to loss or damage arising from a breach of the shipowner's duty to provide a ship fit for its purpose, as it only applied to matters occurring during the voyage. Steel v. State Line Steamship Co., 37 L. T. Rep. (N.S.) 333; 3 App. Cas. 72; 24 Eng. R. 37. High Ct. Just.. Q. B. Div. March 11, 1884. Tattersall v. National Steamship Company (Limited). Opinions by Day and Smith, JJ. COVENANT-RENEWAL-CONSTRUCTION.-In construing a covenant in a lease for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is a covenant for perpetual renewal or not,the same rule of construction applies as in construing any other contract, and the rule is that the intention of the parties to the contract is to be ascertained from the language used. Where the language used is obscure, the presumption is against a covenant for perpetual renewal; but where the language is clear this presumption has no application. When once one is satisfied, according to the canons of interpretation, as to the meaning of a document, which the law does not require to be in any special form of words, the thing is done. When once the bargain is ascertained there is no rule, either at law or in equity, that the parties are to be punished because they have not expressed themselves more fitly. The object of rules of construction is to enable the courts to understand contracts. What was said by Sir Edward Sudgen in Sheppard v. Doolan, 3 Drew. & War. 1, is borne out by the observations of Wood, V. C., in Hare v. Burges, 4 K. & J. 45. See also Ex parte Clarke, Irish R., 6 Eq. 51; Brown v. Tighe, 2 Cl. & Fin. 416. Ct. of App. Jan. 22, 1884. Swinburne v. Milburn. Opinions by Brett, M. R., and Bowen, L. J. A ODDS AND ENDS. NAME now almost forgotten by the public is that of Sir John Karslake. Yet in his day-less than fifteen years ago-he was by common consent the first man at the English common-law bar. The brilliant attorney-general of a brilliant government, learned, eloquent and upright, with a physical presence that well supplemented his intellectual gifts, Sir John was the beau ideal of a great advocate. No other man within my recollection had such weight with the judges, and his certain destiny appeared to be either the chief justiceship, or if he remained in politics, the woolsack itself. But sudden blindness struck him, and amidst the universal regret of his confreres he was forced to retire alike from professional and parliamentary life. He may perhaps still be seen at the Temple church, led to his seat by affectionate hands, but the public hears him no more. He was succeeded by another Sir John, whose career has since been closed by death. Sir John Holker's forensic art was the art that conceals itself. Outwardly rough, heavy and listless, his list of victories spoke for him, and to no one would the attorneys more readily intrust an apparently hopeless case than to this "man from the provinces," as a supercilious critic once called him. In Parliament he achieved a success much beyond that of the average attorney-general The miscellaneous body that represents the British Commons is usually somewhat impatient and incredulous of lawyers. They talk too much and too readily to suit its tastes, but Holker soon gained and kept a place as one of the most valuable debaters in Disraeli's staff. He had a broad way of looking at things, and a certain easy frankness that made his suspicious hearers forget the wig and gown he had left outside. Although a vehement Tory, and a vigorous denouncer of the Liberals and all their ways, yet he made such an impression on Mr. Gladstone that after the fall of the Beaconsfield government he was offered a lord justiceship by his quondam opponent. As a lawyer, Holker was not learned, but he had a way of getting at the pith of a thing that made his opinions valuable. His special virtue as an advocate was hit off by Sergeant Parry, who said that he better than any other man knew when to be silent. But let us leave now the neighborhood of Westminster, and imagine ourselves in the quiet and beautiful city of Worcester. The Worcester courts are an exception to the ordinary dingy, crowded and inodorous abode of justice, being large, lofty and well ventilated. The learned gentleman in the pit arrayed in the neatest of wigs, the most immaculate of frills, and the glossiest of silks, who is just opening his case to the solid, jolly-looking jurors, is Huddleston, the leader of the Circuit, and as good a man at Nisi Prius as any in England. His legal knowledge is not very greatnot more than sufficient to serve his turn-and his opponent, the keen, quiet-looking man beside him, has probably forgotten more than he ever knew; but Huddy" is an advocate all over, and before a jury he will play second fiddle to none. Matthews however has his revenge in banc. There Huddleston's