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that though a despatch had indeed been communicated, yet that it had reference to other unimportant matters, and in no way related to the difficulty about the Trent. Some days later, however, in a summary of the events relating to that case published in the Observer, a weekly paper published on Sunday morning, supposed also to be now and then supplied with authentic information, I noticed at the conclusion a tolerably correct version of the substance of that despatch. After the appearance of that, I had no hesitation in disclosing to persons with whom I conversed my knowledge of its correctness. It was, then, with no little surprise that they perceived last week, when intelligence was received from America of the existence of such a paper, a formal denial in the Post that any such paper had ever been communicated to the British government. No longer able to deny the existence of it, the next step was to affirm that I must have suppressed it. And, not satisfied with that, the same press went on to supply a motive for doing so, in the fact that certain American parties had about the same time appeared in the market buying up stock, which was the cause of the rise in the funds already alluded to. Of course the insinuation was that I was engaged in a heavy stockjobbing operation for my own benefit and that of my friends. The motive for this concoction of a series of falsehoods which were inevitably to be exposed in a very short space of time, seemed difficult to divine. The explanation came almost on the heels of the charge. Lord Russell's note to Lord Lyons of the 19th of December gave his version of the conversation held on that day. The case was clear to all eyes. But to this day the Post has made no retraction of its statement, has not assigned the smallest justification for making them, neither has it disclaimed the authority upon which they are imputed to have been made. So great has been the effect of these disclosures in inspiring a belief that there was an intention somewhere to bring on a war, that it is not impossible it may be made the basis of some proceedings at the approaching session of Parliament.

You will doubtless also perceive that Lord Russell's note of our conversation on the 19th differs in some particulars from that which I had the honor to submit to you in my despatch of the 20th of December, No. 93. The reason of this is to be traced to the distinction which his lordship voluntarily drew between my official and unofficial character at the outset. I understood him as intending to answer my two questions only in my private capacity, as a person desirous of making my own arrangements in certain contingencies. For that reason I did not consider the part of the conversation relating to them as needing to be reported. The other portion of his note, touching the substance of your despatch, substantially agrees with mine. The casual opinions expressed about the policy of the respective countries were not regarded by me as part of the official language, though I have not the least objection to their publication. Whilst his lordship was about it he might as well have inserted his reply to my reference to the part taken by the government of Great Britain in the negotiation of 1804-'09, which was in substance that there were many things said and done by them fifty or sixty years ago which he might not undertake to enter into a defence of now-all which was said pleasantly on both sides, without an idea that the official conference was not closed. Yet so difficult is it to retain in the memory a distinct line between formal and casual conversation that I have no disposition in any way to call in question his report, which, so far as it goes, is undeniably more accurate than my own. What I have here written about it is to account to you for what might otherwise appear an omission of duty on my part.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

HOG. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

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I have reason to believe that the removal of the casus belli in the Trent affair, has proved a most serious obstacle in the way of all the calculations made by the party disposed to sow dissension between the two countries. The expectations that have been raised of a pressure from the manufacturing classes to break the blockade in order to obtain cotton are likewise declining. The stock is yet quite large, and, taken in conjunction with what is known to be coming, it is believed to be sufficient to keep the mills going at the present rate for six months longer. The large manufacturers have become pretty well reconciled to the reduction of their product, from a conviction that the business had already been overdone, and must have ceased to yield any returns had it been continued longer on the former scale. Such being the ruined condition of the old programme, it has been found necessary to direct attention to the preparation of something new. The chief support of the latest schemes is to be traced to the supposed policy of the Emperor of the French. It is believed here that he has already made overtures to the British government to enter a protest against the blockade as in manner and substance too cruelly effective in some respects and very ineffective in others. It is also affirmed that he begins to consider it time to agitate the subject of recognition of the Confederate States. I cannot say that the evidence that has been furnished to me on these points is entirely satisfactory, but it is sufficiently so to make it my duty to mention it. Doubtless your sources of information in Paris will give you more precise knowledge of the truth than I can do here. My main purpose in alluding to it is to call your attention to a singular development made of the policy adopted by the confederate emissaries here with a view to fortify the movement of their allies in this country. The substance of it has been disclosed by a publication in the Edinburgh Scotsman, a well-conducted paper, whose sources of information I have beretofore found to be good. I take from its issue on Saturday last, the 11th of January, the following extract:

