A computer search listing of the U.S. Code sections which have a reference to the previous Collision Regulations which we believe is essentially complete can be furnished to the committee.

In this vein, this may be an appropriate place to address a problem presented by the Federal Boat Safety Act, which was drafted contemporaneously with a proposed legislative unification of the Rules of the Road which was not enacted.

This circumstance resulted in modifications of the Motorboat Safety Act of 1940 which had unintended consequences, insofar as they relate to lighting requirements for recreational boats.

The Motorboat Act, prescribes alternatively the carriage of Motorboat Act lights or Colreg lights for a motorboat while operating_on Inland Rules Waters, Western Rivers Rules Waters or Great Lakes Rules Waters.

It is not clear that the option to carry Colreg lights on internal waters exists today for recreational boats that were previously classified as motorboats. There is, of course, no question but that recreational vessels operating seaward of harbors, rivers and inland waters must carry the Colreg lights.

However, there is no good reason, except the unsettled state of the laws on this point, why recreational boats, including sailboats, should not have the option available to small commercial vessels to carry the Colreg lights while operating on the internal waters of the United States.

Accordingly, it would be useful to add a provision to the proposed legislation clearly authorizing vessels subject to the Federal Boat Safety Act, for example, recreational boats, to carry the Colreg lights wherever they may be operating.

In summary, and subject to the foregoing comments this committee could use H.Ř. 186 or the administration bill as the vehicle for completing the domestic implementation of Colregs 72. It would be preferable to move forward on this legislation and seek enactment before July 15, 1977 when Colregs 72 will enter into effect throughout the world.

The 1972 Collision Regulations are a valuable improvement over the 1960 Collision Regulations, and they represent a significant achievement of international agreement and cooperation. Action on the matters I have mentioned this morning will complete the process of domestic implementation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Admiral.

You heard the bells, as well as I, and we will recess for 5 minutes, just enough time to go vote, and check in and come back.

But you keep referring to the administration bill. I am not aware of any administration bill.

If you are referring to the bill that President Ford sent over, well, that has not been introduced in this Congress. If there is such a bill, I wish you would bring it to the attention of staff, so that they can bring it to our attention.

Five-minute recess.

[Short recess.]

Mr. BIAGGI. The committee is called to order.
Admiral Bursley?

Admiral BURSLEY. Mr. Chairman, as we closed, you had asked for a clarification of my reference to the administration bill. I had reference to a legislative proposal that was transmitted on January 17, by the prior administration.

On May 6 of this year a letter was sent from General Counsel of the Department of Transportation, to the Speaker of the House, and the President of the Senate, stating the support of the current administration for that proposal.

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Crook?

Mr. CROOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no statement in addition to the remarks made by Admiral Bursley. I am merely here today to try to answer whatever questions that are relative to my Department.

Mr. BIAGGI, Thank you.

As I stated at the outset, we have had hearings on this, extensive hearings, along with President Ford, requesting that this legislation be enacted, but with the one point of contention, which was rather than a concurrent resolution, we should have a joint resolution subject to his approval or disapproval.

The Chair feels in the light of the development of these regulations, in IMCO, where this country is represented, and has a great deal to do with the development of those regulations, that the regulations that are subsequently adopted and submitted, pretty much are a reflection of the Administration's position. The Congress should retain some meaningful dominion over the process.

A joint resolution will be ruled that dominion, that meaningful dominion, be envisioned, if you will, in the following process.

IMCO approves a resolution which I stated before, which more often than not, reflects the Administration approval, if it comes to the Congress, and both Houses disapprove it, the President would then be in a position to veto.

So what he would in fact be doing, or what a joint resolution requirement would in effect result in, is a veto of a veto. It is the Chair's view that this is not the most desirable course to take.

The initial legislation only contained requirements that one House only one House was necessary to disapprove and negate the effect of the regulation.

