Compensation to Public Officers. position higher than that of a dependent on Virginia. Ibid. 13. The limitation act of the state of Kentucky, commonly known by the epithet of "the seven years law," does not violate the compact between the state of Virginia and the state of Kentucky. Ibid. 14. Compact between Virginia and Maryland, relative to the river Potomac. City of Georgetown v. The Alexandria Canal Company, 12 Peters, 91. 15. The act of congress, which granted the charter to the Alexandria Canal Company, is in no degree a violation of the compact between the states of Virginia and Maryland, or of any of the rights that the citizens of either or both states claimed as being derived from it. Ibid. 16. A compact entered into between two states, with the assent of congress, is binding on those states, and the citizens of each. Fleeger et al. v. Poole et al., 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 191. 17. Grants may be annulled by such compact, on the ground of having been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the state. Ibid. 18. Private rights cannot be interposed to prevent the taking effect of such compact. Ibid. See BOUNDARIES OF STATES, Ante, 266. COMPENSATION TO PUBLIC OFFICERS. money received by him during a year, commencing from the date of his appointment, instead of calculating it by the fiscal year, which commences with the calendar year, on the first day of January in every year. He had a right to charge the whole yearly maximum of commissions, for the fractional part of the year in which he resigned. Ibid. 3. The United States instituted a suit against Charles Gratiot, to recover a balance alleged to be due by him for money paid to him as "chief engineer in the service of the United States," as shown by two treasury transcripts. The claims of General Gratiot against the United States, as offsets to the demand against him, which had been exhibited to the accounting officers of the treasury, were for commissions on disbursements of public money at Fortress Monroe and Fort Calhoun, being two dollars per day during the times of the disbursements; and which two dollars per day were charged separately, for each day; and for extra services in conducting the civil works of internal improvement, carried on by the United States. In the circuit court, the evidence offered to prove the set-off claimed by the defendant, was rejected. Held, that unless some law can be shown, establishing clearly and unequivocally the illegality of each of the items of set-off, and no such law exists, the refusal of the circuit court to admit the evidence cannot be supported. It was competent and relevant evidence, and proper for the consideration of the jury, as conducing to the establishment of the facts. Gratiot v. The United States, 15 Peters, 336. paid to him in that capacity. Held, that the balance claimed in this action from the defendant, was upon a transcript from the treasury including those items, which had been charged to him as chief engineer; and as there was no distinct charge on the transcript objected to, the refusal of the circuit court to sustain the objection was proper. Ibid. 1. Samuel W. Dickson was appointed a receiver of public money for the Choctaw district, Mississippi, and entered on the duties of his 4. Certain requisitions had been paid to Geoffice on the 22d November, 1833, and continued neral Gratiot on account of Fort Grand Terre, to hold the office until the 26th July, 1836, when and other public works, as stated in a transcript he resigned it. He received more than two hun- of the treasury of the United States; and it was dred and fifty thousand dollars of public money contended that this transcript was not evidence in each year, during the two years of his conti- in an action against "the chief engineer," as the nuance in office; and also, more than two hun-transcript did not state the money to have been dred and fifty thousand dollars during the portion of the year commencing on the 22d November, 1835, and ending on the 26th July, 1836. He claimed under the act of congress relating to the compensation and salaries of receivers, a compensation of one per cent. on the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars in each year; and also, a commission of one per cent. on the money received during the fraction of the year, not exceeding, with the salary of five hundred dollars, three thousand dollars, in the fraction of the last year. The United States claimed to limit the commissions and salary to the fiscal year, from January 1st to December 31st, annually; and denied his right to more than a portion of the commissions on the money received by him, limiting the same to the proportion of the year he was in office. Held, that the receiver was entitled to charge his commissions on the whole sum received by him in the part of the year he was in office; the same not exceed ing, with his salary, the amount of three thousand dollars. The United States v. Dickson et al., 15 Peters, 141. 2. The receiver was entitled to calculate his yearly commissions on the amount of public 5. The United States possess the general right to apply all sums due to an officer in the service of the United States for pay and emoluments, to the extinguishment of any balances due to them by such officer, on any other account; whether as a private individual, or an officer of the United States. It is but the exercise of the common right which belongs to every creditor, to apply the unappropriated moneys of his debtor in his hands, in the extinguishment of the debts due by him. Ibid. 6. It is wholly immaterial whether the claim to set-off against the United States be a legal or an equitable claim; in either view it constitutes a good ground of set-off or deduction. It is not sufficient that these items ought to be rejected, that there is no positive law which expressly provides for or fixes such allowances. There Compensation