"There exists in London an active and growing party, including many M. P.'s, having for its object an immediate recognition of the southern confederacy, on certain understood terms. This party is in communication with the quasi representatives of the south in London, and gives out that it sees its way to a desirable arrangement. Our information is that the south, acting through its London agents, is at least willing to have it understood that, in consideration of immediate recognition and the disregard of the 'paper blockade,' it would engage for these three things: a treaty of free trade, the prohibition of all import of slaves, and the freedom of all blacks born hereafter. It will easily be seen that if any such terms were offered (but we hesitate to believe the last of them) a pressure in favor of the south would come upon the British government from more than one formidable section of our public."

I have reason for believing that some such project as this has been actually entertained by the confederate emissaries. The pressure of the popular feeling against slavery is so great here that their friends feel it impossible to hope to stem it without some such plea in extenuation as can be made out of an offer to do something for ultimate emancipation. Of course no man

acquainted with the true state of things in America can believe for an instant the existence of one particle of good faith in any professions of this kind that may be countenanced by the rebel emissaries here. But I have thought it might not be without its use to recommend that the fact of their sanction of such an agitation should be made known pretty generally in the United States, especially among the large class of friends of the Union in the border States. If the issue of this contest is to be emancipation with the aid of Great Britain, surely the object for which the rebellion against our government was initiated-the protection and perpetuation of slaveryceases to be a motive for resisting it further. If the course of the emissaries here be unauthorized, it ought to be exposed here to destroy all further confidence in them. If, on the contrary, it be authorized, it should be equally exposed to the people in the slaveholding States. In either event the eyes of the people both in Europe and America will be more effectually opened to a conviction of the nature and certain consequences of this great struggle. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

No. 105.]

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, January 24, 1862.

SIR: The only event of any importance connected with American affairs that has happened during the last week is the revocation of the orders prohibiting the exportation of arms and munitions of war. This will release

the large quantity of saltpetre in the hands of parties here, and will probably renew the activity of the confederate emissaries in forwarding supplies to the insurgents. Mr. Davy reports to me the arrival of the Bermuda at Hartlepool. Though it is denied that she is to be despatched again, I am inclined to believe it only a pretence in order to quiet suspicion. In the meanwhile the relative position of the Nashville and of the Tuscarora in the harbor of Southampton remains unchanged. On the other hand, the Sumter, having been warned to leave Cadiz, has put into Gibraltar, after capturing two vessels. This tendency to take refuge in British ports is becoming so annoying to the government here that I shall not be surprised if the limit of twenty-four hours' stay be soon adopted.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

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SIR: Your despatch of January 10, No. 99, has been received.

If it be true, as you seem to think possible, that we have only averted an occasion for the hostilities which the British government indicated, and have not at all removed the cause of those hostilities, we still have every

reason to be satisfied with our course in the Trent affair. The American people could not have been united in a war which, being waged to maintain Captain Wilkes's act of force, would have practically been a voluntary war against Great Britain. At the same time it would have been a war in 1861 against Great Britain for a cause directly the opposite of the cause for which we waged war against the same power in 1812.

