or of gratuitous hospitality (n), for a dinner at a friend's expense is a thing of some temporal value (o). So too the loss of a marriage (p) or of the consortium of one's husband is enough (9); but not strained relations and the probability of a divorce (r), or the loss of friends (s), or mental pain or distress or bodily illness (t), for "bodily pain or suffering cannot be said to be the natural result in all persons" (u), nor even expulsion from a religious society (x). "The risk of temporal loss is not the same as temporal loss" (y), and therefore no action will lie for speaking disparaging words of a candidate of a club, in consequence of which the majority of the club refuse to change

(n) Moore v. Meagher (1807), 1 Taunt. 39; 3 Smith, 135; Lynch v. Knight (1861), 9 H. L. C. 577; 8 Jur. N. S. 724; 5 L. T. 291.

(0) Davies and Wife v. Solomon (1871), L. R. 7 Q. B. 112; 41 L. J. Q. B. 10.

(p) Davis v. Gardiner (1593), 4 Rep. 16; 2 Salk. 694; Holwood v. Hopkins (1600), Cro. Eliz. 787; Matthew v. Crass (1614), Cro. Jac. 323; Nelson v. Staff (1618), Cro. Jac. 422. (q) Per Lord Campbell in Lynch v. Knight and Wife (1861), 9 H. L. C. at p. 589.

(r) Barmund's case (1619), Cro. Jac. 473.

(s) Barnes v. Bruddel (1669), 1 Vent. 4; Weldon v. De Bathe (1884), 33 W. R. 328; 54 L. J. Q. B. 113; 53 L. T. 520.

(t) Allsop and Wife v. Allsop (1860), 5 H. & N. 534; 29 L. J. Ex. 315.

(u) Per Pollock, C. B., in Allsop and Wife v. Allsop (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. at p. 317.

(x) Roberts v. Roberts (1864), 5 B. & S. 384; 33 L. J. Q. B. 249; but see Barnabas v. Traunter (1641), 1 Vin. Abr. 396.

(y) Per Bowen, L. J., in Chamberlain v. Boyd (1883), 11 Q. B. D. at p. 416.

the rules in such a way as to improve the chances of his election (2).

It used to be thought that the loss of general business, as distinct from the loss of specific custom, was not admissible in evidence as special damage to support an action for words not actionable per se. Having regard to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal (a), however, it would seem, that where the statement complained of "in its very nature is intended, or reasonably likely to produce, and in the ordinary course of things does produce, a general loss of business, as distinct from the loss of this or that known customer, evidence of such general decline of business is admissible"(b), and is sufficient to support an action for slander.

In the same case (c) the Court laid down the following general rules as to special damage: "The necessity of alleging and proving actual temporal loss with certainty and precision in all cases of the sort has been insisted upon for centuries. In all actions accordingly on the case, where the damage actually done is the gist of the action, the character of the acts themselves which produce the damage, and the circumstances under which the acts are done, must regulate the degree of certainty and particularity with which

(*) Chamberlain v. Boyd (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 407; 52 L. J. Q. B. 277. It was also held in this case that the damage was too remote.

(a) Ratcliffe v. Evans (1892), 2 Q. B. 524.

(b) Ibid.; per cur. at p. 533.

(c) Ibid. at pp. 532, 533.

the damage done ought to be stated and proved. As much certainty and particularity must be insisted on, both in pleading and proof of damage, as is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts themselves by which the damage is done. To insist upon less would be to relax old and intelligible principles; to insist upon more would be the vainest pedantry. The nature and circumstances of the publication of the falsehood may accordingly require the admission of evidence of general loss of business as the natural and direct result produced, and perhaps intended to be produced."

Moreover, such special damage must be the natural and probable result of the words complained of (d); and therefore a person is not liable for damage caused by the repetition of slanders of which he himself was the originator (e), unless such repetition was the natural and probable result of such original publication, or was expressly or impliedly authorized by him (ƒ).

(d) Lumley v. Gye (1853), 2 E. & B. 216; 22 L. J. Q. B. 463; per Lord Wensleydale, in Lynch v. Knight and Wife (1861), 9 H. L. C. at p. 600; Bowen v. Hall (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 333.

(e) Rutherford v. Evans (1829), 4 C. & P. 74; Ward v. Weeks (1830), 7 Bing. 211; 4 M. & P. 796; Tunnicliffe v. Moss (1850), 3 C. & K. 83; Bateman v. Lyall (1860), 7 C. B. N. S. 638; Parkins et ux. v. Scott et ux. (1862), 1 H. & C. 153; 31 L. J. Ex. 331; Riding v. Smith (1876), 1 Ex. D. 91; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; Clarke v. Morgan (1877), 38 L. T. 354; Speight v. Gosnay (1891), 60 L. J. Q. B. 231; 55 J. P. 501.

(f) Adams v. Kelly (1824), Ry. & Moo. 157; Bond v. Douglas (1836), 7 C. & P. 626.

Thus, if A. utters a slander affecting B. to C., and C. repeats it to D., who repeats it to E., then, subject to the two exceptions just mentioned, A. is not liable for damage caused by the repetition of the slander by C. to D., or by D. to E.

In the recent case of Speight v. Gosnay (g), the defendant uttered a slander consisting of a false imputation upon the chastity of the plaintiff, an unmarried woman (h), in the presence of the plaintiff's mother. The mother repeated it to the plaintiff, who repeated it to the man to whom she was engaged to be married, and he broke off the engagement. There being no evidence that the defendant authorized or intended the repetition of the slander, or that he knew of the plaintiff's engagement, it was held by the Court of Appeal that an action of slander could not be maintained against the defendant.

"Verbal defamatory statements may, indeed, be intended to be repeated, or may be uttered under such circumstances that their repetition follows in the ordinary course of things from their original utterance. Except in such cases, the law does not allow the plaintiff to recover damages which flow not from the original slander, but from its unauthorized repetition" (¿). In Ward v. Weeks (k), Tindal, C. J., thus explained the reason

(g) (1891), 60 L. J. Q. B. 231; 55 J. P. 501.

(h) Such an imputation would, however, now be actionable without proof of special damage. See pp. 36, 37, infra. (i) Per cur. in Ratcliffe v. Evans, (1892) 2 Q. B. at p. 530. (k) (1830), 7 Bing. at p. 215.

for this rule: "Every man must be taken to be answerable for the necessary consequences of his own wrongful acts, but such a spontaneous and unauthorized communication cannot be considered

as the necessary consequence of the original uttering of the words." The result of this is, that where the words are not actionable per se, the originator of the slander frequently escapes all liability.

It is no excuse, though it may be evidence in mitigation of damages (7), that the person repeating a slander mentions that he has heard it from A. B., naming his informant, or adds that he does not, of course, believe it (m).

NOTE 2.-Where the words charge the plaintiff with having committed a criminal offence."The distinction seems a natural one, that words imputing that the plaintiff has rendered himself liable to the mere infliction of a fine are not slanderous, but that it is slanderous to say that he has done something for which he has been made to suffer corporally" (n). Prior to Webb v. Beavan (o), it used to be thought that the offence charged must be not merely criminal, but also indictable. It was, however, expressly laid down

(7) See p. 157, infra.

(m) Watkin v. Hall (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125.

(n) Per Pollock, B., in Webb v. Beavan (1883), 11 Q. B. D. at p. 610.

(o) (1889), L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 609; 52 L. J. Q. B. 544.