summoned to answer or strike his answer from the files, suppress the
testimony in his favor, and condemn him without consideration thereof
and without a hearing, on the theory that he has been guilty of a
contempt of court. Ib.

3. The judicial history of the law concerning contempt of court in England.
and in this country reviewed and considered. Ib.

CONTRACT.

Willoughby, being counsel for Mackall in three cases numbered 2373 and
$118, both against Alfred Richards, and 8038 Mackall v. Mackall, re-
spectively, the latter agreed with him, after reciting the fact that, “in
consideration of the services of said W. Willoughby as such counsel
performed and to be performed, he hereby agreeing to conduct
No. 2373 to a final termination and adjudication by the court of last
resort to the best of his ability as such counsel, the said Brooke
Mackall, Jr., hereby agrees to allow and pay to him as compensation
for such services, in addition to what has already been received by
him, a sum equal to fifty per cent of such money as may be adjudged
to the said B. Mackall, Jr., in . . . No. 8118, by way of mesne
profits, damages and costs, provided that if such fifty per cent be less
than $5000, the said W. Willoughby shall have such sum of $5000,
and
shall have a lien therefor upon said judgment and such
property as may be recovered against the said Alfred Richards." The
litigation referred to in the agreement related to lot 7, in square 223
in the city of Washington, on a portion of which the Palace Market
was erected. Held, that the lien thus given to Willoughby was on all
the property that might be recovered in the three cases. Mackall v.
Willoughby, 681.

CORPORATION.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION;

TAX AND TAXATION, 3.

CRIMINAL LAW.

See EVIDENCE, 1, 2;

JURISDICTION, D, 1.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11 to 17.

EQUITY.

In the course of the various proceedings, referred to in the Statement
of the Case, for the foreclosure of the mortgages in different States
upon different railroads which constituted a part of what was known

as the Wabash system, and for its reorganization, the claim of the
appellant which forms the subject of this appeal was considered.
His claim was for equipment bonds for equipment furnished the Ohio
division. Among the proceedings was a suit in Indiana, involving
the question of the lien of such bonds upon the portion of the road
in Indiana, in which it was decreed that there was no lien. The
various proceedings resulted on the 23d of March, 1889, in a decree
of foreclosure in the several Circuit Courts in Ohio, Indiana and Illi-
nois, by which the entire line was to be sold as a unit, and further
it was provided that the rendering of that decree in advance of the
trial and determination of the appellant's claim should not affect the
rights of the appellant, but that they should be preserved and enforced
in the manner provided for by the decree. The sale under the decree
was made and confirmed. August 17, 1889, it was ordered "that the
issues presented in this cause as to the lien and claim of James Comp-
ton, made by the various pleadings herein upon and concerning said
claim and lien, and reserved in the former decree herein saving the
rights of said Compton, be and the same are hereby referred to
Bluford Wilson as special master," etc. The special master reported
that Compton's lien was a valid one, and that he was entitled by the
saving clause of the decree to have the Ohio division resold if the
purchaser did not pay off his bonds, principal and interest, in full.
The Circuit Court sustained the master in holding Compton's lien
valid, but decided that his only remedy was to redeem the four divi-
sional mortgages, two in Ohio and two in Indiana. Appeal was taken
to the Circuit Court of Appeals. That court, after making a full state-
ment, requested the instructions of this court upon the following ques-
tions: First. Had Compton the right under the saving clause of the
decree for sale to a decree for the redemption of the Ohio division
only? Second. In fixing the amount to be paid in redemption, is
he entitled to have the principal and interest of the mortgages to be
redeemed reduced by the net earnings received by the purchaser?
Third. Is the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for
the District of Indiana between the same parties, and unappealed
from, res judicata upon the foregoing questions in this court? Held,
(1) That the decree of sale of March 23, 1889, conferred upon Comp-
ton, in event that his claim should not be paid by the purchaser, the
right to a decree of resale of the property situated in Ohio and cov-
ered and affected by his lien; (2) That, in event of such sale, and
in applying the proceeds thereof, Compton would be entitled to an
account of the net earnings of the Ohio division over and above all
operating expenses, taxes paid, and cash paid, if any, in redemption
of receiver's certificates and other expenses properly chargeable against
the Ohio division, which net earnings should be deducted from the
amount due on the two prior mortgages on said division; (3) That
the decree rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States for

VOL. CLXVII-48

Indiana was not res judicata upon the foregoing questions. Compton
v. Jesup, 1.

See TRUST, 1, 2, 3, 4.

ESTOPPEL.

The city of New Orleans, under the warranties, express and implied, con-
tained in the contract of sale of June 7, 1876, by which it acquired
the property and franchise of the Canal Company from Van Nordeu,
and under the averments in the bill, which are set forth in the state-
ment of the case, is estopped from pleading against the complainant
the issuance of bonds to retire $1,672,105.21 of drainage warrants,
issued prior to said sale, as a discharge of its obligation to account for
drainage funds, collected on private property, and as a discharge from
its own liability to that fund as assessee of the streets and squares:
and, accordingly the first question asked by the Court of Appeals must
be auswered in the affirmative. Warner v. New Orleans, 467.

See TAX AND TAXATION, 2.

EVIDENCE.

