road, and delivering them to him from the station of that road in
Pittsburgh, there being no siding connection, is transportation "under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions," within the mean-
ing of section 2 of the interstate commerce act of February 4, 1887,
c. 104; and a rebate allowed him by the Baltimore and Ohio road to
compensate for cartage to his warehouse is a discrimination against
other shippers over that road to whom no rebate is allowed. Wight
v. United States, 512.
5. Whether the same words as used in section 4 of that act have a broader
meaning or a wider reach than they do as used in section 2, is not
determined. Ib.
6. A railroad engaged in interstate commerce does not violate the provi-
sions of §§ 4 and 6 of the interstate commerce act, by furnishing cart-
age for delivery free of charge to the merchants of one town on its
line, and not furnishing similar service to the merchants of another
town on its line thirty-three miles distant, nor by failing to publish
such free cartage in the schedule published in the first town, when
such privilege has been openly and notoriously enjoyed for twenty-
five years. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Detroit, Grand Haven
&c. Railway Co., 633.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
1. Congress has not conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission
the legislative power of prescribing rates either maximum or mini-
mum or absolute; and, as it did not give the express power to the
commission, it did not intend to secure the same result indirectly by
empowering that tribunal to determine what in reference to the past
was reasonable and just, whether as maximum, minimum or absolute,
and then enable it to obtain from the courts a peremptory order that
in the future the railroad companies should follow the rates thus
determined to have been in the past reasonable and just. Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Rail-
way Co., 479.
2. The fourth section of the interstate commerce act has in view only the
transportation of passengers and property by rail, and when property
transported as interstate commerce reaches its destination by rail at
lawful rates, having regard to rates charged upon similar transporta-
tion to other points on the line, it does not concern the Interstate
Commerce Commission whether the goods after arrival are carried
to their place of deposit in vehicles furnished by the railway company
free of charge, or in vehicles furnished by the owners of goods; and
the same rule applies to the transportation of passengers. Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Detroit, Grand Haven &c. Railway Co., 633.
3. In matters of this kind much should be left to the judgment of the
Commission; and, should it direct, by a general order, that railway
companies should thereafter regard cartage, when furnished free, as
one of the terminal charges, and include it as such in their schedules,
such an order might be regarded as a reasonable exercise of the Com-
mission's powers. Ib.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. In this suit the matter in dispute was the right of present possession of
real estate in the District of Columbia, whose value was agreed to be
over $5000, but there was nothing in the record to show that the value
of the right of possession reached the jurisdictional amount, and the
case was accordingly dismissed. Willis v. Eastern Trust & Banking
Co., 76.
2. By its decision in Goode v. Gaines, 145 U. S. 141, the court did not intend
to be understood as holding that the rental value after the date of the
rendition of the decree had not been satisfactorily determined, and had
in mind in that regard only the exclusion from the decree of Novem-
ber 10, 1887, of the amount found due plaintiffs for rent prior to that
date, together with interest thereon; nor that the finding by that de-
cree of the then value of the improvements should be disturbed. Latta
v. Granger, 81.
3. The reversal of that decree amounted to nothing more than a vacating
of the accounting so as to permit of a modification thereof in particu-
lars pointed out with sufficient precision in the opinion; and it might
well be held that the Circuit Court had no power, under the mandate,
to again go into the questions of rental rate and value of improve-
ments, which had been determined, and that an accounting was only
required to bring the amounts, including subsequent taxes, if any, paid
by defendant, and interest down to date. Ib.
4. Apart from that, the rent prescribed by the lease did not appear from
the extrinsic evidence to be unreasonable or excessive; nor does the
additional evidence, when carefully analyzed, all the evidence being
taken together, compel to any other conclusion. Ib.
5. It is clear that, under the circumstances, this is not a case for the appli-
cation of the principle of the acceptance by an appellate court of the
conclusions of a master, concurred in by the trial court, when depend-
ing on conflicting testimony; and this court cannot permit its views
to be overcome by presumptions in favor of the second report and
decree. Ib.
6. Orley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648, followed to the point
that "the jurisdiction of this court to reexamine the final judgment
of a state court cannot arise from inference, but only from averments
so distinct and positive as to place it beyond question that the party
bringing a case here from such court intended to assert a Federal
right." Levy v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 175.
7. This court has jurisdiction to review a judgment of the highest court of
a State, holding a national bank liable, under a statute of the State,
as a shareholder in a state savings bank, when the answer sets up that
the stock of the savings bank was issued to it without authority of
law, and the motion for a new trial and the specifications of error
which were the basis of appeal from the trial court to the Supreme
Court of the State assert such want of power under the laws of the
United States. California Bank v. Kennedy, 362.
