Courts of Equity and the Statutes of Limitation. Orders to carry on proceedings. Claim under advertisement. Lunacy. Where time has run pending injunction or action. a fund in court the rights in which have not been ascertained (Lancaster v. Evors, 10 Beav. 154). For the case where a creditor or incumbrancer is made a defendant to the suit, see Watson v. Birch (15 Sim. 523), and Humble v. Humble (24 Beav. 535). As to the application of the Statutes of Limitation to an order to carry on proceedings made before judgment, see Perry v. Jenkins (1 M. & Cr. 118, 121); Bland v. Davison (21 Beav. 312); and after judgment, see Alsop v. Bell (24 Beav. 451); Parkinson v. Lucas (28 Beav. 627, 630); sce also Bampton v. Birchall (11 Beav. 38; 1 Phil. 568; 5 Beav. 67). Where a defendant was out of the jurisdiction and a bill prayed process against him when he should come within it, the operation of the statute was suspended though he had neither been served nor appeared (Hele v. Bexley, 20 Beav. 127). As to the effect of the appointment of a receiver, see the cases quoted ante, pp. 148, 149. The sending in a claim in answer to an executor's advertisement is not such a proceeding as will prevent time running against a debt (Re Stephens, Warburton v. Stephens, 43 Ch. D. 44). Where a creditor cannot recover by reason of the lunacy of the debtor, time will not run (Stedman v. Hart, Kay, 607). But where an executor was found lunatic after time has commenced to run against a legatee, time ran during the lunacy (Boldero v. Halpin, 19 W. R. 320). Proceedings in lunacy were held not to exclude the operation of the statute on a promissory note (Roch v. Cooke, 1 De G. & Sm. 675). A petition in lunacy, after the death of the lunatic, by his committee, and a reference, followed by a report that a sum of money had been expended by the committee in the maintenance of the lunatic, will not take the claim of the committee out of the statute, as against the heir-at-law, who was not a party (Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 9 Hare, 204). Where funds in the hands of a lunatic executrix were under an order transferred to the credit of the lunacy to an account in the names of herself and other persons interested, and the income was paid to her, the order preserved the right of the parties interested, but arrears of income could only be recovered for six years (Re Walker, 7 Ch. 120). An order for repayment to executors of advances made by their testator for maintenance of a lady found lunatic after his death was limited to six years before the death (Re Weaver, 21 Ch. Div. 615). Guardians could only recover six years' arrears in respect of the maintenance of a pauper lunatic (Re Newbegin, Eggleton v. Newbegin, 36 Ch. D. 477). See as to the relief granted by courts of equity where time had run pending an injunction, Brown v. Newall (2 M. & Cr. 572); Anon. (2 Cas. Ch. 217); Fyson v. Pole (3 Y. & C. 273); Morgan v. Morgan (2 Dick. 643); Grant v. Grant (3 Sim. 364; 3 Russ. 607); Duval v. Terry (Show. P. C. 15); O'Donel v. Browne (1 Ball & B. 262): or pending improper litigation, Pultney v. Warren (6 Ves. 73); East India Co. v. Campion (11 Bligh. 158, 186, 187); Furnival v. Boyle (4 Russ. 142); Sirdefield v. Price (2 Y. & C. 73). GENERAL LIMITATION OF ACTIONS UNDER LOCAL AND The stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, after reciting that divers acts, commonly called public, local and personal, or local and personal acts, and divers other acts of a local and personal nature, contain clauses limiting the time within which actions may be brought for any thing done in pursuance of the said acts respectively, and that the periods of such limitations vary very much, and it is expedient that there should be one period of limitation only, enacts, "That from and after the 10th August, 1842, the period within which any action may be brought for any thing done under the authority or in pursuance of any such act or acts shall be two years; or in case of continuing damage, then within one year after such damage shall have ceased; and that so much of any clause, provision or enactment by which any other time or period of limitation is appointed or enacted, shall be, and the same is hereby repealed." But this act does not extend to actions brought before the passing of it (See Moore v. Shepherd, 10 Exch. 424, as to the Ramsgate Harbour Act). On the 8th May, 1801, there was a resolution of the House of Commons, agreed to by the House of Lords, that the general statutes, and the "public, local and personal," in each session should be classed in separate volumes (Richards v. Easto, 15 M. & W. 251). The Metropolitan Police Acts, 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, are not local and personal within the meaning of the stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97; and therefore the times limited by the former statutes respectively for the bringing of actions against justices of a metropolitan district are not altered by the last act (Barnett v. Cox, 9 Q. B. 617). See further Darb. & Bos. Stat. Lim. 464-470. General Limitation of Actions. ABOLITION OF FINES AND RECOVERIES. 