person responsible for the publication of a newspaper," as to which several points are noticeable. In the first place it affords no protection to the actual composer, or author of the libel, to the reporter, or the writer of any article, even though attached to the staff of the newspaper, or to the compositor, or the office boy, all of whom are liable to be prosecuted at common law. It is doubtful whether it includes the printer under the phrase "person responsible for the publication." The Act of 1888, unlike that of 1881, contains no definition of proprietor, so that it is difficult to say precisely what construction the Court will put upon the term. It would seem unlikely, in the absence of any express clause to that effect, that the wide meaning given to it in the Act of 1881 will be held applicable. Further, it will be noticed that the section is confined to newspapers as defined by the Act of 1888 (k), i.e., as defined by sect. 1 of the Act of 1881. Therefore it has no application to books or periodicals not coming within that definition, q. v., p. 98, supra.

ART. 5.-Defences.

The defences to criminal proceedings for libel are1. That the words complained of are true, and that it was for the public benefit that they should be published (1).

(k) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, s. 1.

(1) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6. Art. 6, p. 186, infra.

2. That the publication of the words complained of is privileged (m).

3. That the words complained of are a fair and bona fide comment on a matter of public interest (n).

4. That the publication was made without the authority or knowledge of the defendant, and did not arise from want of due care or caution on his part (o).

NOTE.

Of the above defences those numbered 2 and 3 have already been fully dealt with in treating of the defences to an action (p). Whether the defence be that the words complained of were published on a privileged occasion (4), or were a fair and bonâ fide comment on a matter of public interest (r), the law is precisely the same in civil and criminal proceedings. And here again, as was observed in treating of the defences to an action, it may be said that it is also a defence that the words complained of are not libellous (s), or do not relate to the prosecutor (t), or that there has been no publication (u); but in all these cases the onus of proving the contrary is on the prosecutor, and if he does not do so, he fails to make out even a primâ facie case.

(m) See Note, and pp. 86-88, supra.
(n) See Note, and pp. 78—86, supra.

(o) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7. Art. 7, p. 187, infra.

(p) See pp. 78-88, supra.

(q) See pp. 86—88, supra.

(r) See pp. 78-86, supra.
(s) See pp. 3-10, supra.
(t) See pp. 5-7, supra.
(u) See pp. 181, 182, supra.

ART. 6.-Defence under sect. 6 of Lord

Campbell's Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96).

On the trial of any indictment or information for a libel, it is a good defence to prove that the words complained of are true, and that it was for the public benefit that they should be published (x).

NOTE.—It has already been pointed out that the truth of the words complained of affords a good defence to an action for libel (z); but this is not so in the case of criminal proceedings: the defendant must be prepared to go further and prove not only that the words complained of are true, but also that it was for the public benefit that they should be published. If he can satisfy a jury on both these points, he will be entitled to a verdict of not guilty by virtue of sect. 6 of Lord Campbell's Act (y). The defendant must prove the truth of the words complained of with the same exactness as is required of him in a civil action (2). It is provided by the section cited that this defence will not be available unless it be specially pleaded. Moreover, it has no application to blasphemous, seditious, or obscene words (a).

(x) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6, pp. 230, 231, infra.

(y) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96.

(z) See p. 72, supra.

(a) Ex parte O'Brien (1883), 12 L. R. Ir. 29; 15 Cox, C. C. 180.

ART. 7.-Employer's criminal liability for libels published by his servants.

Upon the trial of any indictment or information for the publication of a libel, it is a good defence to prove that such publication was made without the authority, consent, or knowledge of the defendant, and that the said publication did not arise from want of due care or caution on his part (b).

NOTE. This defence, which, it may be noticed, extends to every indictment and information for libel, owes its existence to sect. 7 of Lord Campbell's Act, and is peculiar to the criminal law. The general rule of law, as we have seen (c), is that a principal or master is liable for any libel published by his agent or servant, with his authority or consent; and this is true not only as regards liability to an action, but also as regards criminal liability. Moreover, as has been pointed out, provided that the agent or servant, in publishing such libel, was acting in pursuance of general orders, the master is equally liable to an action, though he was totally ignorant of the fact of publication; and, prior to Lord Campbell's Act, he would have been criminally liable also (d). Now, however, in accordance with the above

(b) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7.

(c) Pages 57, 58, supra.

(d) Nutt's case (1727), 1 Barnard. K. B. 306; Fitz. 47; Rex v. Dodd (1736), 2 Sess. Cas. 33; Rex v. Cuthell (1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 642; Rex v. Walter (1799), 3 Esp. 21; Rex v. Gutch and others (1829), Moo. & Mal. 433.

provision, the proprietor of a newspaper is not criminally liable for a libel which has been inserted in it without his knowledge or consent merely because he has given the editor a general authority to publish what he thinks proper therein (s). So, too, the directors of a printing company are not criminally liable for a libel contained in a paper printed by the servants of the company unless they knew of or saw the libel before its publication, or gave express instructions for its appearance (t). In all such cases, it will be a question for the jury whether the publication arose from any want of due care and caution on the defendant's part; and the fact that the defendant has employed an editor for the management of a particular department of the newspaper, and has entrusted to him the business of deciding what articles should be inserted in the paper, is not necessarily proof of the defendant's having consented to the publication of the libel by him (u). This defence is available upon the trial of any indictment or information for the publication of a libel, or of blasphemous, seditious, or obscene words (a).

(s) Reg. v. Holbrook and others (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 35; 37 L. T. 530; (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 42; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113; 39 L. T. 536.

(t) Reg. v. Allison and others (1888), 59 L. T. 933; 53 J. P. 215.

(u) Per Cockburn, C. J., and Lush, J.; Mellor, J., diss., in Reg. v. Holbrook, supra.

(x) Reg. v. Bradlaugh and others (1883), 15 Cox, C. C. 217; Reg. v. Ramsay and Foote (1883), 48 L. T. 734; 1 C. & E. 132 ; 15 Cox, C. C. 231.