to be done. Nay, where a patent has in this manner improvidently issued by mistake in the Land Office, even had it been delivered to the person named in it as patentee, I entertain no doubt of the power of the President to issue a new patent, reciting the error committed in the former as the cause of the corrected patent. Such a recital, however, would only be necessary where the person to whom the patent had been issued by mistake refused to give it up for cancellation; which is understood not to be the case in regard to the patent now under consideration.

To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

WM. WIRT.

PRE-EMPTIONS UNDER ACT OF MAY 26, 1824.

No pre-emption occurred under the act of 26th May, 1824, to lands ceded by the Quapaw treaty, ratified January 18, 1825, notwithstanding the lands were within the Lawrence land district. The language of the act of 26th May, 1824, touching pre-emptions, is in the present tense; therefore lands subsequently attached to the district were not subject to the pre-emption rights granted by it.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
December 4, 1826.

SIR: The statement and questions submitted for my opinion from the General Land Office are as follows:

By an act passed on the 26th of May, 1824, pre-emption rights are granted to certain persons in the Territory of Arkansas, on certain conditions, in the land district of Lawrence.

On the 18th of January, 1825, a treaty was ratified with the Quapaws, by which a tract of land was ceded to the United States; part of which lies within the land district of Lawrence.

The boundaries of the land district of Lawrence, as they existed previous to the passage of the act of May, 1824, extended into the Quapaw country, and embraced the land claimed to be entered under the act of May, 1824.

Quære. Are lands thus situated subject to be entered as pre-emption rights, under the act of 1824?

If they be subject to such entry, another question arises, under the act of 1824, for the decision of the Attorney General.

By an act passed at the last session of Congress, the limits of the land district of Lawrence were extended so as to embrace a large quantity of very valuable lands.

Quære. Are the lands embraced in this extension of the boundaries of the district subject to entry as pre-emption rights, under the act of 1824?

The privilege given by the act of 26th May, 1824, (chapter 154,) to the persons therein described, is "to enter with the register of the land office in the district of Lawrence, in said Territory, any tract within said district on which they may have made improvements previously to the passing of this act, or any unimproved tract within said district, the sale of which is authorized by law." The questions are explained by the Commissioner of the General Land Office to arise on the words italicised. The district of Lawrence, as described by law, previous to the passage of

this act, did comprehend the lands afterwards ceded by the Quapaws. But these lands were not, at the date of the act, authorized to be sold; the title being at that time in the Quapaw Indians: and the land opened to these pre-emptions is not the whole of the unimproved lands in the district of Lawrence, but the further limitation is added-"the sale of which is authorized by law;" that is to say, is now authorized by law. To extend the pre-emption to the lands subsequently ceded by the Quapaws, or to the other lands subsequently added to that district, would be to construe the word "is" to mean shall have been; so as to make the passage read, "or any unimproved tract within the said district, the sale of which shall have been authorized by law;" that is, shall have been authorized at the time when the party comes to make his entry. But the act, as it stands, speaks in the present tense; and it would, I think, be rather too bold a construction to convert the present tense into the future past.

I am of the opinion that both questions must be answered in the negative.

To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

WM. WIRT.

THE ACT FOR RELIEF OF ALFRED FLOURNOY.

The act for the relief of Alfred Flournoy did not authorize an entry of reverted lands before they had been again offered at public sale; nor lands relinquished after the passage of the act. The laws upon the subject of public lands are all in pari materiâ, and are all to be construed together. No particular law should be construed as an insulated act upon its own letter, but as having relation to the general system.

The case of Chotard vs. Pope, reported in 12 Wheaton, 586, has settled the rule as laid down in this opinion.

Case for the opinion of the Attorney General.

An act passed on the 22d of May, 1826, for the relief of Alfred Flournoy, by which he was authorized to enter two sections of land in any land of fice in the State of Mississippi or Alabama: provided that no entry shall be made, but of land which may have been previously offered at public sale; and provided he shall not enter any lands which may have been heretofore relinquished, until after they may be again offered at public sale.