3 & 4 WILLIAM IV. CAP. 74. An Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries, and for 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 1. Meaning of certain words and expressions. "Lands." "Estate." I. Interpretation clause, s. 1. II. Fines and recoveries abolished, ss. 2, 3. IV. The amendment of fines and recoveries, and the rendering them valid V. The custody of the records of fines and recoveries, &. 13. VI. Estates tail not barrable by warranty, s. 14. VII. Disposition of lands entailed, ss. 15—21. VIII. Definition of the protector, ss. 22-33. IX. Powers of the protector, 88. 34-37. X. Confirmation of voidable estates created by tenant in tail, s. 38. XII. Modes in which dispositions of land under this act by tenants in tail XIII. Estates tail in copyholds, ss. 50-54. XIV. Bankrupts' estates tail, ss. 55–69. XV. Money to be laid out in lands to be entailed, 88. 70—72. XVII. Alienation by married women, ss. 77-91. XVIII. Ireland, s. 92. I. INTERPRETATION CLAUSE. 1. Be it enacted, that in the construction of this act the word "lands" shall extend to manors, advowsons, rectories, messuages, lands, tenements, tithes, rents and hereditaments of any tenure (except copy of court roll), and whether corporeal or incorporeal, and any undivided share thereof, but when accompanied by some expression including or denoting the tenure by copy of court roll, shall extend to manors, messuages, lands, tenements and hereditaments of that tenure, and any undivided share thereof; and the word "estate" shall extend to an estate in equity as well as at law, and shall also extend to any interest, charge, lien or incumbrance in, upon, or affecting lands, either This act does not extend to Ireland, but on the 15th August, 1834, the statute 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 92, was passed, which corresponds in most particulars with the English statute, and came into operation on the 31st October, 1834, instead of 31st December, 1833. c. 74, s. 1. "Base fee." tail." tail." a base fee." at law or in equity, and shall also extend to any interest, charge, 3 & 4 Will. 4, lien or incumbrance in, upon or affecting money subject to be invested in the purchase of lands (b); and the expression "base fee" shall mean exclusively that estate in fee simple into which an estate tail is converted where the issue in tail are barred, but persons claiming estates by way of remainder or otherwise are not barred (c); and the expression "estate tail," in addition to "Estate tail." its usual meaning (a), shall mean a base fee into which an estate tail shall have been converted; and the expression "actual “Actual tenant in tail" shall mean exclusively the tenant of an estate tenant in tail which shall not have been barred, and such tenant shall be deemed an actual tenant in tail, although the estate tail may have been divested or turned to a right (d); and the expression "tenant in tail" shall mean not only an actual tenant in tail, “Tenant in but also a person who, where an estate tail shall have been barred and converted into a base fee, would have been tenant of such estate tail if the same had not been barred; and the expression "tenant in tail entitled to a base fee" shall mean a "Tenant in person entitled to a base fee, or to the ultimate beneficial inte- tail entitled to rest in a base fee, and who, if the base fee had not been created, would have been actual tenant in tail; and the expression "money subject to be invested in the purchase of lands" shall "Money." include money, whether raised or to be raised, and whether the amount thereof be or be not ascertained, and shall extend to stocks and funds, and real and other securities, the produce of which is directed to be invested in the purchase of lands, and the lands to be purchased with such money or produce shall extend to lands held by copy of court roll, and also to lands of any tenure, in Ireland or elsewhere out of England, where such lands or any of them are within the scope or meaning of the trust or power directing or authorizing the purchase; and the word "person" shall extend to a body politic, corporate or "Person." collegiate, as well as an individual; and every word importing Number and the singular number only shall extend and be applied to several gender. persons or things as well as one person or thing; and every word importing the plural number shall extend and be applied to one person or thing as well as several persons or things; and every word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male; and every assurance already made or hereafter to be made, whether by deed, will, private act of parliament or otherwise, by which lands are or shall be entailed, or agreed or directed to be entailed, shall be deemed a settlement; and every appointment Settlement. made in exercise of any power contained in any settlement, or of any other power arising out of the power contained in any settlement, shall be considered as part of such settlement, and the estate created by such appointment shall be considered as having been created by such settlement (e); and where any such settlement is or shall be made by will, the time of the death of the testator shall be considered the time when such S. R c. 74, s. 1. 