FRANCE AND MOROCCO.

SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, JULY 22 1844

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On Saturday, I informed the right honourable baronet at the head of her Majesty's government, that instead of moving for a committee to inquire how far our commercial interests were involved in the events which are passing in the Barbary states, I shall content myself with moving for papers, of which I have since given him notice. My first impression was, that the extent to which the trade of this country has been affected by the heavy imposts which have been recently laid upon the tonnage of British vessels, and the products of British industry in all the ports upon the coast of the Mediterranean, of which France has made herself the mistress, required a minute investigation; and that the effects of the ordinance, which issued on the 16th of December last, doubling the duties on English shipping, and of the augmentation of duties upon our cottons to 30 per cent., would best be proved by the evidence, oral and documentary, which could be produced before a committee of this house; but I have heard objections raised to the form of the motion, of which I had given an intimation, and in order that a debate on the mere form should be avoided, by which the attention of the house would be in all likelihood distracted from the consideration of more momentous matter, I have thought it more advisable to move that the copies of certain documents should be laid on the table of the house, in which much of the information which I seek to obtain may be disclosed. There is another motive for the adoption of this course. is that which is least calculated to give offence to a gallant, but exceedingly susceptible people. It is not my intention (and I shall prove that it is not by the tone with which I shall treat this important subject) to say anything by which a debate, at which France could legitimately take offence, would be produced. Nothing shall fall from me, by which a pretence shall be afforded for imputing to me the more than reprehensible purpose of exciting a sentiment of animosity between two great nations, both of which are deeply concerned in the maintenance of peace, and whose collision would disturb the world. But while I am fully convinced of the importance of preserving our pacific relations with a country, whose institutions are so nobly assimilated to our own, I am also convinced that with a perfect absence from all irritating lan guage, a candid statement of facts can be readily reconciled; and I think that if circumstances have occurred, or are likely to occur, by which the commercial interests of England may be seriously affected, nothing will be gained by concealing the truth, or by turning our eyes away from those objects which must sooner or later be forced upon our contemplation. On the 5th of March, 1830-I pass at once at the hazard of abruptness, which is more excusable tlian prolixity, to the facts to which I mean to advert-in 1830, on the 5th of March, Lord Aberdeen wrote a despatch to an ambassador at Paris, Lord Stuart de Rothesay, with regard to the great armament which France had pre

pared for the invasion of Algiers. That despatch contains views the most just, expressed in a most prudential and conciliatory spirit; indeed, the entire of the official correspondence of Lord Aberdeen in 1830 is remarkable for a most striking contrast between the soundness of his judgment and a certain infirmity of purpose, owing to which he omitted to obtain from France the assurances, of the necessity of which he appears to have been himself most fully convinced. Lord Aberdeen appears to have been perfectly aware that it was of the utmost consequence to get from the French government a pledge that the occupation of Algiers should not be permanent, and to have felt that our commercial and maritime, and therefore our political interests, were deeply at stake, in the events to which the French expedition would give rise. The whole correspondence is a curious specimen of diplomacy, in which, upon one hand, a plain Englishman asks that a pledge should be given in plain language, and, on the other hand, a French minister, polished and well lubricated, escapes in sinuous diplomacy from his grasp.Those portions of the correspondence which are illustrative of the present position of affairs I shall select, taking care not to read anything which is not appropriate and interesting. On the 5th of March, 1830, Lord Aberdeen writes

My Lord-The extensive scale of the preparations for the expedition against Algiers, and the declaration in the speech of his Most Christian Majesty upon this subject, have naturally engaged the attention of his Majesty's government. Your Excellency is already aware of the sincere desire which his Majesty entertains that the injuries and affronts which have been endured by the King of France from the Regency of Algiers may be duly avenged, and that his Most Christian Majesty may exact the most signal reparation from this barbarous state; but the formidable force about to be embarked, and the intimation in the speech to which I have alluded, appear to indicate an intention of effecting the entire destruction of the Regency, rather than the infliction of chastisement. This probable change in the condition of a territory so important, from its geographical position, cannot be regarded by his Majesty's government without much interest, and it renders some explanation of the intentions of the French government still more desirable. I have communicated these sentiments to the Duke de Laval, and have received from his Excellency the most positive assur ances of the entirely disinterested views of the cabinet of the Tuileries in the future disposal of the state of Algiers. Notwithstanding his Excellency has promised to write to his government in order to obtain the means of making an official communication, I have thought it right to instruct you to bring the subject under the notice of M. de Polignac It is probable that the French minister may be desirous of affording all the explanation we can desire. The intimate union and concert existing between the two countries give us reason to expect that we shal receive the full confidence of the French government in a matter touching the interests of both, and which in its results may be productive of the most important effects upon the commercial and maritime relations of the Mediterranean states."

