Opinion of the Court. Mr. George G. Vest and Mr. Wayne McVeigh for appellants. Mr. Solicitor-General for appellees. MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. These cases, although actions at law, were not tried by jury: and, therefore, are rightly brought here by appeal, according to the provision of the act of Congress of April 7, 1874, 18 Stat. 27. Stringfellow v. Cain, 99 U. S. 610; Hecht v. Boughton, 105 U. S. 235; Woolf v. Hamilton, 108 U. S. 15. The wrong complained of in each case by the respective plaintiffs is, "that the defendants, and each of them, intending to wrongfully deprive the plaintiff of the elective franchise in said Territory, wilfully and maliciously, by the acts and in the manner aforesaid, refused the plaintiff registration, as a voter, at the said registration commenced on the second Monday of September, 1882, and deprived the plaintiff of the right to vote at the election held in said Territory on the 7th day of November, 1882, and at all elections under said registration." The acts which, it is alleged, were done by the five defendants, as a Board of Commissioners or Canvassers, under the law of March 22, 1882, and which contributed to the wrong, and constituted part of it, are, that they prescribed as a condition of registration an unauthorized oath, set out in the complaint, in a rule promulgated by them for the government of the registration officers; and that the deputy registration officer having, in obedience to such rule, "acting under the directions of the other defendants," wilfully and maliciously refused to receive the affidavit tendered by the plaintiff, in lieu of that prescribed by the rule of the board, and to register the plaintiff; and that the county registration officer, on appeal, having refused to order otherwise, the Board of Commissioners also refused to reverse and correct these rulings and to direct the registration of the plaintiffs respectively, but affirmed and approved the same. But an examination of the ninth section of the act of March 22, 1882, providing for the appointment and prescribing the Opinion of the Court. duties and powers of that board, shows that they have no functions whatever in respect to the registration of voters, except the appointment of officers, in place of those previously authorized, whose offices are by that section of the law declared to be vacant; and the persons appointed to succeed them are not subject to the direction and control of the board, but are required, until other provision be made by the legislative assembly of the Territory, to perform all the duties relating to the registration of voters, "under the existing laws of the United States and of said Territory." The board are not authorized to prescribe rules for governing them in the performance of these duties, much less to prescribe any qualifications for voters as a condition of registration. The statutory powers of the board are limited to the appointment of the registration and election officers, authorized to act in the first instance under the law until provision is made by the Territorial Legislature for the appointment of their successors, and to the canvass of the returns and the issue of certificates of election "to those persons who, being eligible for such election, shall appear to have been lawfully elected." The proviso in the section does indeed declare "that said board of five persons shall not exclude any person otherwise eligible to vote from the polls on account of any opinion such person may entertain on the subject of bigamy or polygamy;" but, in the absence of any general and express power over the subject of declaring the qualification of voters, it is not a just inference, from the words of this proviso, that it was intended to admit by implication the existence of any authority in the board to exclude from registration or the right to vote, any person whatever, or in any manner to define and declare what the qualifications of a voter shall be. The prohibition against excluding any person from the polls, for the reason assigned, must be construed, with the additional injunction, "nor shall they refuse to count any such vote on account of the opinion of the person casting it on the subject of bigamy or polygamy," to apply to the action of the board in canvassing the returns of elections, made to them by the officers holding such elections; or, if it includes more, it is to be taken as the announcement of a general prin Opinion of the Court. ciple to govern all officers concerned in the registration of voters or the conduct of elections. It follows that the rules promulgated by the board, prescribing the form of oath to be exacted of persons offering to register as voters, and which constitute the directions under which it is alleged the registration officers acted, were without force, and no effect can be given to them. It cannot be alleged that they had the effect in law of preventing the registration of the plaintiffs, for the registration officers were not bound to obey them; and if they did so, they did it in their own wrong. There was no relation between the board and the officers appointed by them of principal and agent, so as to make the members of the former liable for what the latter may have illegally done under their instructions, and, therefore, no connection in law between the acts of the board as charged and the wrongs complained of. The judgment in favor of the defendants, composing the Board of Commissioners, upon their demurrer, therefore, was rightly rendered. The cases, as to the other defendants, the registration officers, stand