Opinion of the Court. touching any property of the bankrupt transferable to or vested in the assignee. This provision is re-enacted in Rev. Stat. § 4979. By Rev. Stat. § 720 it is provided, that "the writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States, to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." It is contended for the appellant (1) that a suit in equity will not lie for the relief granted; (2) that, at all events, there was no power to award the injunction. That the defendant claimed an adverse interest touching the property is clear. The question is, whether the plaintiff can have relief in equity. He was in possession of the land, and, as he says, of the only building there was on it.. By statutory provisions in Michigan, commencing with § 29 of the act of April 23, 1833 (Code of 1833, p. 358,) followed by § 1 of the act of March 28, 1840, (No. 76, p. 127,) and the Revised Statutes of 1846, (title 21, chap. 90, sec. 36, p. 360,) and now in force as § 6626 of Howell's Statutes, "any person having the actual possession, and legal or equitable title to, lands, may institute a suit in chancery against any other person setting up a claim thereto in opposition to the title claimed by the complainant, and, if the complainant shall establish his title to such lands, the defendant shall be decreed to release to the complainant all claim thereto." If there should be a sale on the executions, there would be a sheriff's deed; and, by another statute of the State such deed is made prima facie evidence of the regularity of the sale. Act of February 19, 1867, No. 20, § 2, now in force as § 5678 of Howell's Statutes. It is held by the Supreme Court of Michigan, that the statute first cited covers a claim to a lien on land, and that a lien which may result in a sale and a deed constitutes such a cloud that equity will afford relief. Scofield v. City of Lansing, 17 Mich. 437, 447, 448. Especially will this be done, if the lien is not void on its face, as the lien here is not, but is a cloud on the plain tiff's title. Therefore, the plaintiff could obtain, under the Michigan statute, and in a court of Michigan, the relief he has had. In such a case a Circuit Court of the United States, hav Opinion of the Court. ing otherwise jurisdiction in the case, will, as a general rule, administer the same relief in equity which the State courts can grant. Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 203; Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503, 519, 520; Van Norden v. Morton, 99 U. S. 378, 380; Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 157; Iolland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15; Reynolds v. Crawfordsville Bank, 112 U. S. 405. It has general power given to it, irrespective of citizenship, to grant equitable relief, in a suit in equity by an assignee in bankruptcy against any person who claims an adverse interest touching the assigned property. We are not disposed, however, to rest the case upon jurisdiction arising from the Michigan statute. We hold that, under the equity jurisdiction conferred by the bankruptcy act, the Circuit Court had authority to remove this cloud on the plaintiff's title. It was the duty of the assignee to remove it, and to obtain a title which would enable him to sell the land for the benefit of the estate. The claim of the defendants, under the levies, is one which ought not to be enforced. It has no validity as against the rights of the plaintiff; it throws a cloud on his title; he is in possession, and cannot sue at law; and the papers supporting the defendant's claim are not void on their face. Story Eq. Jur. §§ 700, 705; 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. §§ 1398, 1399, and cases cited; Pettit v. Shepherd, 5 Paige, 493; Carroll v. Safford, 3 How. 441, 463; Ward v. Dewey, 16 N. Y. 519; Mustain v. Jones, 30 Geo. 951; Martin v. Graves, 5 Allen, 601: Stout v. Cook, 37 Ill. 283; Clouston v. Shearer, 99 Mass. 209; Sullivan v. Finnegan, 101 Mass. 447; Anderson v. Talbot, 1 Heiskell, 407; Marsh v. City of Brooklyn, 59 N. Y. 280; O'Hare v. Downing, 130 Mass. 16, 19. In Pettit v. Shepherd, it was held that a Court of Chancery might interpose to prevent the giving of a conveyance, under pretence of right, which would operate as a cloud upon the title to real estate. In O'Hare v. Downing it is said, that "a Court of Chancery will restrain by injunction a threatened levy of cxecution upon real estate which is not legally subject to such a levy, and thus prevent a cloud upon the title, without compelling the owner of the land to wait until the levy has been completed, and then admit himself to be disseised, in order to main Opinion of the Court. tain a writ of entry." Much more will it prevent a sale after a levy. But it is contended that the Circuit Court had no authority to award or issue the injunction. The jurisdiction of that court in this case is conferred by the "law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy;" and we think the injunction was authorized by that law. The court of bankruptcy was authorized, by 40 of the act of 1867, § 5024 Rev. Stat., where a petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed, to restrain all persons, by injunction, from interfering with the debtor's property. The jurisdiction of suits in equity, given to the Circuit Court by § 2 of the act of 1867, § 4979 Rev. Stat., was given to it concurrently with the district courts. It must be held that Congress, in authorizing a suit in equity, in a case like the present, has, in