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thing from the archaic institution which did duty therefore have to contend that they are not res for positive law at the epochs portrayed by Sir adjudicatæ. Henry Maine. Why not concede that the analyses of It is the paper on the Panama canal, and these different writers are not of universal applica- the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which has the most tion, but relate to different spheres ? This done, direct interest for us on this side of the water. the differentia of the definitions are sufficiently The history of the treaty is first given from the noted without convicting any body of error. We British point of view. Then the several contenobserve that nearly all the late international law- tions of the signatory powers, and in the course of yers and text-writers seem to think it incumbent this discussion considerable insight into recent on them to attribute the force of law to custom, British criticisms of Mr. Blaine's supposed policy and to exaggerate the importance of Sir Henry is afforded. The means which the author suggests Maine's critique that Austin's definition of law for the neutralization of the canal are set out at fails to take into consideration very archaic socie- length. Much stress is laid upon what was unties where custom had certain concomitants of law. questionably Mr. Evarts' unfortunate mistake in But this was no discovery of the greater compara- assenting to the Egyptian law of liquidation, with tive jurist. Cicero in his too little read Treatise on the effect of permitting us to conclude that considthe Law noted the same phenomenon,
erable, or busy lawyers, are not always the best tamen erunt fere in more maiorum qui tum ut lex prime ministers of a great continental power. All valebat. (Lib. II, cap. 10, f. 20.)
the author's ingenuity is brought to bear on his arWhere is the necessity then of postulating that gument, and while it contains plenty of food for custom is law in order to build up a true interna- discussion we prefer not to review at the present tional law ? Custom may not be lex, and yet the time the various positions urged. Before long law of nations may have a veritable existence. much more will be written on this subject, and We think that it has, and that Mr. Justice Stephen then the mere spectator will be better able to draw and other English lawyers fail to treat it with for himself correct conclusions. One thing we do enough deference in the positions cited by Profes- however desire to notice, and that emphatically; sor Lawrence. But until the late Oxford revival it is that our distinguished friend, Commander English lawyers have not been strong on interna- Goodrich, U. S. N., overstepped the bounds of militional law. There is a large hiatus between Sel- | tary criticism when he touched in his late book on den's Mare Clausum and such writers as Westlake, the propriety of the British occupation of the Suez Hall and Twiss, not forgetting Lord Stowell. canal. Soldiers and sailors of all nations think
Positive external law of nations, as we prefer to much alike, and are hardly authority on internadesignate that part of the code which is of univer- tional law, which is founded on that rock - peace sal operation, is positive law enforced by the great to all men. modern amphictyonic council. There the resemblance of the law of nations to internal positive the Work of Grotius. The setting is a good piclaw of a particular State stops. The shadowy ture of Grotius' historical environment, and the border land between ethics and law is only law in reasons why his utterances were immediately poposse, whether it lies in the domain of the interna
tent among nations. This essay also indicates tional lawyers or in that of the municipal lawyers. briefly, but sufficiently, the influence of the Stoic It is no more law in the one case than in the other. philosophy on the Roman ius gentium, and the natThe difficulty with Professor Lawrence
ural confusion of ius naturale with ius gentium, an mon to most of the late writers on international error which greatly influenced the founders of the law - is that he overstates his case; he claims modern law of nations. It may be thought that too much for the institutes of his science, and this paper will have only a special interest to the is unwilling to recognize that the law of na- international lawyers, but this is erroneous. The tions is yet in embryo. In two more centuries, law of nations possesses a singular interest such as the nineteenth, the international lawyers to our own jurisprudence in New York. The will no doubt fill a proud place in the administra- struggle of feudality with the ius naturule tinges tion of law, for the importance of their vocations our entire colonial epoch, during which the foundawill increase with the never-ending advance of tions of our jurisprudence and government were science, which goes hand in hand with commerce. laid. When a complete history of American law But Professor Lawrence fails less in this respect comes to be written the influence of the so-called than do others of his school.
