1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 15. ex parte, and on notice to the bank or company to operate as a distringas. it further enacted that] every order of a judge charging any government stock, funds or annuities, or any stock or shares in any public company, under this act, shall be made in the first instance ex parte, and without any notice to the judgment debtor, and shall be an order to show cause only; and such order, if any government stock, funds or annuities standing in the name of the judgment debtor in his own right, or in the name of any person in trust for him, is to be affected by such order, shall restrain [the Governor and Company of] the Bank of England from permitting a transfer of such stock in the meantime, and until such order shall be made absolute or discharged; and if any stock or shares of or in any public company standing in the name of the judgment debtor in his own right, or in the name of any person in trust for him, is or are to be affected by any such order, shall in like manner restrain such public company from permitting a transfer thereof; and [that] if, after notice of such order to the person or persons to be restrained thereby, or in case of corporations to any authorized agent of such corporation, and before the same order shall be discharged or made absolute, such corporation, or person or persons, shall permit any such transfer to be made, then and in such case the corporation, or person or persons so permitting such transfer, shall be liable to the judgment creditor for the value or amount of the property so charged and so transferred, or such part thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy his judgment; and [that] no disposition of the judgment debtor in the meantime shall be valid or effectual as against the judgment creditor; and further, [that] unless the judgment debtor shall within a time to be mentioned in such order show to a judge of one of the said superior courts sufficient cause to the contrary, the said order shall, after proof of notice thereof to the judgment debtor, his attorney or agent, be made absolute: provided that any such judge shall, upon the application of the judgment debtor, or any person interested, have full power to discharge or vary such order, and to award such costs upon such application as he may think fit (o). (0) See the note to preceding section. The words in italics have been repealed by 37 & 38 Vict. c. 96. For the notice which has now been substituted for the old writ of distringas, see R. S. C., Ord. 46, r. 3 et seq. [Sect. 16 as to taking the body of a debtor was repealed by 37 & 38 Vict. c. 96.] INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 17. 17. Every judgment debt shall carry interest at the rate of Judgment four pounds per centum per annum from the time of entering debts to carry up the judgment [or from the time of the commencement of this interest. act in cases of judgments then entered up and not carrying interest,] until the same shall be satisfied, and such interest may be levied under a writ of execution on such judgment (q). The words in italics were repealed by 42 & 43 Vict. c. 59, s. 2. (9) Formerly a judgment did not carry interest, but interest might be recovered in the shape of damages (Gaunt v. Taylor, 3 M. & K. 302). A judgment given for securing an annuity carries interest under this section (Knight v. Bowyer, 4 De G. & J. 619). Where a judgment was entered by consent for a sum to be paid by half-yearly instalments, no interest was payable so long as the instalments were duly paid (Caudery v. Finnerty, 66 L. T. 684). A judgment of a county court does not carry interest (R. v. Essex, 18 Q. B. D. 704). The interest payable under this section is a debt due from the judgment debtor (Re Clagett, 36 W. R. 653); and may be included in a bankruptcy notice on the judgment (Re Lehmann, 62 L. T. 941). As to when a covenant to pay interest at a higher rate than per cent. is merged in a judgment, see Re European R. Co., Ex p. Oriental Corporation (4 Ch. Div. 33); Popple v. Sylvester (22 Ch. D. 98); Re Sneyd, Ex p. Fewings (25 Ch. Div. 338); Arbuthnot v. Bunsilall (62 L. T. 234). The interest given by this section runs, if the judgment is pronounced in court, from that date (R. S. C. Ord. 41, r. 3; Ord. 42, r. 16), otherwise from the date of the entering up (R. S. C. Ord. 41, rr. 3, 4; Ord. 42, r. 16). The judgment carries interest until satisfaction. As to when a judgment at law is satisfied for the purpose of carrying interest, see Sinclair v. G. E. R. Co. (L. R. 5 C. P. 391). This section applies to judgments as well for costs as for the subject- Costs. matter of the action (Pitcher v. Roberts, 12 L. J. Q. B. 178; see Newton v. Conyngham, 17 L. J. C. P. 288); interest running in the absence of special order, from the date of the judgment (Pyman v. Burt, 1884, W. N. 100; Landowners' Co. v. Ashford, 33 W. R. 41; Re London Wharfing Co., 53 L. T. 112; 33 W. R. 836; Boswell v. Coaks, 57 L. T. 742; 36 W. R. 65). The section does not apply where the costs are directed to be paid out of an estate, as in an administration action (Re Marsden, Withington v. Neumann, 40 Ch. D. 475; A. G. v. Nethercote, 11 Sim. 529; see 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 27). Nor does the section apply to costs given in a foreclosure action (Eardley v. Knight, 41 Ch. D. 537); but where in such a case the costs are ordered to be added to the security, then, independently of this section, interest at 4 per cent. runs from the date of the taxing master's certificate (Ib.; Lippard v. Ricketts, 14 Eq. 291). See also as to payment as between solicitor and client of interest on costs, Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881, Order 7; Blair v. Cordner (19 Q. B. D. 516). Where execution is delayed by an appeal, interest is given under R. S. C. Ord. 58, r. 19. As to interest where the judgment of a colonial court is reversed by the privy council, see Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte (L. R. 3 P. C. 465). See further the note as to interest generally, ante, p. 191. DECREES AND ORDERS IN EQUITY. Decrees and orders of courts of equity, &c., 18. All decrees or orders of courts of equity, and all rules of courts of common law, [and all orders of the Lord Chancellor or of the court of review in matters of bankruptcy,] and all orders of the Lord Chancellor in matters of lunacy, whereby any sum of of judgments. to have effect c. 110, s. 18. 