Title to submerged land. Owner of land bordering shore line owns bed of river to center. McGill v. Thrasher (Ky., 1927), 299 S. W. 955.

State law determines ownership of land under water of Lake Huron. Kavanaugh v. Baird (Mich., 1928), 217 N. W. 2.

Title to land under waters of Lake Huron when Michigan became State passed to latter in trust for people. Id.

State Constitution held to give State right to determine matters concerning title to land covered by navigable waters, subject to Federal Government's authority in navigation matters and disposal before statehood. Angelo v. Railroad Commission (Wis., 1928), 217 N. W. 570.

Bed of navigable lake is "land" to which State has title, subject to trust for navigation. Id.

Federal control of navigable waters is limited, and leaves much of State's authority untouched. Deering v. Martin (Fla., 1928), 116 So. 54; Biscayne Co. v. Martin (Fla., 1927), 116 So. 66.

1

Navigable waters and lands thereunder are property of the people of State in united and sovereign capacity. Id.

Title to center of beds of navigable rivers and streams is in riparian owners, subject to public rights of navigation. Id.

Beds of navigable streams within limits of State are not owned by United States. People ex rel. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co. v. State Tax Commission (N. Y., 1928), 159 N. E. 703.

Owners of uplands hold title to bed of most rivers in New York, with possible exceptions of Hudson and Mohawk Rivers. Id.

Title to beds of navigable rivers passed from United States to State on its admission into Union, together with islands in river which State may transfer to counties for school purposes. Hecker v. Bleish (Mo.,

1928), 3 S. W. (2d) 1008.

The ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters within the limits of the several States belong to the respective States within which they are found. Money v. Wood (Miss., 1928), 118 So. 357. The lands under navigable waters, including the shore or spaces between ordinary high and low water marks, are the property of the State or of the people, held for the use of all the people. McCormick v. Chicago Yacht Club (Ill., 1928), 163 N. E. 418.

Federal Government could cede to Indian tribe tideland and submerged land held by it by virtue of its sovereignty. Taylor v. U. S. (C. C. A., 1930), 44 F. (2d) 531, reversing (D. C., 1929), 33 F. (2d) 608, holding that order setting out Indian reservation did not include submerged lands; certiorari denied (1931), 283 U. S. 820.

Navigable waters in State, and lands thereunder, including shore lands, are property of State in sovereign capacity for use of people thereof. Pembroke et ux. v. Peninsular Terminal Co. (Fla., 1933), 146 So. 249.

Subject to paramount authority of Congress over interstate commerce and navigable waters, and subject to vested private property rights, and trust under which State holds such lands for public benefit, State has full power to legislate concerning disposition and use of navigable waters and lands thereunder, within State's territorial limits (Const. U. S., art. 1, sec. 8). Id.

One purchasing tide lands under navigable waters held chargeable with notice of State's police power and paramount power of Congress under commerce clause. Id.

The paramount title of the Government in the bed of a navigable stream for the purpose of improvement of navigation embraces not only that portion continuously submerged but also that portion of the soil above lowwater mark and below ordinary and usual high-water mark, known generally as the shore and banks of the stream; and the title of a riparian owner to land below ordinary high-water mark on a navigable stream is subservient to the Government's title for navigation purposes without liability of the Government for compensation under the fifth amendment to the Constitution. Marret, Admr. et al. v. U. S. (1936) 82 Ct. Cl. 1. Riparian owner's title to bed of river is not availing against absolute power of Congress to improve navigation, and Government can cause removal of obstruction in river bed and forbid injurious use of river or cut off riparian owner from direct access to deep water. Continental Land Co. v. U. S. (C. C. A., 1937), 88 F. (2d) 104.

Federal Government, when it elects to exercise right, has complete and paramount control over all navigable waters within its boundaries and of land beneath such waters insofar as its use or improvement may affect navigation.

State owns land lying beneath navigable waters within its territorial limits subject to paramount right of control of Federal Government. Adams v. Carey (Md., 1937), 190 A. 815.

The ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tidewaters or navigable lakes with States belong to the respective States within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof when that can be done without substantial impairment of the public's interest in those waters, and subject to the paramount right of Congress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce. McNeely & Price Co. v. Philadelphia Piers (Pa., 1938), 196 A. 846.

Public has right to navigate in waters forming Lake Erie or its open bays, regardless whether they are navigable in legal sense. East Bay Sporting Club v. Miller (Ohio, 1928), 161 N. E. 12.

