ADDENDA. Page 78, fourth line from the bottom. An easement, such as a right to use a pump, is a discontinuous easement, and requires definite words to create it, and differs from a continuous easement, such as a right to drains, which passes with the premises to which it appertains. Upon the severance of the ownership of two tenements, a discontinuous easement over one of such tenements will not pass and attach to the other tenement without words expressly creating an easement de novo, and therefore where a will contained a devise to C. P. of a house and garden as now in the occupation of T. A., and a devise to W. P. of an adjoining house and garden, it was held that no right to go to and from, and draw water from a pump in the garden of W. P., passed to C. P. or her assigns, although, at the date of the will, T. A. occupied the first-named house and was in the habit of using, but not as of right, the said pump. (Polden v. Bastard, 11 W. R. 778; 2 New Rep. 356. See Pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N. 916, post, pp. 78, 79, 101.) When easement will not pass. Page 234, at end of second paragraph. B., having been in possession of an estate as first mortgagee for upwards What not an acknowledgment of of twenty years, on being applied to for an account of the rents and profits right to redeem. on behalf of a person who had a subsequent charge upon the property, replied as follows:-"In answer to your letter I beg to say I deny the claim of your client. If he were entitled to the account, it would be of no use as the rents and profits of the estate have never been sufficient to pay the interest of the first charge." This letter was held not to be an acknowledgment of the plaintiff's right to redeem within 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 28. (Thompson v. Bowyer, 2 New Rep. 504; 11 W. R. 975; 9 Jur., N. S. 863.) Page 502, at end of third paragraph. By a will made in 1848, a testator, after directing payment of his debts, Exoneration of &c out of his personal estate, bequeathed the residue to his daughter, who real estate, stat. predeceased him without issue. The testator also devised his real estate to trustees upon certain trusts for the benefit of his daughter and her children with a gift over. The real estate was subject to a mortgage. In 1861 the testator made another testamentary disposition, but it made no reference to the former will, and only contained the bequest of a legacy. The devisee claimed to have his real estate exonerated from the mortgage 17 & 18 Vict. c. 113. debt it was held, that the will was made at the time of the statute 17 & 18 Vict. c. 113, and that the testamentary instrument, 1861, did not bring the will within the operation of the statute, and therefore the devisee was entitled to have the estate exonerated out of the personalty. Lord Westbury, C., observed, "A difficulty would undoubtedly have arisen if the parties were claiming not entirely under the will of 1848, but claiming the property in question under and by virtue of a will actually made in 1848, but republished at a subsequent time, and the devises in which took effect quoad any particular estate by virtue only of that subsequent republication. There would have been a difficulty in applying to devisees claiming by virtue of a testamentary instrument made at one time and republished at another, and having an effect partly upon property existing before the date of the original making and partly upon property acquired in the interval between the original date and the date of the republication, because such persons could not be said in the language of the statute to be claiming under 'a will already made.' They would be claiming partly by virtue of a will that was already made and partly by virtue of the operation given to that instrument from the fact of its republication. But that is not the case here. The parties here claim under and by virtue of the will of 1848, and the will of 1848 does not cease to answer the description of 'a will already made,' because it may have been republished at a time subsequently to the 1st of January, 1855. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion, that within the spirit of the act and the intent of the act to prevent an unjust retroactivity of the statute, and within the words of the act, this will under which the present controversy arises was 'a will already made' within the meaning of those expressions at the time when this act received the royal assent." (Rolfe v. Perry, 9 Jur., N. S. 853.) STATUTES RELATING TO REAL PROPERTY, PASSED IN THE REIGNS OF KING WILLIAM IV. AND QUEEN VICTORIA. PRESCRIPTION. 2 & 3 WILLIAM IV. CAP. 71. An Act for shortening the Time of Prescription in certain 1. Time limited for establishing rights of common and other profit or benefit, II. Limitation of time as to ways, easements and watercourses. III. As to the use of light. IV. How periods of limitation are to be computed. V. Pleadings. VI. Period less than that provided by statute not to be allowed. VIII. Time excluded in computation of period of forty years. I. TIME LIMITED FOR ESTABLISHING RIGHTS OF COMMON c. 71, s. 1. WHEREAS the expression "Time Immemorial, or Time whereof 2 & 3 Will. 4, the Memory of Man runneth not to the contrary," is now by the law of England in many cases considered to include and denote the whole period of time from the reign of King Richard the First, whereby the title to matters that have been long enjoyed is sometimes defeated by showing the commencement of such enjoyment, which is in many cases productive of inconvenience and injustice; for remedy thereof, be it enacted, That no claim which may be lawfully made at the common law, by custom, prescription (b), or grant, to any right of common (e) or other profit or benefit, to be taken and enjoyed from or upon any land of our sovereign lord the King, his heirs or successors, or any land being parcel of the Duchy of Lancaster claims to right of common and prendre, not to be defeated after Joyment by other profits à thirty years' en |