(111 A.)

purpose is inconsistent with the maintenance of high rates of speed by persons driving automobiles on such highways, nevertheless the management of such automobiles will have to be subordinated to the public safety.

[6] There is, however, another and more serious objection to this prayer, and that is that it predicates the plaintiff's right to recover against both defendants upon the negligence of only one of them, in doing an act with which the other defendant had no connection whatever, and over which he had no control, at a time when there was no relation of any kind between the two defendants which made either responsible for the acts of the other. The prayer, after instructing the jury as to the law of the road, reads as follows:

not crossing, another road, does not "inter- ing public, if the accomplishment of that sect" the latter within the meaning of the statute, and that the driver of an automobile while driving it along a main or trunk road is not required to yield the right of way to a machine approaching from his right along such a lateral road. Such a construction of the statutes is, in our opinion, too narrow, and is opposed to its true meaning and intent. The purpose and design of the statute is to protect the traveling public against collisions at points where roads running at an angle to each other join, and to accomplish this end it provides a simple rule of universal application which so clearly defines the respective and relative rights of the drivers of automobiles approaching each other over such connecting roads that it eliminates the confusion and uncertainty which formerly prevailed under such circumstances as to which car was entitled to the right of way. The mischief for which the act was enacted as a remedy was this: That in the case of automobiles approaching each other along connecting roads running at an angle to each other in such a manner that unless one of them gave way to the other a collision would result, in the absence of some rule on the subject, there would be no way of promptly determining which should give way to the other, and the confusion incident to such situations was the cause of many accidents. The danger of such accidents which the Leg-way caused the collision in this case, then their islature intended by this statute to remove verdict must be for the plaintiff." was the same at all points where two roads joined, and whether the roads so connecting actually crossed each other or merely connected could not possibly lessen or increase that danger. Since such was the intention of the Legislature, the language of the statute should be so construed as to give effect to such intention, unless such a construction would be clearly unreasonable. Hooper v. Creager, 84 Md. 195, 35 Atl. 967, 1103, 36 Atl. 359, 35 L. R. A. 202; 25 R. C. L. par. 254, "Statutes," p. 1015; Commercial Building Ass'n v. Mackenzie, 85 Md. 132, 36 Atl.

754.

And while, therefore, the word "intersect" literally means to cut into or between, or to cross, and does not, ordinarily, mean to begin at, or start from, a given line, yet, in view of the purpose of the act and the intention of the Legislature, it would be an absurd refinement to give it so narrow and limited an interpretation as would result from holding that the phrase "intersecting roads" as used in the act does not include all roads joining each other at an angle whether they cross each other or not. Some apprehension was expressed that such a construction would unreasonably limit the speed at which automobiles can be driven over the roads of this state, but, as the highways in the state are for the service and convenience of all, and since one of the primary purposes of the statute is to insure the safety of the travel

"If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant Earl Buckey on the night of July 14, 1916, was driving an automobile, approaching from the left, at intersecting roads, the car belonging to the plaintiff, and shall further find that said Earl Buckey on the occasion aforesaid did not give the right of way to the plaintiff's vehicle which was approaching from the right, if they so find, and that the plaintiff and his son, who was then and there driving the plaintiff's car, acted with due care and caution immediately preceding the accident, if they shall so find, and that the failure of the said Earl Buckey to give the right of

By this prayer the jury were told that, if Earl Buckey, through the negligent management of an automobile, damaged the plaintiff's car under such circumstances as to give him a right to compensation for such damage, that then his father, who is not referred to in the prayer, is a joint fort-feasor with Earl Buckey, and jointly liable with him for his negligent act. The effect of this prayer was to instruct the jury that the appellant George P. Buckey was responsible for the negligent operation of an automobile by his adult son, whether he had anything to do with such operation or not. The question as to whether he would have been jointly responsible under all the circumstances of the case with his son is not before us, and will not therefore be considered, nor was this question submitted to the jury by this prayer. But under it they were at liberty to find a verdict against both defendants for a negli gent act which they may have found was due to the conduct of only one of them and with which the other had no connection. That is not the law, and there was error in granting this prayer.

[7] But in the opinion of a majority of the court this error cannot be considered, because in thus stating the law this prayer assumed that George P. Buckey was responsible for the negligent acts of Earl Buckey, his son, and that under section 9, art. 5, C. P.

