Epsom grave is also copied from an antique Irish gravestone, and the little wall of inclosure round the tomb is made of granite brought into Surrey from the late Lord Chief Justice's own Newry mountains. Lord Tweedmouth is reported to have said at the newspaper society's dinner that the law courts had decided that the copyright of a speech rested not in the person who uttered it, but in the person of the gentleman who had been good enough to take it down.'" As this misapprehension appears to be still current (writes Sir Frederick Pollock to the Times), may I repeat the explanation which you allowed me to give at the time? The decision referred to was really quite different, namely that, if the speaker has not reserved the right of publication, every producer of an original report is entitled to copyright, not in the matter of the speech, but in his own report of it. That is to say, a stranger who did not report the speech himself, and is not authorized by the speaker, may not copy any particular report without the leave of the reporter or the person for whom the report was made. The speaker's rights were not in question at all. Law Times (London.) that the State law placing restrictions upon the taken or soliciting of orders by a non-resident salesman for intoxicating liquors to be imported from another State is a burden upon interstate commerce, and is, therefore, repugnant to the provisions of the federal Constitution, empowering congress to regulate commerce. In Bethany Hospital Co. v. Hale, a Kansas case, reported in 67 Pacific Reporter, 848, the following unusual examination takes place: Q. “When did you first see her,— before or after her mother was married?" A. "Before her mother was married." Q. "And she had married a man by the name of D.?" A. "Yes, sir." Q. "Prior to the time she was killed?" A. “Yes, sir." We wonder what the custom is in Kansas in regard to this matter. "I thought she was a woman of unbreakable will," said the gentleman with the bob-tailed coat. "And so she was," said the man with the incandescent whiskers. "Yet you tell me that she is completely subservient to her husband," went on the first gentleman. 'Well, you see, she married a lawyer, and he broke the will."- Baltimore American. At the funeral of a lawyer of State reputation, who lived and practiced in a town not for from Philadelphia and who was known among his friends thereabouts as an unbeliever, an eminent gentleman from Philadelphia reached the house after the Not knowing minister had begun the sermon. how far the services had progressed, he accosted a well-known Quaker of the town, who was a friend of the deceased and who was noted for his great sense of humor, and, leaning over his shoulder, asked in a whisper: Say, I thought you always claimed to Times. be a man of intelligence? Biggs You have said it. Diggs - Then how do you explain the fact that you were called to serve on a jury last week Chicago Daily News. "Whisky in the abstract, whisky generically, is by the decree of public sentiment quarantined along with smallpox, leprosy, and cholera. It is an Ichabod, forsaken, cast out, and despised, a Czolgosz among the commodities of commerce, and yet we are enjoined to give it a place with the staples and staff of life, and catalogue it with beef and beans and bread." This extract is from the recent case of State v. Hickox (68 Pacific Reporter, Many good anecdotes of the late Thomas Nolan, of the New York bar, are given in Charles Frederick Stansbury's book entitled "The Barrister," recently published by the Mab Press. The following are two excellent samples of Barrister Nolan's keen wit: Concerning the late Justice Smyth, Nolan remarked that "he's a good judge, a foine judge; but he thinks ivery man ought to go to prison at least wance." The rejoinder of the barrister to one of the judges of this county who offered to plead for the barrister's client on the judgment day: "Your honor will have troubles of your own upon that day," is perhaps equally good. The Albany Law Journal. A Monthly Record of the Law and the Lawyers. Published by THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY, Albany, N. Y. Contributions, items of news about courts, judges and lawyers' queries or comments, criticisms on various law questions, addresses solicited from members of the bar and those interested in legal proceedings. on legal topics, or discussions on questions of timely interest, are [All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions or other business matters should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.] Subscription price, Three Dollars per annum, in advance. Single number, Twenty-five Cents. ALBANY, N. Y., JULY, 1902. Current Topics. A decision which settles many questions long in dispute as to the liability of banks for frauds rendered possible by contributory negligence on the part of depositors has just been handed down by the New York Court of Appeals in De Frees Critten v. Chemical National Bank. It would seem that this decision is entirely fair and establishes by law a much more equitable business method than was embodied in the older decisions in this State. Under it the duty of verifying the balance and examining the vouchers returned, and giving notice to the bank of any discrepancies, within a reasonable time, is placed upon all depositors of banks in this State. It should be added, perhaps, that despite the announcement of these principles, favorable to the bank, the final decision was against the bank in the case of all, except a few of the checks, because it was shown that early in the history of the transactions the bank teller noticed that one of the checks had been altered, and a different He called the attention of the plaintiff's clerk, amount written in upon an apparent erasure. He called the attention of the plaintiff's clerk, Davis, to the