1 & 2 Vict. money, or any costs, charges or expenses, shall be payable to any person, shall have the effect of judgments in the superior courts of common law, and the persons to whom any such moneys or costs, charges or expenses, shall be payable shall be deemed judgment creditors within the meaning of this act; and all powers hereby given to the judges of the superior courts of common law with respect to matters depending in the same courts shall and may be exercised by courts of equity with respect to matters therein depending, [and by the Lord Chancellor and the court of review in matters of bankruptcy,] and by the Lord Chancellor in matters of lunacy; and all remedies hereby given to judgment creditors are in like manner given to persons to whom any moneys or costs, charges or expenses are by such orders or rules respectively directed to be paid (r). Cases under this section. Enforcement of judgment or orders. Orders in bankruptcy. Execution. The words in italics were repealed by 37 & 38 Vict. c. 96. (r) This section is extended to the equity court of Durham as to lands within its jurisdiction (18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 2). As to enforcing a judgment of the Durham court against land outside its jurisdiction, see 52 & 53 Vict. c. 47, s. 3. As to the Lancaster court, see 13 & 14 Vict. c. 43, s. 24. A decree ordering a defendant to pay a sum of money, interest and costs, when ascertained, was held to be within this section (Beaufort v. Phillips, 1 D. G. & Sm. 321). Also a judgment entered up under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 43 (Griffiths v. Hughes, 16 M. & W. 809); but not a decree for an account and payment of what should be found due (Chadwick v. Holt, 8 D. M. & G. 584; Garner v. Briggs, 6 W. R. 378); nor an order for a foreclosure (Burrows v. Holley, 35 Ch. D. 123); nor the chief clerk's certificate finding money to be due to a party, though adopted by the judge (Mansfield v. Ogle, 4 D. G. & J. 38); nor a decree directing payment to the credit of a cause (Ward v. Shakeshaft, 1 Dr. & Sm. 269; Ward v. Docker, 5 Jur. N. S. 1287; compare Re Leeds Bank, 1 Ch. 150; Johnson v. Burgess, 15 Eq. 398; see Gibbs v. Pike, 9 M. & W. 351)X As to enforcing a decree in the lastmentioned form, see R. S. C. Ord. 42, r. 4; Re Coney, Coney v. Bennett, 29 Ch. D. 993; Re Whiteley, Whiteley v. Learoyd, 56 L. T. 846; De la Pole v. Dick, 29 Ch. Div. 351. A rule for taxation of costs, and an allocatur of the master, do not amount to a judgment within this section (Shaw v. Neale, 6 H. L. C. 581); nor a judge's order for payment of money obtained ex parte (Rickards v. Patterson, 8 M. & W. 313; see Neale v. Postlethwaite, 8 Dowl. P. C. 100). Under R. S. C. Ord. 42, r. 3, a judgment for the payment to any person of money may be enforced by any of the modes by which a judgment or decree for the payment of money of any court whose jurisdiction is transferred by the Jud. Act, 1873, might have been enforced at the time of the passing thereof. And under R. S. C. Ord. 42, r. 24, every order of the court or a judge in any cause or matter may be enforced against all persons bound thereby in the same manner as a judgment to the same effect. Any person not a party to a cause or matter in whose favour any order is made may enforce such order by the same process as if he were a party, and a judgment or order may be enforced against him as if he were a party (R. S. C. Ord. 42, r. 26). By sects. 93 and 94 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the Court of Bankruptcy was united with the Supreme Court. And under the Bankruptcy Rules, 1886, No. 93, every order of the court in bankruptcy may be enforced as if it were a judgment to the same effect (See also r. 107). Every person to whom any sum of money or any costs shall be payable under a judgment shall, so soon as they are payable, be entitled to execution (R. S. C. Ord. 42, r. 17; see before this rule Doe v. Barrell, 10 Q. B. 531; Doe v. Hampson, 5 Dowl. & L. 484; Wallis v. Sheffield, 3 Jur. 1002; Hill v. Brown, 16 M. & W. 796). And where costs are given to be ascertained by taxation, a separate writ may be issued for them when taxed 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18. (R. S. C. Ord. 42, r. 18; Harris v. Jewell, 1883, W. N. 216; see before For the older cases as to enforcing awards under this section, see Jones NEW REGISTER. affect real before the act, tered. 