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the Democrats contended that if any of the States chose to maintain slavery, Congress had no right to interfere, for slavery was a domestic institution.' Slavery has gone, but the Democrats are still jealous of any limitation on the powers of the State Legislatures. Fourteen out of the sixteen who secured the rejection of the amendment belong to the Democratic party; one is regarded as doubtful;' of the sixteenth I have no information. The twenty-eight who voted in its favour are, without exception, Republicans.

That the Roman Catholic hierarchy should so far renounce the traditions of their church as to sanction the attendance of the chil. dren of Roman Catholic parents at schools which are not under the control of the priests is very improbable. That, with all the difficulties created by the rivalry of the public system, they should abandon the hope of obtaining assistance for their own parochial schools from the public funds is equally improbable. The conflict appears to have come to an end for the present, and to renew it immediately would seem useless. But the political troubles of America are not over. The two existing political parties are rapidly dissolving, and within a very few years they will have to be reconstituted, probably under new names, and certainly on new principles. The priesthood will watch for their occasion, and will grasp it. In many of the States the Catholic voters are so numerous that politicians will be under a strong temptation to purchase their support. Here and there the denominationalists may win a temporary victory. But on the whole I have a firm belief that, with whatever persistency and energy the struggle may be sustained, the general defeat of the priests is certain. For the American people to surrender their common school system would be to confess that they are a conquered race. It would be to acknowledge that Roman Catholic immigrants from Europe have been strong enough to trample under foot the proudest traditions and to destroy the dearest institutions of the Republic. It would imply a complete revolution in the spirit and temper and habits of the nation.

R. W. DALE.

ENGLAND'S POLICY AT THE CONGRESS.

The expected meeting of a Congress at Berlin to settle the Eastern Question on a new basis marks a turning-point in European history. Whether we are on the eve of an interval of peace, or whether we stand at the threshold of a general war, is still matter for speculation. But, however this may be, our obvious policy at the Congress must be, if possible, to place the future relations of Turkey to Europe on something like a permanent footing. The one thing we, in common with all the peaceful States of Europe, require above all others, is a position of stable equilibrium. It is my object to point out in this paper how, in my judgment, we can best contribute to the attainment of this end. But, in order to make my meaning intelligible, it is necessary first to say something as to the general point of view from which I regard the present position of the Eastern Question.

There is no good in shrinking from the acknowledgment that the settlement which the Treaty of San Stefano professes to establish is eminently unsatisfactory. While the practical liberation of European Turkey from Moslem rule is a benefit in itself, this benefit has been purchased at a cost which renders the acquisition of doubtful value. The aggrandisement of Russia consequent on the results of the war is, as I deem, a blow to civilisation and to progress, while the reduction of the Ottoman Empire to the condition of a Muscovite dependency is fraught with very grave danger to the tranquillity of Europe and the welfare of England. But to acknowledge this does not involve the admission that we ought not to acquiesce in the settlement which the war has brought to pass. As a matter of fact, we have no power of substantially altering the agreement at which Russia and Turkey have arrived, unless we are prepared to go to war. Rightly or wrongly, we elected not to fight with Russia for the purpose of averting the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. We are therefore powerless to undo the results of the late war; and upon those results the terms of peace are, and must be, based. We may also take it for granted that what we are not in a mood to do for ourselves no other European Power will do for us. The conditions of the Treaty of Peace cannot well be acceptable in themselves to any Continental

State, with the possible exception of Germany. But, as no one of these States is inclined to resist the carrying out of the treaty by force, Russia is virtually mistress of the situation. This is the hard, plain fact which must regulate our policy. Nothing is to be gained by playing the part of the Greek chorus, or by lamenting in Ở TTÓTOL TTÓtrol strains on the evils entailed upon mankind by the greed of Russia. Unless we, as a country, have lost the practical good sense which we claim to be our national characteristic, the only course open to us is to take facts as they are, and to make the best of them. The facts are obvious. Russia has crushed Turkey to the ground. By compulsion or persuasion she has induced her defeated enemy to sign a treaty recognising the consequences of the war, and this treaty is about to be submitted for ratification to a tribunal, the majority of whose members are, to say the least, not disposed to dispute its validity. Under these circumstances what can England do? may indeed abstain from taking part in the Congress, a course open on many grounds to very grave objections. But, if we do go into the Congress, we cannot hope to effect any important change in the conditions of the treaty. If we chose to fritter away our influence, we might possibly obtain certain minor concessions as to the line of frontier, the figure of the indemnity, the terms of the occupation. But we cannot hope to overthrow the basis of the whole treaty, namely, the reduction of Turkey to a state of vassalage ; and, unless we can remodel the treaty in toto, ang modification of its terms in the supposed interest of Turkey seems to me a very dubious advantage. If the Eastern Question is to be virtually settled as Russia proposes, it would, to my way of thinking, be far better for Europe and for Turkey herself that the settlement should be thorough in character. There would be some remote chance of regeneration for the Ottoman Empire if the new Principality of Bulgaria were declared nominally instead of practically independent; if the outlying provinces of the West were absolutely detached from the rule of Constantinople ; and if the Hellenic difficulty were settled for once and for all by the cession of Epirus and Thessaly to Greece. There is a bare possibility that Turkey, as an Asiatic power, might once more become a vigorous and independent State; there is no such possibility as long as she is paralysed by the possession of European provinces which she can only hold in future by the grace and favour of Russia. Thus, if it were practicable, I should hold that the wisest course for England was to advocate the complete partition of European Turkey and the formation of independent States powerful enough to hold their own either singly or by means of a confederation. Such an idea would seem to lie at the root of the efforts made by Her Majesty's Ministers to secure the admission of Greece into the Congress. Indeed, unless Greece is expected to obtain some augmentation of territory at the cost of the possessions still remaining to Turkey in Europe, it is difficult to see why her claims to take part in the Congress should have been advocated by our Government. My only objection to this policy is that I doubt its feasibility. In public as in private life I distrust attempts to secure advantages by side-winds. The obvious object of Russia is to obtain complete supremacy at Constantinople, and this object would be retarded, if not defeated, supposing any State or collection of States to be formed between the Russian and Turkish frontiers, which could possibly rival the influence of Russia. My belief is, therefore, that any endeavour to create a powerful kingdom of Greece would be resisted by Russia to the utmost ; and, as neither England nor any Continental Power is likely to make the aggrandisement of Greece a casus belli, I see little prospect of a Pro-Hellenic policy being carried through successfully. For the moment, I repeat, Russia has the game in her own hands. So long as the triple alliance remains in force there is no possibility of a European coalition against Russia; and therefore, with or without the sanction of England, the peace of San Stefano will in the main be ratified by the Congress. If we cannot upset this peace directly, we cannot undo it indirectly. All we can do is to accept the general changes introduced by this treaty, and see how far we can best turn these changes to our own advantage and to that of Europe.