We shall practice towards Great Britain not only justice, but moderation, and even liberality, in all the exciting transactions which this unhappy domestic contest of ours shall produce. We have not left Great Britain in doubt of our own confidence in our ability to maintain the integrity of the Union, or of our grounds for it, notwithstanding the embarrassment which we experience in the indirect support which the insurgents derive from nations whose rights we have invariably respected. We are not unaware, nor do we complain of the impatience in Europe which exacts from us quick and conclusive victories. We can excuse it because, even among ourselves at home, there is a failure to apprehend that the insurrection has disclosed itself over an area of vast extent, and that military operations, to be successful, must be on a scale hitherto practically unknown in the art of war. At the same time we are not unaware of the fact that the impatience of European nations is due chiefly to the inconveniences which they suffer from the contest, and not to a careful consideration of the strength and energies of the parties engaged in it. We have every motive they can have, and many other infinitely stronger motives, for bringing the war to the speediest possible successful conclusion. We expect that Great Britain will realize not only this truth, but another important one, namely, that any solution of this controversy by a division of the Union would be detrimental to British commerce and to British prestige. Believing this, we expect that Great Britain will not become a party in the contest against the United States. If, insensible to these considerations, the British government shall intervene, then we must meet the emergency with the spirit and resolution which become a great people.

The tone of the public virtue is becoming sounder and stronger every day. Military and naval operations go on with success, hindered only by the weather, which, for almost a month, has rendered the coasts unsafe and the roads impassable.

I have observed that the British people were satisfied with the vigor and the energy of the preparations which their government made for the war which they expected to occur between them and ourselves.

It may be profitable for us all to reflect that the military and naval preparations which have been made by this government to put down the insurrection have, every day since the first day of May last, equalled, if not surpassed, the daily proportion of those war preparations which were regarded as so demonstrative in Great Britain.

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SIR: I learn from reports received at the Navy Department from the commander of the American steamer Flambeau that, although the United States nave a deposit of coal at Nassau, our steamers are denied the right of taking it for use by the colonial authorities at that place.

I do not send you a formal statement of the fact, because, although it is presumed that those authorities have not acted under instructions from London, yet that they nevertheless must themselves have reported their proceedings to the home government. Justified, as I think, by this circumstance in assuming that the fact which I thus bring to your attention is already known to Earl Russell, I have to request you to ask from him an explanation of the proceeding, and to inquire whether we are to understand that the colonial ports are to be closed against our vessels-of-war when entering them for coal, or that such vessels are to be denied the right of supplying themselves from stores of our own lying in such ports. Liberal as we are in all our intercourse with the British government in American waters, the President declines to believe that that government has sanctioned or will sanction the proceedings of the authorities at Nassau. Should you find this to be the fact, you will suggest to Earl Russell our desire that proper instructions may be given to the authorities there.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

No. 109.]

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, January 31, 1862.

SIR: The expectations of a declaration of some kind from the Emperor of the French on the subject of the American difficulty which might be made the basis of an agitation here have been disappointed. Whatever is to be done must be originated in Parliament by the avowed friends of the rebels. All the particular grounds of complaint against the United States have been successively removed from under them. The parties seized in the Trent are now safe on this side of the Atlantic. The blocking up of Charleston harbor is shown to be no real grievance. The inefficiency of the blockade is the only remaining proposition which it is attempted to support by evidence. Even that would be met by proof drawn from the admissions made by the insurgents at home, if it could have been supplied in a tolerably authentic form. I regret that I have not at my command any official tabular statement of the number of vessels turned off or taken during the period of blockade, or evidence of the price of the various commodities of foreign growth or manufacture rendered scarce by the operations of the blockading force. But inasmuch as the government is obviously disinclined to sustain an objection of this kind just now, the probability is that nothing will be made out of it. There is, then, not a particle of solid material for the dissatisfaction with the government of the United States, based on its own policy, to make a quarrel out of. Resort must then be had to the simple objection that the rebellion has not been suppressed. This will be urged as justifiable cause for early recognition; and upon that issue the sense of the House of Commons will probably be sooner or later taken. At this moment it is impossible to estimate the strength of parties, or the character of the division. The impression is that the conservatives generally favor such a measure, of which thus far I see no evidence beyond the general tendency of one or two newspapers in that interest, which I have had occasion to suspect not to be trustworthy organs. I am rather inclined to the belief that this subject has not yet become a party question in the eyes of the members of either side. Each individual, therefore, indulges his partic

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