This legislation has been amended, compromised, if you will, requiring it to be a concurrent resolution. We feel it is consistent, and it permits the it gives-well, a greater burden on the Congress to disapprove. If both Houses reflect that they disapprove, that there must be some significant reason, and that should be sufficient to deal with the matter.

On the other side of that question, many of those regulations deal with fundamental and international aspects, and disregard many domestic requirements, which we feel the Coast Guard should have the right, as well as the right to require regulations dealing with our domestic needs.

But more to the point, and narrower to the point, and to the decisive point in this legislation, is that we believe that concurrent resolution would best serve our national interest.

Mr. Treen?

Mr. TREEN. I do not have anything to say, Mr. Chairman. I do want to apologize to the witnesses.

I was in an Armed Services Committee hearing, so that is why I was late. I am trying to catch up.

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. de Lugo?

Mr. DE LUGO. No questions.

Mr. BIAGGI. Captain Heyward?

Mr. HEYWARD. Admiral Bursley, in connection with the question on implementation with the Executive order, or implementation by statute, I assume that the position in the past has been at least, and I am not-I gather from your testimony that the present administration also takes the position that this treaty or convention is a selfexecuting instrument, is that correct?

Admiral BURSLEY. In the fundamental aspects of promulgating the rules, we believe the treaty is self-executing.

As I indicated in my statement, there are some loose ends that we think should be handled by legislation, but the very fundamental heart of the treaty-in terms of the rules to be followed by U.S. vessels-we believe is self-executing.

Mr. HEYWARD. If it is self-executed, why is any legislation needed at all, or as far as a joint resolution of the Congress, in disapproval, in effect of any proposed change, which is a proposal that you endorsed, or the Department of Transportation endorsed, in their recent letter? Admiral BURSLEY. If I understand your question correctly, we are dealing with future changes to the Convention. We are dealing with the process by which the United States would adopt those changes. That process historically has involved the advice and consent of the Senate.

This is an effort to find a more abbreviated and expeditious way of getting these changes. But the process of change could follow the traditional route of advice and consent. We would rather have a more reliably expeditious basis, which is the reason that the tacit approval scheme is included in the Convention.

Mr. HEYWARD. I really do not think that answers my question, because the speed up amendment process is in the Convention itself. It does not if it is self-executing, that part of it also is self-executing. It does not require any further action on the part of the Congress. Why did the President concede to the Congress some role, if he felt that the Covention itself, or any was in place, as soon as the advice and consent and ratification, that is, with the future prospects of effects and why did he propose that the Congress repeal the old statute, if the Convention itself is self-executing, and would supersede the statute, and if it codifies, then drop it out of the code?

Admiral BURSLEY. We felt that the expungement of the COLREGS 60 would be a matter of orderliness in terms of the public not having any misapprehension as to what was in effect.

We do not believe that it is necessary that it be repealed in terms of which provisions would obtain. I think it would just make it a much cleaner situation if there was a repealer.

We are discussing, I think, perhaps a question of what can be done on a self-executing basis, and what might be a cleaner way of wrapping up the whole package.

Mr. HEYWARD. What would happen if the President did not even issue, had not even issued the Executive order, on July 15, 1977?

Admiral BURSLEY. The Executive order?

Mr. HEYWARD. Had he not issued that Executive order, had he been silent, what would have been the legal effect on July 15, 1977, for U.S. vessels?

Admiral BURSLEY. The Executive order did not address that. The Executive order goes to the internal assignment of some of the provisions of the Convention which require executive action.

For example there is a need for a certificate from the U.S. Government, where a vessel cannot conform to some of the provisions of the regulations. The delegation of that authority was accomplished by the Executive order.

Similarly, authority was given to the Navy with respect to lights for their vessels and signals for convoys.

Mr. HEYWARD. Which would not be inconsistent with the Convention?

Admiral BURSLEY. That is correct.

Mr. HEYWARD. Let me ask you one other question.

