c. 5), which came into operation on May 1st, 1890, the Acts relating to lunatics have been consolidated. Under that Act the jurisdiction of the judge in lunacy is exercised either by the Lord Chancellor, entrusted by the sign manual with the care and commitment of the custody of the persons and estates of lunatics, acting alone, or jointly with any one or more of such judges of the Supreme Court as may for the time being be entrusted as aforesaid (s. 108). This Act is amended by the Lunacy Act, 1891.

No other judge of the Supreme Court can exercise the special jurisdiction in Lunacy, and when in the Act the term Lord Chancellor merely is used no other person has jurisdiction to act (d).

A lunatic, so found, must sue by his committee as co-plaintiff with him; if not so found, or if he has not a committee, or if the committee has some interest adverse to the lunatic, then by his next friend (e). The committee must obtain the sanction of the Court of Lunacy before suing. This is done by summons before the master in lunacy, supported by an affidavit showing that the proceedings are necessary. The master will then grant a certificate of approval which must be subsequently approved by the judge (ƒ).

(d) Pope on Lunacy, 2nd ed. p. 30. See Re B, (1892) 1 Ch. p. 462.

(e) Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Ord. XVI. r. 17; and see the notes thereto in the Annual Practice for 1893, pp. 368, 369.

(f) Ibid.

A lunatic defends in the same way by his committee, if he has one, who must obtain the above sanction. If he has no committee, or the interest of the committee is adverse, an appearance should be entered for him, and then an application made by motion or by petition of course for the appointment of a guardian ad litem (g).

NOTE 4. The right of action in respect of a libel or slander upon a person who is subsequently adjudicated bankrupt does not pass to the trustee for his creditors, "although the injury occasioned thereby may have been the sole cause of his bankruptcy "(h), and any damages which he may recover do not pass to his trustee under sect. 44 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (i). "Assignees of a bankrupt are not to make a profit of a man's wounded feelings; causes of action therefore, which are, as in this case, purely personal, do not pass to the assignees, but the right to sue remains with the bankrupt " (k).

Further, the bankrupt may sue for a libel or slander upon him published during his bankruptcy (1), and his trustee cannot intercept any

(g) Ibid. See also Burt v. Blackburn (1887), 3 Times L. R.

356.

(h) Per Alderson, B., in Howard v. Crowther (1841), 8 M. & W. at p. 604.

(i) Drake v. Beckham (1849), 2 H. of L. 579.

(k) Per Lord Abinger, in Howard v. Crowther (1841), 8 M. & W. at p. 604.

(1) Ex parte Graham, Re Job (1870), 21 L. T. 802; Ex parte Vine, Re Wilson (1878), L. R. 8 Ch. D. 364; 47 L. J. Bank. 116; 38 L. T. 327, 730.

damages which he may recover in such an action, or prevent the bankrupt from expending them in the maintenance of himself and his family (7). "If the bankrupt had accumulated the money, and had invested it in some property, that property might be reached by the trustee" (m). It would appear that the defendant cannot obtain an order for security for costs (n), except where the plaintiff has been adjudicated bankrupt pending the action (o).

(7) See note (7) on previous page.

(m) Per James, L. J., in Ex parte Vine, Re Wilson (1878), 8 Ch. D. at p. 366.

(n) Cook v. Whellock (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 658.

(0) In re Carta Para Mining Co. (1881), 19 Ch. D. 457; 51 L. J. Ch. 191; 46 L. T. 406.

ART. 17.-Corporations and companies.

A corporation or company can sue for a libel affecting its property (p); it can also sue for slander in relation to its trade or business. It is liable for libel or slander published by its servants or agents, where such publication has been expressly authorized (q), or in the case of libel where such publication is within the scope of the general duties of such servants or agents (r).

NOTE. In order that a corporation or company may sue for libel or slander, it is obvious that the words complained of must injuriously affect the corporation or company as distinct from the individuals which compose it. And it is clear that not every charge which would be defamatory if made against a private individual, is necessarily so if made against a corporation or company. Thus the latter "could not sue in respect of an imputation of murder or incest or adultery, because it could not commit those crimes. Nor could it sue in respect of a charge of corruption; for a corporation cannot be guilty of corruption, although the individuals composing it may

(p) Mayor, &c. of Manchester v. Williams, (1891) 1 Q. B. 94.

(q) Yarborough v. Bank of England (1812), 16 East, 6; Latimer v. Western Morning News (1871), 25 L. T. 44 ; Abrath v. North Eastern Rail. Co. (1886), 11 App. Cas. 253, 254; 55 L. J. Q. B. 466.

(r) Whitfield v. S. E. R. Co. (1858), E. B. & E. 115; 27 L. J. Q. B. 229.

"The

be" (s). The words complained of will usually affect the corporation or company in its method of conducting its affairs, will accuse it of fraud or mismanagement, or will attack its financial position, in all of which cases an action will lie. limits of a corporation's right of action for libel are those suggested by Pollock, C. B., in the case which has been referred to. A A corporation may sue for a libel affecting property, not for one merely affecting personal reputation" (†); and therefore, where in an action for libel brought by a corporation the Statement of Claim alleged that the defendant had charged the plaintiffs with corrupt practices, but contained no allegation of special damage, it was held that inasmuch as a corporation as distinguished from the individuals composing it cannot be guilty of corrupt practices, the Statement of Claim disclosed no cause of action.

Where, however, a libel on a corporation is in effect a libel on its members, then, provided they can prove that the defamatory statement applies to them, they are entitled to maintain an action in their own name (u).

(s) Per Pollock, C. B., in Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins (1859), 4 H. & N. at p. 90.

(t) Per Day, J., in Mayor, &c. of Manchester v. Williams, (1891) 1 Q. B. at p. 96.

(u) See Booth v. Briscoe and Others (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 496 (C. A.), and pp. 6, 7, 50, supra.