to Public Officers. are many authorities conferred on the different | it, if admitted, would not have sustained it. departments of the government, which, for their Upon a review of the laws and regulations of due execution, require services and duties which the government, applicable to the subject, it is are not strictly appertaining to, or devolved upon, apparent that the services therein alleged to be any particular office, and which require agencies performed, were the ordinary special duties apof a discretionary nature. In such cases, the pertaining to the office of chief engineer, and department charged with the execution of the which the chief engineer was bound to perform; particular authority, business, or duty, has al- and without any compensation beyond his salary ways been deemed incidentally to possess the and emoluments as a brigadier-general in the right to employ the proper persons to perform army of the United States, on account of such the same, as the appropriate means to carry into services. Ibid. effect the required end; and also, the right, where the service or duty is an extra service or duty, to allow the person so employed a suitable compensation. Ibid. 7. The act of congress of the 16th March, 1802, which provides for the organization and establishment of the corps of engineers, never has been supposed to authorize the president of the United States to employ the corps of engineers for any other duty except such as belongs either to military engineering, or to civil engineering. Assuming, that the president possessed the fullest power under the act to employ, from time to time, every officer of the corps in the business of civil engineering, still it must be obvious that, as their pay and emoluments were or would be regulated with reference to their ordinary military and other duties, the power of the president to detach them upon other civil services, would not preclude him from contracting to allow such detached officers a proper compensation for any extra services. Such a contract may not only be established by proof of some positive regulation, but may also be inferred from some practice and usage of the war department in similar cases, acting in obedience to the presumed orders of the president. Ibid. 8. The regulations of the army of the United States, which were sanctioned by the president in 1821, art. 67, and in 1825, art. 67, which allow two dollars per diem, not to exceed two and a half per cent. on the sum disbursed, to the agents for disbursing money at fortifications, do not limit this allowance to the engineer superintending the construction and disbursing the money, as agent for fortifications, to a single per diem allowance of two dollars for all the fortifications for which a distinct appropriation has been made; when he is employed at the same time upon several fortifications, each requiring separate accounts of the disbursements to be kept, on account of there being distinct and independent appropriations therefor. It would be unreasonable to suppose that these regulations intended to give the same amount of compensation to a person disbursing money upon two or more distinct fortifications, that he would be entitled to if he were disbursing agent for one only; although his duties might be thus doubled, or even trebled. Ibid. 10. Dr. Minis, a surgeon in the service of the army of the United States, was appointed a mili tary disbursing agent for removing and subsisting the Cherokee Indians. He charged two and a half per cent. on the sum of five hundred and fourteen thousand two hundred and thirty-seven dollars, actually disbursed by him in the course of his agency in 1836, 1837. The charge was rejected at the treasury, on the authority of a clause in the act of congress of March 3, 1835, ch. 303. It was contended by the plaintiff in error, 1. That this act of congress did not apply to the case. 2. That from the long-established practice of the government, as well as from the established law of the land, he was entitled to commissions; there being no law, prior to 1839, disallowing commissions on moneys disbursed for the government. 3. That the charge for commissions should be allowed, because the charge is made on disbursements of moneys appropriated during the session of congress of 1836-37, and therefore neither the act of 1835, nor that of 1839 were applicable to the claims. Held, that the claim is not supported by the laws of the United States; and that no commissions are chargeable to the United States on the moneys disbursed by the agent of the United States for removing and subsisting the Cherokee Indians. The case falls directly within the act of 30th June, 1834, ch. 162, for organizing the Indian department. This act authorizes the president of the United States to require any military officer of the United States to execute the duties of Indian agent; and prohibits any extra compensation for their services, other than an allowance for actual travelling expenses. Minis v. The United States, 15 Peters, 423. 11. In the act of congress of 3d March, 1835, ch. 303, entitled, An act making certain addi tional appropriations for the Delaware Breakwater, &c., a proviso is introduced, "Provided that no officer of the army shall receive any per cent. or additional pay, extra allowance or compensation, in any form whatsoever, on account of disbursing any public money appropriated by law, during the present session, for fortifications, &c., or for any other service or duty whatsoever, unless authorized by law." Held, that this proviso applied only to the appropriations made for military purposes by that act, and to any which 9. A claim of set-off was presented for thirty-might be made during that session of congress; seven thousand two hundred and sixty-two dollars and forty-six cents, for extra services in conducting the affairs connected with the civil works of internal improvement. Held, that, upon its face, this item has no just foundation in law; and the evidence offered in support of and was not a general permanent regulation, applicable to all cases of expenditures for the military purposes of the United States, under the provisions of acts of congress. It would be somewhat novel to find engrafted upon an act making special and temporary appropriations, Composition with Creditors.