3 & 4 Will. 4, settlement was made: provided always, that those words and expressions occurring in this clause, to which more than one meaning is to be attached, shall not have the different meanings given to them by this clause in those cases in which there is anything in the subject or context repugnant to such construc The principal objects of this act. The origin of estates tail. What may not be entailed. Quasi entails of estates pur autre vie. tion. The principal objects of this statute were to abolish fines and recoveries, to enable a tenant in tail to make an effectual alienation by enrolled deed, and to enable married women to dispose of land by deed acknowledged. (a) By the common law, before the stat. Westm. 2, commonly called the statute De Donis (13 Edw. 1, c. 1), there were two kinds of estates of inheritance: the one a fee simple absolute, where lands were limited to a man and to his heirs generally; and the other a fee simple conditional, where lands were given to a man and to the heirs of his body (See Willion v. Berkeley, Plowd. 222-252; 2 Prest. on Est. 323-354). In the case of the latter, until issue born, the grantee had not the absolute property in the estate; but the moment issue was born, the condition being performed, the estate became absolutely his property for some purposes (2 Bl. Comm. 111), and he could dispose of it in the same manner as if he had held it in fee simple. The statute De Donis declared that the will of the donor or grantor should be observed, and that an estate so granted to a man and the heirs of his body should descend to the issue, and that he should not have power to alienate the estate (3 Madd. 531, 532), thus creating the modern estate tail. Two things are essential to an entail within the statute, viz., that the subject be of a real nature, and that the estate in it be an inheritance (Harg. Co. Litt. 20 a, note (5)). Where a dignity is limited to the heirs of the body, even though no place be named in the creation of the title, the dignity is within the statute De Donis and descendible as an estate tail (Re Rivett-Carnac, 30 Ch. D. 136). Lands in ancient demesne are not within the statute De Donis (Cresswell v. Hawkins, 3 Jur. N. S. 407). As to copyholds, see note to sect. 50, post, p. 277. If a purely personal annuity be granted to a man and the heirs of his body, the grantee takes a fee simple conditional, which becomes absolute on the birth of issue, the case not being within the statute De Donis (Re Rivett-Carnac, 30 Ch. D. 141; see Stafford v. Buckley, 2 Ves. sen. 170; Turner v. Turner, 1 Br. C. C. 325). In the case, however, of bequests of personalty to A. and the heirs of his body, the ordinary rule is that A. takes an absolute interest (Leventhorpe v. Ashbie, Tud. L. C. Conv. 763). Neither estates pur autre vie in lands, nor terms of years, are entailable any more than personal chattels. They may, however, be so settled as to answer the purposes of an entailed estate and be rendered inalienable almost for as long a time as if they were entailable (Harg. Co. Litt. 20 a, note (5); see Fearne, 495-501, 7th ed.) As to chattels settled by reference to limitations of real estate in strict settlement, see Glenorchy v. Bosville (1 White & Tud. L. C. Eq. 1). A quasi tenant in tail in possession of an estate pur autre vie may by act inter vivos deal with the estate as if there had never been any settlement (Allen v. Allen, 2 Dru. & War. 307; see Pickersgill v. Grey, 31 L. J. Ch. 394). The quasi entail in such an estate may be barred by deed, surrender, or even by articles (Guy v. Mannock, 2 Eden, 339; see 16 Ves. 313; Coop. C. C. 178; 1 Mer. 665; see Lynch v. Nelson, I. R. 5 Eq. 192); but not by will (Hopkins v. Ramadge, Batty, 365; Campbell v. Sandys, 1 Sch. & L. 281; Cresswell v. Hawkins, 3 Jur. N. S. 408; see Doe v. Luxton, 6 T. R. 292). A lease for lives may be barred by surrender and renewed by the first quasi tenant in tail of it (Blake v. Blake, 1 Cox, 266; 3 P. Wms. 10, note 1, by Cox; see Coop. C. C. 184, 185); and a renewable freehold by a grant for one hundred years by the quasi tenant in tail (Walsh v. Studdert, I. R. 5 C. L. 478), or a fee farm grant to the quasi tenant in |