on different principles. If they were merely ministerial officers, and if they have deprived the respective plaintiffs of their right to be registered as voters, in violation of law, they may be responsible in an action for damages. Whether they are so must depend, in the first instance, not upon what they have done or omitted, but upon the question whether the plaintiffs have severally shown themselves entitled to the right of which, it is alleged, they were illegally deprived. And in entering upon the consideration of this point it is to be observed, in the first place, that the pleader has not in any of the complaints, alleged, as matter of fact, that the plaintiff was a legally qualified voter, entitled to be registered as such. He has preferred, in each case, with variations to suit the circumstances, to aver the existence of specific enumerated qualifications, and the absence of specific and enumerated disqualifications, leaving it to be inferred, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was a legally qualified voter and entitled to be registered as such. That legal inference is necessary to com Opinion of the Court. plete the case as stated; and the sufficiency of the statement must depend on whether all the positive qualifications required by law are alleged to have existed, and all the disqualifications affixed by law have been negatived. To ascertain this we have to compare the allegations of the complaint in each case with the requisitions of the law, and, by construction, to determine whether they conform. So far as the requirements of the law existing at the time of the passage of the act of March 22, 1882, and which continued in force concurrently with that, are concerned, there is no difficulty. Each of the plaintiffs is shown to have been a qualified voter, unless disqualified by the latter act. The only question is, whether they have brought themselves within the meaning of that act. The language on which the questions arise occurs in § 8, and is: "That no polygamist, bigamist, or any person cohabiting with more than one woman, and no woman cohabiting with any of the persons described as aforesaid in this section," &c., that is, with any polygamist, bigamist, or person cohabiting with more than one woman, shall be entitled to vote at any election held in the Territory. In the case in which Mary Ann M. Pratt is plaintiff, she clearly excludes herself from the disqualifications of the act. She alleges in her complaint "that she is not and never has been a bigamist or polygamist; that she is the widow of Orson Pratt, Sen., who died prior to the 22d day of March, 1882, after a continuous residence in said Territory of more than thirty years, and that since the death of her said husband she has not cohabited with any man." The same is true in reference to the allegations of the complaint in the case in which Mildred E. Randall and her husband are plaintiffs. They are, "that the plaintiff, Mildred E. Randall, for more than three years last past has been and is the wife of the plaintiff, Alfred Randall, who is and prior to March 22d, 1882, was a native born citizen of the United States of America; that she has not on or since March 22d, 1882, cohabited with any bigamist, polygamist; or with any man cohabiting with more than one woman; that she is not a bigamist or polygamist, and never has been a bigamist or polygamist, 6 Opinion of the Court. and has not in any way violated the act of Congress entitled An Act to amend section 5352 of the Revised Statutes of the United States in reference to bigamy, and for other purposes,' approved March 22d, 1882." The requirements of the eighth section of the act, in refer ence to a woman claiming the right to vote, are that she does not, at the time she offers to register, cohabit with a polyg amist, bigamist or person cohabiting with more than one woman; and it is sufficient, if the complaint denies the disqualification in the language of the act. These requirements are fully met in the two cases just referred to. The case of Ellen C. Clawson is different. In the complaint, filed by herself and her husband, it is alleged that she "is not and never has been a bigamist or polygamist, and is not cohabiting and never has cohabited with any man except her husband, the co-plaintiff herein, to whom she was lawfully married more than fifteen years ago, and of whom she is the first and lawful wife; that the plaintiff, Hiram B. Clawson, has not married or entered into any marriage contract or relation with any woman within the last six years, and has continuously and openly resided in the city of Salt Lake, in said Territory of Utah, for more than twenty years last past." It is quite consistent with these statements, that the husband of the female plaintiff was, at the time she claimed registration, a bigamist, or a polygamist, or that he was then cohabiting with more than one woman; and that she was cohabiting with him at the same time. She would be, on either supposition, expressly disqualified from voting by the eighth section of the act of March 22, 1882, and she does not negative the fact. It cannot, therefore, be inferred that she was a lawfully qualified voter. In The cases of Murphy and Barlow are alike in substance. Murphy's case, the allegations are, "that he has not since more than three years prior to March 22d, 1882, married or entered into any marriage contract or relation with any woman, or in anywise violated the act of Congress approved July 1, 1862, defining and providing for the punishment of bigamy in the Territories, . and has not violated any of the provisions |