-Compromise.-Computation of Time. any proviso which was to have a general and he would confess judgment, and not dispute her permanent application to all future appropria- liability upon the note, he, the attorney, would tions. Nor ought such an intention on the part immediately proceed by execution to make the of the legislature to be presumed, unless it is amount from the drawer of the note, the princiexpressed in the most clear and positive terms, pal debtor; who, he assured her, had sufficient and where the language admits of no other rea- property to satisfy the same. Upon the faith of sonable interpretation. Ibid. this promise she did confess the judgment. Held, that this agreement fell within the scope of the general authority of the attorney, and was binding on the plaintiffs in the suit. The plaintiffs in the suit having failed to proceed by execution against the drawer of the note, and having suffered him to remove with his property out of the reach of process of execution, the circuit court, on a bill filed, perpetually enjoined proceedings on the judgment confessed by the administratrix of the endorser; and the decree of the circui court was, on appeal, affirmed by the supreme court. The Union Bank of Georgetown v. Geary, 5 Peters, 99. COMPOSITION WITH CREDITORS. 1. It is generally true in cases of composition, that the debtor who agrees to pay a less sum in the discharge of a contract, must pay punctually. If the agreement stipulates for partial payments, and the debtor fails to pay, the condition to take part is broken, the second contract forfeited, and is no bar to the original cause of action. Clarke et al. v. White, 12 Peters, 178. 2. In a composition for a debt, by which one party agreed to deliver goods to the amount of seventy per cent. in satisfaction of a debt exceeding ten thousand dollars, and omitted to deliver within one dollar and forty-one cents of the amount; the mistake is too trivial to deserve notice. Ibid. 3. If, upon failure or insolvency, one creditor goes into a contract of general composition common to the others; at the same time, having an underhand agreement with the debtor, to receive a larger per cent.; such agreement is fraudulent and void. Ibid. 3. An attorney at law, it is said, cannot make a compromise to bind his client: and the case of Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436, was relied upon for this doctrine. But upon examining the opinion delivered by the chief justice in that case, we find him saying, "that though an attorney at law, merely as such, has, strictly speak-. ing, no right to make a compromise, yet a court would be disinclined to disturb one which was not so unreasonable in itself as to be exclaimed against by all, and to create an impression that the attorney's judgment had been imposed on, or not fairly exercised. Though it may assume the form of an award or judgment at law, the injured party, if his own conduct has been perfectly blameless, ought to be relieved against it." What that court would have said in applying the principles to the case of a compromise made by an attorney in fact, as well as the attorney at law, fully and promptly communicated to his principal, who afterwards received the fruits of it, and who acquiesced for ten or twelve years in what had been done, we need be at no loss to conjecture. Mayer v. Foulkrod, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 511. COMPROMISE. COMPUTATION OF TIME. 1. Where the computation is to be made for the act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included. Arnold v. The United States, 9 Cranch, 104; 3 Cond. Rep. 296. 1. Although an attorney at law has no right to make a compromise, yet a court will be disinclined to disturb one which was not so unreasonable in itself as to be exclaimed against by all, and to create an impression that the judgment of the attorney has been imposed upon, or not fairly exercised. But where the sacrifice is such as to leave it scarcely possible that with a full knowledge of every circumstance, such a compromise could be fairly made, there can be no hesitation in saying that the compromise being unauthorized, and being, therefore, in itself void, ought not to bind the injured party. Though it may assume the form of an award or a judg 3. The only exception to this rule is establishment at law, the injured party ought to be re-ed by the law merchant, which considers the lieved against it. Holker et al. v. Parker, 7 day on which a bill of exchange, payable at so Cranch, 436; 2 Cond. Rep. 506. many days after sight, is accepted, as excluded. Ibid. 2. The attorney of the plaintiffs, in an action on a promissory note, agreed with the defendant, whose intestate was endorser of the note, that if 2. Where the computation of time is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is included; the act being the terminus a quo, the computation is to be made, and there being, in contemplation of law, no fractions of a day, unless the question arises as to the priority of acts of the same date. Pierpont et al. v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 232. 4. When the expressions of a deed are "from the date," if a present interest is to commence Computation of Time.