order to make the other relief granted completely effective, authorized an injunction, as necessarily incidental and consequent, to prevent further proceedings under the levies already made and new levies under the judgment. But for the supposed inhibitory force of § 720, a court of equity, in granting, on the merits, the other relief here granted, would necessarily have power to award the injunction. We think the Circuit Court was authorized to award it here, within the exception in § 720. It is urged, that the plaintiff should have made himself a party to the proceedings in the State Court, and have contested the matter there, under the authority given to him by 14 of the act of 1867, (8 5047 of the Revised Statutes), to defend suits pending against the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication. As the assignment in bankruptcy was not made till October 1, 1874, and the judgment and the levy under the first execution were in May, 1874, we do not think the assignee was called upon to take any steps in the State court, after the assignment, to obtain relief. He was entitled to pursue the remedy he did. The cases of Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, and Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176, are relied on by the appellant to show that the decree in this case was erroneous. The view urged is, that, by virtue of the levy by the sheriff, the State Opinion of the Court. court acquired custody, control, and jurisdiction of the property, which could not be disturbed by the Circuit Court. But the doctrine of those cases has no application in favor of the appellant, in a case like the present. In the first case it was held, that, after property had been attached by a marshal of the United States, on mesne process from a Circuit Court of the United States, a third person, claiming its ownership, could, without reference to citizenship, come into the Circuit Court for redress, by ancillary proceedings. In the second case, it was held, in pursuance of the decision in Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, that possession of property by a marshal of the United States, under a writ of execution from a Circuit Court of the United States, could not be disturbed by virtue of a writ of replevin from a State court, issued by a third person. E converso, as was held in Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, property seized by a sheriff, under process of attachment from a State court, cannot be taken from the sheriff by initial admiralty process issuing from a District Court of the United States. But those were none of them cases where, under the bankruptcy act, an assignee in bankruptcy claimed a paramount title, and resorted to regular judicial proceedings to first vacate and declare void the adverse title, and sweep it away, and then have such final process in regard to the subject-matter of the title as should be necessary to make the decree effective. And, in Covell v. Ileyman, the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Matthews, after explaining the point of the decision in Freeman v. Howe says: "The same principle protects the possession of property, while thus held by process issuing from State courts, against any disturbance under process of the courts of the United States; excepting, of course, those cases wherein the latter exercise jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the United States." This exception includes the present case. The bankruptcy proceeding dissolved the State attachment, and the bankruptcy act conferred on the assignee a paramount title, which he was empowered, by that act, to enforce, by proper equitable remedies, in the Circuit Court, against the adverse title set up by virtue of the suit in the State court. Decree affirmed. Opinion of the Court. EX PARTE MORGAN & Another. ORIGINAL. Argued March 30, 31, 1885.--Decided April 6, 1885. A writ of mandamus may be used to require an inferior court to decide a matter within its jurisdiction, and pending before it for judicial determination, but not to control the decision. The plaintiff in the suit below, believing that the judgment as recorded did not conform to the finding, moved the court to amend it in that particular. The court heard and denied the motion: Held, That this was a judicial act which could not be reviewed by mandamus. This was an application for a writ of mandamus. The facts which make the case are stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Edward Roby for petitioner. Mr. William H. Calkins, (Mr. A. L. Osborn and Mr. A. C. Harris were with him), opposing. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the cour This is an application for a writ of mandamus requiring the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana to amend a judgment entered January 20, 1883, in a cause wherein the relators were plaintiffs and Frederick Eggers, defendant, "so as to conform to the complaint in said cause, and to the finding or verdict of the court rendered upon the trial of said cause." The suit was ejectment to recover the possession of "all of the north part of lot 2, in sec. 36, T. 38, N. R. 10 W. of the second principal meridian, which lies west of the track of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad, and north of a line parallel with the north line of said lot 2, and seven hundred and fifty-three feet south therefrom." The judgment entry, which includes the only finding in the case, is as follows: "And the court, having heard the evidence and being fully |