“law of nature” will have to be profoundly considThe essay on the Suez canal becomes of interest ered, for it plays a great role in the destruction of here as the Isthmus canals approach completion, the feudal system which our English princes at one for it may be assumed that a canon of international | time struggled to perpetuate among us. In short, jurisprudence relating to the former will some day the thinking municipal lawyer who glances observbc affirmed by the European powers, to be of uni- edly through this volume will find much suggested, versal operation. Our National embarrassment is much to ponder over in the enlarged horizon it prethat we have been excluded by our continental pol- sents to him. icy from aiding to formulate these canons, and will The little volume is well done, well printed, and
1- of all the essays in this volume we prefer that on
an agreeable variation from the ponderous tomes have the given quantity; but it articles of different which formerly were thought appropriate to value are mixed, producing a third value, the aggreweighty subjects. It is in such little volumes gate of both, and through the fault of the person mixlibelli they may be called – that the best modern ing them the other party cannot tell what was the thought finds its fittest medium of expression, and original value of his property, he must have the
whole." Chancellor Keut takes a like view of the they foreshadow the day when law shall be no lon- question, and his last editor, Judge Holmes, cites a ger a law of technicalities, but as it was in the great many cases upon the subject. 2 Kent Com. (12th best days of Rome, a science and a part of the com
ed.) 365, 590. This is the view taken by the textplement of every gentleman's and
writers and courts generally in cases where the descholar's every
posit is made with a warehouseman. Story Bail., $ 40; education. We may close our little notice of this Bis.& Sim. Law of Prod. Ex.,$ 152; 2 Schouler Pers. Prop. book with the hope of its author repeated, tha: 46; 6 Am.Law Rev.457; 2 Black.Com. (Cooley's ed.) 404, some day the evolution of juristic science will lead note. There is however, as shown by the cases cited, to perpetual peace.
some conflict of opinion, but as said in a late work, the great weight of authority is that the contract is
one of bailment, and not of sale, the warehouseman BAILMENT-WAREHOUSEMAN-COMMING LING and the depositor becoming owners as tenants in comGRAIN-NEGLIGENCE
mon. Bis. & Sim. Law of Prod. Ex., $ 154, auth. note 9.
To the authorities cited by the authors referred to SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA, MAY TERM, 1884.
may be added Ledyard v. Hibbard, 48 Mich. 421; S.C., 42 Am. Rep. 474; Nelson v. Brown, 44 Iowa, 455; Ser
ton v. Graham, 53 id. 181; Nelson v. Brown, id. 555; RICE V. Nixon.*
Irons v. Kentner, 51 id. 88; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 119, Where a warehouseman receives grain to be stored for the where the rule is carried much farther than is neces
owner, and places it in a common bin with his own or that sary in the present instance. The rule which we acreceived from other depositors, and sells from this recep- cept as the true one is required by the commercial intacle, retaining always sufficient to supply each owner, the terests of the country, and is in harmony with the carcontract continues one of bailment, and the warehouse- dinal principle that the intention of contracting parman is not liable for a loss resulting from an accidental ties is always to be given effect. It is not uukuowu to fire not attributable to his wrong or negligence.
us, uor can it be unknown to any court, for it is a mat. "ROM the Fountain Circuit Court
ter of great public notoriety and concern, that a vast part of the grain business of the country is conducted
through the medium of elevators and warehouses, and J. S. Nave, B. F. Hegler, W. $. Potter and A. A.
it cannot be presumed that warehousemen in receiv. Rice, for appellants.
ing grain for storage, or depositors in intrusting it to T. F. Davidson, for appellee.
