Bills drawn on a Guarantee or a Letter of Credit. resorting to B., whose undertaking was, in effect, | having been dishonoured when presented for a promise to furnish the funds necessary to carry acceptance. Lowber v. Shaw, 5 Mason's C. C. into execution the adventure. Also, held, that R. 241. L. had a right to recover from B. the commissions, disbursements, and other charges of the transaction. Ibid. 206. Where a general authority is given to draw bills from a certain place, on account of advances there made, the undertaking is to replace the money at that place. In this case, therefore, the legal interest at New Orleans was allowed. Ibid. 207. A promise to accept a non-existing bill, if shown to a third person, who, upon the faith of such promise, receives the draft for a valuable consideration, is in law an acceptance. Payson v. Coolidge, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 238. 208. And it is immaterial, whether the consideration be a pre-existing debt, or money advanced at the time. Ibid. 209. What is sufficient evidence of an admission by the acceptors of an endorsement to the holders, is a question to be left to the jury. Ibid. 210. A promise to accept a bill of exchange is an acceptance, when the bill is duly drawn, and taken, bona fide, on the faith of the promise. Ogden et al. v. Gillingham et al., 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 45. 211. If a person undertake to accept a bill, in consideration that another will purchase one already drawn, or to be thereafter drawn, and as an inducement to the purchaser to take it, and the bill is purchased upon the credit of such promise for a sufficient consideration, such pronise to accept is binding upon the party. It is an original promise to the purchaser, not merely a promise for the debt of another; and having a sufficient consideration to support it, in reason and justice as well as in law, ought to bind him. Townley v. Sumrall, 2 Peters, 181. 212. It can make no difference in law, whether the debt for which a bill of exchange is taken is a pre-existing debt, or money then paid for the bill. In each case there is a substantial credit given by the party to the drawer upon the bill, and the party parts with his present rights at the instance of the promissee, whose promise is substantially a new and independent one, and not a mere guarantee of the existing promise of the drawer. Under such circumstances there is no substantial distinction, whether the bill be then in existence, or be drawn afterwards. In each case, the object of the promise is to induce the party to take the ll upon the credit of the promise. Ibid. 182. 213. Where certain merchants had entered into a written contract, to subscribe certain sums for a voyage to Africa, &c., and authorized their agent to draw bills for the amount, if he fitted out the expedition; and he drew a bill on one of the subscribers for the amount subscribed by him, to pay for goods bought for the voyage, on the credit of the written authority above stated, which was shown to the payee of the bill; it was held, that the agent, though drawer, was a competent witness to prove the facts, in a suit brought by the payee against the subscriber, pon a constructive acceptance of the bill, it 214. The supreme court confirmed the principle established in the case of Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 75, that a letter written within a reasonable time before or after the date of a bill of exchange, describing it in terms not to be mistaken, and promising to accept it, is, if shown to the person who afterwards takes the bill, on the credit of the letter, a virtual acceptance, binding the person who makes the promise. Schimmelpennich et al. v. Bayard et al., i Peters, 283. 215. If the drawees of a bill of exchange, who refuse to honour the bill, and thus deny the authority of the drawer to draw upon them, were bound in good faith to accept or pay the bill as drawees, they will not be permitted to change the relation in which they stood to the parties on the bill, by a wrongful act. They can acquire no right as the holders of the bill paid supra protest, if they were bound to honour it in the character of drawees. Ibid. 285. 