1. A cargo of wheat shipped on a British steamer at New York, for Lis-
bon, was insured by an English assurance company through its agents
in Philadelphia "free of particular average unless the vessel be sunk,
burned, stranded or in collision"; all losses to be paid in sterling
at the offices of the corporation in London; "claims to be adjusted
according to the usages of Lloyds." The cargo was loaded and the
lines were cast off, ready to sail, when it was found that there was
a defect in the machinery, which detained them a few hours. During
the detention a lighter, being towed out of the dock, ran into the
steamer, breaking two plates in the bulwarks and doing other dam-
age. This resulted in a further detention of two days. After sailing,
the steamer encountered heavy gales and seas. She took large quanti-
ties of water on her decks, some of which came through the cracks
caused by the collision, and was so strained that the water got into
the wheat. The machinery becoming strained the captain made for
Boston, and on arrival there had a survey made, which resulted in the
taking out of the cargo, and its sale for the benefit of all concerned.
This libel was then filed by the owners of the cargo to recover for
their loss. The District Court gave judgment in favor of the owners,
and referred it to a commissioner to assess the damages, and gave
judgment accordingly. The Court of Appeals having affirmed that
judgment, it was brought here by writ of certiorari, for review. Held,
(1) That under the circumstances the contract of insurance was to be
interpreted according to English law; (2) That, if a ship be once in
collision during the adventure, after the goods are on board, the insur-
ers are, by the law of England, liable for a loss covered by the general
words in the policy, although such loss is not the result of the original
collision, and, but for the collision, would have been within the excep-
tion contained in the memorandum, and free from particular average
as therein provided; (3) That the question whether the law of this
country does or does not accord with the law of England in this mat-
ter does not arise in this case, and no opinion is expressed on that
question; (4) That under the facts stated in the opinion of the court,
the cargo was necessarily sold at the port of refuge, and the loss,
under such circumstances, should be adjusted as a salvage loss. Lon-
don Assurance v. Companhia de Moagens, 149.
2. No contribution in general average can be had against a steam tug
for the casting off and abandonment, by her master, of her tow of
barges, with the intention and the effect of saving the tug. The
J. P. Donaldson, 599.
3. The enforcement in rem of the lien upon a vessel, created by the Public
Statutes of Massachusetts, c. 192, §§ 14-19, for repairs and supplies
in her home port, is exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States. The Glide, 606.
The report of the commissioners for permanently marking the boundary
line established between the States of Indiana and Kentucky by the
decree of May 18, 1896, 163 U. S. 520, is approved by this court.
Indiana v. Kentucky, 270.
CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.
1. New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371, affirmed and followed.
Louisiana v. New Orleans, 407.
2. Cross v. Evans, 167 U. S. 60, as to the certification of questions to this
court by the Courts of Appeal, approved and applied. Warner v. New
Orleans, 467.
3. New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
162 U. S. 184, affirmed and followed. Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co., 479.
See HABEAS CORPUS;
JURISDICTION A, 6;
MINERAL LAND, 2;
PUBLIC LAND, 9, 11;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1. By the common law, prevailing in the District of Columbia, an agree-
ment by an attorney at law to prosecute, at his own expense, a suit
to recover land in which he personally has and claims no title or in-
terest, present or contingent, in consideration of receiving a certain
proportion of what he may recover, is unlawful and void for cham-
perty. Peck v. Heurich, 624.
2. A deed, conveying lands in the District of Columbia to an attorney
at law and another person, in trust that the grantees should sue for,
take possession of, and sell the lands, and that the attorney should
retain one third of the proceeds, after paying out of it all the costs
and expenditures, and that the other two thirds, clear of any costs
or charges whatever, should be paid to the grantors, is void for cham-
perty, and will not sustain an action by the grantees to recover part
of the lands from third persons.
1. The ordinance of the city of Boston which provides that "no person
shall, in or upon any of the public grounds, make any public address,"
etc., "except in accordance with a permit from the mayor," is not in
conflict with the Constitution of the United States and the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment thereof. Davis v. Massachusetts, 43.
2. This was a suit by citizens of New York against citizens of South
Carolina to recover the possession of certain real property in that
State, with damages for withholding possession. One of the de-
fendants in his answer stated that he had no personal interest in
the property, but as secretary of state of South Carolina, had custody
of it, and was in possession only in that capacity. The other defend-
ant stated that he was watching, guarding and taking care of the
property under employment by his co-defendant. Both defendants
disclaimed any personal interest in the property, and averred that
the title and right of possession was in the State. Held, That the
suit was not one against the State within the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States declaring that
"the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens
or subjects of a foreign State." Whether a particular suit is one
against the State within the meaning of the Constitution depends
upon the same principles that determine whether a particular suit
is one against the United States. Tindal v. Wesley, 204.
3. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, and other cases, examined and held
to decide that a suit against individuals to recover the possession of
real property is not a suit against the State simply because the defend-
ant holding possession happens to be an officer of the State and asserts
that he is lawfully in possession on its behalf. The Eleventh Amend-
ment gives no immunity to officers or agents of a State in withholding
the property of a citizen without authority of law; and when such
officers or agents assert that they are in rightful possession, they must
make that assertion good, upon its appearing, in a suit against them
as individuals, that the legal title and right of possession is in the
plaintiff. Ib.
4. The judgment in this case does not conclude the State unless it becomes
a party to the suit. Not having submitted its rights to the determi-
nation of the court, it will be open to the State to bring any action
that will be appropriate to establish and protect whatever claim it
has to the premises in dispute. Ib.
5. The President has power to remove a District Attorney of the United
States, when such removal occurs within four years from the date
of the attorney's appointment, and, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to appoint a successor to him. Parsons v. United States,
324.
6. Section 769 of the Revised Statutes which enacts that "district attorneys
shall be appointed for a term of four years and their commissions shall
cease and expire at the expiration of four years from their respective
dates" provides that the term shall not last longer than four years,
subject to the right of the President to sooner remove. Ib.
7. It was the purpose of Congress, in the repeal of the tenure of office
sections of the Revised Statutes, to again concede to the President
the power of removal, if taken from him by the original tenure of
office act, and, by reason of the repeal, to thereby enable him to re-
move an officer when in his discretion he regards it for the public
good, although the term of office may have been limited by the words
of the statute creating the office. Ib.
8. The legislative, executive and judicial history of the question re-
viewed. Ib.
9. The act of February 25, 1885, c. 149, 23 Stat. 321, is within the consti-
tutional power of Congress to enact, and is valid. Camfield v. United
States, 518.
10. The Government of the United States has, with respect to its own
lands within the limits of a State, the rights of an ordinary proprie
tor to maintain its possession, and to prosecute trespassers; and may
legislate for their protection, though such legislation may involve the
exercise of the police power; and may complain of and take steps to
prevent acts of individuals, in fencing in its lands, even though done
for the purpose of irrigation and pasturing. Ib.
11. Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which declares "nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation," Congress may direct that, when part
of a parcel of land is appropriated to the public use for a highway in
the District of Columbia, the tribunal vested by law with the duty of
assessing the compensation or damages due to the owner, whether for
the value of the part taken, or for any injury to the rest, shall take
into consideration, by way of lessening the whole or either part of the
sum due him, any special and direct benefits, capable of present esti-
mate and reasonable computation, caused by the establishment of the
highway to the part not taken. Bauman v. Ross, 548.
12. By the Constitution of the United States, the estimate of the just
compensation for property taken for the public use, under the right
of eminent domain, is not required to be made by a jury; but may
be entrusted to commissioners appointed by a court or by the execu-
tive, or to an inquest consisting of more or fewer men than an ordi-
nary jury. Ib.
13. Congress, in the exercise of the right of taxation in the District of
Columbia, may direct that half of the amount of the compensation or
damages awarded to the owners of lands appropriated to the public
use for a highway shall be assessed and charged upon the District of
Columbia, and the other half upon the lands benefited thereby within
the District, in proportion to the benefit; and may commit the ascer-
tainment of the lands to be assessed, and the apportionment of the
benefits among them, to the same tribunal which assesses the compen-
sation or damages. Ib.
14. If the legislature, in taxing lands benefited by a highway, or other
public improvement, makes provision for notice, by publication or
otherwise, to each owner of land, and for hearing him, at some stage
of the proceedings, upon the question what proportion of the tax
shall be assessed upon his land, his property is not taken without due
process of law. Ib.
15. The recording by public authority of a map of a proposed system of
highways within certain territory, without restricting the use or im-
provement of lands before the commencement of proceedings for
their condemnation for such highways, or limiting the damages to be
awarded in such proceedings, does not of itself entitle the owners of
lands to compensation for damages. Ib.
16. An act of Congress, providing for the estimate of damages for taking
lands for highways in the District of Columbia, and for the assess-
ment of such damages, with interest, upon lands benefited by the
highways, is not invalidated by a provision that the proceedings shall
be void if Congress, after being six months in session, shall make no
appropriation for the payment of the damages. Ib.
17. The act of March 2, 1893, c. 197, entitled "An act to provide for a
permanent system of highways in that part of the District of Columbia
lying outside of cities," is constitutional and valid. Ib.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 2, 3, 7;
NATIONAL BANK, 1;
TAX AND TAXATION, 6, 9.
1. It is not within the power of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia to order the answer of the defendant in a chancery suit
pending in that court to be stricken from the files, and a decree to
be entered that the bill be taken pro confesso against him, simply
because he was held to be guilty of contempt in neglecting to pay
into court money held by him which was the subject of controversy
in the suit, and declined to appear when summoned to do so. Hovey
v. Elliott, 409.
2. A court possessing plenary power to punish for contempt, unlimited by
statute, has not the right to summon a defendant to answer, and then
after obtaining jurisdiction by the summons, refuse to allow the party
|