them for that purpose, intended or expected that each ELLIOTT, C. J. The appellee was a warehouseman
lot, whether of many thousand bushels or of a few and it was his custom to receive wheat on deposit, and
hundred, should be placed in separate receptacles; ou to place it in a common bin with wheat bought by
the contrary, the course of business in this great him, and it was also his custom to sell wheat from
branch of commerce, made known to us as a matter of this bin, but of this custom the appellants had no
public knowledge and by the decisions of the courts of knowledge. In August, 1882, the appellant, Victoria
the land, leads to the presumption that both the wareRice, deposited with the appellee 210 bushels of wheat;
housemau and the depositor intended that the grain this was thrown into the common bin in accordance
should be placed in a common receptacle and treated with the custom of the appellee, and with it was min
as common property. This rule secures to the deposigled wheat bought by him and wheat stored by other
tor all that in justice he cau ask, namely, that his depositors, and from this bin wheat was sold from grain shall be ready for him in kind and quantity time to time, but there was always in the bin wheat
whenever he demands it. Any other rule would im. enough to supply all depositors, and at any time be- pede the free course of commerce, and render it pracfore the destruction of the warehouse by an accident
tically impossible to handle our immense crops. It is al fire the appellant could have received from the bin
reasonable to presume that the warebouseman and his all the wheat she had deposited. Some time after the depositor did not intend that the course of business storage of the wheat the warehouse and all its contents
should be interrupted, and that they did not intend were destroyed by fire, but the fire was not attributa
that the almost impossible thing of keeping each lot, ble to the wrong or negligence of the appellee. Node.
small or great, apart from the common mass should be mand was made for the wheat until after its destruc
done by the warehouseman). If the warehouseman is tion. The wheat was stored with the appellee, and
not bound to place grain in a separate place for each there was no agreement that the bailor should have an
depositor, then the fact that he puts it in a common option to demand the grain or its value in money.
receptacle with grain of his own and that of other deThere are cases in which the bailee is responsible for positors, does not make him a purchaser, and it he is the loss of goods where he commingles them with his
not a purchaser then he is a bailee. In all matters of own, but this principle does not apply where a ware
contract the intention of the parties gives character houseman receives grain to be stored for the owner.
and effect to the transaction, and in such a case as this Articles of such a character can be separated by meas.
the circumstances declare that the intention was to urement, and no injury results to the owner from the make a contract of bailment and not a contract of act of the warehouseman in mingling them with like
sale. The duties, rights and abilities of warehousemen articles of his own.
are prescribed by the law as declared by the courts and This doctrine is older at least than Lupton v. White,
the Legislature, and as matter of law it is known to 15 Ves. Jr. 432, for there Lord Eldon said: “What are
us that a warehouseman, by placing grain received the cases in the old law of a mixture of corn or flour? from a depositor in a common receptacle, and treating If one man mixes his corn or flour with that of an.
it as the usages of trade warrant, does not become the other, and they were of equal value, the latter must buyer of the grain, unless indeed there is some stipu
lation in the contract imposing that character upon *To appear in 97 Indiana Reports.
was to be entirely changed, and a new and differene ERROR from Reno county District Court. The
The cases in our own reports, cited by counsel for Query : Has not Congress legislated upon inter-State comthe appellants, do not oppose the conclusion here merce by the act of June 15, 1866, authorizing all railroad reached. In Pribble v. Kent, 10 Ind. 325, the defeud- companies to transport passengers and freight from ants received of the plaintiff 132 bushels of wheat, and State to State and empowering them to receive and acon demand failed to deliver the grain, and it was held cept compensation therefor? Rey. Stat. of United States that an action would lie, but the contract was held to (1879), 8 5258. be one of bailment and not of sale. It is plain there- Section 57, chapter 23, Comp. Laws of 1878, known as the fure that in the case cited there was no such ruling as
“Maximum Freight Rate Law" of 1868, had no applicathat asked by the appellants in the present case; on
tion to fix or limit the charges for transportation of the contrary, the ruling overturns their theory.
freight from another State into this State, because if it In Ewing v. French, 1 Blackf. 353, and Carlisle v.