19. No judgment of any of the said superior courts, nor any No judgment, decree or order in any court of equity, nor any rule of a court of decree, &c., to common law, nor any order in [bankruptcy or] lunacy, shall by estate othervirtue of this act affect any lands, tenements or hereditaments, wise than as as to purchasers, mortgagees, or creditors, unless and until a until regismemorandum or minute containing the name and the usual or last known place of abode, and the title, trade or profession of the person whose estate is intended to be affected thereby, and the court and title of the cause or matter in which such judgment, decree, order or rule, shall have been obtained or made, and the date of such judgment, decree, order or rule, and the account of the debt, damages, costs or monies thereby recovered or ordered to be paid, shall be left with the senior master of the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, who shall forthwith enter the same particulars in a book in alphabetical order, by the name of the person whose estate is intended to be affected by such judgment, decree, order or rule; and such officer shall be entitled for any such entry to the sum of 5s. ; and all persons shall be at liberty to search the same book on payment of the sum of 1s. (s). (8) The words "bankruptcy or" were repealed by 37 & 38 Vict. c. 96. Prior to this act, judgments, in order to affect lands as to bona fide pur- Dockets. chasers, had to be docketed under 4 & 5 Will. & Mary, c. 20, made perpetual by 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 36, s. 3. These dockets have been closed, and judgments already docketed directed to be registered under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, ss. 1 and 2; see Bedford v. Forbes, 1 Carr. & K. 33). Registration under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, did not alter the rights of pur- Registration chasers or mortgagees without notice (2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 5; see West- under this brook v. Blythe, 3 E. & B. 737; Robinson v. Woodward, 4 De G. & Sm. section. 562; Hughes v. Lumley, 4 E. & B. 274; Benham v. Keane, 3 D. F. & J. 318). Judgments are now registered at the central office (R. S. C. Ord. 61, r. 1). In addition to the particulars mentioned in the present section, the date when the memorandum is left must be entered (2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 3). A registration was held good where the debtor was described by the wrong christian name in the title of the action, but by the right name 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19. Vacating. 66 in the register (Beavan v. Oxford, 3 Sm. & G. 11). It was held that the master had a discretion as to the particulars to be entered with which the court could not interfere (Ex p. Ñess, 5 C. B. 155). The registration of a writ or order affecting land, may be vacated pursuant to an order of the High Court or any judge thereof (S. L. Act, 1890, s. 19; see Wells v. Gibbs, 3 Beav. 399; Ex p. Holden, 13 C. B. N. S. 641). A judgment registered under this act is void as against purchasers, mortgagees, and Re-registra- creditors unless re-registered every five years (2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 4). As tion. to who are creditors," see Simson v. Morley (2 K. & J. 71). The provisions as to re-registration operate for the benefit of all persons deriving title mediately or immediately from the debtor (Benham v. Keane, 1 J. & H. 685). The circumstance that a re-registration is not within five years from the previous registration does not make it ineffectual as against subsequent purchasers, &c. (18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 6; Beavan v. Oxford, 6 D. M. & G. 492). Nor does a creditor who has once obtained priority over another by registration, lose that priority by omitting to re-register (Beavan v. Oxford, sup.; Shaw v. Neal, 6 H. L. C. 581). Where A. had priority over B., and B. had priority over C., but A.'s judgment was void for want of re-registration as against C., C. was paid in priority to B. to the amount of A.'s judgment, then B. was paid in full, then C. was paid the balance of his debt, then A. was paid (Re Kensington, Bacon v. Ford, 29 Ch. D. 527; see, however, Beavan v. Oxford, 25 L. J. Ch. 299). Notice. Judgments c. 51. Notice to a purchaser, mortgagee, or creditor, of a judgment which is unregistered or not re-registered, does not invalidate any transaction completed before registration or re-registration as the case may be (3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, s. 2; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, ss. 4, 5; Nortcliffe v. Warburton, 10 W. R. 635; Lee v. Green, 6 D. M. & G. 155; see further as to notice, Freer v. Hesse, 22 L. J. Ch. 597). As to the registration necessary where the lands are in a register county, see the cases quoted under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13, ante, p. 453. As to judgments entered up between the 23rd July, 1860, and the 29th July, 1864, see 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, post, p. 470. And as to judgments entered up after the 29th July, 1864, see 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, post, p. 476. See now as to registration, the Land Charges Registration and Searches Act, post, p. 480. [Sect. 20 provided for the issue of new or altered writs to give effect to the provisions of this act, and was repealed by 42 & 43 Vict. c. 59. See now R. S. C. Ord. 42, r. 14.] Chancery palatine courts. COURTS OF LANCASTER AND DURHAM. Sect. 21 extended the provisions of this act to the common law courts of Lancaster and Durham, the jurisdiction of which was transferred to the High Court by the Jud. Act, 1873, s. 16 (t). (t) See also 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, ss. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 9. By 13 & 14 Vict. c. 43, s. 24, all the remedies, authorities and provisions of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, applicable to the superior courts of common law at Westminster, were extended to the Court of Chancery of Lancaster within the limits of the jurisdiction thereof, and orders of that court were directed to be registered. By 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 2, the provisions of ss. 18, 19, and 20 of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, were extended to the Chancery Court of Durham. The section further provided that no judgment or order of any court should bind land in either of the palatine counties unless registered in the proper palatine court. |