216. F., at New Orleans, was the correspondent of P., at Boston, received goods from him on consignment, and was from time to time directed to purchase produce and ship the same to P., and was instructed to draw on P. for the funds to pay for the same. When he made purchases, "the bills of parcels were made out in the name of F., and the accounts entered in the books of the different merchants in his name." The general course of the business was, that P. sent out, in his own vessels, merchandise to F., which was sold by F.; and F., at the request of P., purchased produce from merchants in New Orleans, and shipped the same as ordered by P.; and to put himself in funds for the same, when necessary, drew bills of exchange on P., who had always, until the presentation of the bills on which this suit was brought, accepted and paid the same; but he did not, in his purchases, act under the idea that he was restricted, in making them, to the drawing of bills for the payment of the articles purchased for P. F. purchased a quantity of tobacco to be shipped to P.; and payment for the same in bills on P., made a particular part of the contract for the purchase. At the time of the purchase, F. showed to the vendor of the tobacco, the letters from P., ordering the purchase and shipment of the same. Some of the bills drawn by F. on P., and which were delivered to the vendor of the tobacco in payment for the same, were refused acceptance and payment, and this suit was instituted for the recovery of the amount of the bills from P. Held, that P. was not liable to pay the bills. Parsons v. Armor & Oakey, 3 Peters, 426. 217. A bill of exchange is the substitute for the actual transmission of money by sea or land. Power, therefore, to draw on a house in good credit, and to throw the bills upon the market, is equivalent to a deposit of cash in the vaults of the agent. There is not the least tittle of evidence in this cause, to show that P. meant to use the credit of the drawer of the bills on which Bills drawn on a Guarantee or a Letter of Credit. this suit is brought, or to authorize him to pledge his credit in any thing but the negotiation of the bills. This depended on the confidence which merchants of New Orleans, who wished to remit, would place in the solvency and integrity of the drawer and drawee, and had no connection whatever with the application of the money thus raised to the purchases ordered by the principal. As to those purchases, the agent was authorized to go no farther than to apply the funds deposited with him. Ibid. 428. 218. Of the general power to protest the bills of one who has overdrawn, there can be no question; for it is the only security which one who gives a power to draw bills, and throw them on the market, has against the bad faith of his correspondent. He takes the risk of paying the damages, if in fault, or of throwing them on the other, if he has actually abused his trust. It is a question between him and his correspondent. Ibid. 429. 219. The currency which a merchant may give to bills drawn on him by his correspondent, by the payment of such bills, does not deprive him of the security he has a right to, by refusing his acceptance of other bills so drawn. Ibid. 430. 220. Action on two bills of exchange drawn by Hutchinson, on B. & H., in favour of E., which the drawers, B. & H., refused to accept, and with the amount of which bills E. sought to charge the defendants as acceptors, by virtue of an alleged promise before the bills were drawn. By the court:-The rule on this subject is laid down with great precision by the supreme court, in the case of Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 75, after much consideration, and a careful review of the authorities, that a letter written within a reasonable time before or after the date of a bill of exchange, describing it in terms not to be mistaken, and promising to accept it, is, if shown to the person, who afterwards takes the bill on the credit of the letter, a virtual acceptance, binding on the person who makes the promise. Boyce & Henry v. Edwards, 4 Peters, 121. 221. Whenever the holder of a bill seeks to charge the drawee as acceptor, upon some occasional or implied undertaking, he must bring himself within the spirit of the rule laid down in Coolidge v. Payson. Ibid. 222. The rule laid down in Coolidge v. Payson, requires the authority to be pointed at the specific bill or bills to which it is intended to be applied, in order that the party who takes the bill upon the credit of such authority, may not be mistaken in its application. Ibid. all bills coming fairly within the scope of the promise. Ibid. 224. Courts have latterly leaned very much against extending the doctrine of implied acceptances, so as to sustain an action upon a bill. For all practical purposes in commercial transactions in bills of exchange, such collateral ac ceptances are extremely inconvenient, and injurious to the credit of bills; and this has led judges frequently to express their dissatisfaction, that the rule has been carried so far as it has; and their regret that any other act than a written acceptance on the bill, had ever been deemed an acceptance. Ibid. 225. As it respects the rights and the remedy of the immediate parties to the promise to ac cept, and all others who may take bills upon the credit of such promise, they are equally secure and equally attainable by an action for the breach of the promise to accept, as they would be by an action on the bill itself. Ibid. 226. The contract in this case to accept the bill, if made at all, was made in Charleston, South Carolina. The bills were drawn in Georgia, on B. and H. in Charleston, and with a view to the state