Of course it may prove that the European Powers, including Russia, are anxious above all things to patch up a peace; and the be

2 lief that this is so is held by many persons whose opinions are entitled to respect. If this belief should prove to be correct, Russia will be found willing to make important concessions on those points of the Treaty of Peace which are most obnoxious to England and Austria, and in return for these concessions the Congress will evince reluctance to open up any question which might interfere with a temporary settlement of the Eastern difficulty. Such a settlement would be of very doubtful benefit to England. Still, we could neither decently nor prudently take upon ourselves to insist upon the Congress going into questions whose solution must involve the partition of the Ottoman Empire. In case, then, the Congress should strictly confine itself to the modification of the conditions of peace, we could hardly refuse to acquiesce in the expediency of deferring the consideration of the collateral issues connected with the downfall of Turkey as a European power.

I see, however, little likelihood of the Congress, if it meets, restricting itself to the simple consideration of the Treaty of San Stefano. What concerns the European Powers now is not so much the fate of Turkey as that of her outlying dominions, and in one form or other the question of partition will infallibly be raised. There is strong reason to believe that the initiative in this matter will be taken by Germany. The Government of Berlin has lost VOL. III.-No. 14.

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no opportunity of manifesting its preference for a permanent, as opposed to a provisional, settlement of the Eastern Question; and the Congress will, as I believe, be compelled to deal with the issueWhat is to be done with the outlying provinces and dependencies of the Porte, supposing peace to be concluded on the basis agreed upon at San Stefano ? Thus the logic of facts forces upon us the necessity, whether we like it or not, of considering once more the question of Egypt. My views on this subject are well known to the readers of the Nineteenth Century. I have seen no cause to modify them, and I still hold to the belief that half the difficulties of the present, more than half the dangers of the future, might have been avoided if England had availed herself of the exceptional opportunity afforded her, while the issue of the war still remained doubtful, and had then taken Egypt under her own protection. The opportunity, however, was allowed to pass; circumstances have altered materially since last summer; and, for the present, occupation, pure and simple, is out of the question. We may come to that; in my judgment we shall come to that in the end. But for the time our hands are tied by what we have done, as well as by what we have left undone. We are bound, therefore, to take account of a variety of considerations into which we need not have entered if we had forestalled the close of the

We shall probably end by eating our cherry all the same, but before we eat it we shall have now to make not two bites but many bites.

The first point, then, to be considered is what the position of Egypt will be, supposing the Treaty of San Stefano to be carried out substantially as it stands. If no alteration should be made in the relations between Cairo and Stamboul, Egypt will remain what it is at present, an integral portion of the Ottoman Empire. It may be worth while to recapitulate here the legal status of Egypt, as defined by a succession of firmans. Up to the time of Mehemet Ali the dependency was governed directly from Constantinople by pashas holding office during the good pleasure of the Sultan, or, more truly speaking, of the Seraglio. By the compromise entered into at the close of the Syrian war, the Porte agreed to forego the right of selecting the Pasha of Egypt, and to bind itself to confer the pashaship on Mehemet Ali and his heirs, according to the Mohammedan law of succession. The practical effect of the concession was very great; but in principle it left Egypt still subject to the government of the Porte. The firman of 1841, by which the pashaship was declared hereditary in the family of Mehemet Ali, specified that all taxes raised in Egypt must be levied in the name of the Sultan ; that Egyptian vessels were to sail under the Turkish flag; that the Egyptian army, whose number was strictly limited, was to form part of the Sultan's forces; that all laws made, or to be made, by the Porte were to be binding in Egypt, subject to any