8. The second question of the Court of Appeals, inquiring whether the
decision in Peake v. New Orleans, 139 U. S. 342, should be held to
apply to the facts in this case, and operate to defeat the complainant's
action, puts the facts of the one case over against the facts of the other,
and asks this court to search the record in each case to see if one
operates to bar the other, and practically submits the whole case,
instead of certifying a distinct question of law, and therefore does not
come within the rule in respect to certifying distinct questions of law.
Warner v. New Orleans, 467.
B. JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF APPEAL.
Under the judiciary act of 1891 a Circuit Court of Appeals has no power
to certify the whole case to this court, but can only certify distinct
questions or propositions, unmixed with questions of fact or of mixed
law and fact; and the questions certified in this case are clearly vio-
lative of this settled rule. Cross v. Evans, 60.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. A complaint which alleges that the plaintiff was preemptor of public
land in Washington Territory under the laws of the United States, on
which he had lived sufficient time to entitle him to a patent, and that
the defendant railroad company, a corporation organized under the
laws of the Territory entered upon and seized a strip of said land
and appropriated it for railroad purposes without plaintiff's consent
and without having compensated him therefor, discloses a case of
a contest between a settler claiming title under the laws of the United
States, and a railroad company claiming title under an act of Con-
gress, and makes a case of which the Circuit Court of the United
States for that circuit had jurisdiction. Spokane Falls & Northern
Railway Co. v. Ziegler, 65.
2. No Federal question is presented in this bill, on which the Circuit
Court could base the exercise of jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction
cannot be found in the character of the controversy as one existing
between citizens of different States. St. Joseph & Grand Island Rail-
road Co. v. Steele, 659.
3. A railroad company, owning and operating a line running through
several States, may receive and exercise powers granted by each, but
does not thereby become a citizen of every State it passes through,
within the meaning of the jurisdiction clause of the Constitution of
the United States. Ib.
D. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. On July 24, 1896, a warrant was issued by a commissioner for the
Southern District of the Indian Territory to arrest Johnson upon the
charge of rape, alleged to have been committed upon one Pearl
McCormick on the same day. Subsequently, and on the 9th of Octo-
ber, at a regular term of the United States court for that district, he
was indicted, and on the 17th of October was arraigned, tried and
convicted by a jury, and is now under sentence of death. On July
25, the day following the commission of the offence, a warrant, issued
by a commissioner for the Eastern District of Texas, charging him
with the same crime, was placed in the hands of the marshal for that
district, who demanded of the marshal of the Southern District of the
Indian Territory the surrender of the petitioner in obedience to said
writ, but the same was refused. It does not appear when this demand
was made, or whether it was before or after the 1st day of September.
It further appeared that, at the time of the commission of the offence,
the United States court for the Eastern District of Texas was not in
session, and that no term of said court was held until the third
Monday of November, after petitioner had been tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death. Held, that if the petitioner was actually in the
custody of the marshal on the 1st of September, his subsequent
indictment and trial were valid, though in the first instance he might
have been illegally arrested. In re Johnson, petitioner, 120.
2. It is the settled doctrine of this court that a court having possession
of a person or property cannot be deprived of the right to deal with
such person or property until its jurisdiction is exhausted, and that
no other court has the right to interfere with such custody and
possession. Ib.
3. The United States court in the District of Washington has jurisdiction
of an action brought by the United States against a defendant, found
there, to recover for timber unlawfully cut from lands of the United
States in Idaho. Stone v. United States, 178.
E. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
A judgment in the Court of Claims against the District of Columbia
recovered under the act of February 13, 1895, c. 87, was reversed in
this court because interest on the original claim had been improperly
allowed, and the case was remanded to that court for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with the opinion of this court. The mandate
of this court was filed in that court, and application was made for
judgment in accordance with the opinion of this court, waiving inter-
est. Pending the decision upon this application, the said act of Feb-
ruary 13, 1895, authorizing the original judgment, was repealed by
Congress, and the Court of Claims declined to enter judgment as
prayed for. The plaintiff thereupon made application to this court
for a mandamus, to require the Court of Claims to enter judgment
as requested. Held, that the effect of the repealing act was to take
away the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to proceed further in
any case founded upon the repealed act; but that this court did not
intimate by this decision that that court would not have jurisdiction
to entertain and grant a motion on the part of the petitioner to rein-
state the original judgment. In re Hall, 38.
F. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS.
The fact that Congress may have confirmed similar grants cannot operate
to justify the Court of Private Land Claims in adjudication of a case
not coming within the terms of the law of its creation. Rio Arriba
Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, 298.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 1.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 9, 10.
P. and P., owners of three sugar plantations in Louisiana, leased the sugar-
house on one of them with all its machinery, and such defined land
in that plantation might be found necessary for its use, to F. and
F. for a term of years. The lessees agreed to buy during the term,
and the lessors agreed to sell and deliver to them during that time,
the sugar-cane grown on the three plantations. Elaborate provisions
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