BOYCE, J. [1, 2] The court is constrained to deny the motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of mistake in the initial "T." in the Christian name of the defendant (Carr v. Buchanan, 5 Boyce, 254, 92 Atl. 875), and also to deny the motion to amend (Wagner v. Wagner, 3 Penn. 303, 51 Atl. 603; Sindowski v. Sindowski, 2 Boyce, 547, 84 Atl. 805), and will proceed to hear the case on its merits. If the evidence establishes the fact that the correct initial in the Christian name of the defendant is "I.," and not "T.," and that she was personally served with the summons issued in this cause, and if after hearing the evidence the court shall be satisfied that a decree nisi should be granted, the court will, in entering the decree, substitute "I." for "T." in the Christian name of the defendant. After the hearing:

BOYCE, J. The marriage certificate, the

In divorce action, court will not dismiss pe-admissions of the plaintiff and other evidence tition because of mistake in initial of defendant's middle name, but will proceed to hear case on merits, and on proof that mistake was made, and that defendant was personally served, will, on entry of decree, substitute the correct initial.

2. Parties95(4)-Mistake in middle initial of defendant's name not to be corrected by amendment of petition.

Court will not permit amendment to petition in divorce action to correct misnomer of defendant, in that her middle initial was stated to be "T.," instead of "I."; but the decree will, if adverse to defendant, designate her with the proper initial in her name, as disclosed by the evidenče on hearing on the merits.

BOYCE, J., sitting.

Caleb E. Burchenal, of Wilmington, for plaintiff.

Franklin Brockson, of Wilmington, for defendant.

Superior Court for New Castle County, November Term, 1920.

Action for divorce by James Francis L. Taylor against Blanch T. Taylor. On motion for defendant to dismiss, and counter motion for plaintiff to amend the petition. Motions denied. Cause heard on merits. Decree nisi granted.

See Syfrit v. Gause et al., 111 Atl. 780.

This was an action for divorce on the ground of desertion. The defendant, by the name of Blanch T. Taylor, was served personally. The cause coming on for hearing, counsel and guardian ad litem for the infant defendant, appointed by the court, moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of misnomer, in that the name of the defendant is Blanch I. Taylor. Counsel for plaintiff conceded the misnomer, but opposed the motion to dismiss, and asked leave to amend the petition and record so as to correct the mistake.

clearly show that "I.," and not "T.," is the correct initial for the middle Christian name of the defendant, and that the defendant was served personally, and the evidence adduced establishes the fact of willful desertion on the part of the defendant as alleged in the petition.

Let a decree nisi be entered, with the initial "I." incorporated therein, instead of "T.," in the Christian name of the defendant.

SYFRIT v. GAUSE et al.

(Superior Court of Delaware. New Castle. Dec. 17, 1920.)

Mechanics' liens 157(1)-Statement not dismissed for mistake in initial of owner's middle name.

In mechanic's lien proceeding, claim will not be stricken from record because of mistake in initial of middle name of owner, where there is no question raised as to owner's identity or as to personal service upon her.

BOYCE and RICE, JJ., sitting.

Henry R. Isaacs, of Wilmington, for plaintiff.

Herbert H. Ward, Jr., of Wilmington, for defendants.

Superior Court for New Castle County, November Term, 1920.

Mechanic's Lien, No. 101, September Term, 1920.

Mechanic's Lien proceeding by Leon W. Syfrit for amount claimed to be due for materials and labor against Virginia J. Gause, owner or reputed owner, and J. Frank Owens, contractor. On exception to statement of claim of the plaintiff and prayer that the lien be stricken from the record. Exception dismissed.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(111 A.)

The only question of law raised by the exception is whether or not the lien should be stricken from the record by reason of the mistake in the middle initial of one of the demissions under an agreement whereby he was fendants in the petition and writ.

it appeared that during the life of the exclusive agency the owner notified plaintiff's agent to do nothing further about the sale until further notice, and that the employee so notified left plaintiff's employment without For the reasons stated the exception is dis- communicating such notice, a revocation of missed.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

"New Haven, Conn., April 18, 1917. "Harry J. Clark, of New Haven, Connecticut, hereinafter known as the 'owner,' and Hayes & Allen of New Haven, Connecticut, hereinafter known as the 'agent,' agree together as fol-office, by bringing proposed customers to said lows:

"Should the title to the property prove im-ers to plaintiff's premises, who made a perperfect, in consequence of which the transac-sonal inspection of the same with said emtion cannot be completed, the agent is entitled ployees of plaintiff, all of which the defendto the full commission. ant knew, and one of said agents also took

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

several customers to the premises, who viewed the premises from the outside.