1. The rulings about challenges are without merit. Stone v. United States,
178.

2. Tak-Ke and the plaintiff were indicted for murder. On the separate trial
of the plaintiff in error, Tak-Ke's wife was a witness against him. On
cross-examination the following questions were put to her: Who are
you living with now? Is it not a fact that since your husband was
arrested and convicted you have been living with this witness Ke-
Tinch? Is it not a fact that shortly after this affair took place you
and the witness Ke-Tinch agreed to live together if your husband was
convicted and you yourself got clear? Each of these was objected to
as immaterial and incompetent and the objection was sustained. Held,
that the questions should have been allowed. Tla-Koo-Yal-Lee v.
United States, 274.

3. The same objections made, sustained below, and that court overruled
here, as to drinking of the defendant, and as to what took place at
the sailing of the sloop. Ib.

See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 6.

FRAUD.

See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 2, 3, 4.

HABEAS CORPUS.

Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U. S. 502, followed, to the point that if, in extra-
dition proceedings the committing magistrate had jurisdiction of the
subject-matter and of the accused, and the offence charged is within

the terms of the treaty of extradition, and the magistrate, in arriving
at a decision to hold the accused, has before him competent legal evi-
dence on which to exercise his judgment as to whether the facts are
sufficient to establish the criminality of the accused for the purposes
of extradition, such decision cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus.

Bryant v. United States, 104. V

INFANT.

An infant female was the owner of an unimproved lot in the city of
Washington upon which there were valid liens for unpaid purchase
money and taxes. In order that those liens might be discharged and
the property improved, she borrowed $8000, and executed a deed of
trust upon the lot to secure the loan. Part of the money so borrowed
was used to pay off prior liens and taxes, and the balance was applied
by her, or under her directions, in improving the lot. Upon arriving
at majority, she disaffirmed her contract and deed of trust, and re-
fused to pay the money borrowed by her. At the time the deed of
trust was executed, no inquiries were made as to her age, nor did she
make any representations in regard to it. Held, (1) An infant's deed
is voidable only, unless it appears upon its face to be to his prejudice,
in which case it may be deemed void. And the infant is not estopped
by his acts or declarations, or by his silence, during infancy, from as-
serting, on arriving at full age or within a reasonable time thereafter,
the invalidity of such deed; (2) If the money borrowed by the infant
had been expended by her otherwise than in the improvement of her
lot, the lender would have been without remedy; for it is not a condi-
tion of the disaffirmance by an infant of a contract made during
infancy that the consideration received be returned, if, prior to such
disaffirmance and during infancy, the specific thing received has been
disposed of, wasted or consumed and cannot be returned; (3) Upon
the disaffirmance by an infant of his contract, the contract is annulled
on both sides, and the parties revert to the same situation as if the
contract had not been made; (4) In this case, the infant having dis-
affirmed her deed, she is not entitled, as between herself and the
lender, to be protected except in the enjoyment of such rights in the
property in question as she had at the time the deed of trust was exe-
cuted. And the money borrowed by her having gone into the prop-
erty which she holds in its improved condition, it is to be deemed to
be in her hands within the meaning of the rule which entitles the
other party to recover such of the consideration as remains in the
infant's hands at the time of disaffirmance. She is not entitled to
make profit out of those whose money has been used, at her request,
in protecting and improving her estate; but, as the disaffirmance of
her deed restores her right in the property, a sale ought not to have
the effect of depriving her altogether of the interest she had at the

time the deed of trust was executed; (5) The decree of sale in the
present case was proper, but it was error to give to the lender a pref-
erence in the distribution of the proceeds for the entire debt secured
by the deed of trust, without reference to the amount for which the
property in its improved condition might sell. The decree should
direct the proceeds to be applied, first, in repaying to the lender, with
interest, the sums paid in discharge of the prior liens and taxes;
second, in paying to the infant an amount equal to the value of the
lot at the institution of the suit (less such prior liens and taxes)
without interest on that amount, and without taking into considera-
tion the value of the improvements placed on the lot; and, third, in
paying to the appellees such of the proceeds of sale as may remain,
not exceeding the balance due on the loan, with interest. This last
sum would represent, so far as may be, the value of the improvements
put upon the lot with the money borrowed. Any other decree will
make the disaffirmance by the infant ineffectual, if the property, upon
being sold, does not bring more than the debt attempted to be secured
to the lender. McGreal v. Taylor, 688.

INSURANCE.

See ADMIRALTY, 1.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT.

1. The right of a shipper of goods over a railway, who pays to the rail-
road company reasonable rates for the transportation of the goods to
the place of destination, to recover from such company the excess of
such payment over the rates charged to shippers of similar goods
to the same destination from another place of shipment of the same
or greater distance from it, is a right growing out of the interstate
commerce act; and, being in the nature of a penalty, can be enforced
only by strict proof, showing clearly and directly the violations com-
plained of. Parsons v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 447.
2. The portion of a through rate received by one of several railway com-
panies transporting the goods as interstate commerce, may be less
than its local rate. Ib.

3. The only right of recovery given by the interstate commerce act to the
individual, is to the "person or persons injured thereby for the full
amount of damages sustained in consequence of any of the violations
of the provisions of this act"; and before any party can recover under
the act, he must show, not merely the wrong of the carrier, but that
that wrong has operated to his injury. Ib.

4. Hauling goods on the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railroad
from Cincinnati to Pittsburgh and delivering them to a consignee in
his warehouse from a siding connection, and hauling similar goods
for him from and to the same cities on the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-