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3 & 4 Will. 4, particularly named (Plowd. 136, 137; 11 Rep. 68 b; 5 Rep. 14; 7 Rep.
c. 27, s. 1. 32; see Bac. Abr. Prerogative (E.)). But where a statute is general,

and its effect would be to deprive the king of any prerogatige, right,
title, or interest, he is not bound unless specially named (11 Rep. 68),
and was held not to be within the Statute of Limitations (Br. St. Lim.
67), nor the statute of 13 Edward 1, st. 1, c. 5, which makes plenarty
for six months a good plea in quare impedit (11 Rep. 68; Plowd. 244).
It was said by Lord Romilly that 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, does not affect
suits by the Att. Gen. to recover property belonging to the Crown (18
Beav. 246); and in Rustomjee v. The Queen (1 Q. B. D. 491, 492), it was
said that the Crown cannot be bound by the Statute of Limitations which
has relation only to actions between subject and subject. In the same
case the statute was held not to apply to a petition of right. The Crown
comes expressly within 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 100, for shortening the time
required in claims of modus or discharge from tithes. The Crown is
also expressly within sects. 1 and 2 of 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, ante, pp. 1, 4;

but is not within sect. 3 (Perry v. Eames, 1891, 1 Ch. 658).
Statutes of By stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 2, the king was disabled from claiming any manors,
limitation as lands, or hereditaments, except liberties and franchises, under a title ac-
to rights of

crued sixty years before the then session of parliament, unless within that Crown to

time there had been a possession under such title; but this provision realty.

becoming daily more ineffectual by lapse of time, a permanent limitation 21 Jac. 1, c. 2. was introduced (See Co. Litt. 119 a, n. (1); 3 Inst. 188). And by statuto 9 Geo. 3,

9 Geo. 3, c. 16, it is provided, that the king shall not sue, &c., any c. 16.

persons, &c., for any lands, &c. (except liberties and franchises) on any
title which has not first accrued within sixty years before the commence-
ment of such suit, unless he has been answered the rents within that time,
or they have been in charge, or stood insuper of record; and the subject
shall quietly enjoy against the king, and all claiming under him, by
patent, &c. This statute was extended to Ireland by 48 Geo. 3, c. 47, as
to which, see Tuthill v. Rogers, 6 Ir. Eq. R. 429; 1 J. & Lat. 36.

In the case of tithes where none had been received, it was held, that
the accounts of the auditors of the revenue, in which the tithes had been
entered and returned nil, were sufficient proof that they had been “duly
in charge” (A. G. v. Eardley, 8 Price, 73; see 3 Inst. 189, as to the

meaning of being in charge").
24 & 25 Vict. The stat. 9 Geo. 3, c. 16, is amended by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 62; and by the

1st section of the latter act, the Crown shall not hereafter sue any persons
for real property (other than liberties or franchises) which such persons
or their ancestors have held or taken the profits by the space of sixty years
before the commencement of suit, by reason only that the same real pro-
perty, or the rents thereof, have been in charge to the Crown, or stood
insuper upon record within the said space of sixty years. The Crown
shall not, for the purposes of the act 9 Geo. 3, c. 16, be deemed to have
been answered the rents of real property which shall have been held, or of
which the rents shall have been taken by any person by the space of sixty
years before the commencement of any action, as mentioned in that act,
by reason only of the same real property having been parcel of any manor
of which the rents shall have been answered to the Crown, or some other
person under whom the Crown claims or shall thereafter claim as afore-
said or of any manor which shall have been duly in charge to the Crown or

stood insuper of record (24 & 25 Vict. c. 62, s. 3). Ao to Ireland see?! Adverse Where an entire manor or other district has been in charge to the possession Crown within sixty years, acts done in different parts of it by different against the

persons, such as the erection and occupation of lime-kilns for burning Crown. limestone found within the district, and of cottages for the purpose of

such occupation and the sale of lime so produced, do not amount to such
an adverse possession as to displace the title of the Crown to the district,
although they may have been continued for above sixty years (Doe v.
Roberts, 13 M. & W. 520).
The statute 9 Geo. 3, c. 16, does not give a title, it only takes away

right of suit of the Crown, or those claiming from the Crown, against such
as have held an adverse possession against it for sixty years (11 East,

c. 62.