Prince Polignac, to whom the contents of this despatch were communicated on the 12th of March, 1830, wrote to the Duke de Laval a long despatch in which he says nothing bordering upon an understanding beyoud this statement :

"The King, whose views on this grave question are quite disinte rested, will consult with his allies, in order to determine what should be the new order of things."

Lord Aberdeen saw at once that this communication was most inde finite, and was not in the least binding, and on the 23rd of March, 1830. he wrote

"Whatever may be the means which shall be found necessary to secure the objects of the expedition, the French government ought, at least, to have no difficulty in renouncing all views of territorial possession or aggrandizement. * *** Monsieur de Polignac is doubtless aware of the great importance of the Barbary states, and of the degree of influence which, in the hands of a more enlightened government, they could not fail to exercise over the commerce and maritime interests of the Mediterranean powers."

Lord Stuart de Rothesay made several efforts to obtain a positive assurance, but failed. On the 21st of April, 1830, Lord Aberdeen writes as follows:

"Is it unreasonable to expect from the French government something more than a general assurance of disinterestedness, and an engagement to consult their allies, before the future fate of the regency shall be finally decided? A French army, the most numerous, it is believed, that has ever crossed the sea, is to undertake the conquest of a territory which, from its geographical position, has always been considered of the highest importance; no man can look without anxiety at the issue of an enterprise, the ultimate objects of which are so uncertain and so undefined. * * * ** If we could so far forget what is due to our Sovereign and to ourselves as to rest satisfied with vague explanations in a matter so deeply affecting the interests of British commerce, as well as the political relations of the Mediterranean states, it is certain that the people of this country would not hesitate to pronounce the most unequivocal condemnation of our conduct."

How applicable are these observations to what is passing at this moment on the coast of Africa, and on the frontier of Morocco, and how justified is a member of the British Parliament in the expression of a hope that Lord Aberdeen has been more successful, in 1844, in extracting an engagement from M. Guizot, than he was in 1830 in eliciting it from the unfortunate statesman who succeeded in baffling him, and from whom no written engagement could be procured. Two months were passed in correspondence, yet nothing was attained in the form of a distinct stipulation. On the 4th of May, 1830, Lord Aberdeen wrote to Lord Stuart de Rothesay :

"Monseiur de Polignac expresses a hope that our expectations nay not be so unreasonable, as to urge him to declarations which must prove injurious to the government of his Most Christian Majesty. If the pro jects of the French cabinet be as pure and disinterested as is asserted

by Monsieur de Polignac, he can have no real difficulty in giving us the most entire satisfaction. A concise and simple declaration could not answer the purpose better, but it would appear to be more natural than the course which your Excellency states that the French minister has been commanded by his Most Christian Majesty to adopt; to envelop in such reasoning, and to mingle considerations of national dignity and punctilio, with the statement of intentions such as I have mentioned, appears less calculated to produce conviction, and to convey the impres sion of sincerity and frankness."

Lord Stuart de Rothesay, of course, communicated these well-founded complaints to the French ministry; but the latter, instead of writing a plain promise, such as Lord Aberdeen asked on the 12th of May, 1830, wrote to the Duke de Laval what I perused with some amusement as a specimen of evasions, which it required some disrespect for Lord Aberdeen to have attempted. He says that the fleet was about to sail, and adds

"His Majesty from that moment, namely, the conquest of Algiers, ought to give an assurance to his allies, that he will present himself to those deliberations, ready to furnish all explanations which they might still desire, disposed to take into consideration all rights and all interests," and so on. After this despatch had been written, a remarkable incident occurred. The Sultan had directed Tahir Pacha to proceed to Algiers, in order to adjust the differences with France. The French squadron would not permit Tahir Pacha to land, and he was forced to go to Toulon, where he was detained. Lord Stuart de Rothesay writes" At Toulon he will be, without doubt, detained in quarantine, and if he intends coming to Paris he may possibly not reach Algiers till long after it shall be too late to take part in the negotiations which are likely to follow the capture of the place."

