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Offenders against Naval Laws.

sentation would seem to be necessary to enable those who wish to respect the rights of the patentee to avoid an invasion of them.

To the SECRETARY OF STATE.

WM. PINKNEY.

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN KENT, SUSPECTED TO BE A SPY. It does not appear that the British pilot, under the circumstances, has committed any offence for which he can be prosecuted; and there is not any evidence of criminal intention.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

March 5, 1813.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you, in reply to your letter of the 13th of last month, (which, by reason of its having been sent to Baltimore, I have only very lately received,) that it does not appear to me that John Kent can be prosecuted for any offence.

He appears to be a native American, (born at Boothbay,) settled in the island of Grand Manan, and acting as a British pilot, under British authority. His account of himself and his errand is plausible, and, I should think, true. The fact that he has a brother at Boothbay, where he was arrested, is in his favor; and there is no evidence of any criminal intention or criminal conduct.

If it should be thought advisable to detain him longer in custody, it ought to be for the purpose of fuller inquiry-the result to be transmitted, for further order, to the Department of State. It is scarcely possible that he should be a spy. WM. PINKNEY.

To the SECRETARY OF STATE.

OFFENDERS AGAINST NAVAL LAWS.

Offenders are regularly kept in the custody of that service, the peculiar laws of which they are accused of having violated, and by which they are to be tried.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE U. S., May 12, 1813. SIR: I suppose that the persons to whom your letter of the 8th instant alludes must remain in custody until such a tribu

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nal as the law prescribes can be formed for their trial. Such offenders are regularly kept in the exclusive custody of that service, the peculiar laws of which they are accused of having violated, and by which they are to be tried. They have, of course, been delivered up to the commanding officer of the place to which they were brought, who will detain them until a court-martial can be assembled under the orders of the Secretary of the Navy. The expense must devolve on the United States.

It appeared to be intended at the last session of Congress to remove the inconvenience of which you very justly complain, by allowing officers in the land service to be placed on certain naval courts-martial; and I had imagined that this was done. Perhaps it may be well to go even a step further, and to give a power to refer offences committed on board of privateers to the ordinary tribunals, when a court-martial (either of navy officers only or of navy and land officers) cannot be had without prejudice to the public. A general reference of them to the ordinary tribunals would not be judicious, nor would a particular reference be so where it could be avoided; but there may be occasions to justify and require it.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

WM. PINKNEY.

OPINIONS

OF

HON. RICHARD RUSH, OF PENNSYLVANIA:

APPOINTED FEBRUARY 10, 1814.

FUR TRADE AT MICHILIMACKINAC.

It would be unlawful to grant permission to John Jacob Astor to send a vessel in ballast to Michilimackinac to bring away skins and furs.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

April 11, 1814.

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 9th of this month, enclosing one addressed to you from Mr. John Jacob Astor, in which he asks permission of the government to send a vessel in ballast to Michilimackinac, for the purpose of bringing away a quantity of skins and furs belonging to him, and now at that place, and requesting my opinion whether such permission would be warranted by our laws.

Considering Michilimackinac as a place now in the actual possession and under the dominion of Great Britain, I think the decisions of the last Supreme Court of the United States would make it unlawful to grant the permission in question. RICHARD RUSH.

To the SECRETARY OF STATE.

SURETIES OF A PURSER.

A former purser reappointed to that office in the navy, under the act of 30th March, 1812, should give a new bond.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE U. S.,

April 14, 1814.

SIR: I have received your letter of the 13th instant, relative to Edwin T. Satterwhite, formerly a purser in the navy, reappointed and confirmed by the Senate under the act of the 30th of March, 1812, in which you state its having become important

Duties on Goods sold under order of Court, &c.

to know whether his sureties under the original bond are, or are not, liable for acts done since the reappointment.

On examining the act in question, I think its correct interpretation imports the necessity of a new bond in all cases of reappointment under its provisions. But, by this opinion, I would not be understood to say that the original sureties of Mr. Satterwhite are wholly discharged of responsibility since the reappointment. This point should be saved on behalf of the United States.

I have the honor to be, with very great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

RICHARD RUSH.

DUTIES ON GOODS SOLD UNDER ORDER OF COURT, &c.

Duties on goods seized with a vessel of a neutral nation and sold, but afterwards adjudged to be unlawful prize, may be lawfully exacted, and cannot be remit ted by the Executive.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

April 16, 1814.

SIR: In answer to your letter of yesterday's date, I have the honor to state it as my opinion, that the duties in the case of the brig Euplus should be paid.

The cargo having been sold under an interlocutory order of the district court for the district of Georgia, and the goods thus distributed through the country in the hands of consumers. while the libel was depending, I do not think it would comport with the meaning and objects of the revenue laws that they should be discharged of duties. The apparent hardship to the neutral claimants, to whom the cargo has been released by the ultimate decision of the court, on the ground that it was not lawful prize, must be taken to be done away in the presumption. of the enhanced price at which it sold under the interlocutory order, by reason of the outstanding bonds for the duties which hung over it. Had it remained in bulk, or unsold, so as to be capable of specific restitution under the final decree, a different case, working in favor of the claimants, might have been presented.

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