"Public right of navigation" entitles public generally to reasonable use of navigable waters for legitimate purposes of transportation and for boating or sailing for pleasure in any kind of water craft consistent with enjoyment of right by others. Silver Springs Paradise Co. v. Ray (C. C. A., 1931), 50 F. (2d) 356; certiorari denied (1931), 284 U. S. 649.

Rights of riparian owners.-Consent of Secretary of War is necessary before one may take sand from a navigable stream. Kessinger v. Standard Oil Co. (1925), 245 Ill. App. 376.

Riparian owner removing sand from bed of navigable river without consent of Secretary of War held not entitled to recover damages from one interfering therewith. Id. Riparian owner is entitled to enjoin excavation and removal of sand from bed of a navigable stream as against others than Federal Government. Id.

State may make limited disposition of, or permit use of, land under navigable waters. when people's rights as to navigation and other uses are not necessarily impaired.

Id.

Riparian owners on navigable stream own land to center of stream, and public has only easements for purpose of navigation. Id.

Board of supervisors held unauthorized to grant permission to riparian owners to build bridge from island to shore of navigable lake. Morgan v. Kloss (Mich., 1928), 221 N. W. 113.

That title in lands submerged by public waters may by accretion or reliction pass to riparian owners does not change rule that State has title. Angelo v. Railroad Commission (Wis., 1928), 217 N. W. 570,

Statute held not to give persons removing material from navigable lake's bed leave to invade or injure riparian owner's rights and privileges. Id.

Riparian owner has right of access to navigable waters extending from meander line. Kavanaugh v. Baird (Mich., 1928), 217 N. W. 2.

Right of access to navigable waters of Great Lakes does not entitle littoral owner to fee in lands under water. Id.

Changes by accretion and reliction do not change State's title or rights of riparian owners in lands under waters of Great Lakes when State was admitted to Union. Id.

If sale of submerged lands would interfere with rights of riparian owners, or seriously impede navigation or public fisheries,

should not sell lands. even without formal objection. Deering v. Martin (Fla., 1928), 116 So. 54; Biscayne Co. v. Martin (Fla., 1927), 116 So. 66.

Owners of land along navigable streams have right to use of water in its accustomed flow. Onondaga Water Service Corporation v. Crown Mills (1928), 230 N. Y. Supp. 691.

Riparian owner having qualified title to submerged soil is entitled to no preference over public generally with respect to use of navigable waters, whether for navigation, business, or pleasure., Silver Springs Paradise Co. v. Ray (C. C. A., 1931), 50 F. (2d) 356, certiorari denied (1931), 284 U. S. 649.

Carrying of passengers for hire in glassbottom boats on navigable waters for sightseeing purposes held exercise of public right of navigation, and therefore such use of waters by another could not be enjoined by riparian owners, notwithstanding his ownership of submerged land. Id.

Ownership by riparian owner of land between high- and low-water marks is limited by State's right to improve for public use without compensation, City of Philadelphia v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C., 1934), 12 F. Supp. 647.

Riparian owner has right of access to navigable part of river from front of his lot and right to make landing, wharf, or pier, subject to legislative regulations. Id.

Riparian owner's right of access is for purpose of navigation or use of stream as navigable water, and necessarily includes right to dredge bed thereof for such purpose unless improvement interferes with paramount public right. Id.

Riparian right of access to navigable part of river is property. Id.

"Riparian rights" is defined as the rights of the owner of lands on water to maintain his adjacency to it and to profit by such advantage and is also defined as a right to preserve and improve the connection of his property with the water which rights are not common to the citizens at large, but exist as incidents to the right of the soil itself contiguous to and attingent on the water. Hillebrand v. Knapp (S. D., 1937), 274 N. W. 821.

Riparian boundaries.-Title of riparian owner to thread of stream extends only to land included within his lateral lines as extended. McGill v. Thrasher (Ky., 1927), 299 S. W. 955.

Unless prior grant is shown by owners of mainland, patentee of island has title to thread of stream between island and mainland. Id.

Shoaling and elevation of river bottom held not to affect question of State boundary, designated as river channel. Veatch v. White (C. C. A, 1927), 23 F. (2d) 69.

Id.

At common law, State boundary on stream follows any changes in stream due to accretion, but remains in middle of old channel in case of "avulsion." State ex. Inf. Mansur v. Huffman (Mo., 1928), 2 S. W. (2d) 582. Shore and spaces between high- and lowwater marks are property of State for use in navigation, commerce, fishing, and other purposes. Deering v. Martin (Fla., 1928), 116 So. 54; Biscayne Co. v. Martin (Fla., 1927), 116 So. 66.