-Concurrent Jurisdiction. from the date, the day of the date is included; but if they are used merely to fix a terminus from which to compute time, the day is, in all cases, excluded. Ibid. 5. If in a lease for so many years, a date is of the first description; if the deed had been dated at a past day, and the habendum is from the date, it is of the latter description. Ibid. 6. If a bill of exchange is made payable so many days after the date, the date is merely to fix the terminus a quo to compute the time, and the day is excluded. Ibid. 7. It is the usage of the Bank of Washington, and of the Bank of the District of Columbia, to demand payment of a bill of exchange and a promissory note, on the day after the last day of grace; and this usage has been sanctioned by the decisions of the supreme court. Bank of Washington v. Triplett et al., 1 Peters, 60. 8. By the custom of the banks of the District of Columbia, payment of a promissory note, or bill of exchange, is to be demanded on the fourth day after the time limited for the payment thereof, in order to charge the parties thereto; contrary to the law merchant, which requires a demand on the fourth day. Renner v. The Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581; 5 Cond. Rep. 691. 9. A bill of exchange payable at five days after sight, accepted on the first day of the month, is payable on the ninth of the same month, the day of acceptance being excluded, and the three days of grace allowed; a demand on the eighth, and a protest for non-payment on that day, is too early, and therefore void. Mitchell v. Degrand, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 176. 10. A bill of exchange, payable five days after sight, was presented for acceptance on the 30th of September, but not, in fact, accepted until the 1st of October; the acceptance takes effect only from that day, and does not relate back to the day before. Ibid. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION. 1. In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the subject, must determine it conclusively. Smith v. M3Ïver, 9 Wheat. 532; 5 Cond. Rep. 662. 2. Although courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law, in all matters of fraud; yet, where the cause has already been tried and determined by a court of law, a court of equity cannot take cognizance of it, unless there be the addition of some equitable circumstance to give jurisdiction. In such a case, some defect of testimony, or other disability, which a court of law cannot remove, must be shown, as a ground for resorting to a court of equity. Ibid. 3. The second section of the third article of the constitution, giving original jurisdiction to the supreme court, in cases affecting consuls, does not prevent the legislature from vesting a concurrent jurisdiction in inferior courts. United States v. Ravara, C. C. of Pennsylvania, 2 Dall. 297. 4. Courts of common law have concurrent jurisdiction over questions arising under policies of insurance. De Lovio v. Boit et al., 2 Gallis, C. C. R. 398. 5. When a seizure is made within the limits of a judicial district, the district court of that district has exclusive original cognizance thereof; and if the property is taken into another district, it will be remitted to the proper district. But the cognizance of seizures on the high seas is concurrent in all the district courts, and properly vests in the court of that district into which the property is brought. The Abby, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 360. 6. When the district and state courts have a concurrent jurisdiction in rem, the right to maintain the jurisdiction attaches to that tribunal which first exercises it, and obtains possession of the thing. The Robert Fulton, Paine's C. C. R. 620. the circumstance that a question of title may be involved in the inquiry, and even constitute the essential point on which the case depends, will not arrest the jurisdiction. Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; 2 Cond. Rep. 336. 11. The act of congress, under which a lot in the city of Washington was sold for taxes, required that public notice of the time and place 7. Where, in equity, a cause involves a of sale of lots, the property of non-residents, naked question of title, the suit is local: should be given, by advertising "once a week" in but where the question changes its character; some newspaper in the city, for three months. where the defendant is liable to complainant, Notice of the sale of the lot in controversy was either in consequence of contract or as trustee, published for three months; but in the course or as the holder of a legal title, acquired by any of that period, eleven days at one time, at an- species of mala fides practised on the plaintiff, other ten days, and at another eight days, trans- the principles of equity give the court jurisdicpired in succeeding weeks, between the insertion, wherever the person may be found; and tions of the advertisement in the newspapers. The supreme court said-"A week" is a definite period of time, commencing on Sunday and ending on Saturday. The notice was published Monday, January 6th, and was omitted until Saturday, January 18th, leaving an interval of eleven days. Still the publication on Saturday was within the week preceding the notice of the 6th; and this was sufficient. It would be a most rigid construction of the act of congress, justified neither by its spirit nor its language, to say that this notice must be published on any particular day of a week. If published once a week for three months, the law is complied with, and its object effectuated. Ronkendorf v. Taylor's Lessee, 4 Peters, 349. 32* 8. In cases of fraud, trust, or contract, the jurisdiction of a court of chancery is sustainable, wherever the person may be found, although lands, not within the jurisdiction of the court, may be affected by the decree. Ibid. 9. A court of chancery, having obtained jurisdiction of the principal question, will proceed to make such decree as the justice and equity of the case may require. Hepburn et al. v. Dunlop et al., 1 Wheat. 179; 2 Cond. Rep. 529. 