one owes it as a duty to his fellow men to state what he knows about a person when inquiry is made "(x); and further, "when once a confidential relation is established between two persons with regard to an inquiry of a private nature, whatever takes place between them relevant to the same subject, though at a time and place different from those at which the confidential relation began, may be entitled to protection as well as what passed at the original interview, and it is a question for the jury whether any further conversation on the same subject, though apparently casual and voluntary, does not take place under the influence of the confidential relation already established between them, and is, therefore, entitled to the same protection" (y). Even if volunteered, the communication may fall within the protection of the general rule laid down above, for "it is not necessary in all cases that the information should be given in answer to an inquiry "(2). "Even in this case, the jury is to consider whether the words were dictated by a sense of duty"(a). Under such circumstances it will, of course, be more difficult for the defendant (x) Per Grove, J., in Robshaw v. Smith (1878), 38 L. T. at p. 423. (y) Per Pollock, C. B., in Beatson v. Skene (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. at p. 438. (z) Per Jessel, M. R., in Waller v. Loch (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 621; 51 L. J. Q. B. 274. (a) Per Coltman, J., in Rumsey v. Webb et ux. (1842), C. & M. at p. 105. to satisfy a jury that in making the communication he was not actuated by malice (b). Under this head of privilege come communications as to the characters of clerks and servants. “There is no law to compel the master to give the servant a character; it might be a duty which his feelings might prompt him to perform, but there is no law to enforce the doing of it" (c). If, however, he does it, he must do it honestly, and then, even if the character be in fact untrue, the master will be protected (d). "No action lies for giving the true character of a servant upon application made to his former master to inquire into his character with a view of hiring him, unless there should be extraordinary circumstances of express malice" (e). Moreover, "if I have given a servant a good character, and I afterwards find that I have been deceived, I am bound to make the same communication then as I should have made before if the facts had been known to me"(ƒ), and any such communication made bonâ fide will be privileged (g). (b) Pattison v. Jones (1828), 8 B. & C. 586; 3 C. & P. 387. (c) Per Lord Kenyon in Carrol v. Bird (1800), 3 Esp. at p. 202. (d) Rogers v. Clifton (1803), 3 B. & P. 587; Murdoch v. Funduklian (1885), 2 Times L. R. 215, 614. (e) Per Lord Mansfield in Hargrave v. Le Breton (1769), 4 Burr. at p. 2425. (f) Per Coleridge, J., in Gardner v. Slade and wife (1849), 18 L. J. Q. B. at p. 336. (g) Ibid., and see Child v. Affleck and wife (1829), 9 B. & C. 403. Again, if a master discharges one of his servants, and tells the others why he has done so, such communication will also be privileged (h). Thus, where the plaintiff was a guard in the service of the defendants a railway company, and the defendants dismissed him on the ground that he had been guilty of gross neglect of duty, and published his name in a printed monthly circular addressed to their servants, stating in it that he had been dismissed and the ground of his dismissal, it was held that such circular was privileged if published bonâ fide and without malice towards the plaintiff (i). A similar protection is extended to all communications made bonâ fide, and on reasonable grounds, to a father or master as to the doings of his child (k) or servant (1); by one friend to another as to a doctor (m), or tradesman (n), or an intending suitor (0); by a servant to his master (p); by an under-master to the head master (q); by an official in the army or navy or (h) Somerville v. Hawkins (1851), 10 C. B. 590; 20 L. J. C. P. 131. (i) Hunt v. G. N. Rail. Co., (1891) 1 Q. B. 189. (k) Per Erle, C. J., in Whiteley v. Adams (1863), 33 L. J. C. P. at p. 95. (1) Masters v. Burgess (1886), 3 Times L. R. 96. (m) Dixon v. Smith (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 125; 5 H. & N. 450. (n) Storey v. Challands (1837), 8 C. & P. 234. (0) 15 C. B. N. S. 410, 411. (p) Scarll v. Dixon (1864), 4 F. & F. 250. (q) Hume v. Marshall (1878), 42 J. P. 136. any government office to his superior (r); by a master concerning his servant or a child entrusted to his charge to the parent or guardian of such servant or child (s); by a solicitor to his client (t), even though he is not at the time engaged in the conduct of any legal proceedings on his behalf (u); by a parishioner to the bishop of his diocese as to the conduct of the vicar(x) or curate, or locum tenens; by a parishioner to his vicar as to the conduct of his locum tenens or curate (y); by the secretary of a charity organization society to a stranger as to the deserts of an applicant to such stranger for charity (2); by a member of a trade protection society to the secretary of the society (a); and by the director of a company to the members thereof concerning the character of an official of such company (b). It has also been held that the publication of the minutes of the General Council of Medical Education, containing a statement that the name (r) Sutton v. Plumridge (1867), 16 L. T. 741; Stace v. Griffith (1869), L. R. 2 P. C. 420; 20 L. T. 197; Henwood v. Harrison (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 606; 41 L. J. C. P. 206. (s) Fowler and wife v. Homer (1812), 3 Camp. 294. (t) Wright v. Woodgate (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 573. (u) Davis v. Reeves (1855), 5 Ir. C. L. R. 79. (x) James v. Boston (1845), 2 C. & K. 4. (y) Clark v. Molyneux (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 237; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230. (2) Waller v. Loch (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 619; 51 L. J. Q. B. 274. (a) White and others v. Batey & Co., Ltd. (1892), 8 Times L. R. 690. (b) Harris v. Thompson (1853), 13 C. B. 333. of a specified medical practitioner has been removed from the register on the ground that, in the opinion of the Council, he has been guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect, is, if the report be accurate, and published bonâ fide and without malice, privileged, and the medical practitioner cannot maintain an action of libel against the Council in respect of the publication (c). But statements made by a clergyman as to the knowledge of an architect employed for church work are not privileged, such clergyman being in no way connected with the church in question, either as a subscriber towards the work or otherwise (d). As has been already pointed out, it is sometimes a matter of the greatest difficulty to determine whether an occasion is privileged or not. As Lindley, L. J., recently pointed out in the Court of Appeal (e): "Coxhead v. Richards (ƒ), in which four eminent judges were equally divided upon the question whether an occasion was privileged or not, is a striking illustration of the truth of the remark. In that case the mate of a ship wrote to the defendant, a friend of his, a letter reflecting on the character of the captain. The defendant, who was a stranger to the owner of (c) Allbutt v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 400. (d) Botterill v. Whytehead, (1879) 41 L. T. 588. |