Opinion of the Court. excess of Compton's claim, and, in such event, there would be room for a further order of the court. This view of the import of the decree of March 23, 1889, relieves us from a consideration of the difficult questions that would arise if Compton were compelled to proceed by way of redemption. Those questions are discussed with learning and ability in the respective opinions of the Circuit Judges, furnished us in connection with the certificate, and also in the elaborate briefs of the appellees' counsel. Compton v. Wabash Railroad, 31 U. S. App. 486. But, as we have already said, all parties who have had the benefit of the decree of sale are precluded from going back of it, and from now raising questions that might otherwise have arisen. Not only were those who were parties to the proceedings in the Ohio court bound by the decree, therein reached, that Compton had a right to sell the Ohio line in satisfaction of his lien, but the Ohio divisional mortgagees who were not parties to that decree, but who procured, or, at least, have acquiesced in, the decree of March 23, 1889, and have participated in the benefits of the early sale thus secured, have no right now to object to the enforcement of Compton's lien in the manner pointed out in the decree. The Stephen Morgan, 94 U. S. 599; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514. No objections were taken by any of the parties to the decree of sale of March, 1889, either for want of parties or for any other reason. Indeed, it was plainly a conventional decree. Any inconvenience that would be occasioned by a resale of a portion of the entire line can be avoided by complying with the decree and making payment accordingly. If the Wabash Railroad Company be regarded simply as an outside purchaser, it cannot be heard to object to the terms of the decree of sale. If, what is apparently its real character, it be regarded as a company formed by an arrangement between the parties controlling the sale, it has even less right to disregard the rights of Compton as stipulated for in the decree. The next question put is whether Compton is entitled to have the prior mortgages on the Ohio division reduced by the Opinion of the Court. net earnings received by the purchasers since the receivers turned over possession of the road to them. If the Wabash Railroad Company, as the successor of the purchaser at the sale, is to be regarded as the Ohio mortgagees in possession, it is liable to account for the rents and profits or net earnings of the mortgaged property. Such, certainly, is the general rule when property is redeemed, either by the mortgagor or by a junior incumbrancer having a right to redeem, and we see no reason why that rule should not be applied in a case like the present. Jones on Mortgages, 5th ed. vol. 2, § 114. But we think the better view is that the Wabash Company should be regarded as a party in possession under the express terms of the order of sale, and as representing all parties in interest, including Compton; and hence cannot claim to be an absolute purchaser of the rights of a mortgagor not subject to account for rents and profits. In that point of view there is a trust relation, which involves an accounting until Compton is disposed of. Whether the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana between the same parties and unappealed from, and which, while recognizing Compton's lien, declares his remedy to be a redemption of the railroad in Indiana and Ohio, estops Compton from enforcing his lien or claim against the Ohio division only, is the third question put to us. This question should be answered in the negative, and, indeed, is covered by the view which we take of the real nature of Compton's remedy, as entitling him to a sale of the Ohio division if his debt should not be paid by the purchaser under the decree of sale. Compton's claim, in its present status, consists of the decree of the Ohio state court in his individual favor, fixing the amount of his debt, and decreeing a sale of the Ohio property, and of the decree of sale of the Circuit Court of the United States affirming the decree of the Ohio court as to the validity and amount of the claim, and providing that if it should not be paid by the purchaser, Compton should have a right to a sale of the Ohio road or to some equivalent remedy. Opinion of the Court. Upon the theory of the mortgagees themselves, the suits in the Circuit Courts of Ohio and Indiana were two distinct proceedings, having in view the sale of two distinct portions of the road, and while the decree of the Circuit Court of the Indiana district may restrict Compton from proceeding in that court and district, so as to affect property in Indiana, except on the terms of that decree, such decree cannot, as we view it, be used by the purchaser to affect or defeat Compton's rights in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Ohio district. This contention overlooks the distinction between Compton as one of a class of bondholders and Compton recognized in the decree as the owner of a final judgment or decree of the state court of Ohio. Upon the whole, we answer the questions propounded thus: 1st. That the decree of sale of March 23, 1889, confers upon Compton, in event that his claim shall not be paid by the purchaser, the right to a decree of resale of the property situated in Ohio and covered and affected by his lien. 2d. That, in event of such sale, and in applying the proceeds thereof, Compton will be entitled to an account of the net earnings of the Ohio division over and above all operating expenses, taxes paid and cash paid, if any, in redemption of receiver's certificates and other expenses properly chargeable against the Ohio division, which net earnings should be deducted from the amount due on the two prior mortgages on said division. 3d. That the decree rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States for Indiana is not res judicata upon the foregoing questions. Let it be so certified. A judgment in the Court of Claims against the District of Columbia recovered under the act of February 13, 1895, c. 87, was reversed in this court because interest on the original claim had been improperly allowed, and the case was remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this court. The mandate of this court was filed in that court, and application was made for judgment in accordance with the opinion of this court, waiving interest. Pending the decision upon this application, the said act of February 13, 1895, authorizing the original judgment was repealed by Congress, and the Court of Claims declined to enter judgment as prayed for. The plaintiff thereupon made application to this court for a mandamus, to require the Court of Claims to enter judgment as requested. Held, that the effect of the repealing act was to take away the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to proceed further in any case founded upon the repealed act; but that this court did not intimate by this decision that that court would not have jurisdiction to entertain and grant a motion on the part of the petitioner to reinstate the original judgment. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Edwin Forrest for petitioner. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Dodge opposing. MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the court. This is an original application to this court for a writ of mandamus to the judges of the Court of Claims commanding them to cause to be entered a judgment in favor of petitioner and against the District of Columbia for the sum of $8644.19, as of March 2, 1897, the date of the filing of a mandate from this court with the Court of Claims in the case of District of Columbia v. Hall. The record now before us gives the history of that case since it was decided by this court in February last. The facts in the original litigation out of which this applica Opinion of the Court. tion grows are to be found in the report of the cases of District of Columbia v. Hall, 165 U. S. 340, and District of Columbia v. Johnson, 165 U. S. 330. It appears therein that this petitioner, under the provisions of the act of Congress approved February 13, 1895, had recovered a judgment in the Court of Claims, which was entered June 22, 1896, against the District of Columbia, for the above-named sum of $8644.19, with a declaration contained in the judgment that such amount became due and payable on the 1st of January, 1877, the effect of which was to grant interest thereon from the last-named date. Upon appeal this court determined that the Court of Claims erred in the matter of granting interest, and therefore the judgment of that court was reversed and the cause remanded. On the 1st day of March, 1897, the mandate from this court was issued, in which it was "ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of said Court of Claims in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed. And it is further ordered that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to said Court of Claims for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this court." The mandate was filed with the Court of Claims on the 2d day of March, 1897, and on the opening of the court on that day application was made for judgment in accordance with the mandate and the opinion of this court, the petitioner waiving any interest on the judgment. This motion was consented to by the attorney representing the District of Columbia, but the Court of Claims refused to immediately grant the motion, and soon thereafter adjourned to the 8th of March. On the 15th of March the court entered an order declining to take any further proceedings in any suits based on the act of Congress, among them being the petitioner's claim, for the reason that the act had been repealed. The repealing act was enacted one day after the filing of the mandate in this case in the Court of Claims and the making of the motion by the petitioner for judgment. The judges of the Court of Claims have made return to the order to show cause why the mandamus should not issue, and in that return they state: |