law is listened to with polite indifference mixed with a little of the amusement known at the bar as baiting the badger, whilst Matthews receives the attention his learning deserves. It is however strange to observe the immense advantage Huddleston has over all his opponents before a jury. Matthews is no stick; he is fluent and persuasive in speech, severe in cross-examination, and attentive to the jury. Yet somehow or other Huddleston's cases are half won before they are begun. Does "personal magnetism" make the difference? Huddleston is now on the bench, and no doubt makes a good practical judge of the Baron Martin stamp. We need not stop to discuss any of the half-dozen Q. C.'s who are on the Assize, and amongst the crowd of juniors only Jelf, the tall young man with the single eye-glass, and Motteram, the burly old fellow, just rising to examine the first witness, are the only ones worth notice. Motteram's career has been one of misfortune pluckily met, and now he is County Court judge of Birmingham, and boasts of clearing off his 23,000 cases per annum without arrears! Jelf was undoubtedly the leading junior of the Circuit, a first-rate lawyer and a clever advocate, but a year or two of this tired him out, as it does most men, and he was glad to seek the comparative ease of silk. What with giving opinions, advising on evidence, drawing pleadings, running small cases alone, and prompting his leader in big ones, the leading junior's lot is indeed "all work and no play." Once arrayed in silk, the drudgery of chamber work is past. A glance at his brief over night (and very often not even that), a five minutes' consultation with the attorney, in which the big man listens condescendingly to the poor fellow's nervous suggestions, and dismisses him with a "Well, Mr. A., I dare say we'll pull it through, but it's a weak case," and then into court he goes, and very likely opens for a reference. The judge is ready enough to meet him, for has he not a heavy list and only two days to clear it in? and before the astonished attorney can say Jack Robinson, the case is referred to Mr. Blank, the learned Q. C. walks off with his forty or fifty guineas, and the junior attends the reference. This is bad enough, but worse often happens in London, where owing to the multiplicity of courts counsel is sometimes bound to be in two places at once,and not being Sir Boyle Roche's bird, the result is that one cause loses his assistance altogether. The fees must be paid all the same, for the theory is that these are paid for reading the brief, whilst as if to add insult to injury, this same brief, so dearly paid for, and with all its wealth of legal disquisition and argument, in which probably the attorney has felt a secret pride as the result of much and arduous labor, comes back to his hands unannotated, unread, nay, even unopened. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, JULY 26, 1884. CURRENT TOPICS. THE legal vacation has come, and at t contribu He wrote we always allow ourselves and our contributors a little fooling. At this season alone do we suffer our poetical editor to intrude upon these grave and prosaic columns, although we keep him in pay through the whole year. Last week he tendered some advice to the political candidates on the subject of interviewing. This week he offers a few lines dedicated to those two or three judges of the upper courts in the city of New York, who indulge in the pastime of stock-gambling. these lines a good while ago, and sent a copy to William Cullen Bryant, among others. Mr. Bryant acknowledged the receipt very courteously, but mildly intimated that they had a suspicious resemblance to his own "Lines to a Waterfowl." Whereupon the writer explained to Mr. Bryant that the resemblance, if any, was purely accidental one of those remarkable coincidences which have sometimes been noticed between men of genius - as Charles Reade and Dean Swift, for example. This must have been satisfactory to Mr. Bryant, for the writer did not hear from him again. It is a great resource to be able to diversify law with poetry. Doubtless the great poets have often wished they could diversify poetry with law. These verses were written at a time when a curb-stone broker was known as a "gutter-snipe." The fashion of Wall street may have changed the designation, and we make the explanation for the benefit of our rural readers who do not gamble in Wall street. LINES TO A GUTTER-SNIPE. Whither midst falling due Thou'rt gone; in restaurant For sandwich of Delmonico thou'st vanished; But from my saddened heart thy lesson can't So speedily be banished. He who hath heard the moan Of ruined "snipe," in search of cent per cent, Would better let all gambling risks alone, With lawful gains content. A correspondent asks us why Mr. Hun publishes