495). Adverse possession of Crown lands for less than sixty years was 3 & 4 Will. 4, not sufficient to support the plaintiff's title in an action of ejectment c. 27, s. 1. against a stranger (Goodtitle v. Baldwin, 11 East, 488).

By stat. 21 Jac. ì, c. 14, s. 1, it is enacted, “ that wheresoever the king, 21 Jac. 1, his heirs or successors, and such from or under whom the king claimeth, c. 14. and all others claiming under the same title under which the king claimeth, Practice in hath been or shall be out of possession by the space of twenty years, or Crown suits hath not or shall not have taken the profits of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, within the space of twenty years before any information of intrusion brought or to be brought to recover the same: that in every such case the defendant or defendants may plead the general issue, if he or they so think fit, and shall not be pressed to plead specially; and that in such cases the defendant or defendants shall retain the possession he or they had at the time of such information exhibited, until the title be tried, found, or adjudged for the king.” Although the king can never be put out of possession in point of law by the wrongful entry of a subject, yet there may be an adverse possession in fact against the Crown. Therefore, after such an adverse possession by a subject for twenty years, the Crown could only recover land by information of intrusion; consequently ejectment would not lie at the suit of the grantee of the Crown, notwithstanding the rights of the Crown are not barred by the Statute of Limitations (Doe v. Morris, 2 Bing. N. R. 189). Rules have been made for assimilating the mode of procedure to that in ejectment and trespass on the common law side of the Court of Exchequer as nearly as may be, consistently with the rights and prerogatives of the Crown, and the provisions of the stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 14, the mode of procedure to remove persons intruding upon the Queen's possession of lands, shall be distinct from that to recover profits or damages for intrusion (See Rules on Revenue side of the Court of Exchequer, made in pursuance of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 21, 22nd June, 1860, Nos. 21–38; 2 Chitty's Statutes, 613 et seq.; and also 28 & 29 Vict. c. 104, s. 31 et seq.)

The title of the Crown to lands, of which it has been out of possession for twenty years, may be tried in the information of intrusion itself, and need not be first found by inquest of office, the only effect of the statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 14, being to throw the onus of proving title in the first instance, in such a case, on the Crown (A. G. v. Parsons, 2 M. & W. 23). As to inquests of office, see now 28 & 29 Vict. c. 104, s. 52. See, as to evidence in Crown suits, Doe v. Roberts, 13 M. & W. 520.

Although the Statute of Limitations does not bind the Crown, yet Chose in
where the claim of the Crown is only a derivative right, it must stand in action vested
the same situation as its principal. "Therefore, the statute may be pleaded in the Crown.
to a scire facias issued by the Crown against the drawer of a bill of
exchange, which was barred in the hands of the Crown debtor, upon the
ground that the Crown is only entitled to its debtor's right, and cannot
create or reserve a right, if none existed, or it has become barred (R. v.
Morrall, 6 Price, 24). But where a right has vested in the Crown before
the statute has run against the former owner, the rights of the Crown are
not barred or affected by the statute, as the Crown is not within its opera-
tion (Lambert v. Tayler, 4 B. & C. 138; see Tayler v. A. G., 10 Sim. 413,
as to course of proceeding by a subject to enforce a claim of property
against the Crown; Re Robson, 2 Phil. 64 ; Re De Bode, Ib. 85; see 23 & 24
Vict. c. 34, as to petitions of right and the orders thereon, 8 Jur. N. S.
283, Part II.)

