where words impute dishonesty or corruption, as in this case, where the office is an office of credit, and the party charged with inclinations and principles which show him unfit, and that he ought to be removed, which is a disgrace”(†). In the recent case of Alexander v. Jenkins (u), in the Court of Appeal, Lord Herschell pointed out that "the ground upon which the action has been said to be maintainable" in the case of offices of honour or credit "would seem to be this, that the language used has been such as, if true, would show that the man ought to be deprived of his office, and therefore involves a risk of exclusion from that office"(x). In the course of his judgment(y) Lord Herschell laid down the rule "that where the imputation is an imputation not of misconduct in an office, but of unfitness for an office, and the office for which the person is said to be unfit is not an office of profit, but one merely of what has been called honour or credit, the action will not lie, unless the conduct charged be such as would enable him to be removed or deprived of that office." It was accordingly held that, without proof of special damage, no action lay where the plaintiff had been elected to the office of town councillor for (t) Per cur. in How v. Prinn (1702), 2 Salk. at p. 694. Judgment for the plaintiff affirmed in the House of Lords 7 Mod. 113; 1 Bro. P. C. 97. (u) (1892) 1 Q. B. 797. a borough, and the words complained of were: "He is never sober, and is not a fit man for the council. On the night of the election he was so drunk that he had to be carried home"; for the office of town councillor was not one of profit, and the charges if true afforded no ground for dismissing the plaintiff from his office (b). THE LEARNED PROFESSIONS. THE CHURCH. It is actionable without proof of special damage to say anything defamatory of a clergyman who "was beneficed or was in the actual receipt of professional temporal emolument as a preacher, lecturer, or the like at the time of the speaking of the words (provided that) the charge, if true, would have been a cause of deprivation of the benefice in the first case, and also of degradation from orders, and consequently of the loss of the emoluments, in the other cases" (c). On the other hand, where the plaintiff does not hold a benefice or office from which he might be removed, an action will not lie without proof of special damage (d). (b) Alexander v. Jenkins, supra, p. 31; see also Onslow v. Horne (1771), 2 W. Bl. 750. (c) Per Pollock, C. B., in Gallwey v. Marshall (1853), 9 Ex., at p. 299. (d) Hartley v. Herring (1799), 8 T. R. 130; Hopwood v. Thorn (1850), 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94. Thus it is actionable without proof of special damage to accuse a beneficed clergyman of preaching false doctrine (e); or to impute to him immorality(ƒ), or misappropriation of the sacrament money (g). But it is not actionable per se to charge him with fraud (h), or intemperance (i), unless such charge affects him in his professional character. MEDICINE. To impute to any medical man that he is professionally ignorant (k), unskilful (1), or negligent (m) in the discharge of his professional duties, or to say that he is a quack (n), is actionable per se. (e) Dr. Sibthorpe's case (1628), W. Jones, 366; 1 Roll. Abr. 76. (f) Evans v. Gwyn (1844), 5 Q. B. 844; Gallwey v. Marshall (1854), 9 Ex. 294; 23 L. J. Ex. 78; Highmore v. Countess of Harrington (1857), 3 C. B. N. S. 142. (g) Highmore v. Countess of Harrington, supra. (h) Pemberton v. Colls (1847), 10 Q. B. 461; 16 L. J. Q. B. 403. (i) Cucks v. Starre (1633), Cro. Car. 285. (k) Tutty v. Alewin (1770), 11 Mod. 221; Collier v. Simpson (1831), 5 C. & P. 73. (1) Southee v. Denny (1848), 1 Ex. 196; 17 L. J. Ex. 151. (m) Edsall v. Russell (1843), 12 L. J. C. P. 4. (n) Allen v. Eaton, 1 Roll. Abr. 54; Goddart v. Haselfoot, 1 Roll. Abr. 54. F. D THE LAW. It is actionable, without proof of special damage, to accuse a solicitor of cheating in his profession (0), or of being grossly ignorant of law (p), or of betraying his client's secrets (q), or of acting unprofessionally ("); but not of cheating persons who are not his clients on occasions in no way connected with his business (s). So to say of a barrister that he knows no law (t), or is not fit to be a lawyer (u), or gives bad advice (x), or has deceived his client and revealed the secrets of his cause (y), is actionable per se (x). OTHER PROFESSIONS. Similarly, to impute incapacity to an architect (2), a land agent or surveyor (a), journalist, schoolmaster (6), or veterinary surgeon (bb), is actionable per se. (0) Jenkins v. Smith (1621), Cro. Jac. 586; Anon. (1638), Cro. Jac. 516. (p) Baker v. Morfue (1668), Sid. 327; 2 Keb. 202; Day v. Buller (1770), 3 Wils. 59. (q) Martyn v. Burlings (1597), Cro. Eliz. 589. (r) Byrchley's case (1585), 4 Rep. 16; Phillips v. Jansen (1798), 2 Esp. 624. (s) Doyley v. Roberts (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 835. (t) Bankes v. Allen, 1 Roll. Abr. 54. (u) Peard v. Jones (1635), Cro. Car. 382. (x) King v. Lake (1672), 2 Ventr. 28. (y) Snag v. Gray, 1 Roll. Abr. 57. (z) Botterill and another v. Whytehead (1879), 41 L. T. 588. (a) London v. Eastgate, 2 Rolle's Rep. 72. (b) Hume v. Marshall (1878), 42 J. P. 136. (bb) Hirst v. Goodwin (1862), 3 F. & F. 257. MERCHANTS AND TRADESMEN. To accuse a merchant or tradesman of fraud or dishonesty (c) in the way of his business-e. g. to say that he adulterates his goods (d), or uses false weights or measures (e) is actionable without proof of special damage. "Such would be the case with any words which imputed to a man fraudulent conduct in the business whereby he gained his bread " (ƒ). Also "words imputing insolvency to a person in the way of his trade are actionable, without proof of special damage" (g). So, too, are words which impute that a merchant or tradesman is in financial difficulty (h). In short, 66 'whatever hurts a man in his business is actionable" (i). (c) Crawfoot v. Dale (1675), 1 Vent. 263; 3 Salk. 327; Thomas v. Jackson (1825), 3 Bing. 104. (d) Jesson v. Hayes (1636), Roll. Abr. 63. (e) Griffiths v. Lewis (1846), 7 Q. B. 61; 15 L. J. Q. B. 249. (f) Per Best, C. J., in Thomas v. Jackson (1825), 3 Bing. at p. 105. (g) Per Lord Denman, C. J., in Robinson v. Marchant (1845), 15 L. J. Q. B. at p. 136. (h) Barnes v. Holloway (1799), 8 T. R. 150; Whittington v. Gladwin (1825), 5 B. & C. 180; 2 C. & P. 146; Brown v. Smith (1853), 13 C. B. 596; 22 L. J. C. P. 151. (i) Per Bayley, J., in Whittington v. Gladwin (1825), 2 C. & P. at p. 148. D 2 |