of South Carolina, for the execution of the contract. The interest is to be charged at the rate of interest in South Carolina. Ibid. 227. L., at Memphis, Tennessee, addressed a letter to D. & Co. at New Orleans, stating that N. & D. wished to draw on them for two thousand dollars, saying, "please accept their draft, and I hereby guaranty the punctual payment of it." In a letter of the same date, to one of the firm of N. & D., he says, "I send a guarantee for two thousand dollars. The bal ance I have no doubt your friend W. will do for you." N. & D. drew a bill on D. & Co. for four thousand two hundred and fifty dollars, which they accepted; and, after having paid the draft, they gave notice to L. that they looked to him for the money. No notice was given by D. & Co. to L., that they intended to accept, or had accepted, and acted upon the guarantee before they paid the draft. The drawers of the bill did not reimburse D. & Co. for any part of it. An action was instituted to recover two thousand dollars from L., being part of the bill for four thousand two hundred and fifty dollars. Held, that although the bill was drawn for four thou sand two hundred and fifty dollars, the guarantee would have operated to bind L. for the sum of two thousand dollars included in it, if notice of the acceptance of it had been given by D. & Co. to L.; but having omitted to give such notice, or that they intended to accept, or had accepted and acted on the guarantee, L. was not liable to D. & Co. for any part of the bill for four thousand two hundred and fifty dollars. Lee v. Dick, 10 Peters, 482. 223. The distinction between an action on a bill, as an accepted bill, and one founded on a breach of promise to accept, seems not to have been attended to. But the evidence necessary 228. A guarantee is a mercantile instrument, to support the one or the other is materially and to be construed according to what is fairly different. To maintain the former, the promise to be presumed to have been the understanding must be applied to the particular bill alleged in of the parties, without any strict technical the declaration to have been accepted. In the nicety. Ibid. latter, the evidence may be of a more general character; and the authority to draw may be collected from circumstances, and extended to 229. If the guarantee stood alone, unexplained by the letter which accompanied it, it would undoubtedly be limited to a specific draft for two The Intravention to Pay a Bill of Exchange.-Bills of Exchange to which the United States are Parties. thousand dollars; and would not cover that | that it has been done at the request, and under amount in a bill for a larger sum: but the letter the guarantee of the drawees of the bill, who which accompanied it fully justifies the conclu- had refused to accept or pay the same. sion, that the defendant undertook to guaranty two thousand dollars in a draft for a larger amount. The letter and guarantee were both written by defendant on the same sheet of paper, bear the same date, and may be construed together as constituting the guarantee. Ibid. 230. In the case of Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Peters, 125, the supreme court held, that a party giving a letter of guarantee has a right to know whether it is accepted; and whether the person to whom it is addressed means to give credit on the footing of it or not. It may be most material, not only as to his responsibility, but as to future rights and proceedings. It may regulate, in a great measure, his course of conduct, and his exercise of vigilance in regard to the party in whose favour it is given. Especially it is important in case of a continuing guarantee, since it may guide his judgment in recalling or suspending it. This last remark by no means warrants the conclusion, that notice is not necessary in a guarantee of a single transaction; but only that the reason of the rule applies more forcibly to a continuing guarantee. Ibid. 231. The same strictness of proof as to the time in which notice of the intention to act under the guarantee of exchange is to be given, to charge a party upon his guarantee, as would be necessary to support an action upon the bill when, by the law merchant, a demand upon and refusal by the acceptors must be proved, in order to charge any other party upon the bill. There are many cases where the guarantee is of a specific, existing demand, by a promissory note or other evidence of a debt, and such guarantee is given upon the note itself, or with 'a reference to it and recognition of it, when no notice would be necessary. The guarantor, in such cases, knows precisely what he guaranties, and the extent of his responsibility; and any further notice to him would be useless. But when the guarantee is prospective, and to attach upon future transactions, and the guarantor is uninformed whether his guarantee has been accepted and acted upon or not, the fitness and justice of the rule requiring notice, is supported by considerations that are unanswerable. Ibid. 7. Intravention to Pay a Bill of Exchange, supra Protest. 