Algiers was taken on the 5th of July, 1830. The French general told the French that the stars mingled with the lights which they had kindled on the brow of Mount Atlas, and on the 16th of July, Lord Stuart de Rothesay wrote to Lord Aberdeen that he had waited on Prince Polignac to congratulate him, in the conviction that he would keep faith with his court. His Excellency answered, "by declaring his readiness to repeat his former assurances," and in a few days after he was a prisoner in Ham; Charles the Tenth, who could not learn anything even from the misfortunes of the Comte d'Artois, was driven from his dominions and from his country, and from the Barricades.There arose a throne which the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen hastened to recognise as the legitimate result of the national will. But is it not wonderful that the new government was recognised by England, without any sort of stipulation in reference to Algiers? Lord Aberdeen had not obtained any specific engagement from Prince Polig

nac.

He acknowledged himself, he was fully aware of the vast importance of the results which must follow the permanent occupation of Algiers and her three provinces by France, and yet it does not appear that when Louis Phillipe was recognised by the Tory government, they made a single observation in reference to Algiers. The Tory government remained in office for four months after the French had taken

possession of Algiers, and after they had pushed their acquisitions into the adjoining territory, and yet Lord Aberdeen had no observation to make. The Whigs, finding the French army in possession of Algiers, and not being able to refer to any engagement, took no steps one way or other, and stood passively by. I pass from 1830 to 1841, avoiding any detail of the means pursued by the French to secure their conquest, and thinking it unnecessary to say anything upon the expedients by which civilisation had been extended and Christianity has been diffused by those peculiar propagators of the faith. In 1841, Lord Aberdeen had been scarce a few weeks in office, when the Count de St. Aulaire engaged him in a conversation upon Algiers, to which Lord Aberdeen attached no importance, but which the French ambassador turned very promptly to account. The King of the French introduced into his speech, made on the 15th of December, a statement that he had taken means to secure the possessions of France from all external complication, a paragraph which remained unintelligible, until M. Guizot, as a proof of the influence of France over the Tory government, stated the conversation which had taken place with Lord Aberdeen. I read the speech of M. Guizot in the journal Des Debats, and I inquired from the First Lord of the Treasury whether the conversation of Lord Aberdeen had been correctly reported by the Count de St. Aulaire. The right honourable gentleman said that the report was substantially correct, except that Lord Aberdeen denied that he had said that he had no objection to make. Lord Aberdeen himself stated the conversation was accidental, and on the 28th of January, 1842, wrote a despatch to Lord Cowley, in which he denied his having stated that he had no objection to the French retention of Algiers. This despach was communicated to Monsieur de Guizot. Monsieur Guizot made no observations on the subject, but I cannot help thinking that the course subsequently adopted by the French government was influenced in no small degree by the imputed declaration of Lord Aberdeen. The French government issued an ordinance on the 16th of December, 1843, imposing a duty of four francs a ton on our shipping, and 30 per cent. on our cottons. What has been the result? I beg to call attention to the following letter, which appeared in the Times of July 18. It was written by their own correspondent, and is dated at Oran, July 6:

"The commercial system lately adopted here by the government has completely shut out British commerce from this port. Formerly several British vessels came here, but no more now, except with coals, are expected. The port duties on all foreign vessels are four francs per ton. French vessels rarely pay anything. Sardinian vessels are favoured by treaty, and pay only two francs per ton. English cotton manufactures, which paid last year only 15 per cent., now pay more than 30, which amounts to exclusion."

Who is there that hears these facts who will say that the subject which I have submitted to the attention of the house is one of which the consideration ought to be avoided? The fulfilment of all Lord Aberdeen's propositions in 1830 is found in the fiscal exclusion of English manufactures. A blow has been aimed, not at the honour of England, but at her industry; and those who laugh all the idealism