With respect to the personal estate of a deceased, proceedings on the

ellery part of the Crown cannot now be instituted, nor can a petition of right be na specilied camo presented, except within the same time, and subject to the same rules of

indre into reeds law and equity, as in the case of an action by or against a subject (47 & 48 Vict. c. 71, S. 3). "Under 02 Vecb.c.y $5.912 14°te cilen of ide

The Statutes of Limitation which affect the rights of the Duke of Corn- Statutes of wall are 7 & 8 Vict. c. 105, ss. 71-88; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 53; and 24 & 25 Limitation as Vict. c. 62 ; as to which, see Darb. & Bos. Stat. Lim. 413 ; Brown's Law to rights of of Limitation, 251, 415.

Duke of

Cornwall. But though the Crown was not bound by the Statute of Limitations, yet


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3 & 4 Will. 4, a grant from it may be presumed from great length of possession, not c. 27, s. 1. because the court really thinks a grant has been made, but it presumes

the fact for the purpose and from a principle of quieting the possesof grants

sion (Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 102, 215). Thus grants from the Crown from the

of markets and the like, after an uninterrupted enjoyment of twenty Crown.

years (11 East, 419) have been presumed. So an enfranchisement of a
copyhold may, upon sufficient evidence, be presumed against the Crown
(Roe v. Ireland, 11 East, 280). So where the title of a family to an advow-
son was evidenced by deeds and conveyances for a period of nearly 140
years, and there had been three presentations by them and none by the
Crown, it was held, that a grant from the Crown might be presumed
(Gibson v. Clark, 1 Jac. & W. 159 ; see 3 T. R. 158). Letters patent
from the Crown have been presumed (Picking v. Stamford, 2 Ves. jun.
282); but a grant which would have been against a statute was not
presumed (Goodtitle v. Baldwin, 11 East, 495). În a case where Charles I.
had granted the soil between high and low water marks along the coast
of the county of Southampton, but the Crown remained in possession
for upwards of 150 years after the grant, this was held to create a
presumption against the grant (Parmeter v. A. G., 1 Dow, 316). An ob-
jection to a title that two fee-farm rents, created by letters patent by
James I., were not shown to have been extinguished, was overruled,
it being proved that no claim had been made by the Crown of the
rent from the year 1706, and no proof of any previous claim (Simpson v.
Gutteridge, 1 Madd. 609; see Flower v. Hartopp, 12 L. J. Ch. 507). A
grant from the Crown of undefined shares in land will not be held
void for uncertainty after long modern possession, for a supplementary
grant may be presumed (Des Barres v. Shey, 29 L. T. 592). Enjoyment
of property for 110 years by a parish, although no conveyance appeared
in evidence, was held conclusive proof of ownership against the Crown

(A. G. v. Hotham, 1 T. & R. 210). Presumption But although grants on record have been presumed, there seems to of inrolments be no instance of the presumption of an inrolment of a deed which and registra- was made essential by statute (Doe v. Waterton, 3 B. & Ald. 149, 151; tion.

Wright v. Smythies, 10 East, 409). It might be otherwise if some foundation were laid for raising a presumption by showing that there was a chasm in the records corresponding with the date of the supposed conveyance (Allen v. Walker, 1 Jac. & W. 619). The registry of a deed of lands in a register county will not be presumed (Doe v. Hirst, 11 Price, 475). An inrolment of a tithe award was presumed where the

usage of paying tithe was shown (Macdougall v. Purrier, 2 Dow & Ci. Port duties. 135, cited 8 Q. B. 580). It seems that where port duties are claimed

under a grant from the Crown, which appears from the evidence to be inrolled, but which is not produced by the plaintiff, the jury ought not to be directed to presume such grant upon mere evidence of usage (Brune v. Thompson, 4 Q. B. 543). As to the presumption that a claim for port duties had a legal origin, see Foreman v. Whitstable (L. R. 4 H. L. 266),

and cases there cited. Presumption After long possession the court will even presume an act of parliament of an act of in order to protect a right (A. G. v. Ewelme. Hospital, 17 Beav. 366), but parliament. not the passing of an act of parliament within the last 250 years, on an

important subject of the most general interest, of which no vestige can be found (R. v. Ereter, 12 Ad. & Ell. 532, 533). Jessel, M. R., refused to presume an act of parliament as an origin for an alleged right (Chilton v. London, 7 Ch. D. 733). See further, 1 Taylor, Ev. 144, 7th ed.

