For the last 2 years, the captain of the port has had tight and effective procedures for control of the movement of liquefied natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas by water. These procedures require escort of the tanker by a Coast Guard vessel. This vessel is usually our standby 110 foot tug, the use of which in no way derogates our immediate response capability to a major incident. Additional tanker traffic should add no stress to our response posture.

In summarizing the activities of the Coast Guard within the port of New York/New Jersey, I have attempted to show how each of our programs enhance marine safety. These programs cover the safety of the vessel itself, the redution of the hazards from cargoes carried, the reductions of hazards on waterfront facilities and, finally, our reaction to hazardous incidents as they occur.

The committee has solicited Coast Guard comments on this specific legislation under consideration, H.R. 362. Since this bill is still being reviewed by the Department and OMB in response to a request from you, I cannot comment at this time. As soon as the Department position is developed, it will be provided for the record.

The remaining, Mr. Chairman, are comments on the three alternative strategies which you put in your letter.

It has been suggested that the Coast Guard should assume the responsibility of marine firefighting in the ports. It is the Department position that the primary responsibility for marine firefighting should remain with the local community. Presently the Coast Guard has a variety of port safety responsibilities, including some which pertain to fire prevention and control. These responsibilities generally involve establishing safety standards, preparing emergency contingency plans, and coordinating and assisting local officials in actual disaster relief. The Coast Guard floating equipment has limited firefighting capability which we believe to be adequate for our purposes, but which can be used to supplement the efforts of local fire departments.

Since it is the administration's position that the Coast Guard should not assume the marine firefighting responsibilities, comments concerning funding the program through port user charges is not considered appropriate, at least by me.

The establishment of a Coast Guard strike force, similar to the National Strike Force for oil spills, to respond to marine fires or disasters has been considered, but found not justified.

The regional planning and operational authority in a portwide area for such a force is already established by the authority delegated to the captain of the port. We have found that in most marine fires or disasters, the majority of the damage and/or casualties occurs during the first few minutes of the incident.

Therefore, the incident would be, in most cases, under control well before a strike force could arrive on scene. In those few cases which might need additional Coast Guard expertise-and I would underline that it is not necessarily fire expertise-the personnel can be airlifted from all over the country on short notice, under our present situation.

Establishment of a national firefighting program to provide preplanning and marine fire assistance to port authorities and local governments has been proposed by other legislation, H.R. 1456.

The administration's position on this program has been provided by the Department in response to a request to review H.R. 1456.

Generally, we recognize that the adequacy of existing resources for marine firefighting varies greatly in different localities, and we do not wish to minimize the seriousness of even one port-related fire. Nevertheless, we do not believe that Federal intervention into a service which traditionally has been locally performed is justified. Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on this legislation. This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you, Admiral.

What is the response time to City Island?

Admiral REA. One hour, or an hour and one-half, from Governor's Island.

Mr. BIAGGI. An hour and one-half? What you are telling me is you arrive just in time for the last rites.

Admiral REA. Excuse me, we have some equipment at Fort Totten, but that is smaller equipment. But the larger vessels, the 110-foot tugs, are at Governor's Island.

Mr. BIAGGI. That Fort Totten equipment, does that have any firefighting capacity?

Admiral REA. About 250 gallons per minute.

It is a very small capacity.

Mr. BIAGGI. Well, I think City Island is living in a continuous state of peril, because the risk up there has increased with the diminution of protection provided by the New York City Fire Department. That is one area in which the Coast Guard could be most helpful, because we have marinas, boats, et cetera.

Admiral REA. It is a very busy boating area.

Mr. BIAGGI. That is right.

Admiral REA. And our auxiliary is of tremendous help up there, but they are not in the firefighting business, whatsoever.

Mr. BIAGGI. Sometimes a good supplement is all you need. The supplement might be better in the initital stage, especially when the primary source of firefighting capacity is not available.

Captain FLEISHELL. I might add, Congressman, that one of our auxiliaries pulled four people out of the water in a boat explosion that occurred up there at City Island, just about 2 weeks ago, during the Fourth of July. This was an auxiliarist that we have under official Coast Guard orders. He runs his boat, and supplements our activities up there.