232. The defendants accepted a bill of exchange for the honour of the first endorser, the bill being under protest; and agreed to pay any person authorized to receive the money, and to give a discharge; this acceptance did not bind the defendants to pay, without the holder putting his name on the bill, or giving, as required, an indemnity to the defendants. Joshua Freeman v. Perot et al., 2 Wash. C. C. R. 485. 233. A stranger to the drawer and endorser of a non-accepted bill of exchange, may intervene supra protest, to pay the same for the honour of an endorser or drawer. Konig v. Bayard et al., 1 Peters, 262. 234. It is no objection to this intervention, arrangements made by the payer of the dishonoured bill, with the drawee, by which he was to be protected from loss, do not affect the liability of the party to the bill for whose honour it has been paid. Ibid. 235. If A., at the request of the drawee of a bill of exchange, and under his guarantee, accept and pay the bill, supra protest, for the honour of the endorser; the party against whom suit is brought for the amount paid, may avail himself of every defence which he could have had, if the bill had been paid supra pro test for the honour of the endorser, by the drawee, and suit brought for the same. Ibid. 236. The United States were the holders of a foreign bill of exchange drawn by a bankrupt, negotiated in the regular course of trade, and returned protested for non-payment. They are entitled to a preference out of the estate of the bankrupt, to the whole amount of the claim.. U.S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358; 1 Cond. Rep. 421. 237. Where a bill of exchange was endorsed to T., treasurer of the United States, who received it in that capacity, and for account of the United States, and the bill had been purchased by the secretary of the treasury, as one of the commissioners of the sinking fund, and as agent of that board, with the money of the United States, and was afterwards endorsed by T. to W. and S., and by them presented to the drawees for acceptance, and protested for non-acceptance and non-payment, and sent back by W. and S. to the secretary of the treasury; it was held, that the endorsement to T. passed such an interest to the United States as enabled them to maintain an action on the bill against the prior endorser. Dugan et al. v. The U. S., 3 Wheat. 172; 4 Cond. Rep. 223. 238. However this may be between private parties, the United States ought to be allowed to sue in their own name, whenever it appears, not only on the face of the instrument, but from all the evidence, that they alone are interested in the subject-matter of the controversy. Ibid. 239. The United States might recover in an action on a bill of exchange, without producing from W. and S., their endorsees and agents, a receipt, or a re-endorsement of the bill; W. and S. were to be presumed to have acted as the agents or bankers of the United States, and that all the interest which W. and S. ever had in the bill was divested by the act of returning it to the party from whom it was received. Ibid. 240. If a person who endorses a bill to another, whether for value or for the purpose of collection, comes again to the possession of the bill, he is to be regarded, unless the contrary appears in evidence, as the bona fide holder and proprietor of such bill, and is entitled to recover thereon; notwithstanding there may be on it one or more endorsements in full, subsequent to the endorsement to him, without producing any receipt or Bill of Interpleader.-Bills of Lading. endorsement back to him from either of such endorsers, whose names he may strike from the bill or not, as he thinks proper. Ibid. BILL OF INTERPLEADER. See CHANCERY. BILLS OF LADING. 241. Wherever the government of the United States, through its lawfully authorized agents, becomes the holder of a bill of exchange, it is bound to use the same diligence, in order to charge the endorsers, as in a transaction be- 1. A bill of lading, stating the property to between private individuals. United States v. Bar-long to A. and B., is not conclusive evidence of ker, 12 Wheat. 559; 6 Cond. Rep. 641. property, and does not estop A. from showing, in an action on a policy of insurance, that the property belonged to another. The Maryland Ins. Co. v. Rudens' Adm'r., 6 Cranch, 338; 2 Cond. Rep. 394. 