10. The circuit court has jurisdiction on a bill 2 x General Principles. teen hundred dollars, or the duties which may be ascertained to be due upon certain goods imported, it is not in the option of the obligee to discharge the bond by payment of the seventeen hundred dollars. Arnold et al. v. The United States, 9 Cranch, 104; 3 Cond. Rep. 296. in equity, filed by the United States, against the 2. If the condition of a bond be to pay seven debtor of their debtor, they claiming a priority under the sixty-fifth section of the act of March 2d, 1799, ch. 128, notwithstanding the local law of the state, where the suit brought, allows a creditor to proceed against the debtor of his debtor, by a peculiar process at law. United States v. Howland et al., 4 Wheat. 108; 4 Cond. Rep. 404. 11. The circuit courts of the Union having chancery jurisdiction in every state, they have the same chancery powers, and the same rules of decision in all the states. Ibid. 12. The powers granted to congress are not exclusive of similar powers existing in the states; unless where the constitution has expressly in terms given an exclusive power to congress, or the exercise of a like power is prohibited to the states, or there is a direct repugnancy or incompatibility in the exercise of it by the states. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1. 13. The example of the first class is to be found in the exclusive legislation delegated to congress, over places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state, in which the same shall be, for forts, arsenals, dock-yards, &c.; of the second class, of the prohibition of a state to coin money or emit bills of credit; of the third class, the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and the delegation of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Ibid. 14. In all other classes of cases the states retain concurrent authority with congress. Ibid. 15. But in cases of concurrent authority, where the laws of the states and of the Union are in direct and manifest collision on the same subject; those of the Union, being the supreme law of the land, are of paramount authority; and the state laws so far, and so far only, as such incompatibility exists, must necessarily yield. Ibid. 16. The courts of common law have a coneurrent jurisdiction with those of admiralty over maritime contracts. De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 398. CONDITION. 1. General principles.... 2. Conditions precedent 3. Conditions subsequent.. 1. General Principles. 3. The condition annexed to the devise, that the person that may have the right, is to procure an act of assembly for the change of his name, "together with his taking an oath, before he has possession, before a magistrate, &c., that he will not make any change, during his life, in this my will, relative to my real property," is repugnant to the nature of the estate, and consequently void. Taylor et al. v. Mason, 9 Wheat. 325; 5 Cond. Rep. 595. 4. A bond for the payment of duties, in the alternative, required by the act of March 2d, 1799, ch. 128, is discharged by performance of either part of the condition at the election of the obligor, although the sum named in the condi tion be less than the duties. United States v. Thompson, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 388. 5. By the general rule of law, if the condition of an obligation be in the disjunctive, it may be discharged by either of the enumerated acts, at the election of the obligor, unless where the parties have saved the election to the other party. Ibid. 6. Conditions are to be construed strictly against those for whose benefit they are introduced, where they impose burdens on other parties. Catlin v. The Springfield Manufactory, i Sumner's C. C. R. 439. 7. Among the conditions, which were printed on the same sheet with a policy of insurance against fire, was one requiring, "that all persons insured, and sustaining loss or damage by fire, should forthwith give notice thereof to the company, and as soon after as possible, deliver in a particular account of such loss or damage, signed with their own hands, and verified with their oath or affirmation, and also, if required, by their books of account and other proper vouchers." Held, by the circuit court, that the particular account required by the condition, is a particular account of the articles lost or damaged, and does not refer to the manner or cause of the loss. Page 378 379 Ibid. 379 1. If a party to a contract, who is entitled to the benefit of a condition, upon the performance of which his responsibility is to arise, dispense with it, or, by any act of his own, prevent the performance, the opposite party is excused from proving a strict compliance with the conditions. Thus, if the precedent act is to be performed at a certain time or place, and a strict performance of it is prevented by the absence of the party, who has a right to claim it, the law will not permit him to set up the non-performance of the condition as a bar to the responsibility which his part of the contract had imposed upon him. Williams v. The Bank of the United States, 2 Peters, 102. 8. Stinson, being warden of the state prison of New Hampshire, appointed James his agent for the sale of granite for the prison, with power to sell the granite and collect the moneys arising from the sales. Gass was the security of James for the faithful performance of the agency. It was agreed, between Stinson the obligee in the bond and Gass his surety, that if Gass should be dissatisfied with continuing his suretyship, he should have a right, on ten days' notice being given to the warden of the prison in writing, to discontinue his liability or suretyship; provided the accounts of the agents are then settled, the balance paid, and the property of the state prison delivered over to the warden of the prison. "Held, by the circuit court, that the proviso in this agree ment was not a condition, precedent to the right of Gass, to liberate himself from future surety. |