respect, for both the mental and moral qualities of the man that their praise, so measured to their own minds, in view of the worth of their object, seems almost subject to the reproach of exaggeration. His fame is safe; it rests upon his work, his life, his thought, and these are open to the view of all men; there is nothing concealed, nothing mysterious. We can well afford to ask simply that anyone who would judge James Wilson capable of any action dishonorable in itself or disadvantageous to his country, will take the trouble to examine the record of his life, and make themselves acquainted with his thoughts. No other or further reply will be necessary. But in regard to these transactions of the Georgia Company it is a different matter. They have become obscured by time; they have not been treated with that fullness and fairness that so important an episode merited. From 1789 to 1814, in one way or another, the matter was before the country. The final action of both Court and Congress did justice to those who had been injured. But in their manner of dealing with the subject few historians have done it justice. None, save Mr. Smith in his history of Georgia, have attempted to free the men who took part in it from the obloquy which has covered them; to free the Legislature of Georgia from the reproach that has hung over it, blotting the record of that State with a story of shame. It has not seemed to be a matter of importance hitherto, but if men can be found who are willing to scan the pages of history in order to discover if on those pages there can be found the record of an ancient sin, and without stopping to inquire as to the truth or error of that record, are to use it for the slaying of the reputations of honored men, then there is a cause for examination; then there is a reason for renewing the quest for truth that stopped too soon in the old days. Too long there has been left an unverified slander on the Legislature of Georgia. Too long have honorable men like Matthews and Pendleton and Morris rested under a dishonorable imputation. A partially investigated truth, obscurely reported. accepted without due investigation, has no place upon the pages of any history. Such a half truth has often worse effects than the palpable error which can be traced and refuted. Unless written with an absolute devotion to truth, history will fail to fulfil its object and sink to the level of a feeble fiction. It is for the interest of those upon whom the slander and obloquy did really fall that the true story of the transaction should be told. It is not from the pages of history, however, that any stain is thrown upon the name of James Wilson. To do this it was necessary to scour the pages of the irresponsible and fleeting literature of the time; to read into the records that which was not found there. James Wilson, as has been said, was interested in these companies; after all that has been said such interest does not seem unpatriotic or dishonest. He invested his money; he lost all that he had invested; he died absolutely without worldly wealth, poorer than when he came to America in the days of his youth. But as then he had been rich in intellect, in learning, in energy, so he died; richer in intellect, for he had used that intellect for the benefit of his adopted country; richer in learning, for his learning had been given to great uses; richer still in that character into which his energy had been transfused; a character too deep, too broad, too generous, too widely known, too deeply loved, for any breath of slander, however virulent, to injure. M. C. Klingelsmith. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION. In 1701 William Penn was called back to England to defend his proprietorship. Before his departure a general revision of the earlier legislation was undertaken at the sessions of the assembly held at New Castle in 1700 and at Philadelphia in 1701. The acts there passed, one hundred and fourteen in number, seem, in a sense, to have been regarded as supplying the previous legislation and were passed with the expectation of being presented to the privy council for approval, as required by the charter. In fact, when the board of trade inquired of Penn, on his return, as to whether the laws received from him were a complete body of all the laws of the province, he replied that he believed they were the present body of laws, and it will be noticed that the digests of the eighteenth century begin their compilations with the Acts of 1700.1 Among these acts was one of October 28, 1701, entitled "An Act for Establishing Courts of Judicature in this Province and Counties Annexed." Its origin was as follows: Edward Shippen, for the two previous years chief justice of the provincial court, and John Guest, the then chief justice, both members of the council, brought into the assembly on October 7th, a bill for establishing the courts, which was "unanimously rejected." Some few days after, David Lloyd, who was not then a member of either council or house, proposed a bill which was voted to be adopted with amendments, and Richard Hallowell and Isaac Norris were appointed a committee to draw up the bill, with the amendments. The bill met with no apparent opposition in the council. Without repeating its provisions in full, which would be tedious, it may be said by way of summary that 'II Stat. at Large, 462. 'II Stat. at Large, 148; Charter and Laws, 311. (28) the act provided for the holding of the "County Courts or Sessions" at stated periods, three justices to constitute a quorum, with jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters, capital cases excepted. Maritime affairs, not cognizable in the admiralty courts, were to be tried in a special manner. The county courts also received equity powers, with the right of appeal to the provincial court. The provincial court was to consist of five judges, appointed by the governor, three of whom were required to sit twice a year in Philadelphia, and two, at least, to go on circuit through the counties to try capital cases and serious crimes and hear appeals from the county courts. The practice on writ of error was regulated, and provision made for appeals to the king. The powers and duties of the orphans' courts were also better defined and the forms of certain writs prescribed; all former laws relating to the courts were repealed. In its main outline the act presented the system of judicature then, and afterwards, recognized by the colonists as the most convenient for Pennsylvania, but in the form adopted, it did not prove acceptable to the advisers of the crown. Penn himself seems, on second thought, to have found some objectionable features in the act and desired that it might not be confirmed but sent back to be amended. The lords commissioners for trade and plantations reported that the act, "so far from expediting the determination of law suits," would, as they conceived, “impede the same," and, accordingly, the act was formally disallowed and repealed on February 7, 1705, by the queen in council.* One of the objections that occurred to the minds of the English lawyers was to that clause which directed that the practice, while following that of the common pleas of England, should keep to plainness and verity, and avoid all "fictions and colour in pleadings." A doubt was entertained as to whether this might not preclude an action of ejectment. In this they were not far from the real purpose of the draughtsman of the act, as would appear from a debate in the provincial council in December, 1704, upon a petition 'II Stat. at Large, 440. by Thomas Revel, the plaintiff in an ejectment, who complained that his case had been put off for nearly three years. John Moore, counsel for the plaintiff, and David Lloyd, for the defendant, being summoned before the council, Lloyd boldly argued that that method of trial being fictitious, was repugnant to the law of the province. Lloyd, however, was clever enough at a later day, to use the action of ejectment with success in the Frankfort Company's case, which will be referred to hereafter. The repeal of the Act of 1701 left the administration of justice in a confused state. There had been some debate in the session of the assembly of 1705 upon the subject of courts, but the repeal of the act was not known. Upon receipt of the order in council, Governor Evans called the assembly in special session, in September, 1706," and presented to that body an act for establishing courts, drawn up, it was said, by some practitioners therein. The assembly, however, requested that the matter be referred to the new house, which met in October, 1706, and accordingly at the following session this was the first matter under discussion, the governor laying his bill before the house with his opening address. The assembly, however, had other views and presented them in what is described as a "long and tedious bill," which, on being read in council, was found to disagree very widely from the plan proposed by the governor's advisers. We have not the text of these rival bills, which brought about a complete deadlock between the governor and the house, but as far as can be ascertained from the respective criticisms, the house objected to the governor's bill as tending to increase the power of the governor, council and provincial judges at the expense of liberty (there was a provision for a court of equity to be held by the governor). While, on the other hand, the governor attacked the assembly's bill (undoubtedly the work of David Lloyd, the 'II Col Rec., 185, 19/11/1704. |