last-mentioned defendants; and the judge at the trial, if he awards to the plaintiff the costs of the action, shall thereupon make such order as he shall deem just(r) for the apportionment of such costs between and against such defendants (s).

NOTE. This enables a jury, after assessing the damages suffered by the plaintiff in a consolidated action (see preceding Article), i.e., the amount recoverable in all the actions, to go further, and apportion the amount of damages recoverable against each defendant. Without this provision, each defendant would of course be liable for all the damage, as indeed he still is in any action not coming within the meaning of a consolidated action under this and the preceding Article, i.e., under sect. 5 of the Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888.

ART. 47.-Injunctions.

The Court has jurisdiction in an action of libel or slander to restrain by injunction either before or at the trial any further publication of such libel or slander (t),

(r) See Hopley v. Williams (1889), 6 Times L. R. 3; 53 J. P. 822.

(s) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, s. 5.

(t) Saxby v. Easterbrook (1878), 3 C. P. D. 339; 27 W. R. 188; Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam (1880), 14 Ch. D. 781 (C. A.); 42 L. T. 851; Kerr v. Gandy (1886), 3 Times L. R. 75; Hayward v. Hayward and Sons (1886), 34 Ch. D. 198.

F.

M

but before the trial such jurisdiction will be exercised with great caution(u).

NOTE.-In order to obtain an interim injunction, the plaintiff must prove that the words complained of are untrue (v), and that therefore any subsequent publication by the defendant would be malâ fide(x); and further, there must be "such immediate and pressing injury to person or property threatened by the defendant's proceedings as to make it desirable . . . that (the Court) should interfere" (y). Where, however, the words complained of affect the plaintiff in the way of his business, it seems that such injury will be presumed (2).

There have lately been several important cases on this branch of the law, and the Court of Appeal has recently stated that such an injunction will only be granted "in the clearest cases

(u) Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Beall (1882), 20 Ch. D. 501 (C. A.); Bonnard v. Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch. 269 (C. A.). (v) Burnett v. Tak (1882), 45 L. T. 743.

(x) Halsey v. Brotherhood (1881), 19 Ch. D. 386 (C. A.); 51 L. J. Ch. 233; 45 L. T. 640; Anderson v. Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., Limited (1882), 45 L. T. 757; Hill v. Hart-Davies (1882), 21 Ch. D. 798; 51 L. J. Ch. 845; 47 L. T. 82; Société Anonyme des Manufactures de Glaces v. Tilghman's Patent Sand Blast Co. (1883), 25 Ch. D. 1 (C. A.); 53 L. J. Ch. 1; 49 L. T. 451.

(y) Per North, J., cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Salomons v. Knight, (1891) 2 Ch. at p. 297.

(z) Thomas v. Williams (1880), 14 Ch. D. 864; 49 L. J. Ch. 605; 43 L. T. 91; Lee v. Gibbings, (1892) 93 L. T. 335; 36 Sol. J. 713.

where any jury would say that the matter complained of was libellous, and where, if the jury did not so find, the Court would set aside the verdict as unreasonable" (a).

Thus, in Collard v. Marshall (b), an interlocutory injunction was granted to restrain the defendant, who was the secretary of a trade union, from publishing a placard stating that there was a strike now on at the plaintiff's works; that the sweating system was practised, and the polishing badly done there; these statements being held to be untrue, and the defendant not suggesting that he could produce further evidence in support of them (c). No such injunction will be granted when the defendant swears that he will be able to justify the libel, and the Court is not satisfied that he may not be able to do so (d), or where the words complained of are primâ facie privileged (e), or may be fair and bonâ fide comment on a matter of public interest (ƒ).

(a) Per Lord Esher, M. R., in Coulson v. Coulson (1887), 3 Times L. R. 846, approved and adopted by the Court in Bonnard v. Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch. at p. 284. See also Liverpool Household Stores Association v. Smith (1887), 37 Ch. D.

170.

(b) (1892) 1 Ch. 571.

(c) See also Pink v. Federation of Trades and Labour Unions, (1892) 93 L. T. 335.

(d) Bonnard v. Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch. 269; Collard v. Marshall, (1892) 1 Ch. 571.

(e) Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Beall (1882), 20 Ch. D. 501 (C. A.); 51 L. J. Ch. 874; 46 L. T. 746.

(f) Armstrong and others v. Armit and others (1886), 2 Times, L. R. 887.

The judgment of Kekewich, J., in the recent case of Lee v. Gibbings (g), certainly suggests what the head-note to the report states, that with the exception of a trade libel the Court will not grant an injunction to restrain the publication of a libel before the case has been submitted to a jury. It is, however, submitted that this is not in accordance with the principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in Bonnard v. Perryman, supra, and that even if the libel be not a trade libel, the Court will grant an injunction if the words are clearly libellous, and the plaintiff can prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the words are untrue, and, unless at once restrained, will cause immediate injury to the plaintiff or his property.

The Court has also a general jurisdiction to restrain by injunction the publication of any matter which tends to prejudice the administration of justice, provided that application for such relief is made without delay. Thus the publication of any comments on a pending trial will be restrained (h), and this whether such comments amount to a libel (i) or not (j), both being equally a contempt of Court.

(g) (1892) 57 L. T. N. S. 263.

(h) See pp. 77, 78, supra, and cases cited p. 77, note (m). (i) Coleman v. West Hartlepool Rail. Co. (1860), 8 W. R. 734; 2 L. T. 766; Bowden and another v. Russell (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 414; 36 L. T. 177; Kitcat v. Sharp (1883), 52 L. J. Ch. 134; 48 L. T. 64.

(j) Mackett v. Commissioners of Herne Bay (1876), 24 W. R. 845.

ART. 48.-Costs.

If the action is tried without a jury the costs are in the discretion of the judge, and if he makes no order each party must pay his own costs. tried with a jury, the costs follow the

If the action is event, unless for good cause shown the judge otherwise orders (k).

NOTE. In actions for libel or slander either party is entitled as of right to have the case tried with a jury (k), and this is almost the invariable practice. Generally speaking, therefore, if the plaintiff recovers any damages at all he gets his costs, unless the judge for good cause deprive him of them. "No general rule can be laid down" as to what constitutes good cause, "but the conduct of the parties in each case and the facts of each case must be looked at "(). "The facts at" must show the existence of something, having regard either to the conduct of the parties or to the facts of the case, which makes it more just that an exceptional order should be made than that the case should be left to the ordinary course of taxation" (m). "The smallness of the damages awarded does not of itself constitute 'good cause,' although it is always a matter to be considered in deciding whether or not good cause exists”(n).

(k) Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Ord. LXV. r. 1. (1) Per Lord Esher, M. R., in Wood v. Cox (1889), 5 Times L. R. at p. 274.

(m) Ibid. in Jones v. Curling (1884), 13 Q. B. D. at p. 268. See also Hughes v. Merrett (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 273.

(n) Ibid. in O'Connor v. The Star Newspaper Co. (1893), 9 Times L. R. at p. 234. See also per Smith, L. J., ibid. at p. 235.