was intended to apply to such inter-State commerce, it Wallace, 12 Ind. 252, the wheat was delivered to a mil
was in violation of article 1, section 8 of the Constitution ler to be ground into flour, and this was held to be a
of the United States, and therefore void. sale, on the ground that the character of the article
opinion of the court sufficiently states the case. article was to be given by the miller to his customer in return for the wheat. In the last of the cases cited
James McKinstry, for plaintiff in error. the option of demanding wheat, flour or money was A. A. IIurd, Robert Dunlap and John Reid, for devested in the depositor, so that he had the option of fendant error. making the contract one of bailment or one of sale, HORTON, C. J. It appears from the agreed state. and he exercised that option by treating the transac- ment of facts that while the Maximum Freight Rate tion as a sale. In the case under examination there
Law of 1868 was in force in this State, the goods and was no option, for it is expressly found that the wheat
merchandise mentioned in plaintiff's bill of particuwas received by the warehouseman for storage. The
lars were shipped from St. Louis, Mo., under a concase of Ashby v. West, 3 Ind. 170, holds that one who
tract made there for transporting the same from St. delivers wheat to be manufactured into flour is the
Louis, Mo., to Hutchinson, Kans., upon the usual owner of the flour, and may maintain replevin, the
through rates charged upon such class of goods; that court saying: "We are clearly of the opinion that that
on the shipments of the goods only one receipt or contract is one of bailment, and not of sale," and this
bill of lading was issued to the plaintiff; that the is against the contention of the appellants.
through rate for the freight charged and collected was In deciding that the contract was one of bailment,
in every instance the same as charged by mutual arand not of sale, we determine the only debatable ques.
rangements of all the railroads connecting with the tion in the case, for it has been long settled that where
defendant's railroad for similar shipments from St. property in the custody of a bailee is destroyed by an
Louis to Hutchinson; that in the division of the freight accidental fire, and there has been no fault or negli
among the railroad companies transporting the goods, gence on his part, he is not liable.
the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company We have examined the rulings on the demurrers to
received an amount thereof in excess of its ordinary the answers and think they were correct, but if we
local freight rates, and an amount in excess of that were wrong in this there could be no reversal, because
authorized by the Maximum Freight Rate Law of the special finding clearly shows the ground on wbich Kansas at that time in force. $ 57, ch. 23, Comp. Laws the judgment rests, and from this it appears that if the
of 1879. rulings were erroneous the errors were harmless.
Plaintiff claims to recover the alleged overcharges Judgment affirmed.
paid by him for the transportation of his goods. It is (Note.-See 10 Am. Rep. 581; 74 Ill. 213; 42 Iowa, admitted, if he is entitled to recover any thing, he 38. A warehouseman is liable for the negligent injury shall recover an amount equal to that received by the of goods stored with him for hire, though it appear
defendant or its proportion of the through rate on the that after the happening of the injury the goods were ehipments, less the amount of its local rates from the destroyed without his fault, and that they must have point where the goods and merchandise were delivbeen so destroyed, even if no damage had previously ered to it by the coupecting line to Hutchinson. occurred. Powers v. Mitchell, 3 Hill, 545.-ED.]
Ou the part of the railroad company it is contended that $ 57, ch. 23, Comp. Laws of 1879, had no application to the trausportation of freight from another
State into this State. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INTER-STATE COM- Section 57 is as follows: “Every such railway shall MERCE-POWERS OF CONGRESS.
arrange and classify all property usually carried by
them over their roads, and shall affix thereto the KANSAS SUPREME COURT, NOVEMBER 28, 1884. rates respectively at which the same shall be trans
ported between the several stations, or points of conHARDY V. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE R. Co.* nection or intersection of other roads, which rate
shall be per one hundred pounds, and sball not exUnder article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United
ceed, for distance less than fifty miles, twenty cents States, the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States--inter-State commerce-which consists,
per ton per mile, fifteen cents per ton for second class,
and ten cents per mile per ton for third class articles; among other things, in the transportation of goods from
for distances of fifty miles and over, but less than one one State to another, is exclusive.
hundred miles, fifteen cents per ton per mile for seoThe fact that Congress has not seen it to prescribe any speci
oud class, and sevev cents per mile for third class arti. fic rules to control or regulate the transportation of goods
cles; for distances of one bundred miles or more, ten from a place in one State to a place in another-inter
cents per mile per ton for first class, eight cents per State commerce-does not empower the States of the
ton per mile for second class, and five cents per ton Union to regulate such commerce. Its inaction on the
per mile for third or other classes." subject, when considered with reference to its other leg
The contention is that any statute fixing or limitislation, is equivalent to a declaration that inter-State
ing the charges for transportation of goods from a commerce shall be free and untrammeled.
