written to the Postmaster-General concerning the conduct of a postmaster (m); or to a bishop concerning the conduct of a parson in his diocese (n); or a memorial to the Lord Chancellor concerning the conduct of a magistrate, and praying for his removal (o); or a petition to the House of Commons concerning the conduct of the VicarGeneral (p); or to the Privy Council concerning a sanitary inspector removable by them (q); or to some one whom the defendant might reasonably suppose was the proper person to address in the matter (r), e.g., a letter to the Home Secretary concerning the conduct of a clerk to magistrates (s), or of a magistrate (t); or to the Secretary of War, with the object of compelling a military officer to pay a debt (u).

So, too, everything bonâ fide said or written with the object of preventing or punishing crime is, in the interests of society, privileged. Thus, it has

(m) Blake v. Pilfold (1832), 1 Moo. & Rob. 198; Woodward v. Lander (1834), 6 C. & P. 548.

(n) James v. Boston (1845), 2 C. & K. 4.

(0) Harrison v. Bush (1855), 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25, 99.

(p) Lake v. King (1669), 1 Lev. 240; 1 Saund. 131; Sid.

414.

(g) Proctor v. Webster (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 112; 55 L. J. Q. B. 150; 53 L. T. 765.

(r) Kershaw v. Bailey (1848), 1 Ex. 743; 17 L. J. Ex. 129; Scarll v. Dixon (1864), 4 F. & F. 250.

(s) Blagg v. Sturt (1846), 10 Q. B. 899; 16 L. J. Q. B. 39. (t) Harrison v. Bush, supra.

(u) Fairman v. Ives (1822), 5 B. & Ald. 642.

been held that anything bonâ fide communicated for that purpose to the master (x) or father (y) of the plaintiff, or to a constable (2), is privileged.

But if the statement is not bonâ fide made with this object(a), or is made recklessly (b), or to more persons than necessary (c), or by some one unconnected with the matter (d), there will be no privilege (e).

ART. 33.-Statements made in order to protect interest of writer or speaker.

Every statement made with the object of protecting some interest of the writer (f), or speaker (g), and reasonably necessary for such purpose, is privileged, but

(x) Kine v. Sewell (1838), 3 M. & W. 297; Amann v. Damm (1860), 8 C. B. N. S. 597; 8 W. R. 470.

(y) Fowler et ux. v. Homer (1812), 3 Camp. 294.

(z) Johnson v. Evans-Clerk (1800), 3 Esp. 32.

(a) Hooper v. Trustcott (1836), 2 Bing. N. S. 457; 2 Scott, 672.

(b) Smith v. Hodgeskins (1633), Cro. Car. 276.
(c) Jones v. Williams (1885), 1 Times L. R. 572.
(d) Harrison v. Fraser (1881), 29 W. R. 662.

(e) Padmore v. Lawrence (1840), 11 A. & E. 380; Jones v. Thomas (1885), 34 W. R. 104; 53 L. T. 678; 2 Times L. R. 95. (f) Blackam v. Pugh (1846), 2 C. B. 611; 15 L. J. C. P.

290.

(g) Somerville v. Hawkins (1851), 10 C. B. 583; 20 L. J. C. P. 131; 16 L. T. O. S. 283; Manby v. Witt, and Eastmead v. Witt (1856), 18 C. B. 544; 25 L. J. C. P. 294.

such privilege will be rebutted if plaintiff prove that defendant published such statement maliciously.

NOTE. Thus, if the plaintiff has previously attacked the defendant, any statement made by the latter which is necessary in order to protect himself, and which is in any way relevant to the accusations made against him by the plaintiff, is privileged.

"If a man bonâ fide writes a letter in his own defence, and for the defence and protection of his interests and rights, and is not actuated by any malice, that letter is privileged, although it may impute dishonesty to another, but in such cases malice may either be proved by the letter itself or by other evidence" (h); e.g., where the policy holder of an insurance company published a pamphlet charging the directors with fraud, and the directors published a pamphlet in reply defending themselves, and accusing the plaintiff of making false and calumnious accusations, and further stating that he had upon a certain occasion made statements on oath in direct contradiction of statements which he had previously made in writing, it was left to the jury to say whether the counter-charges made by the defendants were made bonâ fide, and whether they went beyond the occasion, and the jury found for the de

(h) Per Littledale, J., in Coward v. Wellington (1836), 7 C. & P. at p. 586.

fendants (i). So, too, where the plaintiff has previously attacked the defendant in the newspapers (k), or in public (1), and the defendant retaliates by publishing in the papers in selfdefence a statement of the case from his point of view, and in so doing makes defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff, such statement is privileged if made bonâ fide.

Again, if the plaintiff has enticed the defendant into making the defamatory statement in the presence of a third party (m), or if a friend or agent of the plaintiff at his request (n), or with his knowledge or consent (o), has induced the defendant to make the statement complained of, such statement is privileged. If, however, the defendant first made unprivileged statements concerning the plaintiff which led the latter to seek for an explanation from the defendant, such explanation will not be privileged (p).

The privilege noticed above has also been held

(i) Kanig v. Ritchie (1862), 3 F. & F. 413; R. v. Veley (1867), 4 F. & F. 1117.

(k) Coward v. Wellington (1836), 7 C. & P. 531.

(1) Laughton v. Bishop of Sodor and Man (1872), L. R. 4 P. C. 495; 42 L. J. P. C. 11.

(m) Kine v. Sewell (1838), 3 M. & W. 297; Griffiths v. Lewis (1845), 7 Q. B. 67; 14 L. J. Q. B. 199; Palmer v. Hummerston (1883), 1 Cab. & E. 36.

(n) Weatherston v. Hawkins (1786), 1 T. R. 110.

(0) Smith v. Wood (1813), 3 Camp. 323; Hopwood v. Thorn (1850), 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; Whiteley v. Adams (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 392; 33 L. J. C. P. 89.

(p) Smith v. Matthews (1831), 1 Moo. & Rob. 151.

to apply to any statement which is necessary to protect the interests of a principal (g) or client (r), and the fact that such statement is unauthorized will not destroy the privilege (s).

All privilege will, however, be lost if the statement is too widely published (t), or is unnecessarily strong (u); if, for example, the defendant has been attacked by the plaintiff in an obscure local paper and retaliates in a leading London paper, or the retaliation goes beyond what is actually necessary in order to protect the plaintiff's interests (x).

ART. 34.-Statements made in order to protect a common interest.

Every statement made with the object of protecting an interest common to the writer or speaker, and the person to whom such statement is made, and reasonably necessary for such purpose, is privileged, but such privi

(q) Hargrave v. Le Breton (1769), 4 Burr. 2422.

(r) Steward v. Young (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 122; 39 L. J. C. P. 85.

(s) Watson v. Reynolds (1826), Moo. & Mal. 1.

(t) Jones v. Williams (1885), 1 Times L. R. 572.

(u) Cooke v. Wildes (1855), 5 E. & B. 328; 24 L. J. Q. B. 367; Huntley v. Ward (1859), 1 F. & F. 552; 6 C. B. N. S. 514.

(x) Robertson v. M'Dougall (1828), 4 Bing. 670; 3 C. & P. 259; Tuson v. Evans (1840), 12 A. & E. 733; Hancock v. Case (1862), 2 F. & F. 711.