condition of the check, and ac cepted his explanation and a receipt for the money. This act was held to be grossly negligent on the part of the bank, and, the court continues: "That Davis was able to success The facts of the case are substantially these: fully continue from this time to his arrest a A business house depositing with the Chemi- series of forgeries was as fairly attributable cal National Bank of New York was victim-to the folly of the bank in paying to a clerk ized by its confidential clerk, who systematically raised checks and appropriated the excess to his own use. He had charge of the firm's books, had been accredited to the bank as its representative, and otherwise occupied a relation to it which warranted the bank in assuming that he acted by authority in all that he did. His manipulation of checks extended over a period of some two years, during which time the deposit-book of the firm was written up no less than twelve times and the vouchers in the form of paid checks returned. On the discovery of the defalcation the firm brought suit against the bank for the amount of their losses on the raised checks and obtained judgment in the lower courts for the amount of their claim. This has now been reversed by the Court of Appeals, which holds that for the depositor to have made no examination of his accounts and no comparison of returned checks with the stubs, when such examination would have revealed the alterations, was such negligence as excuses the bank for having paid the raised checks, and VOL. 64. No. 7. a check of his employer's which had been plainly altered, without making any inquiry as to the reason or authority for the alteration, as it was to any carelessness of the plaintiffs in failing to detect the alteration when the checks were returned to them from the bank. Since we have held that the question in the case was not one of ratification or estoppel, but that the liability of the plaintiffs to the bank was solely for the loss caused by their negligence, it is a complete answer to the defendant's claim that its own negligence con tributed to the loss." The Court of Appeals has just wrestled with the knotty question to what extent one may enjoy, unhindered and unmolested, the "right of privacy," and has decided, in effect, that there is no such right. The case in point was that known popularly as the "flower of the family case," and concerned the right of a business firm to use a young woman's picture for the purpose of advertising its product, flour. The young woman was Miss Abigail M. Robertson, of Rochester. Although the likeness was unnamed, it was so good as to be easily recognizable by the lady's friends and acquaintances. Miss Robertson secured a verdict in the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Davy holding that a woman's beauty is her own inviolate property and not a public material for advertisers, and that it tended to outrage a woman's privacy and to injure her character and reputation for the portrait to be posted conspicuously in public places. The case was conceded by the Court of Appeals to be quite novel, and, while it did not deny the above reasoning, it, by a majority vote, practically dismissed the complaint on account of the larger principles involved and the danger of establishing a troublesome precedent. Justice Parker says: "The so-called right of privacy is, as the phrase suggests, founded upon the claim that a man has the right to pass through this world, if he wills, without having his picture published, his business enterprises discussed, his successful experiments written up for the benefit of others, or his eccentricities commented upon, either in hand bills, circulars, catalogues, periodicals or newspapers, and necessarily that the things which may not be writ ten and published of him must not be spoken of him by his neighbors, whether the comment be favorable or otherwise. "While most persons would much prefer to have a good likeness of themselves appear in a responsible perodical or leading newspaper rather than upon an advertising card or sheet, the doctrine which the person might claim to be the original. The expediency of the decision is, perhaps, not to be doubted; at the same time it may lead to other results quite as discommoding and unpleasant. For example, what is now to prevent some enterprising manufacturer from using the learned chief judge's picture on a brand of cigars and calling it "The Chief Justice," or another from getting “In the Vann,” or another from using the expression "Love and Haight," or another from utilizing in some equally ingenious way a "Bartlett Pear?" Other combinations might be suggested, but these will suffice, perhaps, to show the possibilities that have not been averted by the refusal to recognize the so-called "right of privacy." Lewis M. Haupt, formerly a member of the Nicaragua and Isthmian Canal Commission, asks, in an article in the July number of the North American Review, "Why is an Isthmian Canal not Built?" Mr. Haupt signed the supplemental report of the Isthmian Canal Commission declaring in favor of Panama, although he thought the Nicaragua route the better of the two, his reason for doing so (as, at his request, it was recorded in the minutes of the Commission) being to avoid throwing an obstacle in the way of the construction of some waterway between the Atlantic and the Pacific. He states at length the grounds of his opinion that the Nicaragua route is preferable to that of Panama: courts are asked to create for this case would apply as well to the one publication as to the other, for the principle which a court of equity is asked to assert in support of a recovery in this action is that "The problem is not merely concerned with the the right of privacy exists and is enforceable in cost of traversing the isthmus from sea to sea, but equity, and that