mere memoranda of decisions. Mr. Hun informs us that it is done at the express direction of the judges. That is a complete justification for the reporter, but what is the use of publishing such memoranda? The stories that newspapers tell about lawyers and judges are sometimes very extraordinary. We look to see Judge Drummond suing the St. Paul Pioneer Press for libel on account of some "anecdotes" of the judge published by that credulous and imaginative journal. If these "anecdotes" are true it is no wonder that the judge resigned, and the bar would probably be, but our readers will conclude after perusing them that some wag of a lawyer has been imposing on the reporter. But here are the " "'anecdotes: "Once Matt Carpenter undertook to play fast and loose in an argument before Drummond. He was interrupted: 'Mr. Carpenter, you helped to pass this law. A man should be ashamed to quibble over a law of his own making.' As Carpenter went out of the court room, smarting under the rebuke like a whipped schoolboy, he remarked to a brother lawyer: 'Old Tom Drummond is the ablest legal mind this country has produced. I say it without reserve.' Once Carpenter alluded to an attorney opposed to him as 'that man.' The expression came out several times before Judge Drummond's wrath waxed vocal. He frothed at the mouth, and cried out: Mr. Carpenter, sit down. Do you desist calling any lawyer in this court 'that man.' If you ever again call a brother attorney in my court 'that man' you will cease to have the opportunity for such an insult.' In a lawsuit over the Adams estate in Milwaukee one firm of lawyers put in a bill for $15,000, another lawyer a bill for $5,000, and still another a bill for an equal sum. The estate amounted to but $32,000, and the parties in interest were orphan children. Drummond went over the charges, which as judge he must audit. As he went from item to item his anger increased. It is said by those who were present that no set of men ever received such a Jove-like castigation. 'Gentlemen,' he said, you consider yourselves good lawyers. How much more are your services worth to your clients than mine to the people? You have charged $25,000 for sixty days' service. Could you not be content each of you to take my pro rata for the same time? These charges are infamous. They are such as men who are scoundrels and thieves at heart would make. This charge of $15,000 is cut down to $1,500, those of $5,000 each to $500. Repeat such a piece of rapine in this court, and I will disbar every one of you." If Judge Drummond can submit to such imputations of bad temper, false logic, and impotent threatenings, it would astonish us indeed, but that he should submit to the charge of expecting the lawyers practicing in his court to work for as little as he got is more than we can believe. commonest form, was fully sufficient, but proof was required that Mr. Benjamin was a British subject. This was supplied by a statement in his handwriting in the books at Lincoln's Inn, that his father and mother were British subjects of Jewish extraction, and that be was a British subject in virtue of 4 George, II, chapter 21, by which the children of British subjects not born on British soil obtain British nationality by descent. It thus appears that Mr. Benjamin was all his life a British subject, and after being an American senator and Confederate Attorney-General he became domiciled in England, and died a domiciled Frenchman." Lord Coleridge is not going to write a book on America, after all. He writes us: "I cannot see your very kind and cordial words in the LAW JOURNAL, which reached me last week, without inflicting a line upon you to thank you for them. I wish also to say that there is not, and never has been, We have not seen the bill, but from what we hear the slightest foundation for the statement, which I of it we should suppose that Judge Poland's bill, have not thought it worth while publicly to contrarecently introduced in Congress, to regulate comdict, that I am writing a book about America. My merce visit was too short, too hurried, too pleasant in all ing to negotiable instruments, would be a very imamong the States, and codify the law relatways, to give me any real insight into your wonderful country. There must be by-ways I never saw, portant reform. It proposes to suspend the laws of the several States regulating commercial paper, and unscrupulous people I never met; and if I were to substitute for them one law of the United States foolish enough to try to generalize from such very imperfect materials, I have not the power to do so importance of having one kind of commercial to govern such paper throughout the country. The with effect. I cannot knock off a dissertion on a great country of infinitely complicated elements, and endless variety