(8) Anything which invites public attention or criticism (r).—The contents of a pamphlet (s), advertisement (†), or handbill issued to the public(u); or a stage-play (v).

ART. 22.-Privilege.

In certain cases, even though the matter complained of is defamatory, in the interests of public policy, no liability attaches to the publication thereof in other words, the occasion is privileged.

Privileged occasions are of two kinds :-I. Occasions of absolute privilege, where no action lies, however untrue or malicious (x) the statements may have been. This exists in the following cases :—

(1.) Statements made in parliament or in the course of judicial, naval, military, or state proceedings. (Art. 23, p. 90, infra.)

(r) Morrison v. Belcher (1863), 3 F. & F. 614; Duplany v. Davis (1887), 3 Times L. R. 184.

(s) Hibbs v. Wilkinson (1859), 1 F. & F. 608; Konig v. Ritchie (1862), 3 F. & F. 413; Odger v. Mortimer (1871), 28 L. T. 472.

(t) Morrison and another v. Harmer and another (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 759; Hunter v. Sharpe (1866), 15 L. T. 421; 4 F. & F. 983.

(u) Eastwood v. Holmes (1858), 1 F. & F. 347; Paris v. Levy (1860), 30 L. J. C. P. 11; 3 L. T. 324; Jenner and another v. A' Beckett (1871), L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14; 25 L. T. 464.

(v) Merivale v. Carson (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 275 (C. A.).

(x) The terms "malicious" and "maliciously" are here and throughout used in the ordinary sense of any corrupt or

(2.) Reports, &c., published by order of parliament. (Art. 24, p. 95, infra.)

(3.) Reports in a newspaper (y) of proceedings in a court of justice if published contempora

neously with such proceedings. (Art. 25, p. 96, infra.)

II. Occasions of qualified privilege. Upon occasions of this kind, no action lies where the statement is made bona fide, and in a manner not exceeding what is reasonably necessary for the occasion. Proof of actual malice will rebut the prima facie protection afforded by such an occasion, and it is for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted in bad faith, not for the defendant to prove that he acted in good faith (z). Qualified privilege exists in the following cases :(1.) Reports other than those in a newspaper (y) of judicial proceedings; and reports in a newspaper of such proceedings, if not published contemporaneously with such proceedings. (Art. 26, p. 102, infra.)

2. Extracts from registers kept pursuant to statute. (Art. 27, p. 107, infra.)

(3.) Reports of proceedings in parliament. (Art. 28, p. 108, infra.)

(4.) Reports of proceedings of public meetings. (Art. 29, p. 109, infra.)

wrong motive, or as it is technically called "malice in fact," as to which, see Article 36, p. 138, infra.

(y) As to the meaning of "newspaper," see p. 98, infra.

(z) Clark v. Molyneux (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 237; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; Jenoure v. Delmege, (1891) App. Cas. 73; 60 L. J. P.

(5.) Reports of vestry meetings, &c. (Art. 30, p. 116, infra.)

(6.) Notices and reports published at request of government office or authority. (Art. 31, p. 119, infra.)

(7.) Statements made to a public servant or other person in authority with the object of preventing or punishing crime, or redressing a public grievance. (Art. 32, p. 120, infra.) (8.) Statements made with the object of protecting some interest of the writer or speaker, and reasonably necessary for such purpose. (Art. 33, p. 122, infra.)

(9.) Statements made with the object of protecting an interest common to the writer or speaker and the person to whom the statement is made. (Art. 34, p. 125, infra.)

(10.) Statements made in discharge of a legal, moral, or social duty. (Art. 35, p. 130, infra.)

NOTE. "A confusion is often made between a privileged communication and a privileged occasion. It is for the jury to say whether a communication was privileged; but the question whether an occasion was privileged is for the judge, and that question only arises when there has been publication to a third party" (a). In other words, "whether or not the occasion gives that privilege is a question of law for the judge; but

(a) Per Lopes, L. J., in Pullman v. Hill & Co., (1891) 1 Q. B. at p. 529,

whether or not the party has fairly and properly conducted himself in the exercise of it is a question for the jury" (b). "It is the duty of the judge to determine whether an occasion is privileged or not; and if it is, and if there is no evidence of malice to go to the jury, it is his duty to enter judgment for the defendant. On the other hand, if the occasion is not privileged, or if there is any evidence of malice, then the case must be left to the jury" (c).

It is, however, frequently a matter of great difficulty to determine whether or not a particular occasion is privileged. As was pointed out by Erle, C. J., in Whiteley v. Adams (d), in a passage which was lately cited, with approval by Lopes, L. J. (e): "Judges who have had from time to time to deal with questions as to whether the occasion justified the speaking or the writing of defamatory matter, have all felt great difficulty in defining what kind of social or moral duty, or what amount of interest, will afford a justification; but all are clear that it is a question for the judge to decide."

Again, in the words of Lindley, L. J., in a recent case in the Court of Appeal (ƒ): “The

(b) Per Lord Campbell, C. J., in Dickson v. Earl of Wilton (1859), 1 F. & F. at p. 419.

(c) Per Lindley, L. J., in Stuart v. Bell, (1891) 2 Q. B. at p. 345.

(d) (1863) 15 C. B. N. S. at p. 418.

(e) In Allbutt v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1889), 23 Q. B. D. at p. 413.

(f) Stuart v. Bell, (1891) 2 Q. B. at p. 246.

reason for holding any occasion privileged is common convenience and welfare of society, and it is obvious that no definite line can be drawn so as to mark off with precision those occasions which are privileged, and separate them from those which Coxhead v. Richards (g), in which four eminent judges were equally divided upon the question whether an occasion was privileged or not, is a striking illustration of the truth of the remark."

are not.

ART. 23.-Statements made in parliament or in the course of judicial, naval, military, or state proceedings.

Every statement made in parliament or in the course of judicial, naval, military, or state proceedings is absolutely privileged, and no action lies therefor however false and malicious such statement may have been.

NOTE. 1.-In parliament. No member is in any way liable for anything said in the House (h), but this privilege does not attach to anything said outside the walls of the House, nor to a speech printed and privately circulated outside the House (i).

A qualified privilege, i.e., a privilege rebuttable

(g) (1846) 2 C. B. 569.

(h) Bill of Rights, 1 Will. & M. st. 2, c. 2.

(i) Rex v. Abingdon (1794), 1 Esp. 226; Rex v. Creevey (1813), 1 M. & S. 273.