place in one State to a place in another is an attempt *To appear in 32 Kansas Reports.
to regulate commerce between the States, and that
such a statute is invalid as a regulation of inter-State
a State and in taking them out. * If theu this In support of this it is asserted that the is the tax upon freight carried between States and a exclusive right to regulate inter-State commerce is ex
tax, because of its transportation, and if such tax is in pressly confided by the Constitution of the United effect a regulation of inter-State commerce, the conStates to Congress by article 1, section 8, which de- clusion seems to be inevitable that it is iu conflict with clares, that “the Congress shall have power * *
the Constitution of the United State. It is pot neces. to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among sary to the present case to go at large into the much the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
debated question, whether the power given to Cone The Federal courts have establisbed that the trans- gress by the Constitution to regulate commerce among portation of merchandise from place to place by rail
the States is exclusive. In the earlier decisions of road is commerce; that the transportation of mer
this court, it was stated to have been so entirely chandise from a place in one State to a place in another vested in Congress that no part of it can be exercised is commerce among the States, or inter-State com- by a State. It has no doubt often been argued and merce; that to fix or limit the charges for such trans- sometimes intimated by the court that so far as Conportation is to regulate commerce; that a statute fix- gress bad not legislated on the subject, the States may ing or limiting such charges for transportation from legislate respecting inter-State commerce; yet if they places in one State to places in another is a regulation can, why may they not add regulations to commerce of commerce among the States; that the power to with foreign nations beyond those made by Congress, if regulate such commerce is vested by the Constitution not inconsistent with them? For the power orer both of the United States in Congress. Keiser v. III. Cent. foreign and inter-State commerce is conferred upon R. Co., 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 40; Louisville & N. R. the Federal Legislature by the same words, and cerCo. v. Railroad Com. of Tenn., id. 1: Carton v. Ill. tainly it has never yet been decided by this court that Cent. R.Co., 59 Iowa, 148; 6 Am.& Eng.Cas.317, and the the power to regulate inter-State, as well as foreign authorities there cited.
commerce, is not exclusively in Congress. The debatable question is, how far this power is con- Inter-State transportation of passengers is beyond the current. May a State act until its legislation is super- reach of a State Legislature. * * * Merchandise is seded or interfered with by Congress? In other a subject of commerce; transportation is essential to words, may Kansas control or regulate, within its commerce; and every burden laid upon it is, pro tanto, limits, the charges for transportation of goods shipped a restriction. Whatever therefore may be the true from another State, under a contract made in that doctrine respecting the exclusiveness of the power State, to a place in this State? We suppose it will be vested in Congress to regulate commerce among the conceded that Kansas can pass no law which seeks to States, we regard it as established that no State can fix or limit the charges for the carriage of goods over impose a tax upou freight transported from State to the lines of its railroads which pass over its territory, State, or upon the transporter because of such trans. but neither originate nor terminate within it, as for portation." instance, goods passing from Missouri to Colorado, In Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. 8. 275, Mr. JasTexas or New Mexico. We suppose it will be con- tico Field said: “It will uot be denied that that porceded also that it is beyond the power of Kansas to tion of commerce with foreign countries and between fix the whole charge for the carriage of goods from a the States which consists in the transportation and point in the State to a point in another. This would exchange of commodities is of national importance be an attempt to give our laws an extra-territorial and admits and requires uniformity of regulation. force. If however the power of Congress to regulate | The very object of investing this power in the general commerce among the States-inter-State commerce- government was to insure this uniformity against diswhich consists, among other things, in the carriage of criminating State legislation, * * The fact that persons and the transportation of goods from one Congress has not seen fit to prescribe any specific State to another, is exclusive, then section 57 could rules to govern inter-State commerce does not affect not fix or limit the charges in controversy. This the question. Its inaction on this subject, when conquestion is one upon which the decisions of the Su- sidered with reference to its legislation with respeot preme Court of the United States are final. We shall to foreign commerce, is equivalent to a declaration therefore refer to the more important of those adjudi- that inter-State commerce shall be free and untramcations.