of social aspects, in half an hour. The incorrigible vanity of such a proceeding would be laughable if it were not sometimes so very mischievous. No; I must be content with the very pleasant memories of my ten weeks' American vision, during all of which I never heard an unkind word, or met an unfriendly person, and which will always warm my heart when I think of it, till it is chilled forever by that which cannot now be very far away. Of course, there were in America, as there are in all countries, things on which one might make unfavorable comment. But then I always said what I thought when I was in America, and did, now and then, presume to find fault a presumption which, as the Americans believed me to be a friend, they in no way resented. I said in fact the little I had to say, in your country, and kept back nothing to say of it after I had left it." cannot be overrated. It would every year save a paper, as we now have one kind of bank notes, greatly facilitate the operations of inter-State comgreat amount of confusion and loss, and would merce. We suppose, of course, that it would require the assent of three-fourths of the States. NOTES OF CASES. 'N Davis v. Lenawee County Savings Bank, Supreme IN Court of Michigan, March, 1884, 18 Rep. 86, a depositor in a savings bank opened a second account in the name of his wife, being told at the bank that he could not open two accounts in his own name. Upon his wife's death the bank refused to recognize his right to the deposit. Held, the fact that an account stands in the name of another does not affect the depositor's rights to the depositor. The court said: "In the present case the testimony does not tend to show that the bank ever contracted with anybody but plaintiff, or received funds on this account which were not his funds. The case he made out, and which the jury must have found true, was that while deposited in his wife's name, it was not intended to be for her benefit, or to be beyond the husband's right to withdraw. Any idea of a gift to her was clearly negatived. Her name was only another form for his name, and so agreed. The bank-book is no contract, and is only one of the means of indicating the state of the funds. Whatever presumptions may arise from it, and whatever protection may be given to acts innocently done on that presumption, it can not exclude explanatory evidence. The contract was made with plaintiff, and with no one else, and the bank is The late Mr. Benjamin came near proving no exception to the rule that great lawyers are apt to make a mess of it in their wills. The Law Journal says: "It is to be observed that Mr. Benjamin declared his intention of living in Paris for the rest of his life, thus carefully precluding any question as to his domicile, which might easily have arisen, and occasioned much litigation. The testator having thus elected a French domicile at the time of his death, the question arose whether the will, which being a holograph, was duly executed according to French law, ought not to be proved in France. Under the act of 1861, known as Lord Cranworth's act, the will of a British subject wherever domiciled may be proved in England if | answerable to him to fulfill that contract. There is executed according to the forms of the English law. The attestation clause, although not in the no principle of law which makes the mere placing of money or property in another's name an irrevoc able gift to that person. But this arrangement falls short of even this, because in law it was merely a contract between two persons that one should open an account in the name of a third person, the original depositor having a reserved right to draw the sums credited. At common law no one could sue on an express contract, except the parties to it. Under the equitable action for money had and received, a beneficiary may sometimes sue, but this can only be where the parties have given him such a right as transfers the fund to his control. The money belonging to one person can not cease to belong to him until he does some act to dispose of it. The cases heretofore determined in this court are stronger cases than the present in favor of plaintiff's rights. See Burtnett v. Bank, 38 Mich. 630, and Bank v. Burrows, 34 id. 153.” To the same effect, Brabrook v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bk., 104 Mass. 228; S. C., 6 Am. Rep. 222. public use of the plaintiff's book. But copyright is the right, by printing or otherwise, to multiply copies. To multiply copies of a material portion of a work which is entitled to copyright is as much a breach of the law, though differing in degree, as to multiply copies of the whole work; and it has long been settled that multiplying copies for private distribution among a limited class of persons is just as illegal as if it were done for the purpose of sale. Take, for example, a valuable copyright like Lord Tennyson's poems. No one could print them and distribute the copies among his friends, or among the boys at a school, or any limited class of persons, any more than he could print them for sale. Novello v. Sudlow, 12 C. B. O. S. 177. Therefore I have no hesitation in saying that the circumstance that the defendants do not sell their books, or that they only give them to their own agents, and to merchants with whom they correspond, would not justify this multiplication of copies. But the defendants' main In Ager v. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Naviga-iff's book, they are doing no more than the plaintiff argument is, that in making this use of the plainttion Company, Limited, Chan. Div. June 14, 1884, 50 intended they should do, and Mr. Giffard ingenL. T. Rep. (N. S.) 477, the plaintiff published and iously compared the case to that of a copy-book copyrighted a book consisting of 100,000 words arranged alphabetically, selected from eight languages, These are intended to be copied, and he argued with the usual slips printed at the top of each page. and specially compiled with a view to correct telegraphic transmission. To each of the words was that if any one bought one, he might fill up that ascribed a different combination of five of the ordi- book, and as many blank books besides as he chose, with facsimile copies if he could make them in handThe book could be used by nary numerals 0 to 9. writing, without infringing the owner's copyright, any one to make a code of cypher telegraphy of his because that sort of use was intended by the owner. own by attributing to any of these words, or to the But the question is, whether the use made in this equivalent numerals, whatever meanings he might please, and communicating these significations to case by the defendants was intended by the plainthis correspondents. The defendants printed a book iff. By bringing this action he declares it was not. containing the bulk of the words comprised in the He has printed on the title-page of his book the right, that it is entered at Stationers' Hall. Is usual intimation in a work intended to have copythere any thing in the nature of the case which makes it necessary or proper to infer that his contention is wrong? In the first place, the use the defendants are making of his book is not absolutely essential even to the defendants' mode of availing themselves of the plaintiff's research. They might print their own code, referring to the words or numbers in the plaintiff's book, without reprinting one of such words, so that any one having a copy of the plaintiff's book, and placing the defendants' code beside it, might employ that code with little, if any, trouble more than is involved in the use of the defendants' book, while the advantto the plaintiff would be, that which he must be very blind to his own interest if he intended to give up, viz., that so many more copies of his book must be bought. On the other hand, if the defendants be right, any one to whom they give one of their books could from it, without betraying any secret of the defendants, inform the whole world what were the words selected by the plaintiff, and thus render his books comparatively useless. In the illustration of the copy-book it is not denied that no one could print a copy even for private use. It can only be copied in the mode and to the extent intended by the owner. Copying to a certain ex plaintiff's book, and taken from it, but appending -- age musical entertainments, furnishing meals for its members, and keeping a small stock of liquors for their exclusive use, affording no profit, but partly tent is the very object which the owner of the copybook intended, but any copying beyond that extent would be illegal. The illustration is inapt, unless it be clear that such copying as the defend-paid for by their monthly dues, each member payants have made was intended by the plaintiff, and I have no difficulty in believing that he never intended any thing of the kind. Applying the usual tests (Scott v. Stanford, 16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 51, 53; L. Rep., 3 Eq. 718, 723; Kelly v. Morris, 14 L. T. Rep. N. S. 222; L. Rep., 1 Eq. 697), it seems to me that the plaintiff must have expended a great deal of time and labor on this compilation; that what the defendants are doing is to avail themselves very largely and unnecessarily of the labor and research of the plaintiff without adequately recompensing him; that the use which the defendants make of their book is calculated to interfere seriously with the sale of the plaintiff's book; that it is a multiplying of copies of the plaintiff's book within the words of the Copyright Act (5 & 6 Vict., c. 45); and