In pursuance of this act, Mr. Flournoy has entered

1st. Lands which had reverted to the United States, and which, by the 4th section of the act of the 24th of April, 1820, (Laws U. S., vol. 6, p. 487,) were, at the time of such entry, subject to be offered at public sale before they could be entered by private entry.

2d. He has entered lands which have been relinquished since the date of the passage of the act for his relief, and which lands thus relinquished are, by the provisions of the acts of the last session, (p. 31,) and acts of the 1st session 18th Congress, (section 3, p. 50,) subject to be offered at public sale, as all other public lands.

Quære. Has Mr. Flournoy a right to enter both or either of the descriptions of lands above mentioned, by virtue of the act for his relief?

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
December 31, 1826.

On the above statement, I am of opinion1 That lands which reverted by forfeiture to the United States, and were by law to be offered at public sale before they could be appropriated by private entry, were not subject to entry by Mr. Flournoy; because the restriction to lands which have been previously offered to sale, is to be construed, I think, with reference to the general system of land laws, and means that kind of previous offer which was effectual to open the lands to general entry; and not that kind of previous offer which had become wholly ineffectual to the purpose of an offer, and threw back the lands into the general mass, to be dealt with as if they had never been offered at all.

I consider such an abortive offer as no offer at all, to the purpose of the law; because it is manifest to my mind that Congress intended that the United States should have the benefit of an effectual offer at public sale, before it should be subject to Mr. Flournoy's entry: whereas the offer at public sale, on which he relies, was an offer only in name, not in sub

stance.

2. I am of the opinion that the lands relinquished after the passage of the law were not subject to his entry by implication; because, by a previous act of the same session, (the "act making further provision for the extinguishment of the debt due to the United States by purchasers of public lands," chap. 34,) these after relinquished lands had been placed under the protection and control of the act of the 18th May, 1824, which expressly provides that they should be offered at public sale before they shall be subject to private entry; and if we look at the reason of the thing, there is no conceivable reason why the after-relinquished lands should be subject to Mr. Flournoy's claim, any more than those which had been previously relinquished.

Mr. Flournoy and his counsel rely on the words of the act" that he shall not enter any lands which have been heretofore relinquished." But the law is acting on the existing state of things; its language is predicated on that existing state of things; and it means to declare on what portion or description of the lands then under the control of Congress Mr. Flournoy might lay his entry: hence the word heretofore relinquished. But they do not go on to say that on lands hereafter relinquished he may lay his entry: this is matter of implication; and against this implication we have the express provision already mentioned, which makes a different provision with regard to these after relinquished lands, and one directly in conflict with Mr. Flournoy's claim to enter them.

This is not imputing to Congress arbitrarily a meaning inconsistent with their language. The laws upon the subject of the public lands are all in pari materia, and are all to be construed together; and an authority to an individual to make an entry of any of these lands is not to be considered as an insulated act, to be expounded strictly upon its own letter; but as having relation to the general system, and to be expounded according to the meaning of Congress, to be collected from the language of the particular law as compared with the whole system, and from the reason and nature of the case. It is well known to every lawyer, that a literal interpretation would often defeat the manifest purposes of the legislature, and sacrifice the spirit of the law to its letter; and to me it is apparent

that the construction of the law contended for by Mr. Flournoy would produce this effect in this instance.

By what rule of construction these private laws are to be expoundedwhether according to the letter, or according to the more liberal rule, on which I have relied has not yet, I think, been judicially settled by the courts of the nation. There is a case now before the Supreme Court, and early on the docket, (the case of Chotard vs. Pope,) which will probably settle this rule. If it should be decided in favor of Mr. Chotard, it will tend strongly to establish the construction contended for by Mr. Flournoy and his eminent counsel. Meantime, the same Congress which passed this law is now in session; and, if I am in error, can easily cor rect it by an explanatory act.