meled." In Crandall v. State of Nevada,6 Wall. 35, a statute of In Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, Mr. Justice Nerada, which in effect laid a tax upon every travel- Strong said: “Whatever may be the power of a State ler passing through or beyond its territorial limits, over commerce that is completely internal, it can no was adjudged to be invalid, but not on the ground more prohibit or regulate that which is inter-State that it was a regulation of inter-State commerce. than that which is with foreign nations. Power orer Chief Justice Chase and Mr. Justice Clifford dissented one is given by the Constitution of the United States from this conclusion, and pronouuced the act to be a to Congress in the same words in which it is giren regulation of inter-State commerce exclusively within over the other, and in both cases it is necessarily ex. the jurisdiction of Congress.
clusive. That the transportation of property from In the case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, a one State to another is a branch of inter-State comstatute of Pennsylvania, which in effect, laid a tax merce is undeniable, and no attempt has been made upon all freight taken up within the State and car- in this case to deny it. * This court has hereried out of it, or taken up without and brought within tofore stated that inter-State transportation of pasit by any railway, was adjudged to be void. The de
sengers is beyond the reach of a State Legislature, and cision was placed solely upon the ground that the law if as we have held State taxation of persons passing was a regulation of commerce among the States and from one State to another, or a State tax upon interwas invalid, although Congress had never legislated in State transportation of passengers is prohibited by the reference to the same subject-matter. Mr. Justice Constitution because a burden upon it, a fortiori, if Strong, in delivering the opinion, said: “The tax possible is a State tax upon the carriage of merchanupou freight transported from State to State is a regu- dise from State to State. Transportation is essential lation of inter-State transportation, and therefore a to commerce, or rather it is commerce itself, and every regulation of commerce among the States. It is a rule
obstacle to it, or burden laid upon it by legislative auprescribed for the transporter by which he is to be
thority, is regulation." controlled in bringing the subjects of commerce into In Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, Chief Justice Waite
said: “We think it may safely be said that State meled.” Stute v. Saunders, 19 Kaus. 127 ; Welton v. legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon Slute of Missouri, supra. iuter-State commerce, or to interfere directly with its Our opinion is therefore that section 57, which was freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of repealed by the Legislature in 1883, is intended to apCongress. * * * If each State was at liberty to ply to inter-State commerce, was in violation of the regulate the conduct of carriers while within its juris- Constitution of the Uuited States aud therefore diction, the confusion likely to follow could not but void. be productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary The conclusion we have reached could not be disbardship. Each Stute could provide for its own pas- puted were it not for the case of Peik v. Chicago & N. sengers and regulate the transportation of its own W. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, and the language of the court freight, regardless of the interebit of others. Nay in State v. Munn, id. 133; and Railroad Co. y. lowa, more, it could prescribe rules by which a carrier must id. 155. We confess it is difficult to reconcile these be governed within the State in respect to passengers three cases with the principles which bare been setand property brought from without. On one side of tled by the prior and subsequent course of decision of the river or its tributaries he might be required to ob- the United States Supreme Court, if they decide that serve one set of rules, and on the other another. Com- until Congress acts in reference to inter-State commerce canuot flourish in the midst of such embarrass- merce, the Legislature of a State may regulate the ments."
transportation of freight and passengers among the In Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, Chief Jus- States. These cases were decided in 1876, and the tice Waite said: “A telegraph company occupies the opinion in the Peik case was delivered by Chief Jussame relation to commerce as a carrier of messages tice Waite; yet ju the case of Hall v. DeCuir, supra, that a railroad company does as a carrier of goods. decided the next year, 1877, the chief justice quotes apBoth companies are instruments of commerce and provingly what was said by Mr. Justice Field, speaktheir business is commerce itself. * * * A specific ing for the court in Welton v. Stute of Missouri, 91 U. tax on each niessage, so far as it operates on private s. 282, that "inaction (by Congress) * is messages sent out of the State, is a regulation of foreign equivalent to a declaration that inter-State coinmerce and inter-State commerce and beyond the power of shall remain free and untrammeled." Referring to tbe State."