that it is therefore an invasion of the copyright of the plaintiff against which he is entitled to be protected." W COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES. HOLESALE LIQUOR DEALER. A manufac In ing for what he uses as it is taken, is not subject to tax as a 'retail liquor dealer' as "other merchants." Tennessee Club of Memphis v. Dwyer, 11 Lea, 452. The court cited Seim v. State, 55 Md. 566; S. C., 39 Am. Rep. 419; Graff v. Evans, 8 Q. B. Div. 373. The court said: "We think it is clear from the statements of the bill that the mode of sale as it is termed, to the members at a rate fixed by the governing committee of the club, is only in fact an equitable mode of distributing refreshments to its members, which are provided by the club for them exclusively. It cannot be controverted but that the complainant would have a right to purchase and keep liquors at its club rooms for the use of its members, and to distribute them among them in any method it might deem proper, and to raise funds for the purpose of replenishing by assessments upon its members, and the mode adopted of the form of a sale alone to its members of such a quantity for so much money can be nothing more than a mode adopted of assessing each member in proportion to the amount he consumes. * * * In the case of State v. Smith, 5 Humph. 394, this stitute a merchant in the meaning of the revenue laws, the business of buying and selling should be the pursuit and vocation by which the party makes his living. In that case the preceptor and proprietor of an extensive female school had between fifty and a hundred pupils and tutoresses boarding with him and members of his family. To supply these persons with clothes, books, etc., he kept on hand a supply of such articles of clothing and stationery as they might need, and furnished these articles not with a view of profit, but to accommodate his pupils and keep up his school. He sold to no person not a member of his family. Held that he was not a merchant, or subject to be taxed as such." 66 turer of liquors selling in unbroken pack-court in construing a revenue act held that to conages at his place of business is not a wholesale liquor dealer," liable to taxation as "other merchants." Taylor v. Vincent, 12 Lea, 282. The court said: "We hold that a dealer is correctly defined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Commonwealth v. Campbell, 9 Casey, 386, as a middleman between the manufacturer or the producer and the consumer, or as was said by Judge Black in Norris v. Commonwealth, 3 id. 495, ‘a dealer, in the popular conception or sense of the word, is not one who buys to keep or makes to sell, but one who buys to sell again. He stands immediately between the producer and the consumer, and depends for his profits not upon the labor he bestows upon his commodities, but on the skill and foresight with which he watches the markets. other words, a manufacturer of an article from the raw material, though he sells the article thus manufactured in unbroken packages to dealers, is not a wholesale dealer under these revenue statutes. The added clause and shall be taxed as other merchants' shows that the Legislature had in mind wholesale merchants - men engaged in buying and selling as an occupation, and not the original manufacturer selling as in this case." In State v. Lawenhaupt, 11 Lea, 13, the court said: "We take it, what is meant by retailing is selling by small quantities to suit customers, articles which are bought in larger amounts generally. Now one who sells in this way, or whose business is so to sell is a retail dealer, one who sells by the nature of his business in gross, and not by the small quantity or parcel to consumers, is a wholesale dealer." RETAIL LIQUOR DEALER.- A social club, organized under statute, maintaining a library, giving MECHANIC. A photographer is not a mechanic" within the statute of exemption from execution. Story v. Walker, 11 Lea, 515. The court said: "The Legislature of this State has not treated photographers as mechanics, but as photographic artists, and subjected their vocation to a privilege tax. * * * The words of the statutes of exemptions were used, and intended to be understood in their usual and proper sense. A mechanic engaged in the pursuit of his trade is a workman employed in shaping and uniting materials, such as wood, metal, etc., into some kind of structure, machine, or other object requiring the use of tools. tools must be such as are used by the workman to shape or change the surface of lumber or other material, or create an object by manual labor. Freeman on Ex., § 226. The photographer is an artist, not an artisan, who takes impressions of things and persons on prepared plates or surfaces. He is no more a mechanic than the painter, who by means The |