Opinion of the Court. contain the affirmative recognition of the power of removal which is contained in the act of 1820. The reason for the omission plainly was because the insertion of language in the section which in so many words recognized a right of removal would have conflicted with the succeeding sections, embodying the terms of the tenure of office act, which prohibited removals. Section 769 was so drawn that in effect it permitted removals within the term, and it was left to the succeeding sections to make provisions that should limit the right of removal otherwise existing by virtue of the language of that section. The same construction of the language of that section should be adopted which we would apply to the act of 1820, and which was applied by Attorney General Crittenden and acted upon by the President, in the case of the chief justiceship of the Territory of Minnesota, 5 Opinions of Attorneys General, 288, a construction of limitation and not of grant, a construction by which no more than a period of four years is permissible, subject in the meantime to the power of the President to remove. In thus construing section 769 we think full effect is given to its language and the practical construction of former periods is adhered to, while at the same time the purpose of Congress to retain officials in office is also given full effect by the succeeding provisions upon the subject of the tenure of office. The right to remain in office is made to depend upon those subsequent sections, and when in 1887 they were repealed by Congress, 24 Stat. 500, the full legal force and effect of the language used in section 769 was permitted to come in play, freed from the restraints of the sections thus repealed. Such being the case, the persons appointed under section 769 are not entitled to hold for four years as against any power of the President to remove, and in no event can they remain in office longer than that period without being reappointed. This construction of the act as one of limitation, we think, in the light of the history of the subject, is a most natural and proper one. The argument of the appellant, however, shows, if adopted, that the result of the passage of the repealing statute of 1887 has been to limit the power of the President more than it was limited before that statute was passed. While the tenure of Opinion of the Court. office provisions existed, it is conceded that the President might remove an officer like a district attorney within the four years for which he was commissioned, provided his removal was concurred in by the Senate or was effected by the appointment of his successor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; yet, now since the repeal of those sections which it was supposed limited and restrained the power of the President, he is still further restrained and limited in his power, because under the construction as claimed by the appellant he cannot now remove an officer within the four years even with the advice and consent of the Senate or by the appointment of his successor by the like advice and consent. This extraordinary result is reached by construing, according to appellant's views, section 769 as meaning to give a term of office of four years in any event, and while this term of office was, before the repeal of the sections above named, subject to be shortened in accordance with their provisions, yet as they have been repealed it leaves section 769 in force as granting an unconditional and absolute term of four years which cannot be shortened by the President, or the President and Senate combined, and which leaves the incumbent subject only to removal by the slow and weary process of impeachment by the House and a conviction thereon and a removal by the Senate as a punishment. This could never have been the intention of Congress. On the contrary, we are satisfied that its intention in the repeal of the tenure of office sections of the Revised Statutes was again to concede to the President the power of removal if taken from him by the original tenure of office act, and by reason of the repeal to thereby enable him to remove an officer when in his discretion he regards it for the public good, although the term of office may have been limited by the words of the statute creating the office. This purpose is accomplished by the construction we give to section 769, while the other construction turns a statute meant to enlarge the power of the President into one circumscribing and limiting it more than it was under the law which was repealed for the very purpose of enlarging it. Syllabus. After a careful review of the case before us we are of the opinion that the Court of Claims committed no error, and its judgment is Affirmed. YARDLEY v. PHILLER. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT. No. 296. Argued April 28, 1897.- Decided May 24, 1897. The national banks in Philadelphia organized, for their convenience, a Clearing House Association, with rules for its business set forth in detail in the statement in the opinion below. Among these rules, one provided for the deposit of securities in fixed amounts by each bank as collateral for their daily settlements; and another for the hours in the day in which settlements were to be made, and the mode of making the exchanges. The Keystone Bank made its deposit in conformity with the rule; but, having become indebted to the clearing house by reason of the receipt of clearing house certificates to a large amount, the securities deposited by it were surrendered, and were redeposited by it as security for the payment of the certificates. In the clearing of March 19, 1891, the Keystone Bank presented charges against other banks to the amount of $155,136.41, and the other banks presented charges against it for $240,549, making the Keystone Bank a debtor in the clearing for $75,359.08. In accordance with the rule, the Keystone Bank between the hours of eleven and twelve paid the $75,000 in cash or its equivalent, and gave its due bill to the manager of the clearing house for the fractional sum of $359.08, which was deposited by the