the publication of that which pur-with the total cost of the movement from port to ports to be a portrait of another person, even if obtained upon the street by an impertinent individual with a camera, will be restrained in equity on the ground that an individual has the right to prevent his features from becoming known to those outside of his circle of friends and acquaintances. port; hence, it is a delusion to assert that because the Panama route is but forty-nine miles long and the Nicaragua is one hundred and eighty-three, the former is the better, since that statement omits entirely the greater length on the sea route by Panama for about three-quarters of the traffic, the presence of the lake and river which compose more than half of the waterway through Nicaragua, and the still more important fact that the general direction of this route lies along the most direct line, while at Panama it is almost at right angles thereto. Moreover, there is the insuperable meteorological disadvantage attaching to the Panama route, due to position, since the southern route lies in the region of equatorial calms which debar sailing vessels from access to Panama, without great expense for towage, while the northern location lies in the region meet the objection due to the doldrums' in Panama bay, it is urged that the sailing vessel is doomed to be superseded by steamers. The present outlook would not seem to justify such a conclusion, since more than half of our registered tonnage is sail, and the tendency is strongly towards larger schooner-rigged craft." The court further holds that the article of the Code providing for the admission of members of the bar of other States under certain conditions cannot extend to the admission of women who are members of the bar of other States; for when that section provides for the admission of lawyers from other States, it means such lawyers as are entitled to admission under the Maryland law. of the trade winds, which also contribute greatly that any male citizen of Maryland possessing to the salubrity and comfort of this transitway. To specified qualifications might be admitted to practice. The amendment of 1898 changes the method of admission, but makes no change in the class of persons entitled to admission. Considerable stress was laid upon the fact that the Code declares that the masculine gender includes all genders except where such construction would be absurd or unreaThe Court of Appeals has sustained Gov- sonable. The court holds, however, that since erner Odell in removing Charles Guden as women are not eligible to practice law at the sheriff of Kings county, and appointing Nor- common law, and statutes in derogation man S. Dike as his successor, as we expected thereof are to be strictly construed, this article it would. It was not shown at the investiga- of the Code cannot be construed to mean an tion held before the governor that Sheriff authorization for the admission of women. Guden had made an agreement with Michael J. Dady to the effect that he would turn over all of the moneys received by him in excess of a stipulated amount (as had been charged), but it was established by evidence that Sheriff Guden had made an illegal agreement with one Bert Reiss prior to taking office, and that he had taken a false oath. Governor Odell regarded this as sufficient to warrant Guden's removal, and he did remove him, appointing Mr. Dike as his successor. The Court of Appeals holds that the power of removal of county officers is an executive, not a judicial, power, and that as such it was intended to be invested exclusively in the governor. Justice Parker, who wrote the opinion of the court, clearly showed the intent of the framers of the Constitution by copious references to the debates of the Constitutional Conventions of 1821 and 1846. Without going into the merits, the Court of Appeals makes it clear that, as the charges made against Sheriff Guden were sufficient, in its opinion, to confer jurisdiction, and, as the governor is given by the Constitution power to remove, there was no ground for interference on the part of the courts. The question of the right of a woman to practice law in Maryland is settled in the opinion of Chief Justice McSherry in the case entitled In re Maddox (50 Atl. Rep. 487). The court holds that the right to practice law is not a natural right, inherent in every one, but is dependent upon legislative authority. He points out that the Constitution provides LABOR LEGISLATION; ITS SCOPE AND TENDENCY. Labor is the chief, if not the only source of wealth; and the predominancy of that class of American society popularly known as laborers and the manifold destinies within its grasp may well make the fortunes of this increasing power of grave im portance to the State. It is essential to the well-being of the community that this class receive from the law the protection which its importance commands A degraded industrial system superinduces, nay, inevitably fosters the efficacy of the entire polity. Moved by these and produces, a degraded social system, and impairs considerations and impelled by the exigencies of the hour, it is not strange that much injudicious legislation, promulgated by enthusiastic and not overprudent men, has found its way into the statutes of the various States. Consonant to the spirit of universal liberty, mighty waves of popular feeling have played conspicuous parts in American legislation. In the middle of the nineteenth century, popular feeling was so exceedingly friendly toward railways, and in aid of such enterprises the people not unwillingly, but rather eagerly, voted upon themselves vast debts, pursuant to ill-advised legislation, in support of such enterprises, many of which later when the popular enthusiasm abated, were never cancelled but by repudiation; and the close of that century witnessed an |