Mr. BIAGGI. I know that is what they do when they start to burn dockside, they start to bring them out to the water. You have a couple of those boats there. That is what they do, I know.

But these 250 gallons, well, that is not really that much. We just got an official command. These hearings are being recorded, and we will have to pause for a minute while they change the tape. Why do we not have a 1 minute recess?

[Short recess.]

Mr. BIAGGI. The meeting is called to order.

Admiral, what do we have for an LNG contingency plan?
Admiral REA. May I have Captain Fleishell respond to that?

Captain FLEISHELL. About 2 years ago, Congressman, my predecessor prepared an LNG and LPG contingency plan, which we have updated, and feel is one of the most effective plans that exist in the

country. We have just gone out with another solicitation to the industry and other people to further update this plan, yet we have not moved LNG into the port as yet.

We did move it, I think, back in 1974, into the Brooklyn Union Gas facility in New Town Creek. But as you know, the Rossville plant is not yet operational, and has not yet been licensed by the Federal Power Commission, but we are moving liquefied petroleum gas into the Exxon Bayonne facility, over in Lindon, N.J. We moved about 12 vessels in there last winter.

We have an extensive plan that has been published, and is readily available to the public. We could supply that to the committee, if you would like.

Mr. BIAGGI. Well, I always conjure up visions of what could happen. And I see an atom bomb exploding. That is what I see. Am I right, or am I wrong?

Captain FLEISHELL. Well, I really do not think you are right in your concern and fear, to be truthful with you, sir.

The Coast Guard's role, of course, is to insure that this product is moved safely by water. We have taken, we think, considerable measures to reduce the likelihood of a high energy collision with these vessels that are especially constructed to carry this product. And you have to bear in mind that they are especially constructed with inner tanks, insulating tanks, and then a space, or a void, of 10 to 12 feet.

If you would, perchance, have initial penetration of the hull of a vessel, the impacting object would have to go at least 10 to 12 feet into the side of that vessel before it was able to penetrate the container which holds the product.

Our role has been, one, to inspect the vessel when it appears in the port, to inspect it prior to permitting its entry. To inspect all of its safety and operational equipment, which, of course, has already been gone over and approved in the design stage by the Coast Guard, to make sure that it is operational, and then to escort it, and limit its movements to certain channels within the port, and then to shut down downbound traffic in opposition to it, and we do this to make sure that there are no encounters, as it transits to its facility-and we do that by helicopter overflights.

Our role is to, as I say, to limit downbound deep draft traffic. Our role is then to inspect and stay with the vessel while it is offloading its product within the port.

We put out safety broadcasts to the mariners, and we notify all the shipping companies that we have this movement going on. And we feel we take rather extraordinary measures to insure its safe movement. Mr. BIAGGI. Given all of the precautions, life's experience tells us that nothing is perfect. Statistics indicate that one day we will have a catastrophic situation.

Given that statistical conclusion, how could it best be dealt with? Captain FLEISHELL. Well, I think, if I understand your question correctly, that means that should we have some sudden release of this product, then what would happen. Well, first of all, I would like to say that that is not likely to occur, and that we take all kinds of preventive measures to insure it.

I am not sure that anybody really knows exactly what would happen, sir. There has been an awful lot of testing, as you well know, out at China Lake.

You are familiar with the rollover effect, and with a variety of other physics of the operation of this, the flameless explosion type of instance, for example, that could occur with LNG.

So we have all of these physical peculiarities of the product, you know, which makes it potentially dangerous.

While it is in the liquefied state-and you know, it must be reduced in volume about 620 times, in order to be moved economically, and this is the liquefied natural gas-while it is in the liquefied state, it is no more explosive than water. It is only when it vaporizes, when it mixes with oxygen that, you know, the vapor concentration becomes in the explosive range.

Mr. BIAGGI. You mean once it gets outside of the container?

Captain FLEISHELL. Yes, that it will become explosive. It is, in one sense, not unlike an unloaded oil tanker, or a gasoline barge, you know, that is not gas free. However, it does have the liquid product. Should it be released and go up into a cloud or a vapor, it does offer potential for fire and explosion.