those decisions, the Supreme Court of Iowa in Carton In Stramship Co. v. Board of Railroad Commission- v. Rallroud Co., supra, uses the following language: ers, 18 Fed. Rep. 10, Mr. Justice Field said: “It was “The cases of Stule v. Munn, 94 U. S. 113; Ruilroad at one time a subject of much discussion and some Co. v. Iowa, id. 155; and Peik v. C. & N. W. R. Co., id. disagreement among judges whether the power con- 164, do not appear to us to sanctiou the validity of acts ferred upon Congress to regulate commerce is exclu- of the State Legislature regulating the transportation sive in its character, or concurrent with that of the of freight and passengers between the States. They States. By recent decisions, this question has been merely determine the power of the statutes to fix reaput at rest. When the subject upon which Congress sonable warehouse charges and reasonable charges for can act under this power is national in its character transportation of freight within the boundaries of the and admits and requires uniformity of regulation af- States respectively, and that when such power is exfecting alike all the States, then the power is in its na- eroised, although it may incidentally affect commerce ture exclusive; but when the subject upon which the between the States, yet the laws of the States are not power is to act is local in its operation, then the power regulations of inter-State commerce because of such of the State is so far concurrent that its action is per- incidental results. That it was not intended in those missible until Congress interferes and takes control of cases to approve legislation like that under considerathe subject. Of the former class is all that portiou of tion in this case it appears to us is conclusively shown commerce with foreign countries and among the by the reasoning in the latter cases of Hall v. DeCuir, States, which consists in the carriage of persons and 95 U. S. 485; and Railroad Co. v. Husen, id. 465.” the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of In the case of L. & N. R. Co. v. R. Com. of Tenn., commodities. Froin necessity there can be but one supra, Hammond, J., in commenting upon the Peik rule in such cases for all the States, and the only case, says: “In the Wisconsin case, the next in the power competent to prescribe a uniform rule is one series of the Granger cases, the court mainly deals which can act for the whole country. Its inaction in again with what were evideutly considered by all such cases is therefore an equivalent to a declaration more important questious. Circuit Judge Drumthat such commerce shall be free from State interfer- mond tells us that question was scarcely argued at all elice." See also Pullman Southern Car Co. v. Nolan, in the court below, and evidently it was only incidentC. L. J., Vol. 19, 369; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; ally considered in the Supreme Court. 6 Biss. 177. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 565; City of Council Bluffs v. The Wisconsin act, unlike ours, contained an excepRuilroad Co., 45 lowa, 338; Passenger cases,7 How 283; tion which excluded from its operation all rates of Slate of Penn. v. Wherling Bridge Co., 18 id. 481; charges for "carrying freight wbich comes from beCooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 id. 299; Gilmun v. yond the boundaries of the State and to be carried Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713.
across or through the State.” Possibly, notwithFrom these authorities and the cases therein cited standing its terms, the act may bave been construed we think it is conclusively settled that the portion of within the purview of this exception, not to apply to either inter-State or foreign commerce which consists persons and property coming from other States into in transit or traffic, including transportation in all Wisconsin or going from that into other States, forms, by land or by water, and the purchase, sale, or which was not thought however to be its construcexchange of goods is national and susceptible of a uni- tion in the court below, though the question whether form plan of regulation, and is therefore under the it could so apply under the State Freight Tax cases, exclusive control of Congress. Even if Congress has 15 Wall. 232, was reserved and not decided in that not seen fit to prescribe any specific rules to gov- court." ern inter-State commerce, that does not affect the In the Peik case, the chief justice speaks of the question. “Its inaction on this subject, when consid- power of Wisconsin to regulate its fares, etc., so far as ered with reference to its legislation with respect to they are a domestic concern, even though incidentally foreign commerce, is equivalent to a declaration that they may reach beyond the State. Clearly a statute inter-State commerce shall be free aud untram. of the State prescribing rates of freight for goods,