Suppose that no legislation is required, and suppose the President later on decides that one way to amend the inland rules, which the Congress would not amend, one way to amend those original rules is to file a change to the International Convention, regulations, which deviates rule 1B, recognizes the right of special-could the administration-I do not care what administration it is, bypassing the Congress on three separate statutes for the governing of operation of inland rules, by deleting this recognition of the special rules from the Convention without referral to the Congress?

Admiral BURSLEY. Well, as I have indicated, it is my feeling that without some authorization to proceed in another manner, the President would proceed by way of advice and consent of the Senate if an amendment to the Convention were to be undertaken.

Mr. HEYWARD. But you have, in effect, said that once the advice and consent of this Convention procedure, this Convention and its speed up provision has been advised and consented to, and ratified by the President, future changes need not be submitted to the Congress.

Admiral BURSLEY. No; I do not believe that

Mr. HEYWARD. But that is the effect of it.

Admiral BURSLEY. I think I mentioned that in respect to the operative rules of the road, I believe that the Convention is self-executing. I also mentioned my feeling that for future changes you would have to for advice and consent, that it would not be self-executing to that degree.

go

Mr. HEYWARD. Future changes would not be self-executing?

Admiral BURSLEY. Not without some domestic provision to amend the Convention.

Mr. HEYWARD. But the Convention itself provides for the amending? Admiral BURSLEY. But the principle of self-execution also recognizes that by domestic law some parts of treaties are not capable of being self-executing.

In our domestic law the Constitution requires changes to international convention have the advice and consent of the Senate. So to that degree, the Convention cannot be self-executing.

Mr. HEYWARD. Nor in my opinion, can the Senate in advice and consent, change legislation, which the Congress has enacted as an exception to these international rules, unless you consider that this Convention itself could change those, and that is the point I am getting to.

In the unification of the rules there are a great many objections, and as you are well aware, in the unification of the inland rules, in my opinion, if this Convention is self-executing, you can avoid that contention, unify your rules by simply dropping 1(b) out of the Convention, which recognizes the right of domestic nations to do it.

That is why part of the threat is in not allowing, or not having a role on the part of the Congress to consider what a particular administration is attempting to do internationally in amending domestic law.

Admiral BURSLEY. I would have to agree with counsel, if I accept the premise that the President could accept a change to the Convention without the advice and consent of the Senate that that result would be accomplished, but I have not maintained that in my testimony here.

Mr. HEYWARD. If each amendment that is going to be made to the regulations needs to be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, what happens to the speed up procedure?

Admiral BURSLEY. Well, I think that is the entire objective of seeking Congressional approval of a rapid procedure within the United States, rather than the advice and consent rule.

The hazards that you mention would then be present.

Mr. HEYWARD. That is the reason that Congress last year tried to give advance consent to the implementing of changes of the rules by the President, with a single condition, that the Congress should have the right to intervene if some change was of such a startling or significant nature that you could not live with it because it was affecting other laws that the Congress was concerned with.

And if you require a joint resolution, as the Chairman has said, you are not really recognizing a simple, conditional role, you are requiring the Congress to go through this entire procedure of both Houses passing a disapproving legislation, and the President being given the opportunity to veto the Congressional veto, and requiring the House and Senate to override by two-thirds vote the Presidential veto of the original Congressional veto, and that certainly is not going to help speed up any changes.

Admiral BURSLEY. I might point out that we are in this situation because the Congressional rejection of the position that the Administration advanced resulted in a provision by the Congress to which this is a response.

Mr. HEYWARD. Let me ask you one other thing.

Did not this entire issue get confused with other legislative controversy between the Executive and Congress, on bills and conditional delegations of authority?

Admiral BURSLEY. My impression is that there is at least one other piece of legislation of that nature.

Mr. HEYWARD. In other words, there was contention between the Executive Department and the Congress in the last Congress, that the Congressional strings that they were attaching to too many bills and regulatory authority were making it difficult for the Administra