Should that incident occur, I think that we would have to react to the situation as it is presented to, in other words, reduce the impact of the fire that might result. It must, however, as I say, come into contact with some flame-producing mechanism to ignite it.

But should it occur, out in the harbor, well, first of all, the route that we take it through, Mr. Chairman, limits the area, the population that might be affected by any sort of high energy collision or release that might occur.

So in response to the question, all I can say is that should the release occur in Raritan Bay, or in Arthur Kill-and bear in mind it does not transit the main channels of the Port of New York, it does not go into what amounts to the main channel in the lower bay, nor in the upper bay at all, but rather goes on the backside of Staten Island, through Raritan Bay, up through what we call Raritan East Reach, into Arthur Kill, which would be the Rossville facility.

In the case of the Astoria facility of ConEd, we have had no movements in there, but they have approached us on the possibility the product would move down through Long Island Sound into the facility in Astoria. It again would not transit the main harbor.

If Brooklyn Union Gas should move LNG into its New Town Creek facility, then in all likehood it would either come down through the sound, possibly up through Red Hook, or Buttermilk Channel-but by barge only-to the New Town Creek facility.

Now, I am talking about the areas where you can possibly move LNG or LPG into the port.

Again getting back to the release, there is very little we can do except to contend with the explosive reaction as it might occur. And that would be in cooperation with all of the municipalities that might be affected, emergency medical treatment of personnel, firefighting, cooperation with the fire department, which we do every day, I might add, sir, in that same area of Arthur Kill.

Mr. BIAGGI. Well, thank you, Captain. I noted with great interest your emphasis on the unlikely occurrence of such an event. I think they were saying the same thing about the Valdez Pipeline, it had fail-safe equipment.

I mean, whoever would conjecture that we would have two blackouts with Con Ed?

The fact is even despite all the efforts of man-and it is not a question of neglect or inefficiency, but is just that uncertain element, that unexpected element, and it is almost to the point of an act of God, if you will-but this fact does at various times manifest itself with catastrophic consequences.

And what you are saying is that you will take all of the traditional steps in order to contain it and fight it. But if I understand you correctly, despite the fact that you have tests and ongoing experiments, you still do not know that it can be dealt with?

Captain FLEISHELL. I think it can be dealt with sir. We have a similar potential problem with the non-gas-free tanker,.

Mr. BIAGGI. Well, we had better get that vessel traffic system in a hurry.

Captain FLEISHELL. I do not think it is any more of a problem to the citizens of New York than every one of the tankers that move in and out of this harbor every day.

Mr. BIAGGI. In other words, we have constant danger?

Captain FLEISHELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BIAGGI. Good. You reinforce my point.

Captain FLEISHELL. Well, I am just saying, sir, that LNG and LPG is not, you know, that peculiar in that sense. And I think we take extra precautions with those vessels.

Mr. BIAGGI. OK. Congressman Patterson.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, pursuing my theme of the day, it seems to me that with what is happening in ports and harbors and has been happening over the past-well, probably longer than 10 or 20 years, but at least in the past few years-I am concerned that we do not have a national plan to cover the kinds of conflagration, explosions, or whatever might occur from petrochemical sources that are coming in and out of the harbors every day like you just said. And I do not think from what I have heard that the Coast Guard feel its role includes any fire suppression, you know, when that is obviously going to be one of the things that is going to happen.

Now, maybe that is what it should be.

But do you feel there should be a national planning source, perhaps adapted to the regions, of course, and to the harbors, to integrate all of the sources that there might be, from the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard auxiliary, the local fire department, the ports authorities, EPA and its regulations?

Should we bring all of these things into some kind of mechanism so that we know what is happening?

You know, the average person has no idea what kind of a bomb we might be living around, I do not think. And as things occur and as every few years these things occur, then some people will become aware of it. And I think they will be making greater demands. I think they will be making them rightfully so. They are going to fall on the Congress first, and then they are going to fall on other agencies of the Federal Government after that.

I think what we are hoping to do in the course of these hearings is to get ahead of the game and to stop the kinds of disasters that we

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