manager and checked against by him as cash. In the runners' exchange of that day, the Keystone Bank owed a balance of $23,021.34, which balance it settled by giving its due bill to the manager for deposit in accordance with the system above stated. In operating the clearing on the morning of March 20, the Keystone Bank, through its runner, delivered to the respective clerks of the various banks packages containing claims held by the Keystone Bank amounting to $70,005.46, and the settling clerk of the Keystone Bank received from the runners of the other banks packages containing $117,035.21, leaving the Keystone Bank debtor in the clearing for $47,029.75. The packages containing the demands which the Keystone Bank held against other banks, and which had been delivered to the agent of each of those banks, were by them taken away at the termination of the clearing. The packages containing the charges presented against the Keystone Bank, which in the aggregate amounted to $117,035.21, instead of being taken away by its settling clerk, were, under the arrangement which we have stated, turned over by him to the Opinion of the Court. manager of the clearing house, to be retained until at the hour named the Keystone Bank paid the balance due by it. Before the hour for making the payment, however, the Keystone Bank, by order of the Comptroller of the Currency, was closed, and subsequently was placed in the hands of a receiver. On the failure of the Keystone to make the payment of $47,029.75, the committee of the association instructed the manager to call on the banks, by whom claims had been presented against the Keystone, "to redeem the packages against the Keystone Bank." The manager thereupon gave the proper notification, and the various banks notified sent their checks and redeemed the packages in question. Among the obligations for $117,035.21, however, were due bills amounting to $41,197.36. These due bills came from the fractional amounts arising by the settlement made on the morning of the 19th, to wit, $359.08; for the due bill given at the runners' settlement on the morning of the 19th, $23,031.44; and for due bills given to various banks during the course of business on the 19th, amounting to $17,806.84. Thereupon, and as part of the same transaction, the manager paid from the $70,005.36, which by his settlement sheet appeared to the credit of the Keystone as owing from other banks to the Keystone Bank for the checks surrendered by that bank, the amount of the due bills referred to, viz., $41,197.36. This left to the credit of the Keystone the sum of $28,808.10, and this amount was by the manager, acting under direction of the committee of the association, credited on the loan certificate account of the Keystone Bank with the association. In a suit by the receiver of the bank to determine the rights of the parties, Held, (1) That the claim of the receiver that the Keystone Bank was entitled to be paid $70,005.36 of credit, irrespective of the outstanding due bills which it had been expressly agreed between the parties were to be paid by way of set-off in the clearing, was without foundation; (2) That the Clearing House Association, having been in possession of the $28,808.10 as the fiduciary agent of the Keystone Bank without a lien or right upon it, its appropriation of the same after the insolvency of the Keystone Bank to the debt owing for loan certificates was obviously a preference within the inhibition of the statute against preferences in the cases of insolvent banks, Rev. Stat. § 5242. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. H. B. Gill and Mr. Silas W. Pettit for appellant. Mr. A. T. Freedley and Mr. John G. Johnson for appellees. MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. The Clearing House Association of Philadelphia is a voluntary organization, created by the coöperation of national banks Opinion of the Court. doing business in that city. Its affairs are governed by rules and regulations adopted by agreement between the banks forming the association, and the general direction of its operation is under the control of a president, secretary and manager, and of a committee selected by the members of the association. As the name of the association implies, it is intended to afford a uniform and convenient method by which daily settlements of balances can be had between the banks entering into the association. In addition to the function of affording a means for the daily clearing of balances, the Clearing House Association, by agreement among its members, issued, at periods when it was deemed best to do so, clearing house certificates. These certificates were delivered, under the discretion of the managers, when applied for by a member of the association, and were secured by the pledge of bills receivable or assets taken from the portfolio of the bank obtaining the certificates. These certificates were available as cash in settlements between the banks and for other purposes, and the object of issuing them was, in times of panic or stringency, to create, to the extent of the certificates, solidarity of responsibility between the banks, as each bank was liable for a proportionate share of the certificates in case of default in their payment, thus fortifying the credit of one by the credit of all. Moreover, the certificates afforded a means by which a bank with good assets could use them in order to obtain certificates which were, for banking purposes, the equiv alent of cash, when, from any stringency or panic, the assets themselves, although entirely sound, could not be readily convertible into current money. Article 2 of the constitution of the Clearing Association provided as follows: "ART. 2. Its object shall be to effect at one place the daily exchanges between the several associated banks, consisting of a morning exchange and a runner's exchange, and the payment, at the same place, of the balances resulting from such exchanges. The responsibility of the association for such exchanges is strictly limited to the faithful distribution by the manager, among the creditor banks for the time being, of |