2. Period of Limitation fired, and when Right first accrues.

Twenty Years. No land or 2. After the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight rent to be

hundred and thirty-three, no person shall make an entry or recovered, but

distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but 3 & 4 Will. 4, within twenty years next after the time at which the right to

c. 27, s. 2. make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, shall have within twenty first accrued to some person through whom he claims, or if such years after the right shall not have accrued to any person through whom he right of action

accrued the claims, then within twenty years next after the time at which claimant, or the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, some person shall have first accrued to the person making or bringing the he claims.

whose estate same (k).

(k) From the 1st January, 1879, sect. 1 of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57 (post, p. 194), 37 & 38 Vict. has, by sect. 9 of the same act, been substituted for sect. 2 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 67. c. 27. Sect. 1 of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, fixes the period of limitation for the recovery of land or rent at twelve years, and also expressly includes "suits, but is in other respects similar to sect. 2 of 3 & 4 Will 4, c. 27. The following note has reference to the last-mentioned section.

Where the claim is to the possession of land, the real right is the right of entry, and the right of action is only given to enforce the right of entry (Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts, 8 Ch. Div. 727). By this section the right of entry is taken away unless an entry be made within the statutory period computed from the right first accruing (Holmes v. Newlands, 11 Ad. & El. 44; 8 Q. B. 679).

This section governs cases which fall within its general words, even This section though not included among the instances given in sect. 3. A testator governs cases charged an annuity on land, payable quarterly, with a power of distress not included if the annuity should be in arrear for twenty days after any quarterly day. among The testator died in 1804, and on the 17th March, 1835, the defendants instances in

sect. 3. distrained for twenty-nine years' arrears of the annuity, ending at Christmas, 1834. The right to make a distress for the annuity first James v. accrued to the annuitant in April, 1805. It was held that the claim to Salter. the annuity was barred. Tindal, C. J., in giving judgment, said “ that the case must have been governed by the second section, if that section had stood alone, cannot be doubted; and upon a more close examination of the third section, the object and intent of it seems to us to be no mor than this : to explain and give a construction to the enactment contained in the second clause, as to the time at which the right to make a distress for any rent shall be deemed to have first accrued,' in those cases only in which doubt or difficulty might occur; leaving every case which plainly falls within the general words of the second section, but is not included amongst the instances given by the third, to be governed by the operation of the second” (James v. Salier, 3 Bing. N. C. 553; approved in House of Lords, Irish Land Commission v. Grant, 10 App. Cas. 27; see Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts, 8 Ch. Div. 727). And in a case where it was held that the right of a mortgagee to recover possession first accrued (within the above section), at the date of a foreclosure order, it was said by Earl Cairns, that sect. 3, in defining when the right shall be deemed to have accrued, is not necessarily exhaustive (Pugh v. Heath, 7 App. Cas. 235).

Where a lessee entered under a lease granted by a charitable corpora- Void lease. tion in 1783, which the court held have been absolutely void, and an action was brought in 1876 claiming possession of the demised land, it was held by the House of Lords that the lessees must be taken to have been in possession from 1783 without any title whatever, and that the rights of the corporation were barred by this section (Magdalen H03pital v. Knotts, 4 App. Cas. 324 ; see Webster v. Southey, 36 Ch. D. 9). In the courts below, the same lease was treated as voidable only; and it was held by the Court of Appeal (overruling Jessel, M. R., 5 Ch. D. 175) that the period of limitation ran from the granting of the lease (8 Ch. Div. 709). Where a lessor permitted his lessee during the continuance of the lease Landlord and



