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There were in it a number of young men who would probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appointments should be recommended, we might be chargeable with having carved out places for ourselves.

On the question, Massachusetts, Connecticut,* Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, aye—5; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no—6.

Mr. WilLIAMSON moved to change the expression into these words, to wit, “to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public service." The motion was seconded by Mr. Ellsworth, and agreed to by all the States except South Carolina. It seemed to be meant only to get rid of the word “fixed," and leave greater room for modifying the provision on this point.

Mr. Ellsworth moved to strike out, “ to be paid out of the National Treasury," and insert, "to be paid by their respective States.” If the Senate was meant to strengthen the Government, it ought to have the confidence of the States. The States will have an interest in keeping up a representation, and will make such provision for supporting the members as will ensure their attendance.

Mr. Madison considered this as a departure from a fundamental principle, and subverting the end intended by allowing the Senate a duration of six years. They would, if this motion should be agreed to, hold their places during pleasure; during the pleasure of the State Legislatures. One great end of the institution was, that being a firm, wise and impartial body, it might not only give stability to the General Government, in its operations on individuals, but hold an even balance among different States. The motion would make the Senate, like Congress, the mere agents and advocates of State interests and views, instead of being the impartial umpires and guardians of justice and the general good. Congress had lately, by the establishment of a board with full powers to decide on the mutual claims between the United States and the individual States, fairly acknowledged themselves to be unfit for discharging this part of the business referred to them by the Confederation.

* Quere. Whether Connecticut should not bo, no, and Delaware, aye?

J. M.

Mr. Dayton considered the payment of the Senate by the States as fatal to their independence. He was decided for paying them out of the National Treasury.

On the question for payment of the Senate to be left to the States, as moved by Mr. ELLSWORTH, it passed in the negative,–Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no-6.444

Col. Mason. He did not rise to make any motion, but to hint an idea which seemed to be

for consideration. One important object in constituting the Senate was, to secure the rights of property. To give them weight and firmness for this purpose, a considerable duration in office was thought necessary. But a longer term than six years would be of no avail in this respect, if needy persons should be appointed. He suggested, therefore, the propriety

proper

of annexing to the office a qualification of property. He thought this would be very practicable; as the rules of taxation would supply a scale for measuring the degree of wealth possessed by every man.

A question was then taken, whether the words “ to be paid out of the National Treasury,” should stand,-Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.

Mr. Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility of Senators to State offices.

Mr. WillIAMSON seconded the motion.

Mr. Wilson remarked the additional dependence this would create in tlie Senators on the States. The longer the time, he observed, allotted to the officer, the more complete will be the dependence, if it exists at all.

General PINCKNEY was for making the States, as much as could be conveniently done, a part of the General Government. If the Senate was to be appointed by the States, it ought, in pursuance of the same idea, to be paid by the States; and the States ought not to be barred from the opportunity of calling members of it into offices at home. Such a restriction would also discourage the ablest men from going into the Senate.

Mr. WilLIAMSON moved a Resolution, so penned as to admit of the two following questions,-first, whether the members of the Senate should be ineligible to, and incapable of holding, offices under the United States; secondly, whether &c. under the particular States.

On the question to postpone, in order to consider Mr. Williamson's Resolution,-Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, no—3.245

Mr. GERRY and Mr. MADISON move to add to Mr. Williamson's first question, “and for one year thereafter."

On this amendment, -Connecticut, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye-7; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no_4.

On Mr. WILLIAMSON's first question as amended, viz, " ineligible and incapable &c. for one year &c.” -agreed to unanimously.

On the second question as to ineligibility, &c. to State offices, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, aye-3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-8.

The fifth Resolution, “ that each branch have the right of originating acts,” was agreed to, nem. con.

Adjourned.

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27TH.

In Convention,-Mr. RUTLEDGE moved to postpone the sixth Resolution, defining the powers of Congress, in order to take up the seventh and eighth, which involved the most fundamental points, the rules of suffrage in the two branches; which was agreed to, nem. con.

A question being proposed on the seventh Resolution, declaring that the suffrage in the first branch should be according to an equitable ratio,

Mr. L. Martin contended, at great length, and with great eagerness, that the General Government was meant merely to preserve the State Governments, not to govern individuals. That its

powers ought to be kept within narrow limits. That if too little power was given to it, more might be added; but that if too much, it could never be resumed. That individuals, as such, have little to do, but with their own States; that the General Government has no more to apprehend from the States composing the Union, while it pursues proper measures, than a government over individuals has to apprehend from its subjects. That to resort to the citizens at large for their sanction to a new government, will be throwing them back into a state of nature; that the dissolution of the State Governments is involved in the nature of the process; that the people have no right to do this, without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for State purposes. Through their tongues only they can speak, through their ears only can hear. That the States have shewn a good disposition to comply with the acts of Congress, weak, contemptibly weak, as that body has been; and have failed through inability alone to comply. That the heaviness of the private debts, and the waste of property during the war, were the chief causes of this inability,—that he did not conceive the instances mentioned by Mr. Madison, of compacts between Virginia and Maryland, between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or of

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