The plaintiff faithfully used all reasonable means and efforts to find a purchaser for defendant's property.

About two months after the execution of the agreement, Exhibit A, defendant notified plaintiff's agent, P. H. Weil, who had executed the agreement for the plaintiff, and who was one of plaintiff's said employees above referred to, to do nothing further for the present about the sale of the property and until plaintiff should notify him to go ahead, assigning to plaintiff's said servant at said time, as a reason for desiring him to temporarily cease his efforts to make a sale of the premises, that he (the defendant) had been informed by his father that there was some question affecting his title to the premises.

Said Weil thereupon ceased making any further efforts to sell said property and shortly thereafter left plaintiff's employ, without, however, notifying plaintiff, or any employee of plaintiff's, of what defendant had stated to him.

783

The first clause of the agreement reads: "Harry J. Clark, of New Haven, Connecticut, hereinafter known as the 'owner,' and Hayes & Allen of New Haven, Connecticut, hereinafter known as the 'agent,' agree together as follows."

[1] The signature of the broker attached to Exhibit A, with the first clause thereof reading as above, establishes the fact that the broker intended thereby to accept the terms of the agreement.

The defendant urges that the express terms of the agreement include no promises on the part of the broker and that the agreement therefore lacks mutuality or consideration and is unenforceable.

[2] The defendant fails to appreciate that, under certain circumstances, written contracts bearing the signatures of both parties, which on their face and by their express terms appear to be obligatory on one party only, create a corresponding and correlative obligation on the other party by implication. This principle of law is stated as follows

The other said employee of plaintiff, how-in Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, § 95: ever, continued his efforts in the manner indicated above and endeavored to sell said premises up to the time that he learned that defendant had himself sold said property.

At the time defendant requested said Weil to defer his efforts to sell said premises until he should further notify him, and assigned as a reason that he had been informed by his father that there was some question affecting his title to said property, defendant did not state what said claimed defect was, nor was any evidence offered on the trial on said question.

On October 5, 1917, defendant personally sold said property to one Julia A. Kinsella, of New Haven, for the sum of $8,000, without notice to plaintiff or any of his agents or employees.

"Frequently it happens that contracts on their face and by their express terms appear to be obligatory on one party only; but in such cases, if it is manifest that it was the intention of the parties and the consideration upon which one party assumed an express obligation that there should be a corresponding and correlative obligation on the other party, such corresponding and correlative obligation will be implied." Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Goodnow, 40 Minn. 497, 42 N. W. 356, 4 L. R. A. 203, and note; Williston on Contracts, vol. 1, § 90; Page on Contracts (2d Ed.) vol. 1, § 187.

In the case of W. G. Taylor Co. v. Bannerman, 120 Wis. 189, 97 N. W. 918, a written contract in these words was signed by both parties.

"We hereby appoint the W. G. Taylor Co. of our agents for Wisconsin and IlUpon this state of facts, the trial court stone rendered judgment for the plaintiff to re-linois, and agree to sell them * * * as follows: (list of kind and prices.) cover a commission of 2 per cent. upon the It is further agreed that W. G. Taylor & Co. price received by the owner.

Prentice W. Chase and Ernest L. Averill, are our exclusive agents for Wisconsin and

both of New Haven, for appellant. Harry W. Asher, of New Haven, for

lee.

Illinois, and we will quote no prices to others without their consent. This agreement is unappel-derstood to be in force for the full term of one year from February 1st, 1899."

CURTIS, J. (after stating the facts as above). The defendant, the owner of certain real estate in New Haven, and the plaintiff, a real estate broker, signed the agreement, Exhibit A, on April 18, 1917. All the express undertakings in the written agreement are made by the owner.

The owner in the agreement gives the broker the exclusive right to sell the property

for the term of one year.

The defendant claims that, under the facts, the terms of Exhibit A constitute merely an offer to contract and that no acceptance of the offer has been established.