242. Where the United States were holders of certain bills of exchange, and their agent, in New York, was directed, by a letter from the secretary of the treasury, dated Washington, December 7th, 1814, to give notice of non-acceptance to the drawer and endorsers, residing in New York, and notice was given to the endorser on the 12th of the same month, the mail which left on the 8th having arrived at New York at thirty-five minutes past ten o'clock, A. M., on the 10th; held, That the endorser was discharged by the negligence of the holders. Ibid. 243. So, also, where the United States were the holders of other bills, and their agent, in New York, was directed, by a letter from the secretary of the treasury, dated Washington, May 8th, 1815, to give notice of non-payment to the drawer and endorsers, residing in New York, and notice was given to the endorser on the 12th of the same month, the mail, which left Washington on the 8th, having reached New York early on the morning of the 11th; held, That the endorser was discharged by the negligence of the holders. Ibid. 244. A bill of exchange endorsed to the treasurer of the United States may be sued and declared on in the name of the United States, and an averment that it was endorsed immediately to them, will be good. U. S. v. Jacob Barker, 1 Paine's C. C. R. 156. 245. Where the endorsee of a bill of exchange, whether as agent or owner, returns it, after protest, to the last endorser, the latter may sue upon it in his own name, and, at the trial, strike out the last endorsement, although it be in full; and prior blank endorsements may be filled up at the trial, so as to correspond with the declaration. Where both these were omitted to be done, the court, on error, refused to reverse the judgment, considering the objection as one of form, and cured by the 32d sec. of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20. Ibid. 2. By the well-settled principles of commercial law, the consignee is the authorized agent of the owner, whoever he may be, to receive the goods; and by his endorsement of the bill of lading to a bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration, without notice of any adverse interest, the latter becomes, as against all the world, the owner of the goods. This is the result of the principle, that bills of lading are transferable by endorsement, and thus may pass the property. Conard v. The Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Peters, 445. 3. Strictly speaking, no person but the con signee can, by any endorsement on the bill of lading, pass the legal title to the goods. But, if the shipper be the owner, and the shipment be on his own account and risk, although he may not pass the title by virtue of a mere endorsement of the bill of lading, unless he be the consignee, or the goods be deliverable to his order, yet, by an assignment on the bill of lading, or by a separate instrument, he can pass the legal title to the same; and it will be good against all persons, except purchasers for a valuable consideration, without notice, by endorsement on the bill of lading itself. Such an assignment by the owner passes the legal title against his agents or factors, and creditors, in favour of the assignee. Ibid. | 4. The endorsement of a bill of lading transfers all the legal right in the property to the assignee, and the consignee cannot claim his debt out of the property shipped to him, unless it was actually in his possession before the assignment of the bill of lading. Ryberg v. Snell, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 294. 5. It is no objection to giving in evidence a bill of lading and invoice, which have been made 246. A citizen of the United States may, law-out after the usual and regular time, if the cirfully, during a war with a foreign country, draw a bill on a subject of such country, such an act not leading to any injurious consequence, nor amounting to trade with the enemy. Ibid. 247. The holder of a bill is entitled to recover at the rate of exchange at the time that notice of the protest is given; this is the settled law in New York. Ibid. 248. As the plaintiff in an action on a bill has a right to recover gold or silver, the measure of damages must be the value of the bill at the time of notice of protest, in gold and silver, and not in a depreciated or fluctuating currency. Пid. cumstances under which the vessel and master were, prevented their being made out at the common period. Graham v. The Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 2 Wash. C. C. R. 113. 6. Goods sold, bona fide, while at sea, by assignment of the bill of lading, the right of the principal to stop, in transitu, ceases. Walter v. Ross, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 283. 7. If the factor sell, bona fide, the goods of his principal for a valuable consideration, by assigning over the bill of lading, the sale is valid against the principal. But such a sale is not valid, unless the bill of lading for the goods has been received by the factor. Ibid. 283. 248 BILL OF SALE.—BLACK BOOK OF THE ADMIRALTY.—BLOCKADE. Bill of Sale.-Bill of Particulars.-Black Book of the Admiralty.-Blockade. 8. The assignee of the bill of lading, who received the goods, is bound to pay the freight, unless the assignor is bound by charterparty to pay it, or unless the assignee had bound himself, by an express agreement, to pay it as surety for the assignor. Trask & Davis v. Duvall, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 181. 