8 & 9 Vict. c. 112, s. 1. notice of the settlement, and the residue of two terms, each of 1,000 years, was assigned by the personal representatives of H. to a trustee for the defendant to attend the inheritance. These terms had originally been created for mortgage purposes, and in 1773, the mortgage debt having been satisfied, were assigned to H. in trust to attend the inheritance for the benefit of the then owner in fee. The estate had been settled in 1778, and had also been mortgaged in 1836 and the three following years, but in none of the deeds, nor in the settlement of 1813, was any notice taken of the outstanding terms. In 1844, C. duly exercised his power of appointment, limiting the estate after his death (which took place in 1853) to the plaintiff his eldest son in fee. In an action of ejectment, a verdict having been taken for the plaintiff, subject to a case disclosing these facts: it was held, first, that the court could not presume a surrender of the terms, which was not stated as a fact, for that, even assuming the decision in Doe d. Putland v. Hilder (2 B. & Ald. 782) to be right, (which the court greatly doubted,) the presumption, if to be made at all, must be made by the jury and not by the court. (Cottrell v. Hughes, 15 C. B. 532; 1 Jur., N. S. 448; 24 Law J., C. P. 107.) It was held, secondly, that, as the terms were, on the 31st December, 1845, attendant on the inheritance by express declaration, and would, if subsisting, have afforded to the defendant such protection against the settlement of 1813 as a court of equity would not have restrained him from setting up in a court of law, they were within the exception of this section, and must be considered as subsisting terms. (Ib.) The intention of this act was that all mere dry satisfied terms made attendant on the inheritance should merge, but not terms assigned or agreed to be assigned as a protection to a mortgagee or purchaser. A term outstanding in a trustee for a mortgagor and to attend is not so merged by this act as to prevent the mortgagor from assigning it to a trustee as a security for the mortgage debt. (Shaw v. Johnson, 1 Drew. & S. 412; 7 Jur., N. S. 1005.) With respect to this case Lord St. Leonards observes, that "there is no date in the report in Drewry & Smale, but in the Jurist it appears that the mortgage was long before the period fixed for merger of satisfied terms. The attendant term therefore was not a satisfied term within the act, as it was by mortgage agreed to be a security for the mortgagee. (Sugd. on the Stat. 282, 2nd ed.) A term of 500 years having been created in 1738 as a security for portions for younger children, and to attend the inheritance, was afterwards assigned by the tenant for life, under a settlement made in 1784, to a trustee as a security for 1001. advanced by W., and to attend the inheritance. W. and the tenant for life afterwards conveyed the term to M., in trust for S., with a declaration of trust for certain parties: it was beld, that such parties, having had notice that the object of the term was satisfied, could not set up against the parties claiming under the settlement of 1784, the term which had been assigned to W. by a person who had no right to deal with it except to the extent of his own interest. (Plant v. Taylor, 7 H. & N. 211; 8 Jur., N. S. 140; 31 Law J., Exch. 289.) A., who had married in 1832, purchased an estate in 1837, subject to a satisfied term, of which he procured an assignment to a trustee for himself. He afterwards executed three mortgages, in each of which he covenanted that the lands were free from dower; and on the occasion of the first mortgage the deed of assignment of the term was delivered to the solicitor for the mortgagee, but it did not clearly appear that he retained the exclusive possession of it. It was held that, notwithstanding the saving in this statute, the term had ceased by the operation of this act, and that the mortgagees were not entitled to its protection against A.'s wife's right of dower. (In re Sleeman, 4 Ir. Ch. R. 563.) TERMS SATISFIED AFTER 31ST DECEMBER, 1845. 2. Every term of years now subsisting or hereafter to be created, becoming satisfied after the said thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and forty-five, and which, either by express declaration or by construction of law, shall after that day become attendant upon the inheritance or reversion of any lands, shall immediately upon the same becoming so attendant absolutely cease and determine as to the land upon the inheritance or reversion whereof such term shall become attendant as aforesaid (b). 8 & 9 Vict. c. 112, s. 2. Satisfied terms now subsisting, ant upon inheritance, &c. of lands. Case of a term not determined under this sec (b) In 1838, Mary Humphreys mortgaged premises for 1,000 years to Davies to secure 601. and interest. In June, 1842, Mary and John Humphreys mortgaged the premises in question, subject to the term of 1,000 tion. years, to Minshall in fee; and in October, 1844, in consideration of 181. conveyed the equity of redemption to Clay, the lessor of the plaintiff. By articles of agreement of the same date, Clay agreed to convey to Meredith Humphreys the moiety of such premises on a certain event. By deed 21st December, 1844, the residue of the term was assigned to John Thompson, his executors, administrators and assigns, with a proviso for redemption on payment by Clay or Meredith Humphreys of 1601. with interest. By the same deed Minshall released the same premises to R. Thompson in fee, upon trust to reconvey to or to the use of J. Clay and M. Humphreys, on payment by them or either of them of 160l. on 21st June then next. On the 20th September, 1847, a portion of the mortgaged premises being required by a railway company, in consideration of 2201. (1601. of which was paid to Thompson in discharge of principal and interest due to him), and the residue, 607., paid to J. Clay, M. Humphreys and R. Thompson, by the direction as well of J. Thompson as of J. Clay and M. Humphreys, released and assigned to the company in fee the portion of the premises required by them. The defendants in an action of ejectment put in an indenture dated 26th October, 1839, and made between M. Humphreys of the one part, and C. Humphreys, her daughter (who afterwards married the defendant Jones), of the other part, whereby M. Humphreys, in consideration of 191. expressed to be paid to her, but which was not in fact paid, by C. Humphreys, conveyed the premises in question amongst others to C. Humphreys in fee. This deed was unknown to the parties to the subsequent deeds. The case of the plaintiff rested on the demise of J. Thompson, the assignee of the term of 1,000 years. For the defendants it was contended that the term had determined, but the court held that the term had not become