WM. WIRT.

ELECTION OF A TRUSTEE OF COLUMBIA COLLEGE,

A legal quorum of trustees being present for the transaction of business, and it being announced, in order to proceed to the election to fill a vacancy in the board, and the majority of the quorum voting for an individual who was thereupon declared elected, the election is valid.

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1827.

SIR: The case stated by you for my opinion is in the following words: "The semi annual meeting of the board of trustees of the Columbia College was properly notified to be held on the 13th December last, at ten o'clock, A. M. At the appointed time five members (the legal quorum) appeared and commenced business. The president announced that there was a vacancy in the board, and a resolution was adopted to go immediately into the election of a member to supply it. One of the five members present declined to vote, and assigned his reasons for it. The other four proceeded to a choice, and an individual was declared to be elected." The question is, Was this election valid?

I am of opinion that it was. The legal quorum being present, the refusal of one of the body to vote on a particular subject can no more defeat the will of the majority in this body than in any other-in Congress, or in a court of justice.

Yours, respectfully,

WM. WIRT.

To the CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U. S.

MRS. BLODGETT'S RIGHT OF DOWER.

Mrs. Rebecca Blodgett, claiming dower in certain lands in the city of Washington, of which she alleges her husband died seized, has not brought herself within the protection of the principle on which she relies as excusing the proof of seisin; and the seisin not being proven, no right to dower is established.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
January 29, 1827.

In compliance with the act of the last session of Congress for the relief

of Rebecca Blodgett, the Attorney General has the honor to report:

That Mrs. Blodgett's petition to Congress, together with the documents which accompanied it, was handed to him by the Clerk of the House of Representatives on the 9th day of October last; that, on inspecting the papers, and finding them wholly insufficient to enable him to form an opinion on the subject, he called on the attorney of Mrs. Blodgett, by two letters, (copies of which accompany this report,) requesting that all the evidence on which the claim of dower was founded might be immediately furnished, in order that the Attorney General might discharge, without delay, the duty devolved on him by the law; that the documents were not furnished until the Supreme Court had commenced its present session; when the attorney for the petitioner, in handing them in, stated that these were all the documents which were to be offered in support of his client's claim.

The Attorney General has availed himself of the earliest leisure he could command, amidst the pressure of his duties in the Supreme Court, to examine these documents, together with the authorities referred to by the counsel of the petitioner; and he states, as the result of this investigation, that these documents do not establish a right of dower in the petitioner in the lots in question.

He does not affirm that Mrs. Blodgett has not a right of dower in these lots; but only that the evidence submitted to him, as all the evidence which she proposed to offer, does not establish such a right.

The reasons for this opinion are stated in an accompanying paper; which, together with the petition and the documents themselves, is respectfully submitted.

To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

WM. WIRT.

Accompanying paper referred to.

"The question submitted to the Attorney General, by the act of Congress of the 20th May, 1826, 'for the relief of Rebecca Blodgett,' is, whether she has a right of dower in lots Nos. 1, 4, and 14, in the square No. 430, in the city of Washington.

"Marriage, seisin, and the death of the husband, are essential to the right of dower.

"In this case the marriage is proved, and the death of the husband is admitted. The only remaining question is as to the scisin. The petitioner relies on a constructive seisin by the following deeds:

"1. As to lot No. 1, in square 430, a deed from David Burns to Samuel Blodgett, dated and acknowledged before two justices of the peace on the 18th March, 1793; recorded on the 29th August, 1794, more than seventeen months after the execution.

"2. As to lot No. 4, in the same square, a deed from the same to the same, bearing, in all respects, the same dates.

"According to the laws of Maryland, these deeds are wholly inoperative to any intent or purpose whatsoever, not having been recorded within six months.

"3. With regard to lot No. 14, no evidence whatsoever of any title in