Where accretions form to land bordering on running water, boundary line of riparian owner remains stream on which land originally bordered.

Where running stream which is boundary, suddenly abandons its old and seeks new bed. called "avulsion," boundary of riparian land remains in center of old channel. Stull v. U. S. (C. C. A., 1932), 61 F. (2d) 826.

Addition to land abutting one of Great Lakes, caused by accretions due in part to erection of artificial structures on adjacent property, belongs to riparian owner. Brundage v. Knox (Ill., 1917), 117 N. E. 123.

Law of accretion applies to boundaries on Missouri River. State ex. inf. Mansur v. Huffman (Mo., 1928), 2 S. W. (2d) 582.

Riparian owner has no title to land attaching to river bank by reason of accretion to island in Missouri River. Hecker v. Bleish (Mo., 1928), 3 S. W. (2d) 1008.

That riparian land, title to which was quieted in predecessor in title, was described by metes and bounds both in decree and in conveyance to claimant, held not to prevent accretions attaching to conveyance, where large part of land embraced within description was accretion land, thus indicating intention that accretions should attach to conveyance. Harrington v. Foster (Iowa, 1935). 264 N. W. 51.

An "accretion" to land is a gradual and imperceptible increase thereof through operation of natural causes, as by alluvium naturally added to land on bank of river by contiguous waters. Mercurio v. Duncan (Neb., 1936), 269 N. W. 901.

An "avulsion" is a rapid and sudden change of its channel by a boundary stream from any cause, whereby it abandons old bed and seeks new one. Id.

Where banks of running stream are changed by accretion, the stream remains as riparian owner's boundary. Id.

Where boundary stream suddenly changes channel and seeks new bed, boundary remains at center of old channel.

Id.

Where public lands bordering Missouri river were obliterated by an avulsion of river, Government lost title thereto the same as a private owner, and land formed as re

Under statute recognizing acquisition of land by riparian owner by accretion and reliction, the mere temporary recession of waters occasioned by seasons does not constitute "reliction" in sense of addition to contiguous lands (Rev. Code 1919, sec. 498, et seq.). Hillebrand v. Knapp (S. D., 1937), 274 N. W. 821.

Tide-water boundaries.-Boundary line between lands described in United States patent as bordering on ocean, and city's tidelands adjacent thereto, must be located along line of mean high tide arrived at by averaging all high tides, including both spring and neap tides (St. Cal. 1911, p. 1256, sec. 1). City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consolidated Limited (C. C. A., 1935), 74 F. (2d) 901; affirmed (1935), 296 U. S. 10.

Test of navigability.-Rivers are navigable in fact when used or susceptible of use in their ordinary condition as highways of commerce. Davis v. Gulf & I. Ry. Co. of Texas (C. C. A., 1929), 31 F. (2d) 109, affirming (D. C., 1928) 26 F. (2d) 930.

Whether stream is navigable in law depends upon whether it is navigable in fact. State of Arizona v. State of California (1931), 283 U. S. 423; Board of Hudson River Regulating Dist. v. Fonda, J. & G. R. Co. (1928), 228 N. Y. Supp. 686.

Where stream has not been used in commerce, commerce actually in esse or at least in all reasonable possibility in posse, is essential to "navigability." Gulf & I. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Davis (D. C., 1928), 26 F. (2d) 930.

Navigability in fact is test of navigability in law. Board of Hudson River Regulating Dist. v. Fonda, J. & G. R. Co. (1928), 228 N. Y. Supp. 686.

Waters capable of use in ordinary condition as highways for commerce on water are "navigable." East Bay Sporting Club v. Miller (Ohio, 1928), 161 N. E. 12.

Test of navigability in fact of lake is whether lake in natural condition is susceptible of being used as highway for commerce in customary modes of trade on water. Lake to be navigable should be of practicable public usefulness in its natural state and must have useful capacity as highway of transportation, which must be established by clear evidence. U. S. v. Ladley (D. C., 1930), 42 F. (2d) 474.

Commercial disuse resulting from changed geographical conditions and lack of congressional action does not amount to abandonment of navigable river or prohibit future exercise of Federal control. Id.

Navigability of water is, to some extent, question of fact. Deering v. Martin (Fla., 1928), 116 So. 54; Biscayne Co. v. Martin (Fla., 1927), 116 So. 66.