the plaintiff's cause of action, and that in pursuance thereof he published such apologies in the manner agreed upon (†).

ART. 39.-Release.

The plaintiff may release his cause of action by executing a deed to that effect.

ART. 40.-Previous action.

It is a good defence that the plaintiff has already brought an action in respect of the same words against the defendant or a third person with whom the defendant was jointly concerned in the publication of such words.

NOTE. This is so whether the plaintiff has failed or succeeded in the previous action. The defendant must be jointly not severally concerned with the third party. Thus, where the third person against whom the previous action has been brought is a partner of the defendant in a firm of printers or publishers, the liability being joint, the fact that there has been a previous action against one of the partners is an answer to an action in respect of the same libel against the other partner (u). But where the liability is several,

(t) Boosey v. Wood (1865), 34 L. J. Ex. 65; 3 H. & C. 484; Marks v. Conservative Newspaper Co. (1886), 3 Times L. R. 244. (u) Brinsmead v. Harrison (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 547.

as, e.g., in the case of the author of a libel and the proprietor of the newspaper in which it has appeared (v), a previous action against one of them is no answer to an action against the other (x).

ART. 41. Statute of Limitations.

An action of libel and of slander for words actionable only by reason of special damage, must be respectively brought within six years from the time of publication (y) and the time when such special damage was sustained (y), and an action of slander for words actionable per se within two years from the time of publication, but in any of these cases, if the plaintiff was at such time an infant or a lunatic (z), or the defendant was beyond the seas, the action must be brought within six years from the time at which such disability is removed (a).

NOTE.-Beyond the seas. This expression does not include any part of the United Kingdom

(v) See p. 53, supra.

(x) Creevy v. Carr (1835), 7 C. & P. 64; Frescoe v. May (1860), 2 F. & F. 123.

(y) Lord Saye and Sele v. Stephens (1628), cited Cro. Car. 535; Litt. 342.

(z) Formerly this was also true in regard to married women. Since the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, however, a married woman is no longer under disability, but can sue as if she were a feme sole, see Lowe v. Fox (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 667.

(a) 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, s. 7; 4 & 5 Anne, c. 3 [al. c. 16], s. 19;

or the Channel Islands. Formerly, by 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, if at the date of publication of the libel the plaintiff were imprisoned or beyond the seas, he could bring his action at any time within six years from his freedom or return, but this right was abolished by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97), sect. 10.

It should be noticed that if once the plaintiff cease to be under any disability-in which case the time begins to run-no subsequent disability can affect the operation of the statute or prevent the time from continuing to run against the plaintiff.

A publication contrived by the plaintiff, e.g., a sale of the libellous newspaper to his agent for the express purpose of maintaining the action, is a fresh publication from the date of which the time will begin to run again, even though the real grievance be a publication many years before that date. Thus, in the case of The Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer (a), a sale to the plaintiff's agent of a copy of the newspaper containing the libel seventeen years after its original publication, was held to constitute a fresh publication, from the Idate of which the Statute of Limitations would begin to run anew.

3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 7; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 12. See, however, in the case of slander for words actionable only by reason of special damage, Littleboy v. Wright (1674), 1 Lev. 69; 1 Sid. 95.

(a) (1849), 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 3 C. & K. 10; 14 Jur. 110; 14 Q. B. 185.

ART. 42.-Death of plaintiff or defendant.

The maxim actio personalis moritur cum personâ applies to every action for libel or slander, and, therefore, where a libel or slander has been published by or in respect of any person, and such person dies, no right of action survives either for or against his executor or administrator.

NOTE 1.-Even though the action has been commenced before the death of plaintiff or defendant, the death of either party before verdict puts an end to it. On the other hand, it is specially provided, by Ord. XVII. r. 1, that "there shall be no abatement by reason of the death of either party between the verdict or finding of the issues of fact and the judgment, but judgment may in such case be entered, notwithstanding the death." The effect of this rule would appear to be that Ireland v. Champneys (b) is no longer law. In that case, the plaintiff in an action for libel died after interlocutory judgment had been signed, a writ of inquiry issued, and damages assessed, and it was held that final judgment could not be entered for the plaintiff for the damages assessed, the suit having abated by his death.

Where the plaintiff dies after final judgment has been entered in his favour, the executors and administrators are entitled to appear as respondents on appeal from such judgment (c).

(b) (1813), 4 Taunt. 884.

(c) Twycross v. Grant and others (1878), 4 C. P. D. 40; 47 L. J. Q. B. 676; 39 L. T. 618.

NOTE 2.-It may be noticed here that where the Court in an action for administration appoints receivers for the purpose of conducting a newspaper, and the receivers publish a libel in such newspaper, they may be sued therefor. The estate alone will be liable for any damages recovered against them, but they will be personally liable for the costs of the action (c).

A libel on the business carried on by a receiver and manager appointed by the Court is a contempt of Court, and may be punished by committal of the offender (d).

ART. 43.-Evidence in aggravation of damages.

At the trial of an action for libel or slander the plaintiff may prove in aggravation of damages the circumstances under which the words were published (e), and, if it has been pleaded, the special damage if any which such words have caused.

NOTE 1.-The circumstances under which the words were published. Thus, the plaintiff may show that the libel was scattered broadcast when

(c) Stubbs v. Marsh (1866), 15 L. T. 312.

(d) Helmore v. Smith (1886), 35 Ch. D. 449; 56 L. J. Ch. 145; 56 L. T. 72.

(e) Vines v. Serell (1835), 7 C. & P. 163; Darby v. Ouseley (1856), 25 L. J. Ex. 233; Blake v. Stevens and others (1864), 11 L. T. 543; 4 F. & F. 235; Risk Allah Bey v. Whitehurst (1868), 18 L. T. N. S. 615.