9. The bill of lading, and the invoice, are the ordinary evidence of property; but they may be contradicted, both as to their genuineness and authenticity and as to their truth. Blagg v. The Phanix Ins. Co., 3 Wash. C. C. R. 5. |curity, and not absolute, and it is pursuant to the agreement of the parties, that the mortgagor shall have the conduct and management of the voyage on which the ship is then destined. Ibid. 3. Under the laws of Louisiana, and the decisions of the courts of that state, a mark for the name, to an instrument, by a person who is unable to write his name, is of the same effect as a signature of the name. Zacharie and Wife v. Franklin and Wife, 12 Peters, 151. 4. A bill of sale of slaves and furniture, reciting that the full consideration for the property 10. In an open policy, the plaintiff must prove transferred had been received, and which does his interest, and the value of his property, or he not contain any stipulations or obligations of the cannot recover. The bill of lading of the out-party to whom it is given, is not a cynalagmatic ward cargo is no proof of the interest of the plaintiff in the homeward cargo. Beale v. Pettit et al., 1 Wash. C. C. R. 241. 11. In an action on two policies of insurance, one a valued policy on the vessel, the other an open policy on the cargo, on a voyage from New York to Gibraltar, the vessel was captured and carried into Algesiras; and there, although the cargo was not condemned, as it was not permitted to the vessel to sail with it, unless security was given that it would not be carried to a British port in the Mediterranean, it was sold by the supercargo; and the vessel, which had not been detained with a view to her condemnation, sailed for New York, with a cargo on freight, and was lost it is not necessary to disclose to the underwriters on the cargo the particular language of the bills of lading; and if they are general, so as to comprehend the port to which insurance is made, it is sufficient. Hurtin v. Phanix Ins. Co., 1 Wash. C. C. R. 400. 12. The endorsement and delivery of a bill of lading, or the delivery of the bill without endorsement, if the cargo is, by the terms of it, to be delivered to a particular person, amounts to a transfer of the property, subject to the right of the vendor, if the consideration be not paid, to reclaim the property before it shall get into actual possession of the vendee. Walter v. Ross, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 283. BILL OF REVIEW. BILL OF REVIVOR. BILL OF SALE. 1. A bill of sale of a ship is good, though it do not recite the certificate prescribed by the registry act. D'Wolf v. Harris, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 515. 2. A bill of sale of a ship and cargo, lying in port, is, as against creditors, good and valid, if bona fide made; although possession is not taken of the same by the purchaser, if such bill of sale be merely by way of mortgage or se contract, under the laws of Louisiana; and the law does not require that such a bill of sale shall have been made in as many originals as there were parties having a direct interest in it, or that it should have been signed by the vendee. Ibid. BILL OF PARTICULARS. 1. A bill of particulars should be so specific as to inform the defendant, substantially, on what the plaintiff's action is founded. This is the object of the bill, and if it fall short of this, its tendency must be to mislead the defendant, rather than to enlighten him. Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company v. Knapp et al., 9 Peters, 541. 2. As the bill of particulars is filed before the trial, it is always in the power of the defendant to object to its want of precision, and the court will require it to be amended before the commencement of the trial; and if this be not the only mode of taking advantage of any defect in the bill, it is certainly the most convenient for the parties. Ibid. BLACK BOOK OF THE ADMIRALTY. The most venerable monument is the Black Book of the admiralty itself, which, though it contains considerable additions of later periods, is generally agreed to have been originally com piled in the reign of Edward III. This book has always been deemed of the highest authority in matters concerning the admiralty. Besides the laws of Oleron, at large, it contains an ample view of the crimes and offences cognisable in the admiralty; and also occasional ordinances and commentaries on matters of prize and maritime torts, injuries and contracts. Among other things it prohibits the suing of merchants, mariners, and other persons, at common law, for any thing appertaining to the maritime law of ancient right.-Per Mr. Justice Story. De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 404. BLOCKADE. 1. An American ship, warranted to be American property, is impliedly warranted to con duct herself during the voyage as an American |