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3 & 4 Will. 4, to pay no rent for the statutory period, time ran against the lessor's right
c. 27, 8.2. to bring ejectment from the determination of the lease, his right of action

accruing under the fourth branch of the third section (Doe v. Oxenham,
7 M. & W. 131). Nor did he lose his right to rent, the word “rent" in
the second section not including rents reserved on leases for years (Grant
v. Ellis, 9 M. & W. 113; Re Turner, 11 Ir. Ch. R. N. S. 304 ; Irish Land
Commission v. Grant, 10 App. Cas. 26). So long as the relation of land-
lord and tenant under a lease in writing subsists as a legal relation, the
landlord's right to rent is not barred by non-payment for however long
a time (Archbold v. Scully, 9 H. L. C. 360). Where a lease was renewed,
the landlord's estate became an estate in possession, and his right of

action accrued (Eccl. Commissioners v. Rowe, 5 App. Cas. 741).
Rent within The word “rent” in the second section of the act does not include rents
this section.

reserved on leases for years, but is confined to rents existing as an inGrant v. Ellis. heritance distinct from the land, and for which before the statute the

party entitled might have had an assize, such as ancient rents service,
fee-farm rents, or the like (Grant v. Ellis, 9 M. & W. 113; Irish Land
Commission v. Grant, 10 App. Cas. 26). The word is used to express
rents which are a charge on land (Paget v. Foley, 2 Bing. N. C. 688; see
1 Real Prop. Report, 50). An additional rent in the nature of a penal
rent reserved by indenture of demise between landlord and tenant was
held not to be within the section (Daly v. Bloomfield, 5 Ir. L. R. 65).
As to the use of the word “rent” in the statute, see further, Doe v.

Angell, 9 Q. B. 328, quoted under sect. 9, post.
Issue in tail. T'he first section interpreting the person through whom another person

is said to claim as meaning any person by, through, or under, or by the
act of whom the person so claiming became entitled to the estate or
interest claimed as issue in tail,” it has been laid down that by virtue
of the first and second sections an ordinary tenant in tail would lose his
right after want of possession for the statutory period in the time of his
ancestor (Abergavenny v. Brace, L. R. 7 Ex. 152, 172). But a statutory
entail (as that of the Abergavenny estates) is not within these words (1ố.

155, 172).
Actions and The right of a lord to enter and seize copyholds quousque was barred
suits to re- after seventy years (Re Lidiard, 42 Ch. D. 234). A suit by a copyhold
cover land

tenant to compel admittance by the lord was a suit to recover land within within this

this section (Walters y. Webb, 5 Ch. 531); So was an action for an assignsection.

ment of dower (Marshall v. Smith, 5 Giff. 37). A foreclosure action is an
action to recover land within this section (Harlock v. Ashberry, 19 Ch.
Div. 539; Hugill v. Wilkinson, 38 Ch. D. 480). A mortgagee's petition
to recover arrears of interest out of a fund in court, representing the
mortgaged property was held analogous to a suit to recover land (Re

Stead, 2 Ch. D. 713, 718).
Limitation of By the common law there was no stated or fixed period within which it
real actions was necessary to commence actions, but afterwards certain remarkable
before 3 & 4 events were from time to time selected for that purpose, as the return of
Will. 4, King John from Ireland, and the coronation of Henry the Third. A cer-

tain period was limited by stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 2, which enacted that no 32 Hen. 8, person should maintain any writ of right, or make any prescription, title

or claim of, to or for any manors, lands, tenements, rents, annuities, com-
mons, pensions, portions, corodies, or other hereditaments of the possession
of his or their ancestor or predecessor, and declare and allege any further
seisin or possession of his or their ancestor or predecessor, but within
sixty years next before the teste of the said writ, or next before the said
prescription, title or claim so made. Actions upon the possession of the
ancestor of the party claiming were limited to fifty years; and those upon
the seisin or possession of the party himself to thirty years; and formedons
in remainder or reverter were required to be sued within fifty years. The
writ of intrusion came within the stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 2, and not within
the stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, and the limitation of time for suing out such
writ was fifty years (See Peircey v. Gardner, 3 Bing. N. C. 748). Dignities
were held not to be within the Statute of Limitations (In the barony of


c. 27.

c. 2.

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