attendant upon the inheritance by construction of law, so as to be determined by the second section of this statute; and therefore Clay was entitled to recover upon the demise of J. Thompson. Patteson, J., observed, "It is not necessary to decide whether the defendants claiming to have the fee can maintain that this is a satisfied term, the satisfaction of the mortgages having been made not by him, but by Clay, under a mistaken belief that the equity of redemption in fee had been conveyed to himself, because we are of opinion that this term is not within either of the alternatives in the statute for determining terms. It is not attendant on the inheritance by express declaration, there being no such declaration, neither is it by construction of law; for the trust is expressly declared to be for Clay and Humphreys, who have not the inheritance; and although they were supposed to be entitled thereto when the deed was executed, that supposition is now proved to have been founded on a mistake. That mistaken supposition has no effect upon the express words of the instrument." (Doe d. Clay v. Jones, 18 Law J., Q. B. 260; see Sudg. V. & P. 777, 11th ed.; and observations on this case, 13 Jur. part 2, pp. 382-384.) In Bass v. Wellsted, 12 Jur. 347, a question was raised, but not decided, as to the protection against dower by a term since the above act. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 112, s. 3. Construction of act. Not to extend to Scotland. 3. In the construction and for the purposes of this act, unless there be something in the subject or context repugnant to such construction, the word "lands" shall extend to all freehold tenements and hereditaments, whether corporeal or incorporeal, and to all such customary land as will pass by deed, or deed and admittance, and not by surrender, or any undivided part or share thereof respectively; and every word importing the singular number only shall extend and be applied to several persons or things as well as one person or thing; and every word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male. 4. This act shall not extend to Scotland. THE TRUSTEE ACT, 1850. 13 & 14 VICTORIA, C. 60. An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to the Conveyance and Transfer of Real and Personal Property vested in Mortgagees and Trustees. [5th August, 1850.] 11 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 1. Geo. 4 & 1 WHEREAS an act was passed in the first year of the reign of his late majesty King William the Fourth, intituled "An Act for amending the Laws respecting Conveyances and Transfers of Estates and Funds vested in Trustees and Mortgagees, and for Will. 4, c. 60. enabling Courts of Equity to give Effect to their Decrees and Orders in certain Cases:" and whereas an act was passed in the fifth year of the reign of his late majesty King William the 4 & 5 Will. 4, Fourth, intituled "An Act for the Amendment of the Law c. 23. relative to the Escheat and Forfeiture of Real and Personal Property holden in Trust:" and whereas an act was passed in the second year of the reign of her present Majesty, intituled 1 & 2 Vict. c. 69. An Act to remove Doubts respecting Conveyances of Estates vested in Heirs and Devisees of Mortgagees:" and whereas it is expedient that the provisions of the said acts should be consolidated and enlarged: be it therefore enacted, that all proceedings under the said acts or any of them commenced before the passing of this act may be proceeded with under the said. recited acts, or according to the provisions of this act, as shall be thought expedient, and, subject as aforesaid, that the said recited acts shall be and the same are hereby repealed: provided always, that the several acts repealed by the said recited acts shall not be revived, and that such repeal shall only be on and after this act coming into operation. terms. 2. And whereas it is expedient to define the meaning in Interpretation of which certain words are hereafter used; it is declared, that the several words hereinafter named are herein used and applied in the manner following respectively; (that is to say,) The word "lands" shall extend to and include manors, messuages, tenements and hereditaments, corporeal and incorporeal, of every tenure or description, whatever may be the estate or interest therein: The word "stock" shall mean any fund, annuity or security transferable in books kept by any company or society established or to be established, or transferable by deed alone, or by deed accompanied by other formalities, and any share or interest therein (a): 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 2. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74. The word "seised" (b) shall be applicable to any vested estate for life or of a greater description, and shall extend to estates at law and in equity (c), in possession or in futurity, in any lands: The word "possessed" shall be applicable to any vested estate less than a life estate, at law or in equity, in possession or in expectancy, in any lands: The words "contingent right," as applied to lands, shall mean a contingent or executory interest, a possibility coupled with an interest, whether the object of the gift or limitation of such interest or possibility be or be not ascertained, also a right of entry, whether immediate or future, and whether vested or contingent (d): The words "convey" and "conveyance" applied to any person, shall mean the execution by such person of every necessary or suitable assurance for conveying or disposing to another lands whereof such person is seised or entitled to a contingent right, either for the whole estate of the person conveying or disposing, or for any less estate, together with the performance of all formalities required by law to the validity of such conveyance, including the acts to be performed by married women and tenants in tail in accordance with the provisions of an act passed in the fourth year of the reign of his late majesty King William the Fourth, intituled " An Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries, and the Substitution of more simple Modes of Assurance" (e), and including also surrenders and other acts which a tenant of customary or copyhold lands can himself perform preparatory to or in aid of a complete assurance of such customary or copyhold lands (f): The words "assign" and "assignment" shall mean the execution and performance by a person of every necessary or suitable deed or act for assigning, surrendering, or otherwise transferring lands of which such person is possessed, either for the whole estate of the person so possessed or for any less estate: The word "transfer" shall mean the execution and per- The words "Lord Chancellor" shall mean as well the Lord The word "trust" shall not mean the duties incident to an |